ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

VOL. II.
THE

ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

ILLUSTRATED WITH

ESSAYS AND NOTES

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THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

BOOKS III.—X.
IT has been already assumed without proof, that virtue implies purpose (Eth. II. iv. 3, II. v. 4, II. iv. 15), and therefore of course will and freedom. Before proceeding to the analysis of particular virtues, Aristotle begins by examining the generic conception of the Voluntary, with a view chiefly to the comprehension of its species, Purpose.

The first five Chapters of Book III. are accordingly devoted to this subject, and stand so much apart from what goes before and after, that some have been led to the conclusion that they were written as a separate treatise (see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 45). That several parts of these chapters are unnecessarily repeated in Book V. c. xiii., and that certain points in them do not agree with the psychology of Books VI. and VII., is no argument against the present chapters having formed part of Aristotle's original draft and conception of his Ethics, but only tends to show that Books V. VI. VII. were written later. It is more to the purpose to notice that in Chapter v. § 10, there is an apparent ignoring of the whole discussion upon the formation of moral states which occupies the commencement of Book II., and that no allusion occurs to 'the mean' or to 'happiness.' But this is only a specimen of the way in which Aristotle concentrated his mind on each new subject as it arose, and in writing upon it frequently neglected to refer to other cognate passages. The same thing is observable in the treatise on Friendship (VIII. i. 1). The treatise on the Voluntary is neatly fitted on to the general ethical treatise by §§ 21, 22, of the fifth chapter of this book. There is no reason to suspect these sections of being other than the work of Aristotle.

It must not be supposed that the present disquisition on the Voluntary is a disquisition on Free Will. The latter question
Aristotle would certainly have assigned to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or metaphysics, and would have thought out of place in a system of ethics. Some remarks upon his views of Free Will, so far as they can be gathered, will be found in Vol. I. Essay V. The ensuing chapters assume that man is the δεξιός of his own actions, and with this assumption treat of the Voluntary under its various aspects in relation to virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. From this practical point of view these chapters furnish to some extent a psychology, though not a metaphysic, of the Will. Their contents are as follows:

1. The general definition of the Voluntary. Ch. i.

2. The special account of Purpose, that it is distinct from desire, wish, opinion; its relation to the process of deliberation. Ch. ii.—iii.

3. Some consideration of the question whether Wish is for the absolute or the apparent good. Ch. iv.

4. An attack upon the position that while virtue is free, vice is involuntary. Ch. v.

The remainder of the book is occupied with a discussion of the two first virtues upon Aristotle's list—Courage and Temperance. With regard to Courage the following heads are treated of:

1. Its proper objects; Ch. vi. 2. That it is a mean; Ch. vii.
3. That true courage is to be distinguished from five spurious kinds of courage; Ch. viii. 4. That it is particularly related to pain, and implies making great sacrifices for the sake of what is noble; Ch. ix. The objects and the nature of Temperance are treated of in Chapters x. and xi. And the book ends with two remarks on Intemperance: (1) that it is more voluntary than cowardice; and, (2) that its character is shown in its etymology; Ch. xii.
ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ ΙΙΙ.

ΤΗΣ άρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεως οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκούσιοις ἑπαίνων καὶ ψώγων γινομένων, ἐτὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συγγνώμης, ἐνιστε δὲ καὶ ἐλέους, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ άρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρίσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τὲν

I. 1—2 Τῆς άρετῆς δὴ—κολάσεων] 'Virtue then being concerned with feelings and actions; and praise and blame being bestowed on acts which are voluntary, while pardon and sometimes even pity are conceded to involuntary ones,—it will surely be necessary for the philosopher who treats of virtue to define the voluntary and involuntary; and moreover this will be useful for the legislator with a view to the rewards and punishments with which he has to deal.' In the Eudemian Ethics, which contain generally speaking a reproduction of these Ethics, for the most part compressed, but also occasionally expanded and supplemented, we find (Et. Eth., II. vi.) a more definite and reasoned statement of the voluntariness of virtue and vice. The reasoning of Eudemus is briefly as follows:

—All ὀνεία are ἄρχαι, and tend to reproduce themselves; and only those ἄρχαι are properly so called (κόραι) which are primary causes of motion, as is especially the case with regard to invariable motions, whose cause is
3 τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς καλὰςεις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἢ ἀκούσια εἰναι τὰ βιά ἢ δὲ ἀγνοου ἐνυμένα. βλαίων δὲ οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη ὑπὸ ἢ ἡ μηδὲν συμβαλλεσται ὦ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεύμα κοιμίσαι ται ἢ ἀνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. δ᾿ οὐ δὲ διὰ φοβον μείζονα κακῶν πράττεται ἢ δια 
καλῶν τι, οἷον εἰ τύμανος προστάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πράξι 
kύριος ὄν γονέον καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξιαντο μὲν σάκωντο, 
μὴ πράξιαντο δ᾿ ἀποθνῄσκοιν, ἀμφισβητησιν ἔχει πότερον

limited to a political, as distinguished from a theological point of view (ἀναγκαίων τοις περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπικοίνων, κρίσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῖς).

3 δοκεῖ δὲ—γνώμην] 'Now those acts seem to be involuntary which are done under compulsion or through ignorance.' In asking what is the Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue a speculative method of inquiry. Such a method might have commenced with the deep-lying ideas of personality and consciousness, of the individuality of the subject, &c. But he is content with defining the voluntary by a contrast to the common notions (δοκεί) of what constitutes an involuntary act. It might be said that this is giving a merely negative conception of freedom. But in fact the conception given is positive, only the analysis of it is not pushed very far. The voluntariness of an act Aristotle represents to be constituted in this—that the actor is in every case the ἀρχή, or cause, of his actions, except in cases of compulsion, where there really is a superior ἀρχή (Kant's 'heteronomy'), or of ignorance, where he does not know what his action is, and can only be held to be the cause of what he meant to do. In what sense and how the individual is an ἀρχή, is the point where Aristotle stops short in the inquiry.

βλαίων δὲ—ἀντί] 'That is compulsory, whose cause is external to the agent, and is of such a nature that the agent (or patient) contributes nothing towards it; as, for instance, if a wind were to carry you to any place, or men in whose power you are,' ἀρχὴ seems here equivalent to ἀρχὴ κυρίων, the efficient cause. Aristotle attributes spontaneity so decisively to the individual act, that he confines the term compulsion as only applicable to cases of absolute physical force, where a man's limbs are moved or his body transported, as if he were inanimate, by some external power. The compulsion of threats, fear, and such like, he will not call compulsion without qualification, because still the individual acts under it. He has already spoken of the life of money-making as being βλαίω τι, 'in a sort compulsory' (ἐπικ. i. v. 8). With ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων cf. v. viii.

3: πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν φόβων ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν—οἷον τὸ γῆρας ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν.

4-9 The cause of the act must be entirely from without, for in some cases men are forced, not to an act, but to an alternative. They may do what is grievous for the fear of what is worse. Such acts, then, are of a mixed character, partaking of the nature both of voluntariness and involuntariness. Relatively to the moment, they come from the choice and will of the individual. Abstractedly and in themselves they are contrary to the will. But as
every act aims at something in reference to the particular moment, and is thus entirely dependent on it, so these must be judged as acts done and chosen voluntarily, and according to circumstances must obtain blame or praise. There seem to be four cases which Aristotle conceives as possible: (1) Praise is deserved where pain or degradation is endured for the sake of some great and noble end; (2) but blame, where what is degrading is endured without a sufficiently great and noble end. (3) Pardon is conceded where human nature succumbs, under great extremities, to do what is not right; (4) except the action be such as no extremities ought to bring a man to consent to, in which case pardon is withheld. In these distinctions we may recognize a practical and political wisdom such as might be found in the speeches of Thucydides, but the discussion does not rise to the level of philosophy.

6 μεταὶ—οδέν] ‘Now it may be said that such actions are of a mixed character, but they are more like things voluntary, for at the particular moment when they are done they are such as one would choose, and the moral character of an action depends on the circumstance of the moment; hence also the terms “voluntary” and “in voluntary” must be predicated in reference to the moment when a person is acting. Now, in the supposed case (ἐν τοιούτω πράξει), the individual acts voluntarily; for the efficient cause of the movement of the accessory limbs is in himself, and where the cause is in a person, it rests with him to act or not. Therefore such things are voluntary, though abstractedly perhaps, involuntary, for in themselves no one would choose any of such things as these.’

τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως] The phrase is general, not referring only to the cases under dispute, but to action universally. In this sense we may translate τῆς πράξεως ‘of an action.’

Τέλος is used here in a peculiar sense to denote the ‘moral character of an action.’ This sense arises out of a combination of associations, ‘final cause,’ and ‘motive,’ being combined with ‘end in itself,’ ‘perfection,’ ‘completeness.’ A precisely similar use of the word occurs, Εὐκλ. iii. vii. 6: Τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας—ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἑκαστὸν τῷ τέλει (on which see note). The Paraphrast, in accordance with the above explanation, states the argument thus:—‘Because the character of an action as good or bad is judged in reference to the mind of the actor at the moment of action, so also must the voluntariness of an action be judged.’

Ἐπει καὶ τὸ ἐκδοτήσῃ πράξεως τέλος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν αὐτῆς εστὶ, καὶ ἀνθευ τοῦ καιροῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν ἢ τοιούτων γίνεται: ὡσεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐκδοτίσιν, ἢ τὸ ἐκδοτίσιν, κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν δὲ τράπεται, δημιουργόν. Of course the interpretation of Muretus is wrong which attributes a merely popular and un-Aristotelian sense to τέλος—‘actio terminatur eo ipso tempore quo agimus.’
κυρών ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκόουσιν, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἐκών. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖσ τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν ὅν δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐπὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττει καὶ μὲν ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαύτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἰσος ἀκούσια: οὕδεις γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιπο καθ' ἀυτὸ τῶν τοιοῦτων οὔδεν.

7 ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπανονται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἡ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένον ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἀν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἰσεργονταὶ τὰ γὰρ αἰσχοθ' ὑπομενεὶ ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἡ μετρίᾳ φαιλοῦ. ἐπὶ ἐνίοις δ' ἐπαινοὶ μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἡ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ 8 μηδεὶς ἃν ὑπομεῖναι. ἐνια δ' ἰσος οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθαναστέον παθόντα τὰ δεινότατα καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδον Ἀλκμαῖνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγ-9 κάσαντα μυθροκτόνωσι, ἐστὶ δὲ χαλεπῶν ἐνίοτε διακρίνων ποιῶν ἀντὶ ποιῶν αἰρετῶν καὶ τὶ ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἐτὶ δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμείναι τοῖς γνωσθέντως ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἔστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκόμενα λυπηρὰ, ἢ δ' ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρὰ, ὅθεν ἐπαινοὶ καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς

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The omission of τις, especially after conjunctions like εἰ, δὲ, &c., is common in Aristotle, though not peculiar to him. Cf. Eth. iii. 5: τὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ τῶν τελοὺν ἐφάπτειν. Pol. v. xii. 3: ὃ ἄτοπος εἰ τῷ κυβαρίτει τιμήσων καὶ καλῶς αἰτίῳ τὴν λόγου μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

tὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη] The 'subservient,' or 'instrumental' limbs. The modern word 'organised,' which has grown out of the Aristotelian conception of ὀργανικὸν σῶμα, does not exactly represent it. 'Organisation' implies multitude in unity, the co-existence and interjunction of physical parts under a law of life. But in ὀργανικὸν originally nothing more was implied than 'that which is fitly framed as an instrument,'—according to Aristotle's principle, that the body is the means to the life, mind, or soul, which is the end. Cf. De An. 11. 6: ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἑνελεξεία ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικῷ δυναμεὶ ἑξῆς ἔκχοιτο. τοὐστό δὲ, δ' ἀν ἐς ὀργανικόν. De Part. An. i. 41: ὠφει καὶ εἰς τὸ σῶμα ὀργανῶν (ἤκεκα τοιοῦ γὰρ ἐκαστῶν τῶν μορίων, ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τὸ δῶν, ἀνάγκῃ ἀρα τοιοῦτο ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο εἰς ἑκάστος ἐστὶ.

8 καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδον—μυθροκτόνωσι] For the things which compelled the Alcmeon of Euripides to kill his mother appear absurd, i.e. the curses threatened by Amphiaras, who, when departing for Thebes, enjoined his son to put Eryphile to death. Aspasia preserves the lines:—

Μᾶλθα μὲν ἐν ἑκατοστὶ θαμάζει, 6θ' ἀρρατ' εἰσελθέων εἰς Θῆβας ἒος.
Τα δε ποια φατεον βιαια; η απλω το μεν, ὅτατ' ἂν αιτία εν τοις ἐκτος κα καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδεν συμβάλλει; α δε καθ' αυτα μεν ακούσια ἐστι, νυν δε καὶ ἀντι των δε αἰρετα, κα η ἀρχη εν το πράττοντι, καθ' αυτα μεν ακούσια ἐστι, νυν δε καὶ ἀντι των εκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' εουκεν ἐκούσιοι: αι γαρ πραξεις εν τοις καθ' ἐκαστα, ταυτα δ' εκούσια. ποια δ' ἀντι ποιων αἰρετον, ου βαδιον ἀποδουναι. τολαι γαρ διαφοραι εισιν εν τοις καθ' ἐκαστα.

ei δε τις τα ηδεα κα τα καλα φαιν βιαια ειναι (ἀναγκάζειν 11 γαρ ἐξω οντα), παντα δε ειν ωτω βιαια. τοιων γαι χαριν παντες παντα πραττοντων, και οι μεν βια κακοντες λυπηρως, οι δε δια το ηδου και καλου μευ ηδουνης.

γελοιον δι το αιτιασθαι τα εκτος, ἄλλα με αυτων ευθηρατον οντα υπο των τοιοτων, και των μεν καλων έαυτων, των δ' αἰσχρων τα ηδεα. εουκε δη το βιαιον ειναι ου εξωθεν η 12 ἀρχη, μηδεν συμβαλλομενον του βιαισθεντος.
because it is right. A little examination shows that the writing here is vague, for presently it is said to be absurd to assign the cause of the good things to oneself, and of the bad things to pleasure (αἰρίσθαι—τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐμαυτόν, τῶν δὲ αἰχμῶν τὰ ἁθα); whereas consistently the 'good things' would have been assigned to 'the good' as an external cause by those who maintained the position, εἰ δὲ τὰ ἁθα κ.τ.λ. Also would Aristotle say that what is done διὰ τὸ καλὸν, is always done μεθ' ἰδιωτικῆς? This goes strangely against Eth. III. ix. 4-5, where the higher satisfaction of the καλὸν is represented as purchased by great pain. There is a vagueness also in the use of βλασ, which first stands for that which compels, and secondly for that which is compelled. The principle, however, is well brought out, that the objective inducement to an action cannot be separated from the subjective apprehension of this in the will.

13 τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίας—ἐχειν ἑλεσθεν] 'Now that which is done through ignorance is always non-voluntary, but it is involuntary only when followed by pain, and when it is a matter of regret. For he who has done something through ignorance, but without feeling any dislike at the action, has not, it is true, acted voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not know he was doing it, but, on the other hand, not involuntarily, since he is not sorry. With regard, therefore, to actions done through ignorance we may say that he who repents has been an involuntary agent, while him who does not repent we may distinguish as having been a non-voluntary one; for where there is a real difference, it is proper to have a distinctive name.' Aristotle begins the discussion of ignorance as modifying volition by this refined distinction, that an action may be done through ignorance, and yet not against the will. It may in short be neither with the will nor against it. He then goes on to consider the precise meaning of δι' ἀγνοίας.

14-16 ἔτερον δὲ ἔοικε—ἀκούστων πράττει] 'There seems to be a farther difference between acting through ignorance and doing a thing in ignorance. Common opinion pronounces that the drunken or the angry man acts not through ignorance, but in consequence of drunkenness or anger, and yet that he does not act wittingly, but in ignorance. Without doubt every depraved man is in ignorance of what he ought to do, and of that from which he ought to refrain, and it is
in consequence of this error that men become unjust, or bad generally. But the term involuntary is not meant to cover ignorance of man’s true interest. Ignorance which affects moral choice, and ignorance of the universal, are the causes, not of involuntary action, but of wickedness, and it is precisely for this ignorance that wicked men are blamed. The ignorance which causes involuntary action is ignorance of particulars, which are the circumstances and the objects of actions. With regard to these particulars, pity and pardon may be proper, for the man who acts in ignorance of some particular is an involuntary agent. The connection of this somewhat compressed passage is as follows. An act is involuntary when caused by ignorance. But ignorance cannot be said to be the cause of an act if the individual be himself the cause of the ignorance. In that case ignorance rather accompanies the act (ἄγνωσιν πράττει) than causes it (δι’ ἄγνωσιν πράττει). We see this (1) in instances of temporary oblivion, as from anger or wine; (2) in those of a standing moral ignorance or oblivion (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄγνοιαις τῷ συμφέρων—ὅ ἐν τῇ προσωρινῇ ἄγνωσίᾳ—ὁ καθήκον τῆς ἄγνωσίας). The only ignorance, then, which is purely external to the agent, so as to take away from him the responsibility of the act, is some chance mistake with regard to the particular facts of the case. A great deal of trouble has been expended upon the endeavour to distinguish and explain the various terms, ἄγνωστα πράττει—ἄγνωσιν τῷ συμφέρων—ὅ ἐν τῇ προσωρινῇ ἄγνωσίᾳ—ὁ καθήκον τῆς ἄγνωσίας. But a closer examination shows that these different terms are not opposed to each other, but rather are all different ways for expressing the same thing, being opposed to the ἦ καθ’ ἐκαστά, ἐν οἷς ἦ πράξεις. This is the way in which the Paraphrast understands the passage, for he renders it: ἄν δὲ τοιαύτα πράξεις οὐκ εἶς ἀκούσιοι· ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ προσωρινῇ ἄγνωσίᾳ, ἦτις ἐπὶ το🤭 τῶν κακῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητα τῶν ἀκούσιοι, ἀλλὰ τῆς μοιχηρίας. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθόλου περὶ τῆς μέθης ἄγνωσιν ἐκαὶ πνεύμονος, αἰσθητὰ γίνεται τοῦ ἀκούσιοι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄγνοια ἐμερίσκει τὴν μέθην ὁλος, φέρει εἰκόν, οὐκ εἰ δόθη μέχρι πόνον πόστας ἐκ μεθέν. Aristotle strictly confines ignorance, as a cause of involuntary action, to mistakes about particulars. Before proceeding to this particular ignorance, he separates from it that kind of ignorance which is faulty, because caused by the agent himself. Of this there are two kinds, the temporary, as for instance that caused by intoxication, and the permanent, such as that caused by any vicious habit. ‘Ignorance of the universal’ is not different from ‘ignorance of our real interest,’ but serves to point the antithesis of ‘ignorance of the particular’: nor is it opposed to ignorance as shown in wrong moral choice, but to ignorance of external facts. It goes to constitute ignorance in the purpose, for in every moral act there is a universal conception, as well as a particular application of this. But Aristotle does not here enter upon the psychology of the subject, as is afterwards done, Eth. vii. iii. The word συμφέρων is used, Politics, i. 11, to include and denote all kinds of good, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ἐκτὸς τῷ συμφέρον καὶ τῷ βλαβερῷ, ὅτε καὶ τὸ δικαίον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

14 διὰ τὶ τῶν εἰρημένων] Some refer
διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἀδικοὶ καὶ δλος κακοὶ γίνονται.
15 τὸ δ᾽ ἀκοῦσιν βουλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐὰν τὰ ἁγιοὶ τὸ συμ-
φέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσθη ἁγιοί αὐτία τοῦ ἁγιοίον ἀλλὰ τῆς μονοθρίας, οὐδὲ ἡ καθολοῦ (ψέγοιται γὰρ διὰ γε 
ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἐκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ᾧ ἡ πράξεις.
16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἤλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων 
τι ἁγιοὶ ἁγιοῖο πράττει. ἰσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διαρίσαι 
αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστὶ, τίς τε ὅ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν 
tιν πράττει, ἐντοίσι καὶ τῖνι, οἷον ὁργαίνῃς, καὶ ἑνεκα 
tίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἰρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.
17 ἀπαντησα ἐν οὖν ταύτα οὐδεὶς ἐὰν ἁγιοθείει μη μανόμενον,
ἂν οὖν ἐν τούτοις πράττοντα ποσο γὰρ ἐστιν γε; ὃ 
δὲ πράττει, ἁγιοθείειν ἐὰν τις, οἷον ἁγιοντες φασιν ἑκτεσεῖν 
ἀντόν, ἡ οὐκ εἰδεῖν ὅτι ἀπορρήτα ἢ, ὡστερ Ἀδηχλοὺ 
τὰ μυστικά, ἥ δεῖξαι βουλόμενοι ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τῶν κατα-
πέλτην. ἁνθρεῖ δ᾽ ἐὰν τις καὶ τὸν ἐνοῖν πολέμιον εἰναι ὡστερ 
ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαύρωσθαι τὸ λεονχωμένον δόμῳ, ἡ τῶν 
λίθων κισέρων εἰναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρία πάσας ἁποκτείναι 
ἀν· καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενοι, ὡστερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι,

this to § 11, γὰρ ἡ ἤδαι καὶ ἡ καλά, but it 
appears simply to mean 'not from 
ignorance, but from one of the things 
now specified' (i.e. drunkenness or 
anger). Cf. iii. iii. 11, τῶν εἰρημένων 
τρόφων, which refers to the passage 
immediately preceding.

16-17 The particulars connected 
with an action are as follows: — (1) 
The person doing it, about which 
ignorance is impossible to the doer. 
(2) The thing done, which may not 
be known, e.g. Eschylus did not 
know he was revealing the mysteries. 
(3) The thing or person made the 
object of the action (περὶ τι ἢ ἐν τίνι), 
e.g. Merope did not know it was 
her son. (4) The instrument, e.g. 
one might fancy one's spear had a 
button on it. (5) The purpose or 
tendency of the act (ἔνεκα τῶν), e.g. 
one wishing to preserve might kill.

[6] The manner (πῶς), e.g. one might 
strike harder than one wished.

ὥστερ Ἀδηχλοὺ τὰ μυστικά] Referring 
to the well-known story that 
Eschylus was summoned before the 
Areopagus on the charge of having 
revealed the mysteries, against which 
charge he pleaded that he had never 
himself been initiated. ἄλλιον, Var. 
Hist. v. 19.

ὦστερ ἡ Μερόπη] This same incident 
is alluded to by Aristotle in the Poetics, 
c. xiv. 19: ἐκ διά τοῦ τελεσταῖον, 
(ι. τῶν ἐθνῶν τοῦ τῶν ἁρείε-
στιν δ᾽ ἁγιονα, ἀναγκαζόμενοι τρίν 
πουλεῖται), λέγω δὲ οἷον τῷ Ἐρεσφόμε 
ἡ Μερόπη μετὰ τῶν υἱῶν ἁποκτείνεις, 
ἀποκτείνει δὲ οὁ, ἡλλ᾽ ἀνεγνώρισεν.

καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενοι, ὡστερ οἱ ἀκρο-
χειριζόμενοι, παράξειν δὲν] 'And wish-
ing to show the way, as those do 
who box with the open hand, a man
might give another a blow.' Aspasius explains ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι thus: ἢστι τὸ πυρετοῖς ἐν παγκρατίσεσι πότε θέρων ἀνέγερται ἡ τῶν ἄχρας τὰς "χεριὰς μὲν ἀλλὰ πρὸς γυμνάζεσθαι, i.e. it is what we call 'sparring.' This same phrase δείχει βουλήμενος was applied before to 'the man who was showing the catapult,' and was given as an instance of one being ignorant of the nature of his act. Here it is an instance of ignorance of the tendency of an act. The different kinds of ignorance are not very distinct from one another.

18 περὶ πάντα δὴ—ἐνεκα] 'Ignorance then being concerned with all these circumstances of the action, he that was ignorant of some one of these is held (δοκεῖ) to have acted involuntarily, and especially (if ignorant) with regard to the most important; and the most important seem to be the objects of the action and the tendency of it.' The words ἐν ὦς are used at the beginning of the section in a general sense, as before (§ 15); afterwards they correspond with περὶ τι καὶ ἐν τινι (§ 16). There is an awkwardness about ὀδ ἐνεκα. A person knows with what end or view he is acting (and this is what ὀδ ἐνεκα legitimately expresses). But he is mistaken about the means which he uses. Hence wishing to produce one result he produces another. But what he mistakes, is not the end (ὁδ ἐνεκα) but the means (τὰ πρᾶς τὸ λειτ. The phrase here would imply that an action had an end, or aim of its own (ὁδ ἐνεκα) independent of the doer,—in other words a tendency, of which therefore the doer might be ignorant.

20–27 Having separated off the involuntary in its two forms of compulsion and mistake, there remains to us the conception of the voluntary, as that whose cause is in an agent know-
ing the circumstances of the action. This definition requires justification, owing to a false notion (ο̣δ καλώς λέγεται) that acts done from anger or desire (which are in the agent) are involuntary. This notion is refuted by the following arguments: (1) It would prove too much, and would make all the actions of brutes and of children involuntary. (2) Some acts prompted by desire or anger are right and good. We must either call these involuntary, or say that while these are voluntary, bad acts similarly prompted are involuntary. Either supposition is absurd. (3) There is a feeling of obligation (δεν), attaching sometimes to these emotions; we ought to desire some things and be angry at some. This feeling of 'ought' implies freedom. (4) Acts prompted by desire are pleasant; involuntary acts, painful. (5) We have as strong a feeling about errors of passion, as about errors of reason, that they are to be eschewed (φυτιστα). The passions are as much part of the man as the reason, therefore acts prompted by them are acts of the man.

The polemic in these arguments does not seem to be directed against any philosophical school, but rather against a popular error. Aristotle does not deal with the maintainers of the doctrine of necessity as a whole, but only with those who, allowing that half our actions are free, would argue that the other half are not free. Such reasoners are comparatively easy to answer. The most important argument adduced by Aristotle is the third, where he implies that the idea of freedom is contained in that of duty. He does not draw out this principle, nor could he have done so without anticipating the philosophy of later times. The last argument seems to come to this, that you cannot separate a man from his passions, or say the reason is the man's self and the passions not. Elsewhere Aristotle says ὁ νοῦς αὐτός ἔκαστος. And in truth the relation of a man's desires to his individuality might be more deeply investigated than is here done.

\[\text{ϕυτιστα μὲν γὰρ ἁμφω} \] This seems a counterpart to the former argument, ἄτονος λοιπὸν τὸ ἀκούσια φάσαι δὲν δὲι ὄργευσαι. The passions are proved to be voluntary on account of the feeling of reprehension we have for errors of passion. On the emphatic opposition between φυτιστα and ἀφετο, cf. Eth. x. ii. 5.

II. Having given a generic account of the voluntary, Aristotle proceeds to examine the special form of it which he calls προαπεξεις. This does not mean the will as a whole (for which, indeed, Aristotle has no one name), but a particular exhibition of it, namely, a conscious, determinate act of the will. 'Purpose' or 'determination' is perhaps the nearest word in our language, but in fact no word exactly corresponds. The contrasts and distinctions made in this chapter might at first seem unnecessary, until we observe that Aristotle is himself founding a new psychology. The
word \textit{proaireseis} only once occurs in Plato, and then not in its present psychological sense, but merely denoting 'selection' or 'choice.' Parmenides, p. 143 B 7: τι ὄν; ἦν προαἱρῆμα αὐτῶν ἦν ὑπολεκτικόν τῆς ὅπως καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ἦν τῆς ὅπως καὶ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἄρ’ ὃν ἐκ διάκρισιν \textit{proaireseis} προαιρετικόν τὸν ὁ δρόμος ἐλεύθερα ἀμφότερον; It is true that the verb \textit{proairetai} is of frequent occurrence in Plato, but generally in the sense of 'selecting' or 'preferring,' and not 'purposing' or 'determining.' As in other cases, then, Aristotle takes up a floating term from common language, and gives it scientific definiteness, so that it becomes henceforth a psychological formula. His account of \textit{proaireseis} in the present chapter is, that it is a species of the voluntary (ἐκονομήν μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῖν ἄλλ' ἕν πλοῦν τὸ ἐκονομήν), and that it differs from anger, desire, wish, and any form of opinion. (1) It differs from desire or anger as not being shared by irrational creatures, as being often opposed to desire, &c. (2) It is still less like anger than like desire, anger excluding the notion of purpose or deliberate choice (ἡκατ' ὑλ' τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ \textit{proaireseis} εἶναι δοκεῖ). (3) It is not wish, because we often wish for what is impossible, or beyond our control, and because, speaking generally, wish is of the end, whereas purpose is of the means, and restricts itself to what is in our power. (4) Nor is it opinion, which may be about anything, the eternal or the impossible, and which is characterised as true or false, not, like purpose, as good or bad. Nor is it opinion on matters of action. For opinion on good and evil does not constitute the moral character in the way that purpose does; again, the use of these terms in common language points out a difference between purpose and opinion.

Purpose then, being a species of the voluntary, implies also intellect (μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας) and deliberation. It is a deliberate desire of what is within our own power (βουλευτική δρᾶσις τῶν ἐνθ' ἡμῖν, Eth. III. iii. 19).

1 \textit{οἰκειοστάτων} γὰρ—πράξεων] 'For it seems most closely bound up with virtue, and to be a better criterion of moral character than even actions.' Cf. Eth. x. viii. 5: ἀρµαθετεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριάτερον τῆς ἄρετῆς \textit{proaireseis} ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥσ τε ἐν αὐτοι ὀσμαί. The importance of this position as a ground-work for the whole doctrine of morality must be estimated by the advance which is made in it beyond what Plato had arrived at.

3 όλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς \textit{λέγουσι}] There is a tendency in Plato to merge the distinctions of will and reason: whether some of his school are here alluded
to, or whether it is a merely popular confusion of terms that Aristotle attacks, is not clear.

5 καὶ προαιρέσει ἡμῖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντιωθαι, ἐπιθυμίᾳ δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὐ.

It might be said that desires are really contrary to each other, and contradict each other as much as purpose contradicts any desire, e.g. the desire for money is thwarted by that for pleasure. But the psychology is not very explicit here, and Aristotle seems to imply without definitely expressing it, that in the moral will there is an element contradicting the desires in a manner different from that in which one desire interferes with another.

οὕτω ἀθανασίας. ὁμοίως τε ἕβολησέ· καὶ ἡ μὲν βουλήσεις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τοῦ μηθαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραξθέντα ἢ, οἷον ὑποκρίτην τινα νικάν ἡ ἀλητήν. προαιρέσεις δὲ τα τοιαύτα οὐδείς. ἀλλ' ὅσα 9 οἴσται γενέσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βουλήσεις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαιρέσεις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑπαίην βουλόμεθα, προαιροῦμεθα δὲ δ' ὑπαίην βουλόμενον, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιροῦμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἄρµοξεν. οἷοι γὰρ έσεϊν ἡ προαιρέσεις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δ' ὅξα ἐν εἰπ' ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἡπτον περὶ τά ἁπάντα καὶ τὰ ἄνωτα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἱσχεί καὶ ἐλθεῖ διαμερεῖαι, οὐ τὸ κακοῦ καὶ ἄγαθος, ἡ προαιρέσεις δ' τούτως μᾶλλον. οἷοι μὲν οὖν δόξα ταύτων ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγειν οὐδείς.
For in purposing what is good or bad our moral character consists,—not in opining it. And we purpose to take or avoid, or something of the kind, but we opine what a thing is, or for whom it is good, or how; but we do not exactly opine to take or avoid. And while purpose is praised rather by the epithets, “of the right object,” or “rightly,” opinion is praised by the epithet “truly.” And we purpose things that, as far as may be (μάλιστα), we know for certain to be good, but we opine what we do not exactly know.

οὐδέ τωι] i.e. purpose is not identical with an opinion as to moral matters. The first argument to prove this is characteristic of Aristotle as opposed to Plato. He says, “our moral character does not consist in our opinions on good and evil, but in the deliberate acts of our will.” This is guarded afterwards by the limitation (§ 15) that ‘opinion may go to form purpose, and may again be reacted on by it;’ but the question is, are they identical?

12-13. The arguments in these sections consist in an appeal to language—we cannot speak of ‘opining to take,’ &c.

μᾶλλον ἴ τῷ ὀρθῷ] “H is of course not connected with μᾶλλον. It simply means ‘or.’ Ὀρθῶς, which should properly go with a verb, seems used because the verb προαίρεσθαι was much commoner before Aristotle than the abstract form προαιρέσεις. Ὀρθῆ is applied to δέσι (the element of desire in προαιρέσεις), Eth. vi. ii. 2.

III. Since Purpose implies deliberation, this latter is now analysed, and an account is given, first of its object, secondly of its mode of operation. The object of deliberation is determined by an exhaustive process. All things are either eternal or mutable; we do not deliberate about things
eternal. Of things mutable, we do
not deliberate about those things
which are regulated by necessity, by
nature, or by chance. Hence it
remains that we deliberate about
mutable things within the power of
man, and not about all such, but
about those within our own power,
and not about ends, but about means,
and where there is room for question.
The mode of operation in deliberating
is a kind of analysis. Assuming as
desirable some end, we first ask what
means will immediately produce this
end, what again will produce those
means, and so on till we have brought
the last link of the chain of causation
to ourselves, when we commence
acting at once, the last step in the
analysis being the first in the pro-
ductive process. If any step occurs
which is on the one hand necessary
for the given end, and on the other
hand unattainable by us, the chain
cannot be completed; the deliberation
is relinquished. But if all the steps
are feasible, that which was indefinite
before at once becomes definite, and
purpose succeeds deliberation. A dis-
cussion of the nature of ἐπιθυμία as
related to ὑπόθεσις occurs Eth. vi. ix.,
but is evidently written quite inde-
pendently of the present chapter, on
which it improves by employing the
formula of the moral syllogism, and
by inquiring after the faculty which
perceives ends. We might have ex-
pected Aristotle to say that in the
deliberation which precedes an action
some account should always be taken
of the right or wrong of the action.
But here the only question is repre-
sented to be, how a given end is to be
obtained? What action will serve as a
means to it? Hence while the present
discussion must be considered a subtle
piece of elementary psychology, and of
great merit in the infancy of the science,
on the other hand it seems incomplete
as regards the theory of morals.

3-5 τερί δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν—ἐπιθέσιων

'No man deliberates about eternal
things, such as the universe, or the
incommensurability of the diagonal
and the side in a square; nor indeed
about things in motion, if the motion
takes place invariably in the same
way, whether of necessity, or by
nature, or from any other cause, as in
the instance of the solstices and the
risings of the sun: nor about things
entirely variable, like droughts and
rains: nor about matter of chance,
like the finding of a treasure.' The
opposition to τὰ ἀληθείας in τὰ ἐν κυκλησι.
The more exhaustive division of ob-
jects would have been that which is
given Eth. vi. i. 6, into τὰ ἐπέθεσιμα
ἀληθείας ἐγκείσων and τὰ μὴ ἐπεθεσιμά.
But there is an absence of logical
formule in the present book which is
observable. The instances here given
of the eternal are (1) the universe, (2) a particular mathematical truth—that the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its side. That the universe is eternal, being uncreated, indestructible, and, as a whole, immutable, was part of Aristotle's physical philosophy. Cf. de Caelo i. x. 10: τὸν ἐνδιάθεσις ἀπεκτέεσθαι τὸν ἐνδιάθεσις διακόσμηται, ἡ δὲ τὸν σύμμετρον ὑπὸ τὸν κόσμον καὶ ὑπὸ τὸν διάμετρον αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τὸν κόσμον καὶ διάμετρον αὐτὸν. The above mathematical truth is called 'eternal,' De Gen. An. ii. vi. 15: ἐκεῖν καὶ τὸ τριγώνον ἐστι δυνατὸν ὑπὸ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὸν διάμετρον αὐτῷ ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν πλευρὰν ἄλλον. It is mentioned as one of those things which philosophy begins by wondering at, and ends by feeling their universal necessity. Metaphys. i. ii. 15: καθάπερ τῶν ταυτάτων ταυτάτων ταυτάτων τοῖς μετα τε διακόσμηται τὴν αἰτίαν, ἢ δὲ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου προκάλει ἢ τὴν τῆς διάμετρον αὐτῷ ἐστι τοιοῦτον ἀναμετρήτων ταυτάτων γὰρ ἐστὶν δοκεῖ πάντως, ἐπεὶ τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μεταβάνει. Dei δὲ εἰς τοιούτων ἀναμετρήτων—οὐδέν ὡστε ἐν ὧν ταυτάτων ἀναμετρήτων ἀναμετρήτως τὰ ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν. Two kinds of eternity seem here placed in juxtaposition—one physical, the other mathematical. But eternity or necessity can only exist in relation to the laws of the mind that perceives it. Therefore we might say that these two kinds of eternity find their meeting-point in a metaphysis above the division of the sciences. Aristotle however is writing of καὶ ἀκριβείαν. 7 αὖτι γὰρ—ἀναφρότου] 'For the causes of things seem to be as follows, nature, and necessity, and chance, and again reason and all that depends on man.' A similar classification of causes is implied Eth. i. ix. 5, vi. iv. 4. The relation of necessity and chance, as causes, to nature, forms the subject of Aristotle's Physics, Book 11. Chapters iv.—ix. See Vol. I. p. 250. 8 καὶ περὶ—γραπτῶν] 'And on the one hand there is no deliberation about sciences that are fixed and complete in themselves, as for instance about writing—for we do not doubt how we ought to write.' ἀκριβείας ἐστιν here meant are not the 'exact sciences,' as we may judge from the instance given. ἀκριβεία seems equivalent to 'fixed' (cf. the note on Eth. i. viii. 18), and ἐστιν is used in a sense equivalent to τέχνη, though the words are immediately afterwards distinguished.
of deliberation is analytical, proceeding backwards ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. It ends with the ἔρωτος αὐτῶν, i.e. the individual will. ‘Will,’ says Kant, ‘is that kind of causality attributed to living agents, in so far as they are possessed of reason, and freedom is such a property of that causality as enables them to originate events independently of foreign determining causes.’ That each man is, as regards his own acts, an originating cause not determined by other causes, is Aristotle’s view throughout. Kant’s definition throws light upon this.

καλέω] Refers to ἐνός and διὰ τοῦτο.

διάγραμμα.] Aristotle compares deliberation with the analysis of mathematical problems. Given a
III.]

ἩΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ III. 21

ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ
οἷον τε πορισθῆναι· εἰώ δὲ δυνατῶν φαντασθαι, ἐγχειροῦσι
πράττειν. δυνάτα δὲ α δι᾽ ἡμῶν γένοις· ἃν τὰ γὰρ διὰ
tῶν φιλῶν δι᾽ ἡμῶν ποσ ἐστὶν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν.

ζητεῖται δ’ ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὀργανά, ὅτε δ’ ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν. 14
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λουποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι’ οὐ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἡ
dιὰ τίνος. ἐνεκε ὃς, καθότερος εἰρηται, ἀνθρώπους εἰναι ἀρχὴ 15
τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ
πράξεις ἄλλων ένεκα· οὐκ ἃν οὖν εἰ συνελευσθοί τὸ τέλος 16
ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη, οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ’ έκαστα, οἷον εἰ
ἄρτος τούτῳ ἦ πέπεπται ὡς δεὶ κυστῆσεως γὰρ ταῦτα.
ἐὶ δὲ οἷον βουλεύεσθαι, εἰς ἀτείρον Τξεί. Βουλευτοῦ δὲ καὶ 17
προαιρετοῦ τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένου ἦδη τὸ προαιρετὸν·
τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς προκριθεὶν προαιρετὸν ἐστίν. παύεται
γὰρ ἢκαστος ζητῶν πὼς πράξει, διὸν εἰς αὐτῶν ἀναγάγῃ
τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ

problem of geometry, e.g. to find the method of constructing some figure. Assume it as constructed, and draw it accordingly. See what condition is immediately necessary, and what again will produce this, &c.

14 ζητεῖται δ’—διὰ τίνος] ‘The question is sometimes what instruments are necessary, sometimes how they are to be used; and, speaking generally, we have to find sometimes the means by which, sometimes the manner or the person by whom.’

Michelet makes a difficulty about ἐν τοῖς λουποῖς, explaining it ‘in reliquis categoriis;’ but the Paraphraz renders it simply καὶ ἄνθλος.

15 ένεκε δὴ—ένεκα] ‘It seems, therefore, that man is, as we have said, the cause of his actions: that deliberation is about the things to be done by ourselves, and that actions are means to something else.’ In one sense, and so far as deliberation is concerned, actions must be regarded as means. Cf. Rhetoric, 1. vi. 1:

πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοτός τὸ συμφέρον, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ οἴ σωρι τοῖς τέλοις ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις. But in another sense, and from a moral point of view, each action is an end-in-itself. Cf. Eth. vii. ii. 5: Οὐ τέλος ἀνθότο τὸ θαυμάτων.

16 εἰς ἀτείρον Τξεί] ‘It will go on to infinity’—impersonal. Cf. i. ii. 1, i. vili. 7.

17 παύεται γὰρ—προαιρετοῦν] ‘For every one stops inquiring how he shall act, when he has brought home the first link in the chain to himself and to the guiding principle in himself; that is to say, to that which purposes.’ Throughout these discussions we find a striking clearness of expression for some of the ordinary phenomena of consciousness; on the other hand, evident tokens that the psychology is new and tentative; and again, a want of deeper inquiry into
the nature of personality and of the will.

18 δῆλον δὲ—δήμῳ] 'Now this is exemplified from the old politics which Homer depicted; for the kings used to announce to the people the cause they had selected.' Cf. the conduct of Agamemnon, Iliad 11. 53, sqq. A modern illustration is furnished by the French Parliament, which used to register the edicts presented to them by the king as a matter of course. The Paraphrast explains the comparison by making the people represent the προαιρέσεις—Εἰδάγει γὰρ τοὺς βασιλεῖς μετὰ τὴν βουλὴν τὸ πρόκριθαν ἐπαγγέλλωται τῷ δήμῳ δοκεῖν τῇ προαιρέσει, ὁπεῖ τραχύματα. The people were required to acquiesce in and carry out the decisions of the kings, which else would have remained unratified. So the reason announces its decisions to the will or purpose, i.e. the active powers in the mind. Metaphors of this sort never accurately represent mental distinctions. The present comparison has many flaws. For the προαιρέσεις is here called τὸ ἡγομένον, which does not answer to the people, distinguished from the king. Again, it is the individual (ἔκαστος), not the reason, that announces his deliberations to the leading part in himself. What constitutes the individual as separate from the will or purpose? And, is not reason part of purpose, how then can it be distinguished from it?

19 δοτὸς δὲ—βουλήσεις] 'If the object of purpose is that, which, being in our power, we desire after deliberation, purpose will be a deliberate desire of things in our power. After deliberating we decide, and form a desire in accordance with our deliberation.' The Paraphrast here reads κατὰ τὴν βουλήσεις at the end of this passage. There might seem to be something plausible in the change, because βουλήσεις is represented as confining itself to means; hence how can we be said to desire κατὰ τὴν βουλήσεις? Consistently, our desires must depend on something else, namely, βουλήσεις—deliberation is the faculty for attaining them. On the other hand, the phrases βουλευτοῦ ὄρκον, and βουλευτικὴ ὑπερηφανία, run the consideration of means and ends together.

IV. Hitherto every act has been regarded as a means, and has been accounted voluntary because originating in the individual. Deliberation and purpose have been restricted in their function to the mere choice and taking of means. A great question therefore remains to be mooted, whence do we get our conception of ends? What is the nature of the faculty called βουλήσεις, which has
been assumed to be the faculty of ends? Are we as free in the choice of these, as we are in that of the means? Aristotle contents himself with mentioning in the present chapter that there are two extreme opinions, the one (that of Plato) that wish is always for the good; the other (that of some of the sophists) that it is for the apparent good. He rejects both of these, the first as contradicting facts, the second as ignoring any true object of wish. He takes a position between them, that, abstractedly and ideally, as appealing to the universal reason (ἀνθρώπων μὲν καὶ σκέφτεσθαι) the good is the object of wish, while to the individual mind only what appears good can seem desirable; hence, although the good man, who has the mens sana, and is thus in accordance with the universal reason, and is its exponent in particular cases (τὰ καλά ἂν ἐκείνου ἤδη ὑπερ ταυτά καὶ μέτρων αὐτῶν ἂν), wishes for the good alone, others are deceived by false appearances and by pleasure, and choose what is not truly good. In the statement that the morally good man (σωτάκειον) wishes aright, there is implied the doctrine, afterwards developed by the Peripatetics, that it is Virtue that gives a right conception of ends. Cf. Eth. Eud. ii. xi. 1, and Eth. Nic. vi. xii. 8, and see Vol. i. Essex i. p. 59.

I ἰδεῖς δὲ τούτων μὲν ἄγαθον εἶναι] This doctrine is found stated at length in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 466, sqq. Polus having argued that the position of a tyrant or orator is enviable, because 'he can do what he wishes,' Socrates answers that 'the tyrant or orator does nothing that he wishes:' φημὶ γὰρ, ὃ Πωλεῖ, έγὼ καὶ τούτου ἰδρομα καὶ τοῦτων τυράννων δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν τοῖς κάλεσι συμβασισμῶν· εἰ δὲ γὰρ ποιεῖν ὑμνωσμα, ὡς ἦσον εἰπεὶν· ποιεῖν μέντοι δὲ τι δὲ αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βελτιστῶν εἶναι. Then follows an account of θυσία, that it is of ends not means. Πέτρου όμως σοι δοκοῦσων οἱ ἐσθρακοί τούτῳ βούλευσαν, δὲ πράττον τοιοῦτον ἢ ἐκείνοον ἢ ἐνεκα πράττον τοιθ’ δὲ πράττον τοισὶν; By which it can be demonstrated that θυσία is of the absolute good. The difference between Plato's account and the one above is, that Plato distinguishes θυσία from ἔνδωμα, while Aristotle does not. The θυσία of Plato is the higher will, or desire of the Universal. In this higher sense of the word wish, no one wishes except for what is good, that is, in his best moments, in the deepest recesses of his nature, if the true bearings of his wish be pointed out to him. In this sense the wish of the individual is in accordance with universal reason, and is an expression of it. In a lower sense, we wish with different parts of our nature, and thus wish for all sorts of things, bad as well as good. But to this latter kind of wish the name 'desire' is appropriate. The tenet ὅτι ἄγαθον βούλευσαν ἐστι is of great importance for morals. It implies much that modern systems would convey in other terms, such as the 'supremacy of conscience,' the 'autonomy of the will,' &c. Elsewhere Aristotle distinctly maintains it. Cf. Metaph. xi. vii. 2: το ὁριστὴν καὶ τὸ νοητὴν κυρίον ό κυριόμενον. τοῦτον τὰ πρώτα τὰ αὐτά (transcendently the objects of reason and of longing are identical). Θυσία μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλὸν, βουλήσεις δὲ πρώτων τὸ δὲ καλὸν. In
De Anima, iii. x. 4, he makes the wish (or will) side with reason, in opposition to desire. 'Ye γὰρ βούλησις δρείς' δεν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κυβε- ταῖ, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κυβεῖται. ἡ δ' δρείς καὶ παρά τὸν λογισμὸν: ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία δρείς τί εἶστιν. In other parts of the Ethics also (which may hence be concluded to have been composed at a different period from this chapter) this distinction between βούλησις, the general wish, and any particular desire or determination, is observed. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 6: οὖθεν γὰρ βούλεται οὖθ' ὁ ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει. οὐθε γὰρ βούλε- ται οὐθεὶς ὁ μὴ ὀλεθρεῖ εἶναι σπουδαῖον. vilii. xiii. 8: τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλὰ, προαφεινθεὶ δὲ τὰ φιλολόγα. τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθόν] This is a corollary of the doctrine of Protagoras. If the individual could only know what 'seemed' to him, he could only wish for what seemed good. Thus the objective distinction between good and evil is done away with (συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι φύσις βούλη- σιν). Cf. Metaphys., vii. 1: Εἰ σείροι (ὁ Προταγόρας) ἐφ' ἰδίων χρησμῶν εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἀθάνατων, οὐθὲν ἐκείνων λόγων ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστην τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι παγίως. τοῦτο δὲ γεγομένου τὸ αὑτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ κακῶς καὶ ἀγαθῶς εἶναι.

4 ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἐκαστὰ κράτει ὁμοίως The good man is made here again, as above (11. vi. 15), that standard of right and wrong, that exponent of the universal reason, by which Aristotle escapes being forced into an utterly relative system of morals.

5 οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται] The 'pleasant' is characterised as 'the seeming good' in the Peripa-
tetic book De Motu Animal. vi. 5: δὲ δὲ τὰ ἅμα καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν χάραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδόν-φαινό-

V. Aristotle winds up his account of the voluntary, by arguing that virtue and vice are free (ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ᾧ κακία). As before remarked, this must not be taken as a metaphysical discussion of the question of free-will. Partly, the question had never yet been fully started; partly, Aristotle would have thought it foreign to an ethical treatise; partly, we find in the present chapter that same elementary and tentative character which marks the previous discussions in this book. In dealing with one of the real difficulties of the question at the end of the chapter, Aristotle contented himself with a very qualified and moderate assertion of freedom, which contrasts with the dogmatic statements on the same subject in the Ethics of Eudemus. The discussion here is evidently suggested by, and directed against, the doctrine of the Platonists, that 'vice is involuntary,' since it consists in ignorance. The arguments are as follows: (1) All action implies the possibility of its contrary, hence if to act rightly be in our power, to act wrongly must be in our power also. (2) That an individual is the originating cause of his actions, is a conception which it is difficult to get rid of. This implies freedom. (3) We all act as if vice were free as well as virtue. It is punished by the state. Even for ignorance and carelessness producing vice, men are held to be responsible. (4) Men must not charge their acts upon their natural character—rather their character is produced by their acts. (5) The analogy of bodily infirmities shows us that if some vices are congenital, some, at all events, are self-produced. (6) The great difficulty of the question is as follows: if, as was said above (Chapter IV.), we each of us desire what seems good; if our conception of the end, that is, our idea of good, depends not on our own will, but on nature, or our character and tendency from birth; and if all our acts are determined by this conception of the end, how can they be called free? Aristotle answers by putting various alternatives: (a) You may either accept this position in its full extent. It will then apply to virtue as well as vice. Both will be equally under a law of nature. Neither will be voluntary. But this the mind seems to revolt against. (β) Or, you may say that while the end is absolutely determined, the means to it are all free as springing from the will of the individual. Thus, virtue and vice are free, because all their parts are free. (γ) Or, you may modify the doctrine by admitting that there is something self-produced and self-determined in the character as a whole, and therefore in the idea of good, which is to determine our actions.

1 - 2 δενοὶ δὴ—ἡ κακία] 'The end then being the object of wish, while the means are the objects of
deliberation and purpose, the actions that are concerned with the means must depend on purpose and must be voluntary. But every calling out of the virtues into play is concerned with the means; virtue accordingly is in our power, and in like manner so is vice.'

αὶ περὶ ταύτα πράξεως] The words περὶ ταύτα are ambiguous. The Paraphrast confines them to 'the means,' which rendering is supported by κατὰ προϊσχέσεις ἅν εἶναι. Actions were above said to be means (III. iii. 15).

αὶ δὲ τῶν θέσεων ἐνέργειας] This is an unusual expression. We find it again, Eth. x. iii. 1: οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰ ἡ ἐνέργεια προϊσχέσεις εἶσαι. Aristotle's usual formula is ἐνέργεια κατ' ἐνέργεια, i.e. the evocation of the internal nature into consciousness or action, under the regulation of the moral law. He seems averse to considering ἐνέργεια as a δύναμις, or latent quality that might be so evoked. The psychology of this passage is different from that of Eth. vi. xii. 8-10. Here it is said that δυναμικός gives us the idea of the end, and that virtue consists in προϊσχέσεις and δυναμικός taking the means; whereas that virtue gives the end, and an intellectual faculty (φυσικὸς) the means. But see above, note on iv. 1.

2 ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν δὲν εφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μηδέπερ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐστιν. Ἐν οἷς, καὶ δὲν εφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, ὁμοίως ἐνδικοῦ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθὸς καὶ τὰ κακὰς εἶναι, εφ' ἡμῖν ἀρά 4 τὸ ἐπεικέσι καὶ φαινόις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὅς

οὐδεὶς ἰὼν σοηθῆς οὖδ' ἀκων μάκας,

ἔσοικ τὸ μὲν ἤπειρετο τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖς μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς
... ή δε μυχητρια έκουσιν. η τοις γε νων ειρημενοις 5 ἀμφιβολητέοι, και τον ἀνθρωπον ου φατενον ἀρχην είναι ουδε γεννητην των πραξεων διοτερ και τέκνων. ει δε ταυτα 6 φανεται και μη έχομεν εις ἄλλας ἀρχας άναγγελεν παρα τως εφ' ήμιν, ὅν και αι ἄρχαι εν ήμιν, και αυτα εφ' ήμιν και έκουσια. τοτοις δ' έοικε μαρτυρεσθαι και ιδια ύφ' 7 έκαστων και υπ' αυτων των νομοθετων κολαζουσι γαρ και τιμωρουνται τους δραοτας μυχητρα, δοσοι μη βία η δι' ἄγνωσιν ή μη αυτοι ατιοι, τους δε τα καλα πράττοντας τιμοσιν, ιω τους μεν προτρέψοντες, τους δε κολαζουντες. κατοι οσα μη έφ' ήμιν εστι μηθ' έκουσια, ουδεις προ-

7 τοτοις δ' έοικε—νομοθετων] 'This seems to be supported by the testimony both of individuals and of the great legislators themselves.' The argument drawn from the constitution of society, from the fact of rewards and punishments, goes so far as this. It proves that the mind is of a nature to be acted on by inducements. It, of course, does not touch the metaphysical difficulty as to the whole world being bound by a law of necessity. But it proves an instinctive belief existing in society, exactly coincident with the position of Aristotle, that the individual is the cause of particular acts. There is no natural tendency in criminals to disclaim responsibility for their crimes. If they do so, it is not from an instinctive feeling, but rather from a sophisticated mind. As before said, this fact is not sufficient to disprove a metaphysical system which would represent legislature, judge, criminal, and the whole world, as forced to do what they do by an irresistible succession of cause and effect. But ethically and politically it is sufficient to justify a practical assumption of freedom. And in any system it must at all events be taken account of.
τρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὖν ἐκ πρὸ ἐργοῦ ὅν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἡ ἀλγεῖν ἡ πεινῇν ἡ ἄλλῃ ὑποῦν τῶν τοιοῦτων. 8 οὖν γὰρ ἦπτον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, εἶναι αἰτίων εἰναὶ δοκῆ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοὺς μεθύοςι διηλὰ τὰ ἐπιτίμα. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἰτίων τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἁγιοκόπτας τὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, δ' ἐπὶ ἐπίστα-9 θεία καὶ μὴ χαλεπὰ ἔστι, κολάζουσιν, ἀμοιοῖς δ' καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, δοκοῦν ἐπὶ ἀφ' ἀυτοῖς ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσι, ὡς ἐπὶ ἀν-10 τοῖς δὲ τῷ μὴ ἁγιοκόπτῳ τῷ γὰρ ἐπιμελήθηναι κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἠμείοις τοιοῦτός ἔστιν ὡς μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἰτίων γενέσθαι αὐτοῖς, οἷοι τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἢ ἀκολαστῶς εἶναι, οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δ' ἐν ποῖοι καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις διάγοντες: αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἑκαστα-11 ἐνεργείαι τοιοῦτως ποιοῦν, τοῦτο δ' ἐνεργοῦν ἐκ τῶν μελετῶντων πρὸς ἡπτιοῦν ἁγιοῦν ἡ πράξεις διατηροῦσι-12 γὰρ ἐνεργοῦσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἁγιοῦν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεί-13 περὶ ἑκαστα αἱ ἐξεις γίνονται, καμιᾷ ἀναισθήτου, ἢ-14 ἢ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βουλεύσαι ἀδικοῦ εἰναι ἢ τῶν ἀκολαστῶν ἄκολαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἁγιοῦν τις πράττει


11 ἐνεργείαι τοιοῦτως ποιοῦν, τοῦτο δ' ἐνεργοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν μελετῶντων πρὸς ἡπτιοῦν ἁγιοῦν ἡ πράξεις διατηροῦσιν] For the particular developments of the mind in each case give people their character. This may be illustrated by the case of those who are practising for some contest or action,—for they keep on exercising their powers. Now not to know that the several states of mind arise from particular developments of the powers is absolute idiocy." This passage contains exactly the same theory of the formation of moral states as that given at the beginning of Book II. But it is written independently of the former passage—in that separate way, which must be called a marked peculiarity of Aristotle's writings.

13 ἢ τῶν ἀλογον — ἀκόλαστων] "Again it is absurd to say that he who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or he who acts intemperately

14 ἀκόλαστων]
to be intemperate.' Aristotle would not say himself that any one 'wished to be intemperate,' that is, wished it in the general, in the abstract, for its own sake. But here he points out that those who do not wish to be intemperate yet take the steps that lead inevitably to this. He argues that the means make the end free; the outset, the conclusion; the parts, the whole. Afterwards (§ 22) he allows that the general state is not so entirely in our power as the particular act. With regard to the former it is rather true to say that we are responsible for it, than that we choose it. A paradox then still remains, that men produce by voluntary acts that which they do not wish. The resolution of this is to be found in Eth. vii. iii., where it is shown that right moral acting consists in allowing the act of the moment to be sufficiently influenced by universal considerations. Error and vice, on the contrary, consist in suffering the universal idea, the general conception of what is good and desirable, to stand in abeyance.

14 προεμὴν δ' οὐκέτα] 'But after he has thrown his health away, he has no longer a choice.' To 'give away' is the only sense in which προεμὴν is used in the Ethics. Cf. iv. i. 9, ix. i. 7, &c.

17–20 This complex argument will be perhaps made most clear, if divided into the following separate members. (1) Εἰ δὲ τις λέγω—αὐτῷ is the general protasis. Suppose it to be said that all aim at what appears to them good, but that their ideas and impressions are beyond their control, being dependent in each case on the character of the individual. (2) On this an alternative follows: either (εἰ
μὲν οὖν—αὐτῶν) the individual is the cause of his own character, and so accordingly of his ideas, or (3) let us see what the consequences will be if we allow that the individual is not the cause of his own character (εἰ δὲ μὴ—εὐφορία). In this case no one will be responsible for doing wrong: wrong will reduce itself to mere ignorance, the knowledge of the good to a happy gift of nature. (4) But these extreme deductions are overthrown (εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἔστιν—ὄψωσθησοτε) by its being shown that they will equally disprove the voluntariness of virtue, as well as that of vice. (5) The argument is concluded by summing up the results of the previous discussions (ἐπε γὰρ ἤμων γὰρ). In whatever sense virtue is said to be free, whether as implying that the idea of the free is in our power, or only that there is something free and individual in the taking of means,—in exactly the same sense will vice be free, for these two opposite terms stand on exactly the same footing.

17 τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριον] 'But are not masters of their impression.' Φαντασία is a special word, denoting something between sense and intellect (φαντασία γὰρ ἔτερον καλανθήσεως καὶ διανοίας: αὐτῇ τε ὁ γύρος ἄνω αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνω ταύτης οὐκ ἔστω ὑπόληψις. De An. III. iii. 5). It denotes, in short, the sensual impression of an object. Aristotle says that we may have a false φαντασία even where we have true opinions, as, for instance, our φαντασία of the sun makes it a foot in diameter, while our belief is that the sun surpasses in magnitude the habitable world (φαντασία δὲ καὶ ψευδή, περὶ ὁμοίως ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἶκον φαντάζεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος τοιχίας, περιστερεῖ δὲ εἶναι μείζον τῆς οἰκουμῆς. De An. III. iii. 15). Φαντασία is closely allied with μνήμη, it belongs to the same part of the mind (De Memor. I. 9). Memory and φαντασία are something short of intellect—Aristotle attributed them to the lower animals. Cf. Metaphys. I. i. 3: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ἀληθευόμενα καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρῶν. Cf. also Eth. vii. iii. 11. Brutes and the incontinent are said to follow their φαντασίαι, De An. III. iii. 21: καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμπειρώματα καὶ δόμοις εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, τολλά καὶ αὐτά πράττει τὰ ἔργα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θέρμα , τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλυπτέοντα τὸν νοῦν ἐπίσταται τὰ διὰ τὰς κατοικίας τῶν νοῶν ἐπιστατεῖ διὰ τὸς διὰ τὸν ἑαυτόν. Cf. Eth. vii. vii. 8. We find the word φαντασία not as yet settled into a psychological formula in Plato's Theaetetus, p. 152 ἔρι, where the doctrine of Protagoras is shown to imply that everything is as it appears, and that this appearing is identical with sensation. Σ. τὸ δὲ γε φαντασία αἰσθήσεως ἐκτὸς ἔστω; Ἡ σημαίνει γὰρ. Σ. Φαντασία ἀρα καὶ αἰσθήσεις ταῦτα ἐν τῷ θερμωτείῳ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τιμῶσι τὰ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἐκατοστι καὶ κυνικοσεῖ εἶναι. Aristotle, giving a scientific account of it in the De Anima, separates it, as we have seen, from sensation on the one hand, and reason on the other. The term does not correspond with any of our regular psychological terms. In relation to the fancy and the imagination, it represents the material for these, the brain-images out of which the creations of fancy (as well as the phantasmagoria of dreams) are con-
καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἐστι πῶς αὐτὸς ἄτιος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ αὐτὸς τὸν κακὰ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δὴ ἄγνωσαν τὸ τέλος ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἴόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔστησα. ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθάρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὡσπερ θυμὸν ἔχοντα, ἢ κρινεὶ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀληθείαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται. καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ὁ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὁ παρ’ ἐτέρου μὴ οἶνον τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ’ οἶνον ἐφει, τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ταῦτο περικείναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθῆ ἂν εἴη εὐφυία. εἰ δὴ ταῦτ’ ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετῆ τῆς ἐκούσιον; ἁμφότερον γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἄγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὀπωσὶδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ’ ἀναφέροντες πράττοντες ὀπωσὶδήποτε. εἰτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαινεται εἰτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικὸν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιος τὸν ὀπωσὶδήποτε ἢ ἀρετῆ ἐκούσιον ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἐστιν καὶ κακὰ ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεις καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τελείᾳ. εἰ οὖν, 20 ὡσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοι εἰσίν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συναίτιοι πως αὐτοὶ ἔσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοῦ τινς εἴναι τὸ τέλος

structured. Aristotle, not entering at all into the philosophy of the imaginative faculties, merely speaks of "phantasia" as furnishing a necessary element to thought (mouse ὅλον ἐστιν ἄθενον ψυχάδεματος, De Mem. i. 5). From what has been said it is easy to see the special appropriateness of the word in the above passage to denote an impression or idea of the good received passively, and in itself erroneous.

19 εἰτε δὴ—τέλειον  ‘Whether, then, the conception of the end, of whatever kind, comes not to each individual by nature, but something also is contributed by himself (τι καὶ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐστιν), or whether the end indeed is fixed by nature, but it is through the good man’s voluntarily taking the means that virtue is voluntary; in either case, I say, vice will be not a wit less voluntary (than virtue), for the bad man, exactly as the good, has individuality (τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ) in the particular actions, if not in the conception of the end.’

20 καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξων συναίτιοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔσμεν] ‘For we are ourselves joint causes, in a way, of our own states of mind.’ The word συναίτιος, meaning not the primary, but a concomitant cause, is of not unfrequent occurrence in Plato. Cf. Timæus, p. 46 D, where it is said of fire, &c., δοξέσθαι δὲ ὑπ’ τῶν ἁλείστων ὦ
21 γάρ. κοινή μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰρήνη ἦμιν τὸ 
τὸ 
γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσοτήτες εἰσίν, καὶ ὅτι ἔξεις, ύφ' ὧν 
τὴν 
ἠγούμαι, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακτικα καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ 
ὅτι ἐφ' 
ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἃν ὃ ὁ ρήσος λόγος προστάξῃ. 
22 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεως ἐκούσιοι εἰσί καὶ 
αἱ ἔξεις τῶν 
μὲν γὰρ πρᾶξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἐσμέν, 
ἐδότες τὰ καθ' ἐκαστὰ, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' 
ἐκαστὰ δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρω-
στίων̣. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἤ ὡς ὁ οὕτως ἡ 
μὴ ὁὐτὸς χρήσασθαι, 
23 διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι. ἀναλαβόντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης, ἐπεμεν 
τίνες εἰσίν καὶ περὶ ποία καὶ πῶς ἀμα δ' ἔσται ἐκδηλο 
καὶ 
πόσα εἰσίν. καὶ πρώτων περὶ ἀνδρείας.

εὐθαῖρα, ἀλλ' αιτία εἶναι τῶν πάν-
των.
21-22 These sections form the 
junction between the somewhat 
isolated treatise on the Voluntary 
and Aristotle's discussion of the 
separate virtues. They bear marks 
of having been added for the express 
purpose of forming a junction. For 
after a general statement of the theory 
of virtue in section 21 there is a 
résumé of some points with regard to 
the voluntariness of actions and habits, 
which is just what a man might have 
been likely to add after reading over 
his own treatise, and thinking that it 
required a word or two of elucidation.
22 οὐχ ὁμοίως δὴ—ἀφορμῶν] 'But actions and habits are not equal-
ly voluntary, for we are masters of 
our actions from the beginning to the 
end because we know all the parti-
culars, but we can only control the 
beginning of our habits, while the 
gradual addition made by each parti-
cular step is unperceived, as is the 
case also with illnesses.'
23 ἀναλαβόντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης—εἰσίν] 'Let us therefore resume 
our discussion of the separate virtues,
right principles in spite of the distractions of danger. By Aristotle, courage is extended to all those objects which are here expressly excluded from it—dangers by sea, illness, political conflicts, even the encountering of temptation. Βούλησις γὰρ σοι παθεῖναί μὴ μόνον τὸν ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρεῖον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἱστάμενον καὶ ἐν ἱματισμῷ τῷ πολεμικῷ ἐδεί, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἐν τῷ πολεμῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἥλιατον κυνωσιν ἀνδρεῖον οὕτως, καὶ δοῦν γε πρὸς νόσουν καὶ δοῦν πρὸς πεινᾶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ ἀνδρεῖον εἰσε, καὶ ἄλλα καὶ τὸν μηδὲν δοῦν πρὸς λύπαν ἀνδρεῖον εἰσε ἡ φόβου, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἑπισθείαν καὶ ἱδώνας δεινοῖ κάλον, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες . . . εἰσὶ γὰρ ποῦ τινες, ὡς Ἀρκεῖος καὶ ἐν τοῖς τούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι. Aristotle treats all such applications of the word ἀνδρείας as merely metaphorical (λέγεται δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρείων κατὰ μεταφορὰν), to these he opposes the proper use of the word (καίρων δὴ λέγεται δ’ τοι ἀλλὸ) as belonging peculiarly to war.

Εἰς γὰρ δει φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλῶς]

Cf. Eth. III. i. 24: δει δε καὶ ὄργασε ναι ἕν τις καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶς, οἷον ἤγελε καὶ μαθήσεως. It admits of discussion how much, independently of a merely permissive attitude in the will and reason, the instincts of fear, anger, and desire may be positively called out and even created by considerations and suggestions of the reason, or how far their place
θοίκων ηνιόμαηεΐων τοιούτων. λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινὸς ἀνδρείας κατὰ μεταφοράν ἔχει γάρ τι θυμοῦν τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ ἀφοβός 4 γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείας. πενιναὶ δ' ἱσως οὐ δει φοβεῖται οὐδὲ νόσουν, οὐδ' ὅλως οὐσα μὴ ἀπο κακίας μηδὲ δὲ αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἀφοβός ἀνδρείας. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τούτων καθ' ὤμοιότητα· ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις διελθοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθερίαί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων
5 ἀποβολήν εὐθαρσός ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δ' εἰ τὶς ὑβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἡ φθόνον ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοι, διελθοὶ ἐστίν' οὐδ' εἴ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρείας. 6 περὶ ποία οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρείας; ἡ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικότερος τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερῶτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥτις τῷ 7 τεθνεώτι δοκεῖ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οἴτε κακὸν εἴναι. δοξεῖ δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείας εἴναι, οἶδον εἰ 8 ἐν θαλάττῃ ἡ ἐν νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἡ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἴ ἐν Ἡθλετῃ· ἐν μεγάστῳ γὰρ 9 καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμολογοῦ δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαί αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. 10 κυρίως δ' λέγοντι· ἂν ἀνδρείας ὁ περὶ τον καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεις, καὶ ὁσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυνα ὄντα· τοιαῦτα 11 δὲ μᾶλλα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ ἐν θαλάτῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὶς ὁ ἀνδρείας, οὐχ οὔτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐλπίδες εἰσὶ 12 παρὰ τὴν ἐμπερίαν. ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται εἰν οἶς ἐστὶν ἀλῆ ἡ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.
while sailors are made confident by their experience. Besides, men put forth their courage on occasions where prowess may be shown or where to die is glorious; but in death at sea or from sickness neither of these qualities is to be found.' In this passage Aristotle was evidently not alluding to death in a sea-fight, but to being drowned in a shipwreck. At Salamis 'the deck' was a 'field of fame' (ἐν οἷς ἄλκη ἄ καλον τὸ ἀνθρακών).

VII. This chapter discusses courage as being a mean state with regard to daring and fear. Setting aside terrors which are too great for human nature to bear, the brave man is calm (ἀνέκπληκτος), and endures or fears all things in their due measure according to the true standard, his aim being to attain the noble. Thus he is distinguished from the extremes by whom these proportions are violated. The extremes, by a refinement which Aristotle does not extend to the other virtues (cf. note on Ἐθ. ii. vii. 2), are fourfold. (1) Deficiency of fear, producing a character which has no name. (2) Excess of fear = cowardice. (3) Deficiency of daring = cowardice. (4) Excess of daring = rashness. Two of these terms are identical, and one is nameless, so that the extremes really reduce themselves to cowardice and rashness (§ 12). Some excellent remarks are introduced on the characters of the boastful man and the rash man.

1 τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν—θαρραλέα] Having said where fear and courage are to be looked for, we next observe that fear admits of degrees, so that courage is proportionate. 'Now the Fearful is different to different persons, independently of our calling some things fearful beyond human endurance. These latter are fearful to every man in his senses, but dangers that are not beyond human endurance differ both in magnitude and in degree, a difference found also in the things that give courage.'
HÖIKΩN NIKOMAXEΙΩΝ III.

36

[Chap.

dé πάσης ἐνεργείας ἦστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ
dé ἡ ἀνδρεία καλὸν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρίζεται
γὰρ ἐκατον τῷ τέλει. καλὸν δὲ ἓνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείας ὑπομένει
καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δὲ ὑπερβαλ-
λόντων ο μὲν τῇ ἄφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (ἐρητω δ' ἦμιν εἰ τοὺς
πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἔστιν ἀνώνυμα), εἰ δ' ἂν τις μικρὸ-
μενος ἡ ἀόλγες, εἰ μηδὲν φοβούτο, μήτε σεθομον μήτε
τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς. ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν
8 ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ
ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ προσποιήτος ἀνδρείας. ὅσον
ἐκεῖνοι περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὕτως οὕτος θεωρεῖν φαίνε-
σθαι ἐν οἷς οὐδὲν δύναται, μμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ
πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασύνόμενοι
10 τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβείσθαι
ὑπερβάλλων δειλὸς καὶ γὰρ ἄ μὴ δεί καὶ ὥσ τοῦ δεῖ, καὶ

that 'the End-in-itself, or perfection, of a particular moral act will be
declared identical with that which belongs to
the formed moral character. The
End-in-itself for courage, as a whole,
is the idea of the beautiful. The idea
of the beautiful, therefore, must be
that End-in-itself which a man pro-
poses to himself in each separate act
of bravery in order to constitute it
brave.' In short, the meaning comes
to this, 'what makes an act truly
brave, is that, like the perfect state of
bravery, it aims at the beautiful.' The
term τέλος is used in a sense between
that of 'perfection' and 'motive,' or
rather as implying both (see Vol. I.
p. 226, and cf. Εὐκλ. iii. i. 6, note).
'Ενεργεία, in πάσης ἐνεργείας, is op-
posed to ἔξις as 'act' to 'state.'
The phrase τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν τέλος
occurs again III. ix. 3 : οὐ μὴν ἄλλα
δέξειν ἔτι ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν
tέλος ἔχει. The whole notion that
a moral act can only be considered
good when it exhibits the qualities
of the formed moral character has
been already brought forward, 11.
iv. 3.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείᾳ δὲ—ἀνδρείαι] 'Now
to the brave man courage is some-
thing morally beautiful. Of this
nature, then, must be the end of
courage, for it is the end of a thing
which in each case determines its
color. Therefore the beautiful is
the end for the sake of which the
brave man endures and does whatever
is brave.' The argument is as follows:
Moral beauty is what characterises
bravery, therefore it is the end of
bravery (because final and formal
causes coincide), therefore it should
be the end of each brave act. The
above explanation agrees with that
given by the Paraphrast, except that
he does not appear to supply τέλος
with τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. His words are,
to which γὰρ τέλος ἦστι πάσης ἐνεργείας
tῆς κατ' ἀρετήν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον
tῆς ἔξεως γίνεσθαι: οὐκ αἱ κατὰ δι-
kaiosótan πράξεων τέλος ἔχων τὸ κατὰ
tὸν λόγον τῆς ἔξεως τῆς ἰδιοσύνης
πράττεσθαι καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν

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VII.—VIII.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ III.

πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἔλλειπε δὲ καὶ τῷ" θαρρεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλον μᾶλλον κατα-

θανατικά ἐστιν. κύστες δὲ τοῖς ὁ δειλοῖς πάντα γὰρ φο-

βείται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείοις ἐναντίως: τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐληπτίδος.

περὶ ταύτα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν δ' τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασύς καὶ 12

ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφόροις δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτὰ: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἔλλειπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἔχει καὶ ὤς

dei καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν

κυνικῶν ἐν αὐτῶς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρείοι ἐν τοῖς

ἐργοῖς ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι. καθάπερ οὖν εἶρηται, 13

ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστιν περὶ θαρραλεία καὶ φοβερά, ἐν αἷς

εἶρηται, καὶ ὁτι καλὸν ἀιρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἂν ὁτι αἴσχον

τὸ μῆ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνίσκειν φεύγοντα πενιὰν ἡ ἔρωτα ἡ τι

λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ. μαλακία γὰρ

τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὁτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ

φεύγουν κακῶν.

"Εστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτον τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ 8

ἐτερωι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική:

κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ξέως τῆς ἀνδρείας.

κ.τ.λ.

13 Aristotle denounces suicide comm-
itted on account of poverty, or love, or anything grievous, as the act
rather of a coward than of a brave
man. Taking a broad human view of
life, he does not sympathise with or
discuss the sentimental deaths of the
Cynic philosophers (see Vol. I. Essay
II. p. 174). Suicide was afterwards
dignified by the Stoics with the name
of ἐξαγωγή, 'ushering oneself out of
the world.'

VIII. This chapter discusses the
spurious kinds of courage, classified
under five heads. Of this classification
we find the germ in Plato's Pro-
tagoras, p. 351 A : θάρσος μὲν γὰρ κα"

ν ἀντί τέχνης γίγνεται ἄνθρωποι κα"

ν ἀντί θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀντί μάθας, διὸ

η ἔννοια, ἄνδρεια δὲ ἀντὶ φύσεως κα"

ν εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται. The

five shades (πρῶτον) mentioned by
Aristotle are: apparent courage pro-
duced (1) from a regard to the opinions
of society, (2) from experience of the
particular danger, (3) from anger, (4)
from a sanguine mind, (5) from ignor-
ance.

Πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική] This
phrase is to be found in Plato's
Republic, p. 430 c, where it probably
originates, but it is there used in a
different sense from the present.
Plato meant by the term 'civil
courage' to distinguish the true
courage of a civilised man from all
merely brutal instincts. Οἰκεῖς γὰρ
μοι τὴν ἐρήμον ἄλλαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
toxtōn ἀνεκ παιδείας γεγονότα, τὴν το

θρησκία καὶ ἀνθρωποδοξία, οστέ πάντων
νόμων ἠγείρεθα, ἀλλ' τι τῆς ἀνδρείας
καλεῖ. Ἀληθεύεται, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, λέγει. Ἀποδέχομαι τοὺς τοῦτο ἀνδρείαν
calé. Καὶ γὰρ ἄποδέχου, ἢ β' ἐγώ, τολομοῖς γε, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἄποδέχει.
Aristotle meant by 'civil courage' that daring which is prompted, not by an independent desire for the beautiful, but by a regard to reputation, and to the fame or disgrace, and even punishment, awarded by society to brave or cowardly actions respectively. 

Διὰ τὰ ἐκ νόμων ἐπίτιμα] The laws relating to cowardice are alluded to, Eth. v. i. 14.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο—ἐντιμοι] 'And for this cause men appear to be more brave in communities where cowards are held in dishonour, and the brave in honour.' Aristotle does not actually assert that real courage is capable of cultivation by the influence of society. But if we do not put too fine a meaning on the word courage, there is no doubt that it flourishes most in warlike ages and communities. And, in short, with all but the very few, individual virtue generally springs out of the feelings of society; what is first outward, afterwards takes root in the mind.

2 τοισοῦτος δὲ—ἐμεῖς] 'Now just such men does Homer depict, as, for instance, Diomed and Hector, (when the latter says,) "Polydamas will be the first to cast a reproach at me;"' and so Diomed, "Hector will some day, haranguing among the Trojans, declare,—Tytides, by me terrified, fled to the ships." Cf. Iliad xxii. 1100, vIII. 148, sq., where the line ends φεβούμενος ἑκεῖ ὁ ἄρας.

3 ὁμοιωταί δὲ—ὅτε] 'But this courage is most like the kind which we described above, for it originates in virtue, namely, in a sense of honour (αιδός), in a desire for the beautiful (since it aims at reputation), and in a fear of dishonour as of something base.' On the nature of aïdós, see Eth. iv. ix. and the note on ii. vii. 14. Most admirably does Aristotle touch off here in a few words the spirit of honour which is the nearest approach to, and, at all events in many of the relations of life, the best substitute for a genuine morality. In reading his words, we can hardly fail to be reminded of Burke's magnificent lament over the loss of the age of chivalry. 'The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone! It is gone, that sensibility of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which
inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness' (Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 149). Just as Plato placed the philosopher above the man of honour (θυμοκήθη, cf. Republic, p. 547-9), so Aristotle conceives of a courage higher and purer than that which emanates from the spirit of honour.

4 'Civil courage' is of two kinds: (1) that which depends on honour, (2) that which depends on fear. The latter may remind us of the description given by Plato (Plato, p. 68 D), where he speaks of most men being courageous from a sort of cowardice. There is a vast falling off between the first class and the second. To the second belongs the spirit of Asiatic slavery, which Burke contrasted with the spirit of chivalry (i.e.). The instances here given are the compulsory measures used by the princes in the Trojan war to make the people fight, and similar devices used by the Persians, &c.

6 [Εκτερ] This is a misquotation; the words are those of Agamemnon (Iliad 11. 391).

5 [προστάτωτες] As Rassow observes, the emendation of Lambinus — [προστάτωτες], 'those who set the soldiers in front of them and beat them if they fall back,'—seems certain.

6 δοκεῖ δὲ—[κεν] 'Experience of particular dangers is also accounted a kind of courage; which gave Socrates occasion to think that courage was a science. Different men have experience in different dangers, and regular soldiers in the dangers of war. Now there are many unreal shows of danger in warfare, and professional soldiers, being perfectly accustomed to these, appear brave, because other men are deceived by appearances.' The second cause (after that of a regard for opinions) which gives rise to a semblance of courage, is experience, the quality of the practised veteran. The effects of this may be analysed and subdivided into (1) a familiarity with, and contempt for, much that is seemingly, but not really, terrible; (2) a skill of weapons, &c., giving both an offensive and a defensive superiority (σώματος καὶ μὴ πάθεισι μάλιστα δόναται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας).
ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἐκαστὰ ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι ὑδεν καὶ ὁ Ὁσκράτης ωῆθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὶν ἀνδρείαν, τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δὲ οἱ στρατιώται·
δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἡ μάλιστα συνεργάσις ὁδοῖ· 
φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρείας, ὅτι οὐκ ἦσαν οἱ ἄλλοι ἕαστεν. εἶτα ποίησις καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύναται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοὺς ὅτι πολλοὶ καὶ τοιούτα ἔχοντες ὅποια ἄν εἰ ἑν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποίησις καὶ πρὸς τὸ

den καὶ ὁ Ὁσκράτης] Cf. Memorab. iii. ix. 2, and Plato, Protag. p. 350, where it is agreed that those who dive most boldly are the professional divers, those who fight most boldly the professional soldiers, &c. This empirical view of courage forms one side, it is true, of the Socratic doctrine, but by no means the whole (see Vol. I. p. 107), and the statement about Socrates in the text is accordingly unfair. The statement is corrected by Eudemus in his Ethics (iii. i. 13), where he well sums up the present part of the subject: "Εἰστι δὲ εἰνὶ ἄνδρεια κατὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ἀμφότερα· τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ ἐπικόμενοι, ἄλλ' οὖ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ. Μιὰ μὲν πολιτικὴ· αὐθὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ αἴδεος ὅμως. Δεύτερα δ' ἡ στρατιωτική· αὐθὴ δὲ δὲ ἐμπειρία καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οἷς δὲν ὁμορρίζει Σωκράτης ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἄλλ' ὅτι (Ἰσαία) τὰ βορθεῖς τῶν δεινῶν.

πολλὰ κενὰ τὸ τοῦ πολέμου] This is the reading of Bekker, supported by a majority of the MSS., the Scholiast, the Paraphrast, Casaubon, &c. It is illustrated by Cicero, Epist. ad Att. v. 20: 'Scis enim dici quendam pæned, dici item τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου,' where the edition princeps (Romana) has καυδ, another instance of similar confusion. Another reading, supported by six MSS., is 'τὰ καυδ τοῦ πολέμου,' which would mean 'the surprises of war.' The phrase occurs in Diodorus Siculus, xx. 30: ἀληθεὶς εἶναι, ὅτι πολλὰ
tὰ καυδ τοῦ πολέμου. Cf. Thucyd. iii. 30: καὶ μὴ ἀποκρήσωμεν τῶν κυνικῶν, νομίσαστε ὅτι ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὰ καυδ τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δὲ εἰ τι στρατηγὸς ἐν τε αὐτῷ φιλάσσοιτο καὶ τοῖς πολεμίσαντες ἐνορκότω ἐπιχειρήσει, πλεῖον ἃν οἰκεῖο: where also the MSS. vary between καυδ and κενᾶν. It would seem, then, that τὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and τὰ καυδ τοῦ πολέμου, were both received formulæ, only with different senses. In the text above, either phrase might have been substituted for the other, according as it was more familiar to the transcriber. But τὰ κενὰ alone makes good sense, for while the soldiers would get accustomed to the empty show, the noise and pageantry of war, it is not true to say that they would get accustomed to the surprises of war, these being exactly what not even the experienced could calculate upon. Perhaps there is no better setting forth of the καυδ τοῦ πολέμου than in the speech of Brasidas, Thucyd. iv. 126, 4: οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλουσαν μὲν ἔχουσι τοὺς ἄνευρους φοβεράν καὶ γὰρ πλῆθει δύσως δεινοὶ καὶ βοήθης μεγέθεις ἀφόρτου·, δὲ τὰ καυδ κατανάλωσιν τῶν ὅπλων ἔχει τωρὰ δήλωσιν ἀτελῆς· προσμέει δὲ τοῖς ὅποιοι ἔχουσιν αὐτὰ ὅλοι ἰδίου.

συνεωράσασθαι] The συν here seems to mean not 'together,' or 'at a glance,' but as in συγγινώσκω, σύνοδο, &c., 'intimately,' 'privily,' 'familiarly.'
9 οἱ στρατιώται δὲ—σωφή] 'But regular troops lose heart when the danger is overpowering, and when they are inferior in numbers and equipment. In such cases they are the first to run away, while citizen troops remain and die, as actually happened at the Hermæum.'

ἐπὶ τῷ Ἑρμείῳ] Of this affair the Scholiast gives the following account. Coroneus had been betrayed to one Onomarchus of Phocis; an engagement took place in an open spot called the Hermæum; the Coronean citizens were killed to a man, while their Boeotian auxiliaries fled in a panic. Τὰ πολεμικὰ, by a common usage, is nearly equivalent to οἱ πολεῖς. Cf. Esch. Persæ, 1. τάδε μὲν Περσῶν—πιστὰ καλεῖται, &c. Στρατιώται, or mercenaries, in the time of Aristotle had not a high name. As common fighting men, the machines of war, they are opposed to the independent heroism of the brave man; see below, iii. ix. 6. The present passage contrasts the courage of the man of honour with the hardiness of the veteran, which under any extraordinary pressure gives way. 'Citizen courage' in the instance mentioned cannot externally be distinguished from the very highest kind of courage.

10 καὶ τῶν θυμῶν ἡμᾶς] 'The spirit of anger, too, men reckon as courage, and they who act through anger (like brutes turning on those who have wounded them) get the character of being brave, because the converse is true, and brave men are spirited. The spirit of anger is most keen for the encountering dangers, and hence Homer wrote:

"(Apollo) put strength into his wrath."
"He roused up his strength and wrath."

"Fierce strength in his nostrils."

"His blood boiled."

For all such things appear to signify the awakening and outbreak of anger. These quotations are obviously made from memory, and none of them are quite accurate. The first seems to be compounded of II. xiv. 151, μέγα σθένος ἵματι καὶ κατάνη Καρπίσ, and xvi. 529, μένος δὲ οἱ ἱμαλε θυμός. The second appears to be meant for II. v. 470, ὅτους μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου. The third is Od. xxiv. 318, ἀλὸς οὐκ εἰς οἱ ἰδέ άρμω μένος πρόσθεψε. The last is not in Homer at all. This passage illustrates the progress of psychology towards distinctness, for it is impossible to translate it simply into English; θυμός means more than anger, or than any one modern word, for even with Aristotle it includes what we should call 'spirit.' But with Homer it meant (1) life, (2) spirit, (3) wrath, (4) heart, (5) mind. Aristotle in quoting Homer fails to remember this great indefiniteness, though there is no doubt that in Homer a simple and physical account is given of the manifestations of courage.

12 φυσικοτάτη δ' έοικεν — εἰναί] 'Yet the sort that springs from anger appears most natural, and with purpose and motive added, it becomes genuine courage.' Taking this sentence in its context, it must be an apology for the ἄνδρεια διὰ θυμόν. Aristotle had said that anger makes a man brave only in the sense that a hungry ass is brave, obeying the goads of a blind instinct. He adds that the instinct of anger is part of our nature (cf. Euk. ii. iii. 10, note, and VII vi. 2), and that, rightly directed and brought under the control of the will and reason, it can be elevated into a moral state. It is remarkable on what a high level Aristotle places courage. It must be entirely, he says, prompted by a desire for what is morally beautiful (οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄνδρεια διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττονται); mere physical courage is only an assistance in realising this (δὲ θυμός συνεργεύει αὐτὰς), and the prompting of anger, &c., will make men pugnacious, but not brave (οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχητικοὶ μάχημα μέν, οὶς ἄνδρειος δὲ). Perhaps Aristotle makes almost too great a separation between true courage and this 'spirited element,' which must be its physical basis. This is to be attributed (1) to
his high moral tone, (2) to his analytical mode of treatment. In Shakespeare, as in Homer, courage is attributed to physical causes. It is made sometimes to depend on the action of the spleen, or it is connected with the gall. Cf. King John, Act II. Sc. 1:

' rash, inconsiderate, fiery voluntaries, with ladies' faces and fierce dragons' spleens.'

And Hamlet, Act II. Sc. 2, quoted below on 2b. iv. v. 6.

13–15 The fourth kind of spurious courage is that which arises from a sanguine mind. This may be due to previous success, and gives a confidence like courage, but also like intoxication. Such confidence is liable to a collapse.

15 did kal—ξένον] ' For this reason it seems braver to be fearless and untroubled in sudden perils than in such as may be anticipated. In the former case a man is brave more by habit, or in other words less by premeditation; for in foreseen dangers a man may calculate and reason out the course to be chosen, in sudden ones he must depend upon his habitual character.' This acute observation puts real courage in opposition to the case of a man puffed out with a sort of extraneous confidence. Take a man on a sudden, and you will find how brave he is. While Aristotle makes courage a quality of the moral will, he requires that it should be a settled habit, and a second nature of the mind, not prepared consciously to meet a particular emergency.
last place, men appear brave from not knowing their danger. Such persons are not far removed from the sanguine, but are inferior to them, because they have no self-confidence, as the sanguine have. This confidence enables the sanguine to stand their ground for a time; while those who have blundered into bravery, as soon as it appears that the danger is other than they had supposed, take to their heels, as was the case with the Argives, when they fell in with some Lacedemonians whom they took for men of Sicyon. The last and poorest semblance of courage is when something daring is done unknowingly, and from a mistake. The instance given is mentioned by Xenophon (Hellenics, iv. 10). Some Spartans assumed the shields of some vanquished Sicyonians, and were at first contemptuously encountered by the Argives, who, when they discovered their formidable enemies, took to flight.

IX. This interesting chapter is on the connection of courage with pain and loss. The nobleness of courage chiefly depends on the sacrifice which it implies (ἐπιλυτον ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται). The brave man by encountering death consciously makes a sacrifice of the greatest magnitude, since he runs the risk of relinquishing a life which is eminently valuable, and, by reason of his virtue, full of happiness. Courage, then, is not to be called pleasurable, except as attaining to a satisfaction above all pleasure, attaining, in short, to the end of one's being (οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἄθλος ἄρεταις τὸ ἄθλος ἄρεταις ὑπάρχειν, πλὴρο ἐσ'. δεν τοῦ τέλος ἐφάνεται). The conscious heroism of the brave man distinguishes him from the recklessness of the mercenary; it disqualifies him, indeed, from becoming mere rank and file, a mere machine of discipline.

3 οὐ μὴν ἄλλα—[χειρ] 'Without
doubt the end that belongs to courage is pleasant in itself, but this pleasantness is neutralised by the attendant circumstances, as happens likewise in the contests of the arena. The end at which the boxers aim, the garland and the honours, is pleasant; but the blows, and indeed the whole exertion, are painful and grievous to flesh and blood; so that by the multitude of intervening pains the incentive, which is small in itself, loses all appearance of being pleasant.'

Great issues, good or bad for human kind,
Is happy as a lover, and attired
With sudden brightness, like a man inspired;
And, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw;
Or if an unexpected call succeed,
Come when it will, is equal to the need:
He who, though thus endued as with a sense
And faculty for storm and turbulence,
Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans
To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes;
Sweet images! which wheresoe'er he be
Are at his heart, and such fidelity
It is his darling passion to approve;
More brave for this, that he hath much to love.'

The consciousness of the sacrifice to be made appears rather more prominent in Aristotle's brave man than in Wordsworth's. In saying this we must not forget that the word 'sacrifice,' in the moral sense of the term, expresses an idea that has grown up in the human mind subsequently to Aristotle. How nearly Aristotle, by the force of his penetration, realised it, the present chapter shows most remarkably.
5 αὐτ' ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἑδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἑφ' 
6 πτεται. στρατιώτατα δ' οὐδὲν ἵσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους 
κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἤτον μὲν ἀνδρείας, ἀλλὰ δ' 
ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας. ἦτοι μὴν γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς 
κυνόνες, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. 
7 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τι δ' ἐστίν, 
οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπο γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.  
10 Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι

5 οὐ δὴ—ἔφαστεια] 'Therefore it is not the case that in all the virtues 
virtuous action is accompanied by 
pleasure, except in so far as one 
attains to the End-in-itself.' On the 
import of this passage, see Vol. I. 
Essay IV. p. 226. With ἔφαστεια, 
τις is to be understood; see above, 
III. i. 6, note.

6 στρατιώτατα δ'—καταλλάττονται] 'After all, perhaps it is true that it is 
not brave men such as I have de-
scribed who will make the best mer-
cenaries, but fellows who, while they 
are less brave, have nothing to lose; 
for these are ready for dangers, and 
will sell their life for a trifling sum.' 
See above, ch. viii. 9, note. On the 
readiness of miserable wretches for 
danger and death, cf. Shakespeare, 
Macbeth, Act III. Sc. 1:

Second Murderer.—I am one, my 
liege,
Whom the vile blows and buffets of 
the world
Have so incens'd, that I am reckless 
what
I do, to spite the world.
First Murderer.—And I another,
So weary with disasters, tugg'd with 
fortune,
That I would set my life on any 
chance,
To mend it, or be rid on't.

X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην—ἀπερα] 'Next
let us speak of temperance, for these
(namely, courage and temperance) seem
to be the excellencies of the irrational 
parts of our nature.' This is almost 
the only indication which Aristotle 
gives of the system upon which he 
has arranged the several virtues in 
or order; he places together, and first 
treats of, the development of the 
lower and more instinctive qualities. 
On the arrangement of the remaining 
virtues see the plan of Book IV. 
With regard to the first two, there is 
a want of any distinct principle in 
their arrangement. If it be said 
that they are based on θυμός and 
ἐνιδομα, and that Aristotle begins at 
the bottom of the scale, why does he 
not begin with σωφροσύνη, since θυ-
μός is higher than ἐνιδομα (Eth. VII. 
VI) ? Again, as we have seen (ch. 
VIII. § 12) θυμός is here considered 
rather as having an occasional con-
nection with courage than as being 
the basis of it. But in fact Aristotle's 
Ethics are very little psychological in 
their character. In them psychology 
and morals are both in process of for-
mation; we cannot therefore expect 
in so tentative and unfinished a work 
to find systematic arrangement. Ari-
stotle probably began his list of the 
virtues with courage and temperance 
because they were two of the Greeck 
cardinal virtues, and when he came 
to temperance, he said 'this comes
next, since it also belongs to the irrational part of our nature.

τῶν ἀλόγων μερών] The instincts, such as those of self-preservation, fear, desire, &c., can only be capable of excellence by being brought under a law (μετάτηθη, λόγος) of the intellect, having no law in themselves. This law of the intellect becomes the most important part of the conception of virtues, as form is more striking than matter. In Plato the law is put for virtue altogether, and thus, as we saw, he calls courage a science. Similarly in the Charmides, where temperance is discussed, the nearest definition that is given is 'self-knowledge,' though it is shown that mere 'self-knowledge' has no content, and would be a useless blank; therefore it is implied that knowledge of the good must be added to make the conception complete.

It is the extreme opposite of Plato's view to speak of temperance as 'a virtue of the instincts' (τῶν ἀλόγων μερών); the word μετάτηθη however in the next line implies what was omitted, namely, 'under a law of the intellect.' The formula of Aristotle attributes a worth to the bodily instincts which would be opposed to asceticism.

μετάτηθη ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς] ἑωρόσωσιν, which, in spite of the false etymology given in Plato's Cratylus, 411 ε, and Κλ. vi. v. 5, meant originally 'sound-mindedness' (in German Besonnenheit), soon came to mean temperance with regard to pleasures. In this sense it is often popularly defined by Plato, cf. Repub. p. 430 e: ἀδόμην τοῦ τις—ἐν ἑωρόσωσιν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινών καὶ ἐνίβαμών ἑγκράτεια. Symposium p. 196 κ.: εἰ δὲ γὰρ ἐμπλοῦται ἑωρόσωσιν τὸ κρατεῖν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐνίβαμών, &c. Aristotle's procedure in discussing it is first to ascertain definitely its object. Pleasures are either bodily or mental. With mental pleasures temperance and intemperance are not concerned. Nor again with all bodily pleasures—not those of hearing, nor of smell; but only the merely animal pleasures (ὅποι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ ὄνωμα) of touch and taste. Even taste, as an object of intemperance, reduces itself to touch; and with regard to touch we must exclude the manly and human satisfaction felt in exercise, &c. (chapter xi.) Desires of the kind in question are either common, or special and acquired (ἴδιοι καὶ ἑκάστοι); in the former, excess is the only kind of error possible; in the latter all kinds of errors are committed. The only pains with which temperance and intemperance can be concerned are pains arising from the want of certain pleasures; these pains the intemperate man feels to excess. While intemperance thus consists in excess, there is no such thing as deficiency in the sense for the above-named pleasures; thus there is no name for the opposite extreme to intemperance. With due regard to his health, and the means at his disposal, and acting under the law of the beautiful (xii. 8), the temperate man preserves a balance.

2 διηρήθωσαν—διακόλας] 'We must
4-5 While Aristotle justly says that the words temperance and in-
temperance do not apply to the pleasure felt in colours, forms, painting, music, and acting, it is strange that he should have spoken of these at all as bodily pleasures. Such a way of speaking shows an early and immu-
ture psychology.

6 Pleasures of smell are not the objects of intemperance, except accident-
ally, as by association, reminding people of eating, &c. Eudemus quotes a witty remark on the subject.

Ebd. End. iii. 10: ἐμπάλῳ ἐφή Στρα-
τόνικος τὰ μὲν καλὸν ὀφεί, τὰς δὲ ἥδες...

7 Brut. says Aristotle, have no
pleasures of hearing, or smell, or
sight, except accidental ones, namely,
when sounds or scents indicate to them their prey or their food. It may be questioned whether this is absolutely true, whether, for instance, brutes are not capable of some pleasure from musical sounds. This appears to be the case with lizards and snakes; and horses are fond of bells. It is said that the cat likes the smell of mint. Dogs like the smell of carrion, apparently for its own sake, this being their taste. With brutes the senses are the intellect, and thus by the well-known law that as an organ increases in fineness of perception, it decreases in sensitiveness to pleasure and pain—we may conceive how it is that the fine perceptive organs of brutes are to them in a less degree the instruments of pleasure.

See Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, pp. 880 and 886.

ἑύρων ἐλαφον] This alludes to Homer, Il. III. 23:

 opting ἔχαρη γεγόρη ἐπὶ σώματι κύρισας,

εὐρὼν ἐλαφον κεραυ ἐγρυν αὐγα.

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The name of this glutton is recorded by Eudemus (iii. ii. 10), who paraphrases the present passage as follows: did oi ψυφάγοι oik εἰσχύται τὴν γλώτταν ἔχειν μακρὰ ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρ

ρυγγα γεράνου, ὅτερ Φιλάξενος ὁ Ἐρο-

ξίδος. Athenaeus mentions the same story (viii. 26), quoting the verses—

Φιλάξενος ποδ', ὥς λέγειν', ὁ Κυθραῖος

εὔχατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάργυγα πῆχεων.

Aristotle uses the word φάρυγγα here in its loose sense for the 'throat,' as λάργυγς (which properly meant the top of the windpipe) was also loosely employed by the ancients to mean the whole throat. Speaking scientifically Aristotle confined the term φάρυγγα to mean the trachea or windpipe, distinguishing it from the ascophagus or gullet, cf. De Part. An. III. iii. 1: ὁ μὲν οὖν φάρυγγες τοῦ πνεύματος ένε-

κερ πέφυκεν—ὁ δ' οὐσφάγος ἐστὶ δι' ὧ

οὐ ἡ τροφὴ περίειται εἰς τὴν κολάν. The latter was the term properly required above. Aristotle seems to
have considered that the pleasure of

The very diversity of tastes to a law of

gluttony was not in taste, of which the
tongue was the organ, but in the con-
tact of food with the passage of the

have considered that the pleasure of

The very diversity of tastes to a law of

...and
to a wise purpose, else what a fearful
rivalry there would be in the world.

Some MSS. for τίσω read τίσω.

It seems common for transcribers, when
they do not understand a sentence, to

play fast and loose with τίσω and τίσ:

see below, Eth. v. vii. 4.

Greedy-bellies’

from μάργαρις, cf. Homer, Od. xviii.

2, μετά δὲ ἐκπευεῖ γαστερί τὸ μάργαρις — and

Euripides, Cyclops 310, πάρες τὸ

μάργαρον σῆς γυναῖκος.

τυλισμένες αὐτήν] sc. τὴν γαστερὰ,

which is to be supplied from γαστερί-

μαργαρος, according to the Aristotelian

mode of writing.
καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦτων λεγομένων ἡ τῷ χαίρειν ὡς μὴ δεί, ἡ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἡ τῶς οἱ πολλοί, ἡ μὴ ὡς δεί, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλουθοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνοικὸς ὡς οὐ δεί (μισητὰ γὰρ), καὶ εἰ τις δεί χαίρειν τῶν τοιοῦτων, μᾶλλον ἡ δεί, καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοί χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς 5 ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολουθία καὶ φεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύτρας οἷς ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων ἀκόλουστος δὲ τῷ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλουστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον δεί ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονῆ), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπονοίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδος. ὁ μὲν 6 οὖν ἀκόλουστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἡ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἀγέται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὡστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῦτο ἀφεῖται· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν. μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀτόπῳ δ' ζοκε τὸ δ' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλειποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ὑποτον ἡ 7 δεί χαίροντες οὐ πάνω γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναίσθησις· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπά ζωὰ διακρίνει τὰ βρόματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὖ· εἰ δὲ τῷ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἐτέρων ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἃν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁνόματος διὰ τὸ

4 ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ τῶς οἱ πολλοί] It seems almost certain that οὐ here is an interpolation. It could not have been said that 'with regard to the special pleasures men are called "lovers of particular things" because they like them as people in general do.' What Aristotle wrote was, no doubt, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, 'or because they like them more than people in general;' cf. Eth. iv. iv. 4, ἐπαινοῦστε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, φέσουστε δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεί. The copyist must have taken ἢ οἱ πολλοί for a separate sentence, and so have thought it necessary to insert οὐ.

5 καὶ τῆς λύπης δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή] ‘And thus it is pleasure that produces him his pain.’ This is stated as if it were a sort of disgraceful paradox, which takes place in intemperance.

7 οὐ πάνω γίνονται] Aristotle, from his experience as a Greek, might have been justified in asserting that a deficiency in the sense for pleasures ‘could hardly be said to exist.’ It is not so certain that the same would be true in all periods of the world. It is not so certain that the monkish turn of mind does not occasionally diminish to an unhappy extent the natural and human feelings, so as to impair the kindliness, the geniality, and the good sense of mankind.
8 μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. οὐ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταύτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἢδεται οἷς μάλιστα οὐ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὀλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδέν, οὔτ' ἄποινων λυπεῖται οὔτ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἵπ μετρίως, οὔτ' μᾶλλον ἢ δεὶ, οὖτ' οὐκ ἢ δεὶ, οὐδ' ὀλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς οὐγείαι ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς οὐείς ἢδεα ὅντα, τοιῶν ὁμίλεται μετρίως καὶ ὅς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἢδέων μὴ ἐμποδίζου τοῦτος οὖν ἡ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ο γὰρ οὕτως ἐχων μᾶλλον ἄγαπα τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ο δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὅς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

12 Ἐκοιμάσθε δὲ μᾶλλον ἐοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας, ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἢδονήν, ἢ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὅν τὸ μὲν αἰρέτον, τὸ δὲ φευ-2 κτόν. καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξιστηκε καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἐχοντος

8 We see how indefinite after all Aristotle has left the standard of temperance; he refers it merely to the blank formula of ὡς δεὶ and τὸ καλὸν. In so leaving it, however, he appeals to a sense in each man's own mind. There is a relative element to be considered, the health or fortune of the individual (πρὸς οὐγείαν, μὴ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν), and there is also something that appears absolute amidst all that is relative (τὸ καλὸν).

ο γὰρ οὕτως ἐχων] This is an awkward piece of writing. Οὕτως refers to those phrases which have been negated—παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

XII. Which is most voluntary, cowardice or intemperance? a suitable question to conclude a Book which opened with a theory of the voluntary and proceeded to discuss courage and temperance. Thus far there is method. Courage and temperance are considered very much throughout in relation to each other, and here they are considered in relation to the voluntary. On the other hand, the subject of this chapter is closely connected with the theory of the formation of habits (Eth. ii. i.-ii.), and also with the questions mooted above (Eth. iii. v.) as to the voluntariness of vicious habits. Standing then as it does isolated, it forms an instance of the immaturity of Aristotle's moral investigations.

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice, inasmuch as it consists in choosing pleasure, while cowardice is under a sort of compulsion, flying from pain. (2) Again it is easier by practice to learn to resist temptation, than it is to learn to withstand danger, for the opportunities are frequent and free from risk. Hence intemperance is the more disgraceful of the two. (3) These vices are in a peculiar way different from each other, for cowardice as a whole is more voluntary than its parts. Intemperance as a whole is less voluntary than its parts.

The chapter ends with some remarks on the nature of ἀκολασία as connected with its etymology.

2 καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη—ποιεῖ] 'And while pain distracts and overturns,
the mental balance of him who experiences it, pleasure does nothing of the kind." Φώσις here denotes the perfect or normal state; see above, Eth. ii. 1, 3, note.

3 δέξει τ' ἐν—ἐξατρέψας] 'But cowardice is not equally voluntary with (i.e. is more voluntary than) its particular acts, for in itself it is painless, while its particulars distract the mind with pain.' It seems curious to speak of cowardice in this abstract way as distinct from all particular acts of cowardice. It is, however, true that cowardice is not, like in temperance, a growing chain upon the mind. Each cowardly act, while it leaves the mind irresolute and so prone to fresh cowardice, on the other hand brings experience and renders the mind more familiar with danger. Thus cowardice, which at first was involuntary, tends to become more and more voluntary and deliberate, the more it is continued in; but in temperance, which at first was voluntary, becomes, the longer it lasts, more and more involuntary and a mere bondage.

5-6 τὸ δ' ὅρμα—ὅρεξις] 'Now the name intemperance (or unrestrainedness) we apply also to the faults of children, for these have some resemblance to it. Which is called from which, matters not for our present purpose; obviously that which is later in conception is called from that which is earlier. And it seems no bad metaphor, for that which hangkers after what is base, and which has a mighty capacity for development, requires to be chastened, and this is just the character of desire and of the child. Children live entirely by desire, and have the longing for what is pleasant most strongly.' Eudemus (Eth. Eud. iii. 1) commences his account of intemperance with this etymology. He points out that ἀδαλάστος is capable of two meanings,
7 η τοῦ ἠδείος ὀρεξὶ· εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπείθες καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἦξει· ἀπληστός γὰρ η τοῦ ἠδείος ὀρεξὶ καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνόητῳ, καὶ η τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὐξαί τὸ συγγενές, καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ δοῖ, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρουότιν, διὸ δεὶ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ 8 ὀδύγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθεν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπείθες λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον· ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸν παιδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ξῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ 9 ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεὶ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφότερον τὸ καλὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρον ὁν δεὶ καὶ ὁς δεὶ καὶ 10 ότε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

'he that has not been chastened,' and 'he that cannot be chastened.' His account of the metaphor implied in the word appears to be lost. He says (§ 3), διεγραφαίην πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολούθαν ὄνομαζότας μεταφέρομεν, but in Eth. Eud. ii. iii., to which he alludes, there is apparently a lacuna. Aristotle declines to decide which is the primary and which the metaphorical use of the word; but there can be no doubt that the punishment and unrestrainedness of children is the more concrete and the primary idea.

7 et odu—εναντιοῦσθαι] 'If then this thing be not obedient and subjected to the governing element, it will develop vastly; for the longing for what is pleasant is insatiable in him that is foolish, and it seeks satisfaction from all quarters; and the exercise of desire increases its native powers, and if the desires grow great and vehement, they expel all reasoning in the end. Wherefore the desires should be moderate and few, and no wise opposed to the law of reason.' Εἰσαγαγέται is indefinite; it might refer either to ἡ ἐσθήτα or ὁ πάθος. Aristotle speaking indistinctly had the idea of ἐσθήτα most present to his mind. Out of this etymology of 'intemperance' he develops anew the relationship which ought to exist between the passions and the reason. The passions should be to the reason as a child to his tutor. This analogy was already suggested in Eth. i. xiii. 19: διττῶν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγῳ ἔχων, τὸ μὲν κυρίος καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὡσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικὸν τι.
PLAN OF BOOK IV.

WITH only two exceptions, this Book follows faithfully the programme drawn out in the seventh chapter of Book II. These exceptions are, that it inverts the order of the social virtues—Truth, Wit, and Friendship; and that, being at its close fragmentary or mutilated, it omits to discuss Indignation, and breaks off in the middle of a discussion upon Modesty.

The only question, then, that arises is—Can we find any logical sequence in Aristotle's list of the virtues as given in Book II. and followed out here? There are various principles on which a classification of the virtues might have been made; as, for instance, on a principle of psychological division, it might have been shown how the virtues are the proper development of man's nature in its various parts. Or, again, with a view to education, the virtues might have been arranged according to the most natural order of inculcation. Or, again, in point of excellence, the greater virtues might have taken precedence of the lesser ones. But no one broad principle of this kind is to be found in the arrangement made by Aristotle. It must always be remembered that his Ethicæ, while tending to advance psychology very greatly, are not composed upon a psychological system. Hence, though he said (Eth. iii. x. 1) that Temperance must succeed Courage, because these both consisted in the regulation of the brute instincts, we do not find elsewhere any reference to a classification of the parts of man's nature. Aristotle, having clearly divided moral from intellectual excellence, does not carry out the same sort of division in discussing moral excellence. He seems to have taken up first the most prominent and striking qualities, according to the common notions in Greece—Courage, Temperance, and Liberality. Liberality suggested to him Magnificence—Magnificence, Great-souledness; and from this
he proceeded to distinguish the more ordinary quality of Ambition. He then added, what had hitherto been omitted, the virtue of regulation of the temper; and pointed out that in social intercourse three excellent qualities are produced by bringing the demeanour under the control of the law of balance. Lastly, he was proceeding to show that even in the instinctive and untrained feelings of Modesty and Indignation, this same law exhibits itself, when, either from interruption, or from mutilation, the book came abruptly to a close.


I. Aristotle’s excellent account of liberality represents it as the balance between illiberality and prodigality. On the characters produced by these different qualities the most discriminating and happy remarks are made in the present chapter.

I oûv' ad én tais krasisv] ‘Nor again in decisions.’ The Paraphrast adds ὅπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Κρασις here is used in a general sense; it may or may not be a legal decision. Cf. Eth. v. vi. 4: ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρασὶς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ δίκαιου.

2 χρήματα δὲ—μετρεῖται] ‘Now

we call “property” all things whose value is measured by money.’ In other words ‘all things with an exchangeable value.’

3 την δ' ἀσωτίαν—καλούμενος] ‘But the term “prodigality” we sometimes apply in a complicated sense, for we call those who are incontinent and who lavish money on intemperance—prodigals.’ Exactly the same usage has been confirmed in modern language by the associations of the parable of ‘the Prodigal Son.’

5 ό δὲ ὀκελευ—ἐκδεχόμεθα] ‘This application of the name is improper;
for "prodigal" ought to denote a man who has one fault, the habit of wasting his substance. The word literally means "he who destroys himself," and the wasting of one's substance may well be thought a kind of self-destruction, for life depends upon substance. This accordingly is the sense in which we take the word "prodigality." Aristotle attributes some weight here to the etymology of ἀσωτός, arguing that the man who destroys his property, destroys himself, and he who destroys himself is beyond salvation (ἀσωτός). Βοσλεται εἶναι is exactly analogous to the English word 'means.' Cf. Eth. III. i. 15.

7 Liberality or 'the virtue connected with property' consists more in right giving and spending than in right receiving. The former is the positive and active side, the latter is the negative and passive side. Giving is the 'use' of money, receiving and keeping is mere 'possession.' And 'use,' as Aristotle tells us in the Rhetoric (I. v. 7), constitutes wealth proper, as being a sort of life and reality (ἐνέργεια), which mere possession is not. "Ολείς δὲ τὸ πλοῦτον ἐστιν εἰ τῷ χρήσασθαι μάλλον ἢ εἰ τῷ κεκτήσασθαι: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρήσις πλοῦτος.

8 οὗκ ἄδηλον δ'—ἀισχροπραγείν] 'It is not hard to see that giving is an avenue to the doing of good and to noble action, while in taking we only receive a benefit or at most keep clear of doing a base action.' Αισχροπραγείν here corresponds with αἰσχροκρατεῖν in § 41; an act of λήψις may have the negative praise of having avoided this.

9 καὶ ρέσον δὲ—ἀλλότριον] 'And it is easier too to abstain from taking than it is to give; for men are less willing to give away (ηττώ τροφεῖται...
λαβεῖν τοῦ δούναι. τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἦττον προέται μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ λαμβάνωσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέρως δὲ ἰο λέγονται οἱ διδόντες. οὗ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐπανοῦνται, ἀλλ' οἱς ἦττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην. οὓς δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπανοῦνται πάντες. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μᾶλλον οἱ ἐλευθέροι τῶν ἄτ' ἄρτης. ὥφελιμοι γὰρ, τούτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἄρτην πράξεις 12 καλὰ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέρος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα καὶ ὁρθῶς: οἷς γὰρ δει καὶ δόσα καὶ ὁτε, καὶ τάλλα δόσα ἔπεται τῇ ὑρή δόσει. καὶ ταύτα ἡδέως 13 ἡ ἀλήτως: τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἄρτην ἡν' ἡ ἀλητως, ἡκοτα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ δίδους οἷς μὴ δει, ἡ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα 14 ἀλλ' διὰ τὶν ἀληθὲν αὐτίναι, οὐκ ἐλευθέρος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ὑμθήσεται. οὖδ' ὁ λυπηρός. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλογον' ἀν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὖκ ἐλευθερίων. οὔδε λήπται δὲ θεον μὴ δει. οὔδ' γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶν 15 τος τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη λήπτης. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δ' οὖδ' 16 αἰτήτους. οὐ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ εὐθούντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργε-

μᾶλλον) what is their own, than they are to abstain from taking what belongs to others.' Μᾶλλον is redundant; it goes to strengthen the comparative force of ἦττον.—Οἱ λαμβάνοντες corresponds to μὴ λαβεῖν just before, and makes up a positive notion to 'abstain from taking.' Aristotle attributes to men in general a character the reverse of that attributed by Sallust to Catiline, 'alieni appetens, sui profusus.'

11 οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπανοῦνται πάντες] 'But they who receive are not praised at all.' Πάνω means 'quite': οὐ πάνω in the sense of 'hardly' is frequent in Aristotle; cf. Eth. III. ii. 12-13: οἱ λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνω δοθέωμεν—δοθέωμεν δ' οὐ πάνω ευμεν; and οὔθε πάνω appears to mean 'not at all,' the οὔθε being joined with the verb.

16 οὖκ δ' εἰ—ἐνεργειαῖς] 'Nor would he be ready to ask favours, for it does not belong to the benefactor to be easily a receiver of benefits.' This is a manifestation of the spirit, which runs through the virtuous characters of Aristotle—the spirit of manliness and nobility (ἀνδρότης καὶ φιλάκαλος, cf. Eth. IV. iv. 3). It appears most strongly in the character of the great-souled man; see below, ch. iii. § 24. The principle of individuality, a sense of life and free action (ἐνεργεία), are with Aristotle the basis of morality, and the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect. Now, a slight difference in the way in which this truth is stated will make it appear a pure or a selfish principle. Christianity says, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive,' implying that to gratify a feeling of love and kindness is better than any pleasure that the sense of gain could afford. But the Christian sentiment of love and charity, though unselfish, is not selfless.
For as all knowledge implies a subject as well as an object, so does every moral act or feeling imply the will and individuality of the actor. In the Christian sentiment there is so great a harmony between the object and subject, that the subjective side appears to be lost; but in reality it is only lost to be found again, it is diminished to be enhanced. Aristotle's statement would be, 'It is better to give than to receive, because it is more noble.' This has a slight tendency to give too much weight to the subjective side. In Aristotle's whole account we do not find a word about benevolence or love to others as prompting acts of liberality. We find no other motive but the 'splendour' (καλὸς) of the acts themselves. What is said in the present section verges towards the selfish theory, which would ascribe such acts to the love of power inherent in man. In Hobbes (Leviathan, Book I. Chap. xi.) we find a bitter statement of the feelings with which benefits may be received. 'To have received from one, to whom we think ourselves equal, greater benefits than there is hope to requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred. For benefits oblige, and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thraldom, which is to one's equal, hateful.' Cf. Eth. ix. vii.

17-19 Points in the character of the liberal man: he will take care of his own property in order that he may have means for his liberality. Hence, too, he will be discriminating in the objects of his favours; yet his tendency is to forget himself, to give largely, to leave hardly anything for himself; yet again, liberality does not depend on the largeness of the gift, it is in proportion to the means of the giver—a less gift may be more liberal than a large one.

20 ἑλευθερώτεροι δὲ.—we see that those are the most liberal who have not themselves acquired their property, but have inherited it; for they have never known what want is, nor are they restrained by that love of what we have ourselves produced, which belongs to all men, and is well exemplified in parents and poets.' On the philosophy of this remark, cf. Eth. ix. vii. 2-7. The remark itself
ἔνδειας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὡσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ πουηταί. πλουτεῖν δὲ οὐράδιον τὸν ἐλευ-
θερον, μῆτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μῆτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν 
de καὶ μῆ τιμῶντα δ' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἑνέκα 
tῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα 21 
ἀξίοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως 
tοῦτο: οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰ χρήματ' ἐχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον 
ὅπως ἔχει, ὡσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ μὴν δῷσει γε 22 
οἰς οὐ δει οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δει, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιὰτα· οὐ γὰρ 
ἀν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθερίατη, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα 
ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεὶ ἀναλάσκειν. ὡσπερ γὰρ 23 
ἐρῆται, ἐλευθερίας ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ 
eis ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄστοσ. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους 
οὐ λέγομεν ἁσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτίσεως οὐ δοκεῖ 
ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεις καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. 
τῆς ἐλευθερίατης δὴ μεσότητος ὁς ὑπὲρ χρημάτων 24 
δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὁ ἐλευθεριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς 
ἀ δεὶ καὶ ὅσα δεὶ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα 
ὁδεῖς· καὶ λήφεται δ' θεν δεὶ καὶ ὅσα δεὶ. τῆς ἀρετῆς 
γὰρ περὶ ἀμφοῦ ὁς μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὅσο δεῖ· 
ἐπεταί γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεἰκείᾳ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λήψις, ἡ δὲ 
τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστὶν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίγνονται 
ἀμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντία δῆλον ὡς οὖν. εάν δὲ παρὰ 25 
τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔχον συμβαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλάσκειν, 
λυπησται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ

comes almost verbatim from Plato's Republic, p. 330 b-c. Socrates asks Cephalus whether he made his money or inherited it, and gives as a reason for the question, οὐ τοι ένεκα ἡμέρη, ἣν δ' ἠγώ, δι' ομιάδεις οὐ σφόδρα 
ἀγαταί τὰ χρήματα. Τούτῳ δὲ τοοῦν ὃς τὸ τοῦλ οὐ δὲν μὴ αὐτὸν κτίσωνται. 
οῖ δὲ κτησάμενοι δι' ἡμὲν οἱ ἄλλοι 
ἀσφάλειοι αὐτὸν· ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ πουηταὶ 
tὰ αὐτῶν χρήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοῦ 
παιδὸς ἀγαταί, ταῦτά τε δη καὶ οἱ 
χρησμοισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπου 
dασώσουν, ὡς ἐργον αὐτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν 
χρελαν, ἔρει οἱ ἄλλοι. From another 
cause, however, merchants, with their 
large fluctuating gains, seem often 
more liberal than the landowners, 
with their fixed incomes.

21 With perfect good sense Aristotles says that a very natural explana-

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26 ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ’ οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώ-
27 νησὶς ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδι-
κείσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἁχθόμενος
eἰ τί δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἡ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε.
28 καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδη οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ’ ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν
tούτοις διαμαρτάνει. οὐτε γὰρ ἤδεται ἐφ’ οἷς δεὶ οὐδὲ ὡς
29 δεὶ οὐτε λυπεῖται· ἑσται δὲ προιούσι φανερώτερον. εἰρήνα
δ’ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπέρβολαι καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἴσιν ἡ ἁσωτία καὶ ἡ
ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυνίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην
γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἁσωτία τῷ διδόναι
καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπέρβαλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει,
ἡ δ’ ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν
30 δ’ ὑπέρβαλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἁσωτίας
οὐ πάνω συνδικάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ράδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα
πάσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπεται ἡ οὐνία τοὺς ἱδώτας
31 διδόντας, οὔτε καὶ δοκοῦν ἁσωτοὶ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν τοιούτοις
dοξείν ἀν οὐ μικρὸ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐιάτος

26–27 καὶ εὐκοινώνῃος—ἀρεσκό-
μενος] ‘Further, the liberal man is
easy to deal with in business transac-
tions; for there is no difficulty in
cheating him, owing to his disregard
of money, and he is more annoyed at
having omitted any proper expense
than vexed at spending what is
needless, nor does he approve the
precepts of Simonides.’ These re-
marks show a penetrating knowl-
dge of mankind, but they do not exhibit
liberality in the highest light. The
gratification of a personal feeling is
made rather too prominent, hence we
miss the beauty of ‘charity seeketh
not her own.’ With the present
passage we may compare the descrip-
tion of equity in the Rhetoric (1. xiii.
15–19), part of which is τὸ ἀδέχεσθαι
dιακοσμοῦνον. Various sentiments are
attributed to Simonides, all testifying
to the solid advantage of riches. Cf.
Ar. Rhetoric, π. xvi. 2: δεῖν καὶ τὸ
Σιμωνίδου ἐρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ
πλούσιων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τῆς Ἰέρωνος
ἐρωτήμην πότερον γενεάθαι κρεῖττων
πλούσιων ἢ σοφῶν· πλούσιον εἶναι τῶν
σοφῶν γὰρ ἐφ’ ὅραι ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν
πλούσιων θύραις διατρίβοταν. Again,
there is quoted by Plutarch a say-
ing that ‘the money-chest is always
full, and the chest of the graces
always empty;’ and another, that
‘avarice is the proper pleasure of
old age.’ On the philosophy of
95–96.

29 τῷ λαμβάνειν—μικροῖς] ‘Illibera-
larity exceeds in taking, only it must
be in petty matters.’ Grasping on a
large scale gets another name than
illiberality; cf. §§ 41–42.

30 τὰ μὲν οὖν—ἀνελευθέρου] ‘The
two sides of prodigality can hardly
exist together; as it is not easy to
give to everybody and receive from
nobody; private persons, whom alone
we reckon prodigals, soon find their
substance failing them. For, in fact, the
prodigal man may well be thought in no small degree superior to the illiberal. The commentators, from not seeing the train of thought in this passage, have made a difficulty about ἐξεῖ, which refers to the beginning of the sentence, the intermediate clauses of γὰρ μὴν—ἐναι being parenthetical. With ὅπερ καὶ δοκοῦν, cf. § 23.

31–32 Reasons are given why the prodigal is better than the illiberal man; namely, he may be cured by time, or by the failure of his means. His tendency to give is a principle which requires only to be harmonised to become a virtue. Lastly, he does more good than the illiberal man. Aristotle here is speaking of a better sort of prodigality (τούτων τῶν τρόπων ἀσωτοῦ), which is only a slight overstepping of the bounds of liberality; but even with this restriction, it is much to be doubted whether prodigality does more good than illiberality. From wise acts of liberality much good may arise, but the common sort of prodigality, as Aristotle himself says, § 35, being prompted by folly and vanity, almost invariably goes to enrich the wrong people. If the case be even not so bad as this, the solid benefit which accrues from any tendency to capitalise money may surely be set against the chance good done by money given away indiscriminately or spent unproductively.

33 ἄλλ' οί πολλοὶ—ἀνελεύθεροι] 'But most prodigals, as we have implied already, take whence they ought not, and in this way are illiberal.' This is an instance of a phenomenon often to be observed in Aristotle's virtues and vices, that the 'extremes meet' (cf. IV. vii. 15, II. vii. 15). The rationale of this phenomenon appears to be that the extremes are both the result of the same principle, they are both different forms of selfishness. Selfishness can equally produce prodigal giving and meanness in receiving. Hence, if a man be selfish, though his tendency is to be prodigal, yet on occasion selfishness, which is his governing principle, will lead him to become illiberal. The fact is noticed by Eude-mus, Eth. Eud. iii. vii. 12: ἔστι δ' ἐναυτοὺς τῶν ἄκρων τὸ μέτοχον ἣ ἴκενα ἄλληλοι, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' ὁδε- τέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις
vice of prodigality. Its connection with vanity, selfishness, and often utter heartlessness, he does not sufficiently notice, nor does he observe that lavish giving often proceeds from the want of a faculty—from an incapacity for estimating the worth of objects. Thus if illiberality be incompatible with a magnanimous spirit, prodigality is incompatible with absolute truth and justice.

38 Illiberality is widely spread, and has many forms; it contains two elements—excess of taking and defect of giving; but it does not always manifest itself in its entirety (οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ ἄλλας χάρακες ναραγίγεργε), sometimes one element exists separately from the other.
men. of one class, those who go by such names as “stingy,” “closefisted,” “curmudgeons,” all fall short in what they give away, but they neither covet their neighbours’ goods, nor wish to take them. With some of them this arises from a certain sense of equity and shrinking from what is base; for their motive, either supposed or professed, in being careful of their means, is to prevent the possibility of their being compelled by want to do base actions. To this set belong the “skinflint,” and all his like, a name derived from superlative unwillingness to give to anybody. But others again abstain from their neighbours’ goods through fear, since it is not easy to take what belongs to others, and not have others take what belongs to oneself—they are content, therefore, neither to take nor give. A second class are excessive in taking everything and from all quarters, as, for instance, those who ply illiberal trades, brothel-keepers, and all such like, and lenders of small sums at high interest. For all these take whence they ought not, and more than they ought.” This passage falls into two parts, ol δ’ αδ κατά τήν λήψην corresponding to ol μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις. There are two subordinate divisions of the first part, namely, ol μὲν διὰ τινὰ εἰπεὶκεναι, and ol δ’ αδ διὰ φόβον.
43 ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἁσβεῖς καὶ ὁδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβετησι καὶ ὁ λυποῦται καὶ ὁ λυπητής τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν. αἰσχροκερδεῖς γὰρ, κέρδους γὰρ ἐνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ οὐνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους τους μεγίστους ἐνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οὐς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ θεῖν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἰ τοιάωτα
44 λήψεις ἀνελευθέροι, εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται: μεῖζον τε γὰρ ἔστι κακὸν τῆς ἁσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν
45 λεχθείσαν ἁσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριώτητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακῶν τοσάτο εἰρήθωσα.

2 Δῶξει δὲ ἄν ἄκολοθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας

44 μεῖζον τε γὰρ ἔστι κακὸν τῆς ἁσωτίας] Before (§ 32) Aristotle made the doubtful statement that prodigality does more good than illiberality. He now makes the positively untrue statement that illiberality does more harm than prodigality. His view is fallacious from an ignorance of the principles of political economy, and from not looking at the question with sufficient breadth. He regards prodigality as a short-lived evil which will be cured by time, and illiberality as inveterate. But in their consequences it is rather prodigality that is incurable, and illiberality transitory. Illiberality can always be remedied, and indeed it brings its own remedy, for saving produces wealth and capital, and these lift a man naturally and necessarily into a more expensive style of living, however much he may haggle over details. But prodigality causes personally, to the family, and to the nation, a loss of resources which is absolutely incurable.

II. Magnificence, the virtue next discussed, is a higher kind of liber-
from timidity and constant fear of expense, will be always below the mark, and even after considerable expense will mar the whole effect by meaness in some point of detail.

2 τὸ δὲ μέγεθος—ἀρχιδεσμῷ ἕως ᾧ ἴση τοῖς τεῖς τῆς εἰκόνος τῶν τοιούτων τῶν παρασκευῶν. This latter office would of course demand peculiar splendour. The leitourgiai at Athens were exactly fitted to exercise the magnificence of the citizens.

τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς τοῦ ἐρωτευόμενου. The propriety accordingly must be relative to the person, the circumstances, and the object. We have here nearly the same categories as were given, Ἐκθ. iii. 1. 16, where the points connected with an action are enumerated, ἢ τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τι ἢ ἐν τούτῳ πράττει. On the suitableness of the person see below §§ 12-14. The circumstances are touched upon §§ 11, 15. The object

(which cannot be definitively separated from the circumstances), §§ 16-18.

3 πολλάκις δόρον ἄληθῆ] Homer Odyss. xvii. 420.

4 ἢ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βαναισία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ δοσι κανόνα] 'The corresponding excess is called "vulgarity," and "bad taste," and the like.' Βαναισία is said to be derived from βαῖνως 'a forge' and αἰων. Thus it means a metal-worker, or artisan. From the contempt felt by the Athenians for this kind of craft, βαναισία came to imply 'mean,' 'vulgar,' analogously to φορμίς. In Aristotle's Politics, there is a definition of what kind of work is strictly to be considered βαναισία (vii. ii. 4). Βαναισία ὡς ἄργον ἄριστον πρὸς τὰ τρόπο τῆς ἀρετῆς διακρινόμεθα. The word βαναισία is applied here to denote vulgarity in expenditure.
5 προςομεναι· υστερον δε περι αυτων ερυμεν. ο δε μεγαλοπρεπης επιστημων εοικεν· το πρεπον γαρ δυναται θεω-
6 ρησαι και δαπανησαι μεγαλα εμμελως. υσπερ γαρ εν
άρχη ειπομεν, η εξις τας ενεργειας οριζεται, και αδειον
αι δη του μεγαλοπρεπους δαπαναι μεγαλαι και πρεπουσαι.
τοιωτα δη και τα έργα· ουτω γαρ έσται μεγα δαπανημα και
πρεπον τη έργω. ωστε το μεν έργον της δαπανης αξιον
dei ειναι, την δε δαπανην του έργου, η και υπερβαλλειν.
7 δαπανησε δε τα τοιωτα δο μεγαλοπρεπης του καλου ένεκα
8 κουλον γαρ τουτο ταις αρεταις. και έτι ηδειος και προετι-
9 κως· η γαρ ακριβολογια μικροπρεπεσ. και τως καλτιστων
και πρεπουσετατων, σκεψαίταινι μαλλων η τοσον και τοσ
10 ελαχιστων. αναγκαιον δη και ελευθεριον των μεγαλοπρεπη
ειναι· και γαρ ο ελευθερος δαπανησεi δει και ως δει.
εν τουτω δε το μεγα του μεγαλοπρεπους, ουν μεγεθος,
περι ταυτα της ελευθεριοητης ουσης, και άπο της ίσης
δαπανης το έργον ποιοει μεγαλοπρεπετερον. ου γαρ η
αυτη άρετη κτιματος και έργου· κτιμα μεν γαρ το πλει-
στου αξιον ποιοτατων, ουν χρυσος, έργον δε το μεγα

5 δο μεγαλοπρεπης· εμμελως] 'The magnificent man is a kind of
artist, because he has an eye for the
becoming, and can spend great sums
tastefully.' The word επιστημων here
conveys the association of those quali-
ties which were said to belong to a
perfect work of art, Eth. II. vi. 9: Ει
δη τασα επιστημη οθω το έργον εο έπιτελει,
προς το μεσον βλεποναι,
k.t.l.

6 υσπερ γαρ· το έργω] 'For as
we said at the outset, a moral state is
determined by its acts and its objects.
Therefore the outlays of the magnifi-
cent man will be great and suitable.
And the works on which he employs
them will be of the same character,
for only thus it will be possible to
have a great outlay suitable to the
work.'

ην άρχη] The allusion seems to be
generally to the beginning of Book II.;
perhaps Eth. II. ii. 8 is the nearest
reference that can be given. But in
the present place Aristotle is not
speaking of the formation of habits
out of acts, but rather of moral habits
or states having a definite existence
and reality only in acts and in the
objective circumstances (ον έστι) to
which they (the moral states) refer.
This view regards a moral state as a
mere potentiality, which only attains
definite and conscious reality by
emerging into an act. The remark
is apparently made to account for a
concrete treatment of the virtue of
magnificence. Elsewhere we have
noticed (Eth. III. xii. 3 note) a com-
plete separation made between the
habit and the act.

10 αναγκαιον δε· μεγαθει] 'It
follows therefore that the magnificent
man must also be liberal, for the liberal man spends what he ought and in the way he ought. But it is in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality, that the element of greatness which there is in the magnificent man appears, as for example in vastness of proportions, and with the same expense he will make the result more splendid. For a work is not to be esteemed for the same qualities as a possession. That possession is most prized which is worth most, as for instance gold, but that work which is great and noble. When we contemplate such a work, we admire; but the magnificent is always admirable; and in short magnificence is—excellence of some work, which is on a scale of grandeur. The words οὐκ ἔφεσεν have vexed the commentators. One device that has been adopted is to omit the stop after μέγεθος and to translate the passage, 'Sed in his magnum est magnifici, veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa hec (reading ταύτα) versantis' (Michelet). Or, without altering the punctuation, we might construe, taking οὐκ μέγεθος as apexegetic of τὸ μέγα, 'But the greatness of the magnificent man, as it were a certain grandeur of scale, appears in these same particulars, which are common to magnificence and liberality.' But the point Aristotle insists on is that magnificence differs from liberality not in degree, but in kind, being a display of more genius and imagination on the same objects, and thus with the same expense producing a more striking result. He gives as an instance of the means employed, 'vastness of size.' Τὸ μέγα is the moral greatness of the magnificent man, this takes as its exponent μέγεθος or physical bulk. Cf. Aristotle's definition of Tragedy (Poetic vi. 2). 'Εστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μέγησιν πράξεως σπουδαία καὶ τελεία, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, κ.τ.λ., where μέγεθος implies bulk, or length of the story. Its limits are assigned 18. viii. 12. ἄλι μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνθετος εἶναι καλλίστον ἔστι κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς ἄλιν διαρίσσαντας εἰσί, ἐν δούλῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκασί τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐρεῖ οἰνοποιέων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐγνωμιάς ἐκ ἐστιν ἀνελθείς ἐὰν εὐγνωμίας ἐἰς ἐστι τοῦ μεγέθους.

11 εὐφαλιστηρία] 'favourite objects of rivalry.' Dr. Cardwell (upon § 2 above) quotes Lycurgus, Orat. contra Leoc. p. 167: Οὐ γὰρ εἶ τις ἐπιτετράφηκεν ἢ κεχορηγήκει λαμπρὸς ἢ εἰ χαρίστοις χάριτος ἢ τείχῃ τῇ παρθένῳ περιβάλλει, ἢ πρὸς τὴν κοφὴν συμπεριέν ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων συνεπάρχουσα.
άξια γὰρ δει τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἄλλα καὶ
13 τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης μὲν ύπ' ὁν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως·
ὁ δ' ἐπιχειροῦ ἡλιθίος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον,
14 κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθὸς. πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα
προϋπάρχει δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὁν αὐτοῖς
μετέτασι, καὶ τοῖς εὔγενεσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὁσα
τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα.
15 μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς, καὶ εἰν τοῖς
τοιοῦτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὡσπερ εἰρηται
μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμῶτα· τῶν δὲ ιδίων ὡσα εἰσαπαξ
γίνεται, οὖν γάμος καὶ εἰ τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περὶ τὰ πάσα ἡ
τόλις σπουδαῖει ἢ ὁ εν ἀξίωματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑπο-
δοχας καὶ ἀποστολᾶς, καὶ δωρεας καὶ ἀντιδωρεας· οὐ γὰρ
εἰς ἐαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ
16 δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθημασιν ἔχει τί δμοιον. μεγαλοπρεπῶς δὲ
καὶ οἷον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλοῦτι· κόσ-
μος γὰρ τὸς καὶ σῶτος, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανῶ
ὡς πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν
17 ἐκάστους τοῦ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀρμόδιει θεοῖς καὶ ἀν-
θρώποις, οὖν ἐν ἰερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων
ἐκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτων μὲν τὸ
18 ἐν μεγαλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτωι μέγα. καὶ
diaφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι
σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ λύκνθος ἡ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν
παυδοῦ δάφου, ἢ δὲ τούτω τιμή μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον.
19 διὰ τούτο ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ὃ ἀν ποίη γένει,

14 πρέπει δὲ—ἀξίωμα] 'The undertaking of such expenses is proper for
persons already distinguished by magn-
nificence, either in themselves, or their
ancestors, or their connections, and
for the noble, the illustrious, and such
like persons: for in all those cases
greatness and dignity are present.'

The use of προϋπάρχει here to denote
that which exists already as an achieve-
ment in one's family is not unlike its
use, Eth. i. xi. 4, to denote those

events which in a play are supposed
to have been done before the com-
menement of the action.

18–19 καὶ διαφέρει—δαπανήματος
'And the "greatness," which is ex-
hibited in the work, differs from the
"greatness" of the expense; for the
most beautiful of balls or of bottles is
magnificent as a present to a child,
though its price be small and paltry.
Hence the magnificent man, whatever
kind of thing he be producing, will
produce it magnificently; for the character of such work is that it cannot be easily outdone, its magnificence being always in proportion to the outlay; i.e. the feeling about such works will never be merely 'how costly they are!' but 'how great they are!' from an imaginative point of view; cf. § 10. The 'ball' and the 'bottle' seem to have been common toys. Dr. Fitzgerald compares the description of Cupid's toy in Apollonius Rhodius, Arg. iii. 135, and Plato, Phaedo, p. 110 B, ὀνειρεῖται διδακτάκινον σφαίραν, ποικίλη, χρώματι διαλημμένη. Also Theophrastus' Characters, Περὶ ἀρεσκείας, where the ἀρεσκεία is said to purchase θυρακᾶς τῶν στρογγυλῶν λιθίσθου—καὶ σφαιραστήριον.

II.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ-IV. 71 μεγαλοπρεπῶς τοιειν: τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐινυπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατʼ ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ 20 μεγαλοπρεπὴς, ὁ δὲ ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δεύν ἀνάλεικεν ὑπερβάλλει, ὡστερ εἰρηντι. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οὖν ἐρανιστᾶς γαμικὸς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμο-δοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρειν, ὡστερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα τοιοῦτα οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεκυνέως, καὶ διὰ ταύτα οἰόμενον θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεὶ πολλὰ ἀναλώσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δὲ ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς 21 περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὃ τι ἃν ποιῆ μέλλων, καὶ σκοτῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταύτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ

the Megarians do. In all this extravagance he never aims at the beautiful, but only seeks to parade his riches, in the hope of being stared at; where he should spend much, he draws his purse-strings, where he should spend little, he squanders. The last sentence shows that in vulgarity extremes meet, selfishness prompting both too much expense and too little; see above, chap. i. § 33, note. With παρὰ μέλος we may compare Shakespeare, Merry Wives, Act i. sc. 3. 'His frowning was like an unskilful singer: he kept not time.'

οὖν ἐρανιστὰs ἔρως being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ] The parody was the first song of the chorus sung at its entry. Naturally the comic chorus would not require rich purple dresses. The expense of a comic chorus at Athens appears to have been sixteen minae (64l.), that of a tragic chorus thirty minae (120l.); see Bentley on Phalaris,
p. 360. The Megarians were noted among the Greeks for stupidity.

22 ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἀπ' ἄσχημος ἀνθρωπία, οὐ μην ὀνειδίζῃ γ' ἐπιθέουσι διὰ τὸ μίας βλαβερὰ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μίας λίαν ἄσχημονς.

3 'Η δὲ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος

But we find on nearer inspection that this means that he is above all those minor interests which might induce to vice; he does not care about money, so he will never cheat; he does not value even life very high, so he will not be a coward. Here then there is no self-subjection to a law. The great-souled man does not avoid vice because it is 'wrong' (in the modern sense), but simply because it is unworthy of him. Thus he is most essentially a law to himself and above all other law. Aristotle spoke of great-souledness as being a sort of culmination of the virtues (§ 16), and justly so, for it is the culmination of his moral system. As we before remarked (ch. i. § 16, note), his system is based on the idea of self-respect. Loftiness of spirit is the highest form of self-respect (μεγαλωμένον προ τῶν ἄξοστοι, ἄξιοι ὡς). This principle goes a long way in elevating the character and purifying the conduct, but its natural development is also a dislike (§§ 24–26) of all limitations of the individuality; in short, its natural development is a sort of noble pride.

Great-souledness, however fine may be the qualities that go to make it up, is essentially not a human attitude. As we have observed already, it is something exceptional, and in Aristotle's account of it we have a psychological portrait of a great man. Yet still this account shows Aristotle not to have been familiar with that conception of 'moral goodness' which has arisen out of later associations.
II.—III.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΩΝ IV. 73

έοικεν είναι, περί τοία δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. διαφέρει δ' ὁδέν τὴν ἔξων ἡ τὸν κατ' τὴν ἔξων σκοπείν. δοκεῖ δὲ 3 μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλον αὐτὸν αξίων ἀξίων ὁν. ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίων αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁδέν ἡλίθιος αὐτό ἀνέστος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρὸν ἀξίων καὶ τούτων ἀξίων ἐαυτὸν 4 σώφρον, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὖ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλο- 5 ψυχία, ὅσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστείοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὖ· ὁ δὲ μεγαλόν 6 ἐαυτὸν ἀξίων ἀνάξιον ἄν χαῖνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἡ ἁξίος οὐ πᾶς χαῖνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττώνῳ ἡ ἁξίος μικρόψυχος, εάν 7 τε μεγάλων εάν τε μετρίων, εάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἁξίων ὁν ἐτι ἐλαττώνων αὐτὸν ἁξίων. καὶ μάλιστα ἄν δόξειν ὁ μεγαλόν ἁξίος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποτει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἂν ἁξίων; ἔστι 8 δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἀκρος, τῷ δὲ ὅς δεὶ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίων αὐτῶν ἁξίων. οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλ- λουσι καὶ ἐλλεῖπουσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἐαυτῶν ἁξίων ἁξίων 9 ὁν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγάστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἶν. ἡ δ' ἁξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' 10 ἂν θείμεν δ' τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὔ μάλιστ' ἐφιέναι οι ἐν ἁξίωματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστους ἄθλον.

2 διαφέρει δ' ὁδέν—σκοπείν) 'Now it does not make the least difference whether we consider the state of mind, or the character that is produced by the state of mind. The procedure adopted by Aristotle throughout is that of describing virtues in the concrete, though in no other case does he give so complete a personality as in describing the great-souled man. This procedure, while it gives graphic liveliness to his discussions, tends to make us forget that these virtues are not so much different kinds of character as different elements in the same character. A later development of Aristotle's ethical system calls attention to this point (cf. Eth. vi. xiii. 6). It has been said that the picture of a great-souled man here given to us must have been taken from life. Probably Aristotle traced different manifestations of the great-souled element in different people, and has here combined them.

5 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ—οὖ] 'For great-souledness implies greatness, just as beauty implies a large body; little people may be pretty and elegant, but not beautiful.' This was the Greek idea, cf. Politics, vii. iv. 8: τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πληρέω καὶ μεγέθει εὐπορεῖ γίνεσθαι. Poetics, vii. 8: τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξις ἐστί. Cf. also the story of Phye in Herodotus, i. c. 60. Against such critics of beauty as the Greeks, nothing is to be said.
10-11 toiovtov δ'—κατ' ἄξιαν δέ]
'Such a prize is honour, which is the greatest of all outward goods. Therefore the great-souled man bears himself as he ought with regard to honour and dishonour. But why should we prove what is obvious, that the study of magnanimous minds is honour? And great men lay especial claim to honour, yet according to their desert.' Aristotle here fixes external honour as the object with which great-souledness deals. Afterwards he sets it above all external honour (§ 17), ἄρετῆς γὰρ παντελῶς οὐκ ἄν γένουσα ἄξια τιμῆ. Honour is not good enough, but the world has nothing better to give.

15 οὖδαμῶς—παρασελγαρτ] 'It would never suit the great-souled man to fly in ungraceful haste.'

**Parasenex (i.e. τὰς χεῖρας) meant 'to work the hands in running.' Cf. De Iness. Animal. iii. 4, where the principle of the lever is shown to be involved in this-motion. Διὸ καὶ οἱ τεναλθοὶ ἀλλοτίαι πλεῖον ἔχοντες τῶν ἄλτρας ἢ μὴ ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ θέωνες μᾶκαν ἔθους παρασελεψεῖς τὰς χεῖρας γίνεται γὰρ τις ἀτέρεσις εἰς τὴν διατάξει πρὸς τὰς χεῖρας καὶ τῶν καρπῶν.

16 έοικε μὲν οὖν—καλοκαγάθαι] 'Now great-souledness appears to be, as it were, a sort of crown of the virtues; it enhances them, and it cannot come into existence without them. Hence it is hard to be great-souled in the true sense of the term, for this is impossible without nobleness and virtue.' The word 'magnanimity' is the conventional


representation of $\textit{megallaphia}, but it does not really answer to it. 'Magainanimity' often implies rather Gene-

osity, and what Aristotle calls $\textit{ekplē-

kea}$, than that loftiness of spirit which he attributes to the $\textit{megallaphia}$.

$\textit{kalokagagnia}$] This abstract noun does not occur in Plato, who fre-

quently uses the words $\textit{kalos}$ $\textit{te}$ $\textit{kagathō}$ (written separately) in the common Athenian sense, denoting

very much what we mean by 'a gentleman.' Aristotle uses the words $\textit{tōn}$ $\textit{en}$ $\textit{bhp}$ $\textit{kalos}$ $\textit{kagiathan}$ (Euth. i. viii.

9) to denote generally 'what is noble and excellent in life.' He also in-

roduces the present form, $\textit{Euth.}$ x. ix.

3, todes $\textit{de}$ $\textit{pollois}$ $\textit{dunastin}$ $\textit{pro}$

$\textit{kalokagagnia}$ $\textit{protrēpēsanw}$.$\textit{In Pol.}$

i. xiii. 4, he asks if both ruler and

ruled must equally partake of $\textit{kalo-

kagathia}$. In these passages there is

no special import given to the word.

It seems to imply a sort of elevated

virtue. Stahr translates the present

place, 'Es ist unmöglich ein Gross-

gesinter zu sein, ohne die Totalität

aller Tugenden.' And St. Hilaire—

"On ne peut l'être sans une vertu

complète." This is, however, taking

$\textit{kalokagathia}$ in the Eudemian sense, on

ἐνωτὸς μεγάλων ἀξιόσων οὕτε ὅρθως μεγαλόψυχοι λέγον-
21 ται. ἀνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοὺς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ῥεπ-
όπται δὲ καὶ ύβριστα καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχοντες υγαθὰ
γίγνονται. ἀνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ράδιον φέρειν ἐμελῶς τὰ
eὐτυχίματα· οὐ δυναμένοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
ἂλλων ὑπέρέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονούσιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὁ τι
ἂν τύχοσι πράττοσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τῶν μεγαλόψυχων
οὐχ ἄμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ ὅρασιν ἐν ὅσι δύνανται· τὰ μὲν
οὐν κατ’ ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττοσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν
22 ἂλλων. ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει
23 γὰρ ἄληθος), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχώντως, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
μικροκίνδυνους οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνους διὰ τὸ ὀλγα τιμᾶν, μεγα-
λοκίνδυνος δὲ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βλοῦ ὡς οὐκ
24 ἄλλων ὁ πάντως ζην, καὶ οίος εὖ τοιεῖν, ἐνεργετούμενον
δ’ ἀισχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ’ ὑπερεχο-
μένου, καὶ ἀνευρεγτικὸς πλειώνων οὕτω γὰρ προσ-
25 οφησθείς ο ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθός, δοκοῦσι δὲ
καὶ μνημονεύειν οὕς ἄν ποιῆσον εὖ, δὼ δ’ ἄν πάθωσιν
οὗ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ πάθων εὖ τοῦ ποιῆσαντος, βουλεῖται
δ’ ὑπερέχειν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἱδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ’ ἄρθροι· διὸ
καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐγενείας τῷ Δὐ’ οὖθ’ οἵ
Δάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς ’Αθηναίους, ἀλλ’ α πεπόνθεσαν εὖ.

22 ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος—τυχώντως] 'But the great-souled man despises justly (for his estimate is true), but most people do so at haphazard.' Throughout, the great man is justified in the high position he assumes by reason of the correctness of his estimate. Modern ideas of delicacy, to say the least, would prescribe this accuracy of self-appreciation, and the claims founded upon it.

24–26 He is glad to do a benefit and ashamed to receive one; he will wipe out a favour by doing a greater one in return; he will remember those whom he has benefited, but not those by whom he has been benefited; he will be in want of no one; he will serve any readily; he will be proud to the great, and easy with the lowly, &c. On the principle of independence, which appears here in an extreme form, see above, note on ch. i. § 16.

δὶ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν] Homer, Iliad 1. 503–4. She only says—

εὐς ἐς δε σε μετ’ ἄθανατως δησα ἡ ἐκ δ’ ἔργων. οὖθ’ οἳ Δάκωνες] This is said to have been on the occasion of a Theban invasion into Laconia. Aspasia quotes from Callisthenes a mention of the circumstance. Xenophon is thought to allude to the same event (Hell. vi. v. 33), where, however, he makes the Spartans enumerate their services.
μεγαλοψυχόχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἡ μόγις, ὕπρετειν 26
dὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξίωματι καὶ εὐνυχίας
mέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς τοὺς μέσους μέτριον τῶν μὲν γὰρ
ὑπερέχειν χαλεπτὸν καὶ σεμνὸν, τῶν δὲ ράδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις
μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἄγεννος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικῶν,
ὡσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἅσθενεις ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα 27
μὴ ἴεναι, ἡ οὖ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἄργον εἶναι καὶ
μελλήτην ἄλλη ἡ ὁποὶ τιμή μεγάλη ἡ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλγόν
μὲν πρακτικῶν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνοματῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ 28
καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν
φοβομένου. καὶ μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἡ τῆς
dόξης, καὶ λέγει καὶ πράττειν φανερός παρρησιασθῆς γὰρ
dιὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ
dι' εἰρωνείαν· εἴρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. καὶ πρὸς 29
ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ξῆν ἄλλη· ἡ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν γὰρ,
dιὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες διητικοί καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες,
οὐδὲ θαυμαστικὸς· οὐθὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ 30
μνησίκακος. οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψυχόχου τὸ ἀτομημονεῦνεν,
ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἄλλα μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδὲ ἀνδρω- 31
πολάγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐρεί οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου·
οὔτε γὰρ ἱνα ἐπανημείλει αὐτῷ αὐτῷ οὖθεν οἷς οἱ ἄλλοι
ψέγωνται, οὖθεν ἀδ ἐπανειρτικός ἐστιν· διόσπερ οὐδὲ κακο-
λόγος, οὔδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὑβριν. καὶ περὶ 32
ἀναγκαίων ἡ μικρῶν ἰκιστα ὀδοφυρτικός καὶ διητικός:

27-34 A list of characteristics follows, completing the picture of the
great-souled man. He will not
compete for the common objects of
ambition (τὰ ἔντιμα); he will only
attempt great and important matters,
hewill seem otherwise inactive; he
will be open in friendship and hatred;
really straightforward and deeply
truthful, but reserved and ironical in
manner to common people. Will live
for his friend alone, will wonder at
nothing, will bear no malice, will be
no gossip (οὐκ ἀνθρωπολόγος), will not
be anxious about trifles, and will care
more to possess that which is fine
than that which is productive. His
movements are slow, his voice is
deep, and his diction stately.

28 ἐλωλα δὲ πρὸς τῶν πολλῶς]
Bekker has introduced this reading
on the authority of one MS. alone;
all the rest read ἐλωλεῖα. Ἐλωλα is
not strictly grammatical, but it is in
accordance with the Aristotelian mode
of writing; it comes in despite the
nominative ἀληθευτικός, as a carrying
on of the accusatives before used,
καὶ ἄργον εἶναι—καὶ ὀλγῶν πρακτικῶν,
&c.
33 σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὖτως ἦχεν περὶ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷος
κεκτήσαθαί μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀκαρτά τῶν καρπίμων καὶ
34 ὡφελήμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κινήσει δὲ βραδεία
tοῦ μεγαλοπύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνῆ βαρεία, καὶ λέξεις
στάσιμος· οὖ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὁλίγα σπουδάζων,
oὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηθὲν μέγα αἰώμενος· ἢ δὲ ὁξυφωνία καὶ
35 ἡ ταχύτης διὰ ταύτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπύχος, ὁ
ἕλλειπτος μικρόφωνος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαίνως. οὐ κακοῖς
μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ρωσθ' οὖτοι· οὖ γὰρ κακοποῖοι εἰσιν·
ἡμαρτημένοι δὲ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόφωνος ἄξιος ὁν ἄγαθων
ἐαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὁν ἄξιος ἐστι, καὶ ἔσχε κακὸν ἐχειν τι ἐκ
τοῦ μη ἄξιον ἐαυτὸν τῶν ἄγαθῶν, καὶ ἄγνοιει δ' ἐστωτι
ἐφέγετο γὰρ ἄν ὅν ἄξιον ἦν, ἄγαθων γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν
ἡλίδιοι γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροὶ.

35 οὐ κακοὶ—ἡμαρτημένοι δὲ] 'Now it is true that these again are not
bad, for they do no harm, but are
only in error.' οὖθε refers to ch. ii.
§ 22. Vanity and want of spirit are,
like pettiness and vularity, not very
serious vices. Of the latter pair,
speaking of the qualities and not the
persons possessing them, he said they
are κακίας, but not disgraceful.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ—ἄγαθων] 'For the small-
souled man, though worthy of good
things, deprives himself of his deserts,
and seems to be harmed by not
appreciating his own claims, and by
ignorance of himself; else he would
have aimed at the good things he had
a claim to. Such characters, how-
ever, are not to be called foolish, but
it is rather their energy that is defi-
cient. Still this way of thinking
seems to have a bad effect upon the
character: for men's aims are regu-
lated by their opinions of their merits,—but these draw back from
noble actions and pursuits, thinking
themselves unworthy; and in the
same way they cut themselves off
from external advantages.' From
these considerations, and from the
whole tendency of his system, Aris-
totle decides that small-souledness is
worse than vanity (§ 37), and he also
asserts that it is more common.
Want of elevated aims, want of effort,
of will, of individuality, these are
indeed fatal deficiencies as regards
the attainment of what is fine and
noble in character. The conception
of 'humility' is of course quite
beside the system of Aristotle, but
we may observe that it does not come
into necessary collision with a con-
demnation of μικρόφωνα For this
latter implies a want of moral aspi-
ration. Now it is desirable to combine
with humility the greatest amount of
moral aspiration.

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροὶ] Another
reading, supported by several Mss.,
is νοεροὶ, which the Scholiast explains
by δριμεῖα καὶ ἐπωνυμία. The Para-
phrast, however, gives νοθροὶ, which
supports the present reading. Νοθροὶ
makes good sense, since it is true that
want of spirit often accompanies an
intellectual turn of mind, men's
'native hue of resolution' being
we may infer a mean. There are two words, ambitious and unambitious; both these are made terms of reproach, thus implying that there must be a middle quality, in relation to which they are each extremes. Again, both are used as terms of praise, which shows that each in turn lays claim to the mean place, as setting itself off against its opposite.

1 kαθάπερ εν τοῖς πρῶτοι] Cf. Eth. ii. vii. 8. This expression might seem to suggest that the present passage was written after an interval; it is repeated in § 4.

4 ἄτι δ' ὅτε—μέσον] 'But sometimes we praise the ambitious man as
manly and noble-spirited, and sometimes we praise the unambitious man as moderate and sober-minded, as mentioned in our first remarks. Now it is plain that as the term “lover of anything” is used in more senses than one, we do not always apply the term “lover of honour” to express the same thing, but when we praise, we praise that ambition which is more than most men’s, and when we blame, we blame that which is greater than it should be. The mean state having no name, the extremes contend, as it were, for this unoccupied ground; but still it exists: for where there is excess and defect there must also be a mean.’

6 έοικε δ’ τούτ’ είσαι καί περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς] Cf. ΕΠΑ. II. viii. 1–2.

V. The regulation of the temper (μεσότης περὶ ὅργας) is the next subject for discussion. Aristotle confesses that there is no name for this, but he provisionally calls it mildness, though this term is also used to express a deficiency in the feeling of anger. Excess in this feeling has various forms, and accordingly various names; the passionate (ὁργαλο), the hasty (ἀκρόχολο), the sulky (πειρόλ), the morose (χαλέστοι), all come under the same category as showing excessive or ill-directed anger. Aristotle does not here enter upon the philosophy of anger, inquire its final cause, and in accordance with this determine its right manifestation. He says it is human to avenge oneself (§ 12), and not to resent certain things is slavish (§ 6) and a moral defect, hence we must have a certain amount of anger. This amount must be duly regulated, but where the true mean is cannot be laid down in the abstract (οὐ ῥήτων τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδεεναι); it depends on the particular circum-
stances, and must be left to the intuïtive judgment of the mind (ἐν τῇ αληθείᾳ ἡ κραίσ).

3-6 Βοιλεται γὰρ — ἀνδραποδόθει] 'For the term "mild man" means one that should be dispassionate and not carried away by his feeling, but should be angry in the way, at the things, and for so long a time, as the mental standard may have appointed. Yet this character seems rather to incline to error on the side of deficiency, for the mild man is more apt to pardon than to resent. But the deficiency is a moral fault (ψέκαται), whether it be called perhaps (τὰ) want of anger, or whatever else. For men seem fools who do not feel anger at things at which they ought to feel it, or in the manner they ought, or at the time they ought, or with the persons they ought. Such a man seems to be devoid of feeling and of the sense of pain, and since nothing provokes him, he seems not to know how to defend himself: but to suffer insult or to stand by and see one's friends insulted is servile.'

Βοιλεται γὰρ ὁ πράος] Βοιλεται appears to be used here in a doubtful sense, something between 'the word mild means,' &c., and 'the mild man has a tendency to,' &c.; cf. ch. 1. § 5, note.

τὸ δὲ προσηλακτικόν] Had the Ethics been composed on a psychological plan, what is said here might have been arranged under the head of θυμός, and would have been connected with the relation of θυμός to courage, which is discussed above, Eth. III. viii. 10–12. The present passage is admirably illustrated by Shakespeare's Hamlet, Act II. Scene 2:

'Am I a coward? Who calls me villain? breaks my pate across? Plucks off my beard and blows it in my face? Tweaks me by the nose? gives me the lie i' the throat.
As deep as to the lungs? Who does me this?
Ha! why I should take it: for it cannot be
But I am pigeon-liver’d, and lack gall.
To make oppression bitter.’

7 ᾧ δ’ ὑπερβολὴ—γίνεται] ‘Now the excess is possible under all heads, the wrong people, the wrong things, more, quicker, longer, than is right. However, these excesses cannot all coexist in the same man. This would be impossible. For evil destroys even itself, and if it exist in its entirety, it becomes unbearable.’ Psichological reasons might be assigned why the same person cannot be passionate, peevish, and sulky. But Anthotole here gives an abstract generalisation—that the different forms of evil are mutually destructive, and that it is only by tempering evil with a certain admixture of good that its existence can be borne.

8 συμβαίνει δ’—ἀπειρασίων] ‘This happens because they do not keep in their anger, but through their keenness make reprisals in an open way, and then they are done.’ The words ὕφερπολεὶ εἰσὶ can have nothing to do with the principle given in the Rhetoric, II. ii. 1, that anger desires to make itself manifestly felt, else we must have had ἤφερπολεὶ ἀν ὕφερπολεὶ. The Paraphrast simply renders ὑπερβολὴ δ’ εἰσὶν ὅ ἀκρόχολοι ὥξεις καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὄργυλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντὶ ὀθεν καὶ τούτοιμα. οἱ δὲ πυκνοὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ
in their wrath. Now there is a natural termination, when one has wreaked one's resentment, since re-venge stops anger by substituting a feeling of pleasure for that of pain. But if this does not take place, these people continue to feel their burden. Their feeling is not manifest, and so no one reasons them out of it, while to digest it internally requires time. Therefore such persons are exceedingly vexatious both to themselves and to their best friends.' An admirable account of sulkiness, on which nothing more need be said.

13 ο δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦ πρότερον εἰρηνα] This refers to Eth. ii. ix. 7-9, which passage is with some amplification almost exactly repeated here. This part of the Ethics is written with a constant reference to Book II., and yet as if the subject had been taken up again to be worked out after an interval.
VI. The next subject is the regulation of one's deportment in society, with regard especially to complacency or the reverse. This also is a balance between extremes, avoiding on the one side surliness (τὸ δύσκολον), and on the other side the conduct both of the weak assessor (ἀρέσκεια), and of the interested flatterer (κόλαξ). The balance has no name, it is most like friendship, but differs from it in being devoid of affection, and being extended to all in proper degrees. There is a slight departure here from Book II. vii. 11–13, and it may be said that the present treatment is an improvement. Before (l.c.) it was said, there are three virtues connected with speech and action in society: the first is about what is true, the others about what is pleasant. But here the quality which concerns the deportment and whole spirit of a man in society is rightly treated as most generic, and placed first. In Book II. the name φίλος is unreservedly given to the quality in question, but here no name is assigned, and only a resemblance to friendship is pointed out.

5 ὅπος ἄρμοις—λυπείτων ὅτι it is not fitting that we should pay the same regard to strangers as to familiairs, nor again have we an equal title to put them to pain. This latter clause is explained in §§ 7–9, where it is laid down that though the general object will be to give pleasure, yet that a man must bring himself to give pain on occasion, with a view to important moral consequences in the future. He would, of course, feel himself more bound to exercise this duty with regard to friends. Φρενίτις is a
general expression, implying equally care to please, and care for the welfare of the persons in question.

6-7 καθόλου — δυσχεραίνῃ] We have said generally that (the good man) will associate with people as he ought, but we may add (βδ) that, with a constant reference to what is beautiful and what is expedient, he will aim at not giving pain, or at contributing pleasure. The province of his virtue lies among the pleasures and pains that arise out of social intercourse, and wherever in giving pleasure he would dishonour or injure himself, he will make a difficulty, and rather choose to give pain than such gratification. And if there be something which will bring, to any considerable degree, disgrace or harm on the doer, while opposition will give him slight pain, (the good man) will not approve it, but will show his repugnance.' (1) It may be derogatory to oneself to show complacency. (2) It may be hurtful to some member of the company. These cautions show the moral and thoughtful spirit by which Aristotle would have conduct in society regulated. The following section prescribes the bearing of a finished gentleman, giving to all their due. It must not be forgotten that Aristotle himself had played the part, not only of a philosopher, but also of a courtier.

9 δύσκολον] Eudemus uses the word αὐθώντος to denote this character (Eth. Eud. iii. viii. 4), in which he is followed by Theophrastus (Characters, c. 15) and the author of the Magna Moralia (r. xxii.). Eudemus makes the mean state συμβούς, which is a departure from the present treat-
VII. There follows another nameless excellence closely connected with the former, having still to do with demeanour in society; this, by a curious formula, is termed the regulation of boastfulness (ἡ τῆς ἀλαξωνείας μεσότης). The boastful man lays claim to honourable qualities which he does not possess, or to a greater degree than he possesses them (δοκεῖ προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι κ.τ.λ.), while the ironical man denies or understates his own merits. The balance between these two is found in the straightforward character (αὐθεκαστὸς ταῦ), who in word and deed neither diminishes nor exaggerates his own good qualities. In Eth. ii. vii. 12, the provisional name ἀλήθεια was given to this virtue, but here Aristotle points out that it is to be distinguished from 'truth,' in the more serious sense of the word,—that 'truth' which makes the difference between justice and injustice. What he is at present concerned with is merely a truthfulness of manner, though he confesses (§ 8) that this has a moral worth (ἐνισχύοντας), and that the man who is truthful in little things will also be truthful in more important affairs.

3 ἐρωτ. This is an excessively difficult word to express in English. 'Ironical' has acquired an association of bitterness and taunting,—'Dissembler' of craft. If we render it by 'over-modest' we trench upon the qualities of the μερόφυνχος, and imply too much that is connected with the whole character. Ἐρωτεία as here spoken of is simply an affair of the manner; there appear to be two forms of it, one that refined species exhibited by Socrates, the other an affectation of humility which is really contemptible. There is perhaps no one English word to express these two forms, the only resource appears to be to use the word 'Ironical' in a restricted sense. Ἐρωτ. in Theophrastus (Char. I.) is used in a worse sense than in Aristotle, to denote one who dissembles for selfish motives, and whose whole life is artificial and deceitful.

4 αὐθέκαστος, probably from αὐτὸ ἐκαστῷ, 'everything exactly as it is,'
and hence a 'matter-of-fact' or 'straightforward' man.

5-6 ἐστι δὲ—διαλείψαντι] *Now it is possible to practise both irony and boastfulness either with or without a particular motive. But in general a man speaks, acts, and lives, in accordance with his character, unless he have a particular motive. Falsehood is in itself base and reprehensible, and truth is noble and praiseworthy. And thus the truthful man, who occupies the mean, is praiseworthy, while those who strive to give a false impression of themselves are both reprehensible, and especially the boaster.' Aristotle first appears to assert that both irony and boastfulness are prompted generally by a particular motive, for, if it were not so, men would be simple and natural. Afterwards we are told that boastfulness is a condition of the will (ἐν τῇ προαίρεσι), that it aims at either gain or reputation,—that irony may spring from a motive of refinement, or again from vanity itself. Those things however may aim at reputation and yet be instinctive, the desire for reputation forming part of men's natural impulses.

8 διέγειται οὐκ—ἐπανετέρων] *But this character appears to possess a moral excellence. For the lover of truth, who adheres to what is true even in things where it does not matter, will be still more truthful in affairs of importance, for he will surely avoid a lie when it appears as something base, when he avoided it before merely for its own sake.' The writing here is a little careless, since above, all lies were declared to be essentially base, but here a contrast seems to be drawn between the 'white lie' in society, and the base lie in affairs of importance. Aristotle probably intended in his account of Justice (§ 7) to treat more profoundly
εμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθείς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζων τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος μηθεός ἕνεκα φαίλω μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαρε τῷ ψευδεῖ), μᾶταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακὸς. εἰ δὲ ἔνεκα τινος, ὃ μὲν δόξης ἡ τιμῆς οὐ λιαν ψεκτός, τῶς τὸ ἁλαζόνιον, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὁσα εἰς ἀργυρίου, ἀσθομονέστερος. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ἁλαζόνιον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαρέσει κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτο δεῖναι ἁλαζόνιον ἐστίν, ὡσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὃ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαῖρων, ὁ δὲ

δόξης ὁρεγόμενος ἡ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἁλαζόνευμοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' ὃς ἐπαίνοις ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὅν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οὖν μάντιν σοφὸν ἡ ἱατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλέοντες προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἁλαζόνευονται· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ' ἐφιστεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν λέγοντες χαρίστεροι μὲν τὰ ἥσοι φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ

of Truth in its relation to the moral character. This intention, however, was never fulfilled.

10–12 ὁ δὲ μείζων—κέρδους] 'But the man who pretends to better qualities than he really possesses, if he has no motive, shows like a mean man, for else he would not have delighted in the falsehood, though he seems foolish rather than bad. Supposing there is a motive, if it be reputation or honour, the boaster is not to be severely blamed, but if it be money, directly or indirectly, his conduct is more discreditable. The boaster is not constituted by a given faculty, but by a particular condition of the will; for it is in accordance with his moral state, and by reason of his character, that he is a boaster, just as either from taking pleasure in falsehood itself, or from aiming at reputation or gain (in short, from the state of his will and moral character)—a man is called a liar.

†τὸς δ' ἁλαζόνιον] This makes no sense. The Paraphrase omits ὃς altogether, rendering the passage, ei δὲ τῶς ἑνεκα προσποιούται, ei μὲν δόξης ἡ τιμῆς οὐ λιαν ψεκτός ὁ ἁλαζόνιον. To follow his example seems the simplest remedy. One of the MSS. omits ὃ, which would give the sense 'he is not very blameable considering that he is a boaster.'

12 ὃς καὶ τῇ δυνάμει—ἀλλ' εν τῇ προαρέσει] Cf. the well-known passage Rhet. i. i. 14, where the Sophist is said to be distinguished from the Dialectician not intellectually but morally, δ' γὰρ σοφοτέρους ὃς καὶ τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' εν τῇ προαρέσει.

13 This is a very happy observation, that desire for reputation makes men pretend to virtue, power, and the like; but desire for gain makes them pretend to useful arts the possession of which cannot be tested; thus a man will give himself out to be a clever soothsayer or doctor.

14–15 of δ' ἐφιστει—ἀλαζόνει οὐ
Ironical persons, in depreciating themselves, exhibit, it is true a certain refinement of character, for they do not appear to speak in that way for the sake of gain, but to avoid pomposity; but it must be confessed that these too especially disclaim qualities held in repute, as Socrates used to do. But they who make a pretence about things petty and obvious are called "humbugs," and are despised by everyone. Sometimes this kind of conduct appears to be really pretension, as in the case of the Laconian dress; for both the excess and the extreme of deficiency are of the nature of boasting.

There appears to be a slight antithesis between χαριστέροι μὲν—and μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ὁτιο, as if the disclaiming of honourable qualities were not so much to the credit of the Ironical. καὶ ὁτιο seems to imply a reference to the great-souled man, who was described as having tendencies of the same kind, I. ii. § 27–28.


It is impossible to understand this in the sense of 'disclaiming' which the context requires. The Paraphrase supplies μὴ δοκεῖναι, and explains it very clearly, as follows, δὲ δὲ ὡς μοῦν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ...

VIII. 1 Οὐσία δὲ—τοιοῦτον ἄκοδων] 'Rest also being a part of human life, and an element of this being playful diversion, we find here likewise the sphere for a certain harmonious manner of intercourse, and the possibility of both speaking and hearing the right sort of things in the right way; though there will be a difference as to whether one is the speaker in such matters or listens to what is said.'
joke and why it Please. Nor does he lay down any canons for the regulation of wit, except such general ones as that 'nothing should be said which is unworthy of a gentleman' (πότερον οὖν τὸν εὐφράτεις ἥγεσιν ὃς ἐκκακεῖ ἔλευθερω), that the hearer must not be shocked, &c. On the whole he leaves it indefinite, saying that tastes differ, and the educated man will be a law to himself. His account of wit then is negative, and abstract, though perfectly just as far as it goes.

1 διαγωγή μετὰ παιδαίας] διαγωγή is the passing of time, hence 'dissension.' Cf. Metaphys. Ι. I. 15: πλακόων δ' εὐφράτειν τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τάναγεα τῷ δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν οὖν. Eth. x. vii. 3: κατασφεύγοντε δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονίασθω νοὶ πολλοί.

2 βομβολόχα] This name seems originally to have belonged to the viles creatures who lay in wait at the altars to purloin the offerings, and hence to have been applied to those who thought nothing too low for them, buffoons who would descend to anything.

οἱ δ' εὐμελοὶ—τὰ ἡθα] 'But they whose jocularity is in good taste are called witty, by a name that implies their happy turns; for such motions of wit seem to belong to the moral character, and characters, like bodies, are judged by their movements.' Aristotelē here calls attention to the etymology of εὐφράτειος, as he did before to that of ἀδυντος. Ch. 1. § 5.

4 ἐπιτολάδωστος—χαριστερε] 'But as the ludicrous meets us at every turn (ἐπιτολάδωστος, cf. Eth. I. iv. 4), and most people take pleasure in sport and jesting more than they ought, even buffoons get the name of witty, just as though they were fine wits.'
6 ὃδε δ' ἄν—εὐσχημοσύνην] 'This we may see from a comparison of the old and the new comedy. In the former it is coarse language that provokes laughter, in the latter it is rather insinudo; which makes no small difference with respect to decorum.' This interesting remark is in accordance with what we know from other sources of the comparative tameness of the new comedy in relation to the license of the old. Cf. Horace, A. P. 281 sqq.

9 οὐ δὴ πᾶς—σκόπτεται] 'Therefore he will not give utterance to every jest, for the jest is a sort of reviling, and the lawgivers forbid certain kinds of reviling—they ought perhaps to have forbidden (certain) jests.' 'Εκα must be understood as carried on from λιθοδοσίας to σκόπτεται. Aristotle could never have wished that jesting altogether should be forbidden by the law.

10 ὃ δὴ χαρίες—ἔαντο] 'This then will be the attitude of the refined and liberal man, he being as it were a law to himself.' Aristotle usually escapes from pure definiteness and relativity by asserting that the standard in each case is to be found in the good, the wise, the refined man. This standard is evidently the expression of the universal reason of man. It is not to be supposed that wit, beauty, or goodness are mere matters of taste, as Aristotle would seem for a moment to imply (ὅ καὶ τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἄριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισθῶν τε καὶ ἤδο). When he adds afterwards that the educated man must be the standard of appeal, he means that the laws of reason must decide. And these might, had Aristotle thought it worth his while, have been more drawn out in reference to the question under discussion.

10-12 These sections are an almost
Verbal repetition of what was said, *Eth. ii. vii. 11-13*. They appear like an after-thought as compared with *Eth. iv. vi. 1*.

We perhaps ought hardly to quit the present subject without alluding to the remarks which Aristotle has elsewhere thrown out on the nature of wit and of the ludicrous. The most striking are *Rhet. ii. xii. 16*, where he defines wit as ‘chastened insolence,’ ἡ γὰρ εὐστρεπελλα πεπαινεμένη ὑβρὶς ἄστιν, and his account of the ludicrous, that it consists in a thing being out of place, anomalous, ugly and faulty, though not in such a way as to cause any sense of apprehension or pain. *Poet. v. 2*: Τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον ἐστὶν διάφθειμα τι καὶ αληχος ἀμοῦνοι καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἴον εἴοθε τὸ γελοῖον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον αληχοῦ τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀξύνοις. This definition, which is to the highest degree penetrating, has been made by Coleridge the text for his admirable dissertations on wit and humour. *See Literary Remains, Vol. I.*

**IX. 1-2** Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς—εἰςαὶ 'Modesty we can scarcely with propriety describe as a virtue; for it seems to be rather a feeling than a moral state; at least it is defined to be a kind of fear of evil report; and in its effects it is analogous to the fear of danger, for persons who are ashamed blush, and those who are in terror of death grow pale. Both affections then appear to be in a manner corporeal, which is the mark rather of feelings than of states.' Aristotle, following out the programme given, *Eth. ii. vii. 14-15*, arrives now at the place for discussing two instances of the law of the balance existing in the instinctive feelings of the mind (ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι μεσοθησί), namely modesty and indignation. But from some cause his work is interrupted here; indignation (Νέμωσις) is not treated of at all, and the discussion on modesty is left unfinished. There is no mention of the extremes, shamelessness (ἀρατιωσία) and shamefacedness (κατάτηξις), which are specified in Book II. (*l. c.*) and in *Eth. Eud. iii. vii. 2.* After stating that only to certain ages is 'modesty' suitable, and that only in a certain provisional sense (ἐξ ἱστολεκοῦ) can it be called a virtue, the chapter abruptly ends, a couple of sentences having been added by some later hand which give an appearance of finish to the book and awkwardly connect it with the opening of Book V.
3-5 aïdōs is the apprehension of shame, joined of course with a capacity for strongly feeling it; neither modesty nor any other English word seems adequately to convey the force of aïdōs. Aristotle speaks of it as a desirable quality in tender age, before the character is formed. But in maturer life the necessity for it, and therefore its merit, ceases to exist. It might be said that sensibility to shame ought to be preserved with regard to acts that are conventionally (κατὰ δόξαν) and not really (κατ' ἄληθείαν) disgraceful; but Aristotle says that any possibility of feeling shame must be avoided altogether, so that the former acts must not be done.

7 'Modesty can only be good hypothetically: if a person were to do so and so, he would be ashamed. But this is not the way with the virtues. Though shamelessness and the having no sensibility about base acts is bad, it does not follow that to do such things and feel shame is good.' Ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 'conditionally' is opposed to ἄνθρωπος 'absolutely.' While the virtues are absolutely good, modesty is only conditionally so.

οὐκ ἢτι δὲ τούτο περὶ τᾶς ἀρετᾶς. The same formula occurs before, Eth.
ἐστι δ' οὖν ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθῆσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὄστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

1. vii. 20: ἰκανῶν ἐν τοιῷ τὸ δτὶ δειχθήματι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς.
† οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὖν ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή· δειχθῆσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὄστερον. Νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν] Aristotle's MS.

of the fourth book having ended abruptly at the word ἐπιεικώς, Nicomachus or the editor, whoever he was, in all probability added these clauses in order to give the book a seeming union with the three Eudemian books which were now to be grafted on.
PLAN OF BOOK V.

HITHERTO all has been perfectly coherent and regular in the "Ethics of Aristotle. Down to the ninth Chapter of Book IV., though all the parts may not have been composed at the same time, yet all belong to the same plan, and bear every mark of being the work of the same author. But the MS. of Book IV. seems suddenly to have broken off in the middle of a subject. Whether this was owing to mutilation, or to original incompleteness, there are now no means of saying. What is clear to us from internal evidence is, that the editor has at this point commenced supplying a lacuna; and accordingly three whole books are now introduced, which, though bearing a close resemblance to the style of Aristotle, and probably conveying, with only slight modifications, his actual system, yet belong to the "Ethics of Eudemus, Aristotle's disciple, and thus have only an imperfect coherence with the present work. The chief arguments by which it is demonstrated that Books V., VI., VII., are only 'copies' from Aristotle by one of his school have been given, Essay I. pp. 50–71, and need not here be recapitulated.

The present Eudemian book on Justice may bear the same relation to Aristotle's theory of Justice, now lost, as the Eudemian theory of Pleasure in Book VII. bears to Aristotle's theory of Pleasure given in Book X. Or, on the other hand, Aristotle's account of Justice may never have been actually written, and may only have existed as orally imparted to the School; in which case the present book would claim a slightly more original character, being built up by Eudemus out of Aristotelian materials, but not on the lines of any one treatise. The extent to which parts of this book appear to have been suggested by passages in the "Politics of Aristotle (see ii. 11, iii. 1–14, v. 6, vi. 4–5, and notes) would rather
favour the latter supposition. But we trace the same endeavour to slightly improve on the conclusions of the *Politic*ē, which Eudemus elsewhere so often exhibits to improve upon the *Ethics* of Aristotle. We observe here also indications that the Peripatetic School had been busy in working out the beginnings of political economy as made by Plato and Aristotle. The theory of money, value, and price, given in chap. v., is in its way excellent. The Eudemian books, however, have all a peculiar indistinctness which taxes the reader's thought to divine their exact bearing. But on consideration, the outlines of a method appear to show themselves through the mist. And accordingly the following parts may perhaps be discerned in Book V.

(1.) Justice having been defined to be 'a state of mind that wills to do what is just,' the first part of the book is concerned with determining what is the just? (*rò δικαίος*) as distinguished from *δικαιοσύνη*). The abstract principle of 'the just' may either be identified with all law, and therefore with all morality; or it may be restricted to its proper sense, fair dealing with regard to possessions, &c. (*rò ισός*). In this restricted sense 'the just' finds its sphere either in distributions of the state, or in correcting the wrongs done in dealings between man and man. Though justice is not retaliation pure and simple, yet in all commerce, &c., there is a sort of retaliation. Ch. i.—v. § 16.

(2.) Having settled the nature of 'the just,' it follows to discuss 'justice,' or this same principle manifested in the mind of the individual. This part of the subject is very imperfectly carried out. We miss the graphic impersonations of the virtues with which the fourth book of Aristotle's *Ethics* is filled. We find nothing but a few barren remarks on voluntariness as necessary to make an act unjust, and deliberate purpose to constitute an unjust character. There is a large digression here on the proper sense of the word 'justice.' Justice, it is said, can only properly exist between citizens; it is a mere metaphor to talk of justice in families, &c. Ch. v. § 17—Ch. viii.

(3.) Certain questions are added, the answers to which go to supply deficiencies in the definition hitherto given of justice. The leading question is, Can one be injured voluntarily? and the answer to this shows that justice implies a relation between two distinct
wills and interests. It is again repeated that justice must be a
settled state of the character; thus the just man could not at will
be unjust. The subject is concluded by an assertion that justice is
essentially a human quality. Ch. ix.

(4.) An appendix follows on the nature of Equity, which is a
higher and finer justice, dealing with exceptional cases and acting
in the spirit, not in the letter of the law. Ch. x.

(5.) Ch. xi. might be called superfluous and out of place. It
touches on the already settled question, Can a man injure himself?
But the want of a lucidus ordo is universally characteristic of the
Eudemian Ethics; and this chapter adds some after-thoughts on
suicide as an act of injustice, and on the metaphor of justice be-
tween the higher and the lower faculties.

Owing, probably, to the want of distinctness in it, this book has
not made so much impression on the world as some of the Nicoc-
macean books with which it has been incorporated. The distinc-
tion between 'distributive' and 'corrective' justice is, however,
sometimes referred to, as, for instance, by Lord Bacon in the 'Ad-
vancement of Learning.' This and the other distinctions which
the book brings out belong rather to politics or political economy
than to morals. The remaining contributions to the subject here
made—such as the showing that injustice implies a conflict of
wills—may have been useful as a clearing up of language at the
time when the book was written.

Hildenbrand, in his Geschichte und System der Rechts- und
Staatsphilosophie, complains of the meagre account of Contracts
given in this book, especially as contrasted with the full disquisition
in the Laws of Plato.

What is still more to be complained of and regretted is, the
insufficient account of Justice—from an ethical point of view, as a
state of the soul—with which we have here to content ourselves.
ΠΕΡΙ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκέπτον, περὶ ποιας
te τυχαίνονσιν ὁδὸι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης
2 ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ
σκέψις ἡμῖν ἐστὶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρμένοις.
ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξὶν βουλομένους

I. This chapter proposes and opens the discussion upon the nature of justice and injustice. The chief points it contains are as follows. (1.) Justice and injustice must stand opposed to each other, as being two contrary states of mind. From the nature of one, we may infer its contrary the nature of the other, and if the one term be used in a variety of senses, the other term will be used in a corresponding variety of senses. (2) The term 'unjust man' is used in two senses, to denote one who is lawless, and one who is unfair. Therefore the term 'just' must denote both lawful and fair. (3) The lawful (τὸ νόμου) is simply all that the state has enacted for the welfare of its citizens. Therefore, in one sense, 'justice' means fulfilling all the requirements of law. Thus it is nothing else than perfect and consummate virtue. In this general sense justice is different from virtue only in the point of view which one would take in defining it.

1 ποῖα μεσότης] Aristotle proposed the question about the two kinds of justice, 'in what sense are they mean states?' τῶν μεσότητις εἶσαι (Eth. II. vii. 16), which is slightly different from the above. Cf. ch. v. § 17 of this book.

2 η δὲ σκέψις—προειρμένοις] 'And let our inquiry be according to the same method as what has preceded.' This probably refers to the way in which the moral virtues have been treated in the preceding Book of the Eudemian Ethics. There is nothing distinctive about this method, or different from the procedure of Aristotle. What is most specially alluded to at present must be the fixing of the meaning of terms, which is now resorted to with regard to justice, and which was more or less employed before. Cf. Eth. Eud. III. v. 1–3, where the general method and the style of the writing has great affinity to the present opening. Περὶ δὲ μεγαλοφυχαῖς ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλο-
ψχοις ἀποδιδομένων δὲι διορθά τὸ
ἴδιον (e conj. Bonitz. Ceteri aitio). Ὡστερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἀλα κατὰ τὴν
gενετές καὶ ὁμομυθήματα μέχρι τοῦ
λαθάνην πάροικον προέναι, καὶ τερί
Λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἄφ' ἴση πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἄφ' ἴση δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περί ἀδικίας, ἄφ' ἴση ἀδίκωσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διό καὶ ἢμιν πρότον ὡς ἐν τούτῳ ὑποκείθοντα ταῦτα. οὕτω γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπὶ-4 στιμῶν καὶ δύναμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξεσ. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἔξεσ δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων σι, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεῖα μόνον. λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιείως βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἄν ὁ ὑγιαινών. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἔξεσ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντιάς, πολλάκις δὲ ἢ ἔξεσ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· εάν τε γὰρ ἡ ἰσχία ἡ φανερά, καὶ ἡ κακεξία φανερα γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεκτικῶν ἡ ἰσχία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ ἐνεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ ἰσχία πυκνότης σαρκῶς, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν κακεξίαν εἶναι μακρότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐνεκτικόν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, εἰν αὐτῷ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, καὶ βατέρα πλεοναχὸς λέγει—

τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταῦτα αὐτὸ ομοθέτερον. —Λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλοψυχὸν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ δικαίου προστασίαν, διότερ ἐν μεγεθεὶ τῷ φύσεω καὶ δυνάμεω. κ.τ.λ.

4 ὁδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν — μόνον] ' (And I have specified them thus), for it is not the same with developed states as it is with sciences and faculties. A faculty or a science appears to be the same of contraries, but a contrary state does not include its contraries, as, for instance, from health only healthful things and not the contraries of health are produced.' Γὰρ refers to the mention of both justice and injustice separately, and as opposed to each other. The writer accounts for this by saying that a δύναμις admits of contraries, but a ἔξεσ not (see Vol. I. p. 241). The style above is somewhat careless, for we first have ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτή, and then, to answer to it, ἔξεσ ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων σι.

5–6 Though a state does not include its contrary, yet its contrary may be inferred from it; and the state itself may be known by its particular manifestations (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), just as a bodily condition is known from the symptoms. If the name of a state be used in more senses than one (πλεοναχῶς), it follows usually that the name of its contrary will be used in more senses than one. ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων] As we might say, 'from its facts,' the ὑποκειμένα being the singular instances in which a general notion is manifested. The meaning is, that τὰ δίκαια are to δικαιοσύνη as good symptoms are to good health. Τῶν ὑποκειμένων is an instance of the logical formule with which the writing of Eudemus abounds.
7 σθα, οδοι ει το δικαιον, και το αδικον. ἐσοκε δε πλεονα-
χως λέγεσθαι ή δικαιοσύνη και ή αδικία, ἀλλά διὰ τὸ 
σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὀμοιομοίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὀσ-
τερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρων δήλη μᾶλλον. ἡ γὰρ διαιφορὰ τολλη 
ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἱδέαν, οδοι οτι καλεῖται κλεῖς ὀμοιομοίας ή 
te ύπο τῶν αὐχένα τῶν ζώων καὶ ἦ τὰς θύρας κλείσουσιν.
3 εἰλήφθω δὴ ο το αδικος ποσαχχος λέγεσται. δοκει δὲ ο 
te παράνομος αδικος εἶναι και ο πλεονέκτης και ο ἄνισος,
ὡστε δήλον οτι και ο δικαιος ἔσται ο τε νόμιμος και ο 
Ἰσος. τὸ μὲν δικαιον ἀρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἱσον, τὸ δ'

Cf. Ar. Met. I. ii. 4 (ὁ ἔχων τὴν 
καθόλου ἐπιστήμην) οδε ποι πάντα τά 
ὑποκειμένα.

7 ἐσοκε δὲ—κλείουσιν] 'Now the 
term "justice" appears to be used in 
more senses than one, and so does 
the term injustice, but, because there is 
a close resemblance between the 
ambiguous senses, the ambiguity 
escapes notice, and the case is not the 
same as with things widely differing, 
where the ambiguity is comparatively 
plain (δήλη μᾶλλον). A physical 
difference appealing to the eye (κατὰ 
τὴν ἱδέαν) is widest, as, for instance, 
the word "key" is used ambiguously 
to denote the clavicular bone of 
animals, and that with which men 
lock doors.' While the general up-
shot of this passage is clear enough, 
the writing is in itself very indistinct. 
Hence in translation it has been 
necessary to use expansion. To say 
that 'their equivocation escapes notice 
because it is close' goes beyond the 
legitimate bounds of compression. 
Cf. the obscure and probably corrupt 
passage above cited from Eth. Bud. 
III. v. 1: διδνερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ 
τὴν γενειαν καὶ ὁμοιοτύπα μεγαὶ τοῦ 
λανθάνειν πόρων προϊόντα.

κατὰ τὴν ἱδέαν] This seems to mean 
'in external form.' Cf. Eth. i. viii. 
16: ὁ τὴν ἱδέαν παραλαχέται.

κλεῖς There is a pun attributed to 
Philip of Macedon—cf. Plutarch, Reg. 
ei Imp. Aporth., Philipp.i ix.—which, 
it has been thought, may be here 
alluded to: τὴν κλείδιον αὐτῷ κατε-
αγεῖσα ἐν κόλωμι καὶ τοῦ θεραπεύοντος 
λατρεψ τὸν τι καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδερφοῦς, 
λάμβανε, ἢφι, δοκα βοδελε, τὴν γὰρ 
kλεῖν ἑξελις.

8–11 The word 'unjust' is used 
in three different senses to denote the 
lawless man, the greedy man, and the 
unfair man. The word 'just' may 
mean either the lawful man or the 
fair man. In this statement there is 
something illogical, for we notice at 
one that there are only two senses of 
the word 'just' to match the three 
senses of 'unjust.' We find in § 10, 
that unfairness (τὸ ἄνισον) is a generic 
term, including both greediness (κλεο-
νεῖα) and also the collateral notion 
of selfishly avoiding evil. In short, 
to divide 'unjust' into lawless, 
greedy, and unfair, is a cross 
division. Evidently there are on 
each side two terms: (1) justice 
is divided into lawfulness or uni-
versal justice, and (2) fairness about 
property, or particular justice. In-
justice is divided into (1) lawlessness 
or universal injustice, and 
(2) unfairness about property, or 
particular injustice.
ἀδικων τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἁνίσχον. ἔτει δὲ καὶ πλεονε-9
κτῆς ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἐσται, οὐ πάντα, ἄλλα περὶ
ὄσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ὃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἄπλως ἂεὶ ἁγαθά,
τινὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ’ ἀνθρώποι ταῦτα εὑχομαι καὶ διά-
κουσιν: δει δ’ οὐ, ἄλλ’ εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἄπλως ἁγαθὰ καὶ
αὐτοίς ἁγαθά εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἁγαθά. ὁ δ’ 10
ἄδικος οὐκ ἂεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἄλλα καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον ἐπὶ
tῶν ἄπλως κακῶν: ἄλλ’ οτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακῶν
ἀγαθὸν πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ’ ἁγαθοῦ ἐστιν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ
tούτου δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ’ ἁνίσχος: τοῦτό γάρ 11
περιέχει καὶ κοινὸν. ἔτει δ’ ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἢν ὁ δὲ 12
νόμιμος δίκαιος, δὴλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐστὶ πως
dίκαια: τὰ τε γὰρ ἀριστερὰ ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμα
ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκαστὸν τοῦτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαινεῖν. οἱ δὲ 13
νόμιοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἦ τοῦ
κοινῆ συμφέροντος τῶν ἦ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἦ τοῖς κυρίοις,

9 ἔτει δὲ — ἁγαθά] "Now, since
the unjust man is greedy, he will be
concerned with things good, not all,
but the "goods of fortune," which
abstraccdly are always goods, but
which are not so always to the in-
dividual. (Men pray for these and
follow after them, but they ought not
to do so; they ought to pray that
what are abstractedly goods may be
so to them, and they ought to choose
the things which are good for them.)"
The goods of fortune are those which
all men desire, though it is not certain
that they will prove goods to them.
The phrase τὰ ἄπλως ἁγαθὰ is an
Eudemian formula. See Vol. I. Essay
I. p. 63. The difficulties connected
with prayer, arising out of human
ignorance, form the subject of Plato's
Second Alcibiades. They are also
alluded to, Laws, III. p. 687. At the
end of Phaedrus is given the prayer
of Socrates (279 B): "ὤ φίλε Πάτ-
te καὶ Ἀλκός διὸς τὰς τέρες θεοῦ, δοξὴν
μοι καλὸ γενέσθαι τάνθωθεν." ἔξωθεν

12-15 In one sense all that is
lawful is just; the law aiming at the
good of all, or of a part, of the citizens,
speaks on all subjects, and more or
less rightly enjoins the practice of all
the virtues. Justice, then, in this
sense, may be said to be the practice
of entire virtue towards one's neigh-
bour.

13 στοχαζόμενοι ἦ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέ-
ροντος κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Ar. Pol. III. vii. 5:
ὥ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς
tὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦτος, ὃ δ’
ὄλγαρχα πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐτομῶν, ὃ ὡς
δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν
dιαρχῶν. The term νομοθετική (§ 12)
occurs again in the Eudemian book,
Eik. vi. viii. 2. The view given here
of law, which is expressed still more
strongly below, ch. xi. § 1, is quite
different from modern views. Law is
here represented as a positive system
κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἦ κατ’ ἄλλον τῶν τρόπων τοιοῦτον. ὡστε ένα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.

14 προστάταις ὤ νόμος καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἶον μὴ λέειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὀπλὰ, καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἶον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πρᾶγμα, οἶον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύον τὰ δ’ ἀπαγορεύουν, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς,

15 χείρον δ’ ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἔτερον. καὶ διὰ τούτω πολλάκις κρατίσθη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἦ.

(though the instances quoted of its formulae are all negative, μὴ λέειν τὴν τάξιν, & c.), aiming at the regulation of the whole of life, sometimes, however, with a bias of class-interests, and sometimes only roughly executed (ἀπεσχεδιασμένος). This educational and dogmatic character of the law was really exemplified to the greatest extent in the Spartan institutions. Athens rather prided herself (according to the wise remarks which Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles) on leaving greater liberty to the individual. But Plato and Aristotle both made the mistake of wishing for an entire state-control over individual life.

14 τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου] Cf. Eth. iii. viii. 1-2. Enactments of the kind here mentioned form part of the system given in Plato’s Laws, pp. 943-4. Modern statutes of military discipline against desertion, &c., furnish an exact parallel to these ancient laws, if we only consider that in the Greek cities the whole state was more or less regarded as an army.

15 αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν—ἔτερον] ‘Now this justice is complete virtue, not absolutely, however, but in relation to one’s neighbour.’ There is a careless transition here from τὰ νόμαμα and τὰ δίκαια to ἡ δικαιοσύνη. Correct writing would have required ἡ κατὰ τάῦτα δικαιοσύνη or a similar phrase. Generally speaking, this first part of the Book is about τὰ δίκαια as distinguished from ἡ δικαιοσύνη (see Plan of Book V.)

15-20 Hence justice is often thought the best of the virtues, brighter than the evening or the morning star, the sum of all other excellence. It is the use of virtue, and not in relation to oneself alone, but also towards others. Hence it has been defined ‘others’ profit.’ As he is the worst man who is bad both to himself and others, so he is the best who is good to himself and to others. This kind of justice is not a part of virtue, but the whole; it can only be distinguished from virtue when you come to define it, and discover that you must take a different point of view for each.

15 εἴδε ἔτεροι κ.τ.λ.] This may have allusion to something in literature now lost. At all events, it is a fine saying.

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ] Given among the
δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὖθ' ἐστερος οὖθ' ἔφος οὖτως θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φαμεν

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἄρτη ἐν.
καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἁρετή, ότι τῆς τελείας ἁρετῆς χρῆσις ἑστιν. τελεία δ' ἑστιν, ότι ὁ ἔχων αὐτῆν καὶ πρὸς ἐτερος δύναται τῇ ἁρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἁρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἐτερος ἀδύνατους· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 16 εὐ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ότι ἄρχη ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἐτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινοῖς ἤδη ο ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τοῦ 17 αὐτοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἁγάθων δοκεῖ εἰσὶ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἁρετῶν, ότι πρὸς ἐτερον ἑστιν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἀρχοντί καὶ κοινῳ. κάκιστος μὲν 18 οὐν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρῶμεν τῇ μοχθῆρα, ἀριστος δ' οὐκ ὃ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἁρετῇ ἄλλα πρὸς ἐτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλετῶν. αὐτὴ μὲν οὖν 19 δικαιοσύνῃ οὐ μέρος ἁρετῆς ἄλλ' οὖν ἁρετῆ ἑστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἄλλ' ὅλη κακία. τι δὲ διαφέρει 20 ρει ἡ ἁρετῆ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτῇ, δήλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων.

verses of Theognis (147 sq.) in the following couplet:

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἁρετῇ ἑστιν,
πᾶσι δὲ τ' ἄνδρη ἁγάθως, Κόρης δίκαιος ἐστιν.

It is, however, also attributed to Phocylides, and may have been the common property of many early moralists.

πρὸς ἐτερον] Fritzche quotes Eurip. Her. 2:

ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τοῖς πέλας τέφριν ἄνηρ.
ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ κέφαλον λίμ' ἔχων ἀνεμενόν,
πόλει τ' ἄρχοντο καὶ συμβαλλόσειν

And Ar. Pol. iii. xiii. 3: κοινωνίκην γὰρ ἁρετήν εἰναι φαμεν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ

ἡ πάσας ἀναγκαῖων ἀκολοθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας.

16 ἄρχη ἄνδρα] The same sentiment is expressed by Sophocles, Ant. 175 sq.


20 τι δὲ διαφέρει—ἀρετή] 'But what the difference is between virtue and this kind of justice is clear from what we have said already. They are the same, only conceived diffe-
rently: viewed as a relation to others, the state is justice; viewed as a state of the mind simply, it is virtue."

"το δ' εἶναι οὐ το αὐτό." This logical formula occurs again Eth. vii. viii. 1, where it is said that wisdom and politics are the same state of mind, only their essence is differently conceived (τὸ μὲν τὸν εἶναι οὐ ταὖτον αὐτάρκης). On the force of εἶναι, see Eth. ii. vi. 17, note. In both of these Eudemian passages, where it is said of two things that ‘they are the same, only their εἶναι is different,’ we must understand that the results are the same, but the essential nature, the causes, and what the Germans would call the Grund-begriff, or fundamental conceptions, are different. Thus the first idea about justice (in the widest sense) is, that it is a relation to others. The first idea about virtue is, that it is a regulation of the mind. There is a slightly different application of the formula, Arist. De Anima, iii. 4: ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθήματος ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήματος ἡ αὐθή μὲν εἰσὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐτάρκης. 'Now the present existence of an object is identical with and inseparable from the present existence of the sensation of it, but yet in conception these differ from each other fundamentally.' Here we have two distinct sides or 'moments' represented as, though logically distinct, yet inseparable.

Plato in discussing justice had first to clear the subject of sophistical notions, and to prove that justice did not depend alone upon human insti-

...tutions, but far more on the nature of the human soul. Thus he concluded by defining it to be a just balance in the mind itself. The Peripatetic starting-point is different. It is assumed that justice proceeds from the development of man's nature as a 'political creature.' Also it is assumed that in political institutions there is something which is absolute and not merely conventional (Eth. v. vii. 1-5). Then the only question is, what are the exact limits of justice itself? To which the answer is, that we may either regard it in the broadest sense as including the whole of right dealing with others, or, more restrictedly, as right dealing in respect of property and advantages of all kinds.

II. This chapter consists of three parts. (1) It brings arguments to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice, relating chiefly to property, from which the existence of a particular kind of justice might also be inferred, §§ 1-6. (2) It sets aside universal justice as not being the object of discussion to the present book, §§ 7-11. (3) It divides particular justice into two kinds, distributive and corrective, §§ 12-13.

1-6 The arguments brought to prove the existence of a particular kind of injustice reduce themselves apparently to an appeal to language. (1) We speak of the coward as 'doing wrongly' (διὰκόνω); also we speak of the man who takes more than his share as 'doing wrongly;"
μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδὲν, οἷον ὁ ἰψάς τὴν ἀστικὰ διὰ δειλίαν ἡ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἡ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήσας δε' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόσας, κατὰ ποινήματι δὲ γε τινὰ (ψέφομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἅλλη της ἁδικίας 3 ὡς μέρος τῆς δόλης, καὶ ἁδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἁδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίεν ἔσκα 4 μοιχεία καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστίθεις καὶ ζημιούμε- νος δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν, οὕτως μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειν αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἡ πλεονεκτητική, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ- δένον ἄρα ὑπὲρ τὸ κερδαινέν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τῶλα 5 πάντα ἁδικήματα γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορά ἐπὶ τῶν μοχθη- ρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοιχεῖνεν, ἐπὶ ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπτε τὸν παραστάτης, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπαταξεῖν, ἐπὶ ἄργην· εἰ δ' ἐκερδαίεν, ἐπὶ οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἡ ἐπ' ἁδικίαν.

the latter use of the terms is evidently different from the former.

(2) A crime committed for the sake of gain is called a 'wrong' distinctively, rather than by the name it would have had, were this motive of gain not present.

(3) While all other wrongs (ἀδικομα) are referred each to some evil principle, such as cowardice, intemperance, and the like; acts of unjust gain are referred to no other principle except 'injustice,' which accordingly must be used in a special sense and denote a special vice in the mind.

The statement of the first of these arguments in the text is extremely confused. It is put in such a way that it would as well prove any other vice as πλεονεκία to be particular injustice. Suppose we substituted 'idleness' in the text for 'grasping,' it would then be true to say, 'When a man is idle, he often errs in none of the other vices, certainly not in all, but yet he acts with a certain faultless (for we blame him) and wrongly (κατ' ἁδικίαν). Hence there is a kind of wrong separate from universal injustice,' &c. However, this is only a matter of statement; there is no doubt that ἁδικία with regard to property means something special, and different from ἁδικία in the sense of wrong-doing in general. In English 'injustice' is not used to mean vice generally; though its opposite 'just' is occasionally used in the translation of the Bible as equivalent to 'righteous,' and in a sense answering pretty nearly to that of ἃμωμον.

4. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν—κερδαίεν] 'Again if one man commits an adultery for the sake of gain, making a profit by it, and another man does the same for lust, lavishing money (προστιθειν) and incurring loss; the latter would rather be deemed intemperate than covetous, the former would be called unjust, but not intemperate; evidently because of his gaining by it.'

Fritzsche (upon l. 14) quotes Aeschines Socraticus, II. 14: δοκεῖ δ' ἄν σοι ἀθραυστος εἰ μοιχεῖτας τῶν πείλας ὁ
6 οὕτως φανερῶν ὅτι ἐστὶ τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὀλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρθῶς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γενέτ. ἀμφοτερῶν ἐκείνων, ἄλλῳ ἢ μὲν περὶ τιμῆν ἢ χρήσται τῇ σωτηρίᾳ, ἡ εἰ τινὶ ἔχομεν ἐν ὁμόμοιῳ περιλαβεῖν ταύτα πάντα, καὶ δὲ ἤδη ἔρχεται τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ ἄπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ στοιχείος.

7 "Οτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιούνται πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶ τις καὶ ἐτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὀλην ἀρετῆν, δηλοῦν τις δὲ καὶ ὁποία τις, ληπτεόν. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἁνίσον, τὸ δὲ δίκων τὸ τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἱσον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστὶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἁνίσον καὶ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταὐτῶν ἀλλ' ἐτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὀλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἁπαν ἁνίσον, τὸ δ' ἁνίσον οὖ πάν πλέον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἐτερα ἐκεῖνα, τὰ μὲν ὥς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὀλα' μέρος γὰρ αὐτή ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὀλῆς ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαίωσις τῆς δικαιοσύνης. οὕτως καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιούντας καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέων, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἄδικου ὕπατως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ..."
no less than as a particular virtue it includes all the generic qualities of universal virtue. Some MSS. read ἐτεί δὲ τὸ ἀστικὸν καὶ τὸ παράδομον, from not understanding the force of the illustration applied in ἐτεί. It is no wonder that confusion should have been caused when the writer was at so little pains to avoid it.

10-11 We may set aside justice in the wider sense as being identical with the exercise of virtue, and also the principle on which it depends (καὶ τὸ δικαίως δὲ), this being simply the inculcation of virtue by the state. (The question as to whether private education is the same as public, whether the good man is the same as the good citizen, may be discussed hereafter.)—This seems to be the train of thought, the whole of § 11 being parenthetical. σχεδον γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ κ.τ.λ. is a mere repetition of ch. i. § 14.

τὰ δὲ ποιητὰ—παντὶ] 'Now the enactments productive of entire virtue are those which have been made with regard to education for public life. With regard to individual education, according to which one is not a good citizen, but simply a good man, we must afterwards determine whether it belongs to politics or some other province. For perhaps the idea of the good man is not the same as that of the citizen in every case.'

ὑπότεων διοριστέων] This is an unfulfilled promise in the Eudemian Ethics as they stand. The question here started seems to have arisen out of the discussions in Politics iii. iv. and iii. xviii., as to whether the virtue of the man and the citizen is the same, which, on the whole, Aristotle would answer in the affirmative; and he also lays it down decisively that all education should be public, i.e. under the control of government and reduced to a common standard. Aristotle's treatise on education was however unfinished, the eighth book of the Politics being a fragment. Eudemos would seem to have wished to take up the question where Aristotle left it, and—with the view of giving a separate existence to Morals as a science—to ask whether there is not a kind of education, not falling within the province of Politics, which aims at producing the virtues of the individual man, as distinct from those of the citizen. But the Eudemian Ethics
τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἡ χρημάτων ἡ τῶν ἀλλῶν ὅσα μεριστὰ τοίς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τοῖσι γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἰσον ἔτερον ἔτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖσι συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τοῦτον δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσα ἐστὶ τὰ δ’ ἀκούσα, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶξις ὃνδ εἰςεισμὸς ἔγγυη χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις· ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τοῦτον ἐκούσιος. τῶν δ’ ἀκούσιων τὰ μὲν λαθραία οἷον κλοτῇ μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία θευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰέα δεσμὸς θάνατος ἀρπαγὴ πίρωσις κακηνορία προπηλακισμὸς.

3 Ἐπεὶ δ’ ο’ τ’ ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δὴλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ τοῦ ἄνισου. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἰσον· ἐν ὅποια γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττον,
It is fully developed in *Politics*, iii. c. ix.—a passage from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly taken, though an interpolated reference (καθάπερ εργαταί πρό
tepoν ἐν τοῖς θηκοῖς) gives the passage in the *Politics* a fallacious appearance of having been written later, and of having accepted conclusions from the present book. Far rather it is likely that the conception of 'distributive justice,' having been received as a conception from Plato, and farther worked out by Aristotle in his *Politics*, only became stereotyped into a phrase in the after-growth of his system, at the end of his own life, or in the exposition of his views made by Eudemus. It is in speaking of the 'oligarchical and democratic principles of justice' that Aristotle says: (§ 1) πάντες γὰρ ἀπόνται δικαίων τῶν ἀλλὰ μέχρι τῶν πρόφασιν, καὶ λέγοντες ὀὐ τὰς τῶν κυρίων δικαίων. Οἴον δοκεῖ ἵνα τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἐστί, ἀλλὰ ὀὐ τὰς ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἵναι. καὶ τὸ ἄνω χορεύει δικαίων εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ἔστω, ἀλλὰ οὐ πάνω, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνίσων. οἱ δὲ τοῖς ἀφαιροῦν, τὸ οίω, καὶ κρίνουσιν κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἰτίων ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις χεῖσθαι δοί οἱ πλείονοι φαῦλοι κρίναι περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. Ὡσ' ἐτεί τὸ δίκαιον τῶν, καὶ διήφηται τὸν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐτεί των πραγμάτων καὶ οίω, καθάπερ ἐργαταί πρόφασιν ἐν τοῖς θηκοῖς, τῆς μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἄνωτη ἀμπολογοῦντα, τὴν δὲ οί ἀμφαιρεθήσονται. The conclusion is (Pol. iii. ix. 15) that they who contribute most to the joint-stock of virtue and good deeds in the state are entitled to a larger share in the control of affairs than those who base their claims upon any other kind of superiority.

1-4 These sections are full of
confused writing. It is said 'since the unjust is unequal, there must be a mean, which is equal; justice must be equal; the equal is a mean, therefore justice must be a mean. As being equal justice implies two terms, as being a mean two extremes, as being just two persons, therefore it must be in four terms, &c. The general meaning is clear, but the statement, especially in § 4, is very faulty. A confusion is made by the introduction of the idea of μέσον with regard to justice, which at the present part of the argument was not required.

6 el γάρ μη ἱσο, κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Ar. Pol. III. ix. 1 sq. l. c.

7 ἢ τι ἐκ τοῦ—ἀρετήν] 'Again this is clear from the principle of equality according to standard; for all agree that justice in distributions must be according to standard, but men are not unanimous in declaring the same standard. While the democrats declare freedom, those who are for an oligarchy declare wealth or birth, and those who are for an aristocracy (in the highest sense) declare virtue.' This is apparently taken from the saying in Aristotle's Pol. III. ix. 4: Οἱ μὲν γάρ ἐν κατὰ τι ἱσοα δῶν, οἱ δὲ <χρήματι, διότι οὕτως ἢσοι εἰσι, οἱ δὲ ἐν κατὰ τοῦ, διότι ἐλευθερία, διὸ τοῦ. Cf. Ib. III. ix. 15. 'Freedom' here of course means being above the condition of a slave. To make this the ground for political claims would be analogous, from A.'s point of view, to instituting manhood suffrage. For a slave is less than man; cf. Ib. § 6, where it is said that slaves and the lower animals could not constitute a state διὰ τὸ μὴ προδεχόμενοι εὐθαμβοῦσι μηδὲ τοῦ ἢ τοῦ κατὰ προορίσθην. 8-14 ἢσον ἢρα—ἀγαθοῖ] 'The just then is something proportionate. The proportionate is not restricted to pure number alone, but applies to everything that admits the idea of number. Proportion is an equality of ratios, and implies four terms at the least. Now it is plain that "discrete proportion"
III.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] V. 111

μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ὑδιον, ἀλλ' ὁλος ἀριθμοῦ. ἦ γὰρ ἀνάλογα ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἦ μὲν οὖν διηρμενήσται ἐν τέτταροι, ὁλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἦ 9 συνεχῆς τῷ γὰρ ἐν ὅσο δυνα χρῆται καὶ δὲς λέγει, οἷον ὅς ἦ τοῦ ι πρὸς την τοῦ β, οὗτος καὶ η τοῦ β πρὸς την τοῦ γ. δις οὖν ἦ τοῦ β εἰρήνθη ὅστ' ἦν ἦ τοῦ β τεθή δις, τέτταρα ἐσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. δηρηνται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ᾧ. ἔσται ἅρα ὅς ὁ ο δροσ πρὸ τοῦ 11 β, οὗτος ὁ γ πρὸς τον δ, καὶ ἐναλλαξ' ἅρα, ὅς ὁ α πρὸ τον γ, ὁ β πρὸς τον δ. ὅστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον οπέρ ἦ νομη συνδιαις καὶ οὗτος συντεθή, δίκαιος συνδιάει. ἦ ᾧ τοῦ α ὅροι τῶ γ καὶ ἦ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύνεις τῷ εἰ 12 διανομή δίκαιον ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦ ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον

is in four terms; but so also is "continuous proportion," for it uses the one of its terms as two, and names it twice over, thus,—as a is to b, so is b to c. b then is twice named, and if it be set down twice over, the proportionate terms will be four. But justice also implies four terms at least, and an equality of ratios; for the two persons and the two things are divided in similar proportion. (The formula) then will be, "as the term a is to b, so is c to d;" and alternando, "as a is to c, so is b to d," and so too the whole to the whole, which the distribution couples, and if the terms be thus united, it couples them justly. The joining therefore of a to c and of b to d in distribution is just, and this justice is a mean between violations of proportion. For proportion is a mean, and the just is proportionate. Mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical, for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as each separate term is to each. This proportion is not "continuous" for it has no one term standing in a double relationship. Well, then, the just is that which is thus proportionate, and the unjust is a violation of proportion, which takes place either on the side of more or less. And this is actually the case, for he that does an injury has more than his share, while he that is injured has less than his share of what is good.' This passage gives a formula for distributive justice in mathematical language, which comes in short to this, that in all awards of the state, the result should be proportionate to the separate worth of the citizens.

8 μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ] 'Number expressed in cipher,' 'abstract number,' in German, unbemalte Zahl. Fritzsche refers to Euclid Ετ. vii. def. 1. The terms introduced in this chapter seem to be neither lines, nor numbers, but algebraic quantities. 9 ἦν ἦ τοῦ β] ἦ is indefinite, and probably meant to be so. It may stand for στιγμή, γραμμή, or the like. 13 γεωμετρικῶ] Cf. Plato, Gorgias, p. 508, quoted above, p. 109.
13 ἀνάλογον· καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιούτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρίην οἱ μαθηματικοὶ· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὀλὸν πρὸς τὸ ὀλὸν ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον.

14 ἕστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἀρίθμῳ ὁρὸς, ὅ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἐλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἁδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὃ δ' ἁδικοῦμενος ἐλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἕπι δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθῷ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἐλαττον κακῶν πρὸς τὸ μείζον

15 κακὸν· ἕστι γὰρ τὸ ἐλαττον κακῶν μᾶλλον αἱρέτον τοῦ

16 μείζονος, τὸ δ' αἱρέτον ἁγαθῶν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἴδος τοῦ δικαίου τούτου ἐστίν.

4 Ὁ δὲ λοιπῶν ἐν τῷ διορθωτικῷ, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλ-

15-16 A repetition of ch. i. § 10.

IV. This chapter is on corrective justice, which is said to apply to the transactions between men whether voluntary or involuntary. Corrective justice goes on a principle, not of geometrical, but of arithmetical proportion; in other words, it takes no account of persons, but treats the cases with which it is concerned as cases of unjust loss and gain, which have to be reduced to the middle point of equality between the parties. Justice is a mean, and the judge a sort of impersonation of justice, a mediator, or equal divider. The operation of justice, bringing plaintiff and defendant to an equality, may be illustrated by the equalising of two unequal lines. The names, ‘loss’ and ‘gain,’ are, however, often a mere metaphor borrowed from commerce.

The term ‘corrective justice’ (τὸ διορθωτικόν, or, as it is afterwards called, § 6, τὸ ἐπαρθωτικὸν δίκαιον) is itself an unfortunate name, because it appears only to lay down principles for restitution, and therefore implies wrong. Thus it has a tendency to confine the view to ‘involuntary transactions,’ instead of stating what must be the principle of the just in all the dealings between man and man. In the present chapter, it is remarkable that although we are told at first that ‘voluntary transactions’ belong to corrective justice, yet all that is said applies only to the ‘involuntary transactions,’ and at last we are told that the terms used are ‘a metaphor from voluntary transactions’—as if these were something quite distinct. It may be said, however, that bargains, and voluntary dealings in general, have no respect of persons (κατὰ τὴν ἀρετῆν. ἀναλ.), and thus have something in common with civil and criminal law. Bacon, in the Advanced

ment of Learning, Book II., refers to the two heads of Justice here given, under the names ‘commutative and distributive.’

1 τὸ δὲ λοιπῶν ἐν] This excludes all possibility of the writer having conceived another kind of justice, to be called ‘catallactic’ or some such name, as it has been sometimes fancied. Τὸ διορθωτικὸν δικ. implies not merely ‘regulative,’ but strictly ‘remedial’
justice; δίφθωμα is used to signify a remedy in Arist. Pol. iii. xiii. 23, where it is said of ostracism, βλάτων μὲν οὖν τὸν νομάθετα ἡμῶν ἀρχὴς ἥτις συνέτριψε τὴν πολιτείαν ὡστε ἐπὶ διόνυσι τουράτισ τιταίρεις διότερος ἢ πλύως, ἢ συμβιβάζει τουράτισ τινι διορθώσεις ἰδιορροιν.

2 To μὲν γὰρ—εἰσερχόμενα: 'For distributive justice deals always with the goods of the state according to the proportion we have described; for if the distribution be of common goods, it will be according to the proportion which the different contributions bear to one another.' Τὰ εἰσερχόμενα is thus explained by the Paraphrast, ἀναλογίας ἐκάστης ὧδε καὶ τὰς ἐξέαν ἐκάστω καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν, ὅτι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν συντέλεσαν ἐπει ὥστε πάντες δύμοι, οὐδὲ πάντες δύμοις εἰσφέροντες.

Possibly the remark in the text was taken from Aristotle, Pol. iii. ix. 15: διότερ δοὺς συμβάλλοντες κλάσμον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην εἰσφοράν, τούτως τὴς πόλεως μέτεστω πλείως.

3 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν] This term occurs Eik. ii. vi. 7. 'Arithmetical proportion' denotes a middle term or point of equality, equidistant from two extreme terms; thus, 0 is the mean, according to arithmetical proportion, between 4 and 8. In Eik. ii. (l.c.) it is called μέσον τῶν τρέχων, which implies that it has no respect of persons. So corrective justice is here said to regard each case impersonally as an affair of loss and gain, and between these it strikes the middle point. It is the moral worth of persons that is ignored (ἐκ ἐνεργίας φαύλων κ.τ.λ.), for we find afterwards, ch. v. §§ 3-4, that a consideration of the position and circumstances of persons does come in to modify the estimate of the loss sustained from an indignity, &c.
5 τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὦς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τῶν ὀικείων ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος,
6 οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ Ἑκάμια τῷ παθόντι. ἀλλًا ὅταν γε μετρηθῆ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν Ἑκάμια τὸ δὲ κέρδος.
7 ὅστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἱσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ Ἑκάμια τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἐλάττον ἐναντίος,
8 τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἐλάττον κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον Ἑκάμια. ὃν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἱσον, ὑπὸ λέγομεν εἶναι
dίκαιον. ὃστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἄν εἴη τὸ μέσον
7 Ἑκάμιας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν. τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἴναι
ἰέναι ἔστιν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βουλεῖται εἶναι
ὐφοῦς δικαίου ἐμπυγνοῦν καὶ ἰσούσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ
9 καλοῦσιν ἐνα ἦσοσιν, ὅσι εἰάτο τὸ ἱσον. τὸ δὲ ἱσον μέσον ἐστὶ
tῆς μεῖζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀνα-
λογίαν. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστὶν,
ὡςπερ ἄν εἴ τις εἴπῃ δίκαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς δίχασθαι.
ετάν γάρ δύο ἵσων ἀφαιρεθῆ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θατέρου δὲ ἐκ προστέθη, δυοὶ τούτων ὑπερέχει θατέρον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστέθη δὲ, εἰ δὲ μὸνον ὑπερέχειν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐν, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ’ οὐ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνι. τούτῳ ἄρα 11 γνωριοῦμεν τι τε ἀφελείν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τι προσθείναι τῷ ἐλαττών ἔχοντι· φ’ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον υπερέχει, τούτῳ προσθείναι δεῖ τῷ ἐλαττών ἔχοντι, φ’ δ’ ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελείν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ἦσαν αἱ ἐφ’ ὅν 12 ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλας· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ὑφηρέσθη τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ’ ὅν ΓΔ, ὡστε δὴ ἡ ΔΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ. τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. ἡστι δέ καὶ επὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τεχνῶν τούτω. ἀνθρωπὸς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅσον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐπαυξε τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτοτον καὶ τοῦτον. ἐληλύθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἢ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, 13 ἐκ τῆς ἐκουσίαν ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ

10–12 ετάν γάρ—ΓΔ] 'For, of two equal lines, if a part be taken from the one and added to the other, that other will exceed the first by twice this part; for if it had been subtracted only from the one and not added to the other, that other would have exceeded the first by only once this part. Therefore the line which is added to exceeds the mean by once the part added, and the mean exceeds the line subtracted from by once the part added. By this we learn what we must take from the term which has more, and what we must add to that which has less. We must add to that which has less the amount by which the mean exceeds it, and we must take from the largest term the amount by which the mean is exceeded. Let AA, BB, and CC be equal to one another; from AA take AE, and add CD to CC; then the whole DC exceeds EA by CD and CZ; and therefore it exceeds BB by CD.' The figure required is as follows:

| A | ———— | A |
| B | ———— | B |
| C | ———— | C | ———— | D |

Ἑστι δὲ—τοῦτον] This clause exists in all the MSS. The Paraphrast explains it here to signify that the same principles of corrective justice are applicable to the arts and commerce, &c. But when the clause is repeated with a different context in the next chapter, the Paraphrast, no doubt feeling a difficulty about the repetition, does not again touch it. In its present position the clause has no meaning, in the next chapter it is an important remark. All we can say about its appearance here is that it is an evidence of the same sort of unskilful interpolation which shows itself in chapter xi., and also in sundry other parts of Books v., vi., and vii.

13–14 ἐληλύθε δὲ—θετερόν] 'Now these names, "loss and gain," have
come from voluntary exchange. For having more than one's own is called "gaining," and having less than at the commencement is called "losing," as, for instance, in buying and selling, and all the other things in which the law gives one immunity. But when the things are neither more nor less, but on a level (αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν), then men say they have their own, and neither lose nor gain. Thus justice is a mean between a sort of gain and loss in involuntary things; it is the having the same afterwards as before.'

ἐν δὲ [ἐν δὲς] In commerce of all kinds, the law allows one to gain as much as one can. In involuntary transactions, the law allows no gain to be made, but brings things always back to their level. This non-interference of the law with bargains becomes, if carried out, the principle of free-trade.

ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν γένηται] This has puzzled the commentators. Felicianus interprets it 'sed sua cuique per se ipsa evasenter;' Argyropulus, 'sed sua per se ipsa sunt facta;' Lambinus, 'sed paria paribus respondent.' What the phrase must mean is plain, whether grammatically it can mean this is another question. It must mean 'neither more, nor less, but equal to itself.' Perhaps it may be construed 'but result in being themselves by means of reciprocity,' i.e. by mutual giving and taking, ἡμαν being equivalent to ἀλλήλων.

V. This chapter, commencing with a critical notice of the Pythagorean definition of justice, that 'justice is retaliation,' shows it to be inadequate, and then goes off into an interesting discussion upon the law of retaliation as it exists in the state. Proportionate retaliation, or an interchange of services, is said to be the bond of society. The law of proportion regulates exchange, and settles the value of the most diverse products. Money measures and expresses value, and turns mere barter into commerce. The chapter concludes with some general remarks on the relation of justice as a quality to the just as a principle.

[1] δοκεῖ δὲ — ἀλλαὶ] 'Now some think that retaliation without further qualifying (ἀλλὰ) is justice, as the Pythagoreans said, for they defined justice simply as retaliation on one's neighbour.' On the rude and inadequate attempts at definition made by the Pythagoreans, cf. Ar. Metaph.
Note. Rank is here looked at as a kind of property. It is not a question of individual goodness or badness, but an officer being struck loses more than a common soldier being struck in return, so that retaliation is in that case not justice.

But in commercial intercourse, at all events, this kind of justice, namely, retaliation, is the bond of union—on principles, not of equality, but proportion, for by proportionate requalit the state is held together. Men seek to requite either evil or good; to omit the one were slavery, to omit the second were to fail in that mutual interchange by which men are held together. On mutual need as the basis for civil society, cf. Plato, Rep. p. 369 b: γίγνεται τοιούτων πόλεων ἔπειδη γιγάντας ἡμῶν ἐκατοσ εἰς αὐτὰρ, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐκάθετον. A recognition of this principle might be called the first dawning of political economy; from it several deductions are made in the text above as to the nature of value, price, and money. These, though rudimentary, are able
and interesting, but the relation of
the law of value (τὸ διάμετρον εν ταῖς
κοιν. ταῖς διὰ.) to the other kinds of
justice is not stated.

τὸ ἀντιπεπωθὸς, καὶ ἀναλογίαν καὶ
μὴ καὶ ἀναλογίαν] This seems to be
written as if in correction of Ar. Pol.
II. ii. 4. Διότερ τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντίπεπ-
ωθὸς σῶτε τὰ κόλπη, τὸ διότερ εἰν
τοῖς ἡπτάκιοι εἰρηται πρῶτερον. On
which see Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 52, 53.

7 διὸ—Χαρίτων] 'Hence, too,
it is that men build a temple of the
Graces in their streets, that there
may be reciprocity. For this is the
property of grace, one must serve in
return one who has done a favour,
and again be in turn the first to
confer favours.' Seneca (Benef. I. 3)
mentions with some disdain the
various symbolical meanings which
were supposed to be expressed by the
figures of the Graces, and on which
Chrysippus appears to have written
an elaborate treatise. Of course no
English word will exactly answer to
χάρις.

8 πῶς ἀρὰ—σύγχυσις] 'Now the
joining of the diagonal of a square
gives us proportionate return.' The
diagram supposed to be drawn is as
follows:

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The joining of the diagonal gives each
producer some of the other's work,
and thus an exchange is made, but
the respective value of the com-
modities must be first adjusted, else
there can be no fair exchange. What,
then, is the law of value? It is
enunciated a little later (§ 10). ἐξ
τοῦ ὁμοῦ—τροφὴν. 'As an architect
(or a farmer it may be) is to a
shoemaker, so many shoes must there
be to a house or to corn.' That is,
the value of the product is determined
by the quality of the labour spent
upon it. The sort of comparison here
made between the quality of farmer
and shoemaker seems connected with
a Greek notion of personal dignity
and a dislike of βαραύλια. But in the
following section a view more in
accordance with Political Economy is
taken—for it is said that all pro-
ducts must be measured against one
standard, and that this is in reality ‘demand’ (χρεία). It is demand, then, or in other words the hagglng of the market, which determines how many shoes are to be given for a house. But the result ought to be such (§ 12) that the architect + the number of shoes that he will receive (or the equivalent of these in money) will be to the shoemaker + a house, as the architect was to the shoemaker, originally. That is, each producer will have got his deserts.

9 ἐστι δὲ τούτῳ—ἰσασθήναι Cf. ch. iv. § 12, note. ‘Now this is the case with the other arts also (i.e. beside those of the architect and shoemaker), for they would have been destroyed if there had not been the producer producing so much, and of a certain kind, and the consumer (τὸ πάσχον) consuming just the same quantity and quality. For out of two physicians no commerce arises, but out of a physician and a farmer it does, and, in short, out of persons who are different from one another, and not equal; these, then, require to be brought to an equality.’ The division of labour, the mutual dependence of the arts, and the correspondence of supply and demand, are here well stated. The terms ποιοῦν and πάσχον may probably have some reference to the ἀρσενοκοιτία, which is the subject of the chapter.

11 οἶον δ’ ἔπολλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην] ‘Now money is a sort of representative of demand conventionally established.’ This excellent definition was not altogether new; Plato had already said (Rep. p. 371 ν): ἀγορὰ δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ἐξεμβολῶν τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ένεκα γεγονέται ἐκ τούτου. The present chapter is disfigured by repetitions. Thus cf. § 15; τοῦτο δ’ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. The saying (§ 10) τὸ νόμισμ’ ἐλήλυθε καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον, is repeated
κατὰ συνθήκην. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν νόμον ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ γίνεται ἄλλα νόμισμα ἐστι, καὶ ἐὰν ἤμισυ μεταβαλεῖν 12 καὶ ποὺσαι ἄρχηστον. ἔσται δὴ ἀντιποτοθοῦ, ὅταν ἱσασθῇ, ὡστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτὸμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχήμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἄλλαξονται, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀμφότερα ἔχει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἐτερον ἄκρον, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν. οὕτως ἵστω καὶ κοινονεῖ, διότι αὐτὴ ἡ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α', τροφῆ Γ', σκυτοτόμος

§ 14: τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὅπερ μέτρων σύμμετρα παίζειν ὤλειν. The law of value is given twice, § 10 and § 12, &c.

12 ἔσται δὴ ἀντιποτοθοῦ—γίνεσθαι] 'Retaliation, then, will take place when the terms have been equalised, and the production of the shoemaker has been made to bear the same relation to that of the farmer, as a farmer himself does to a shoemaker. We must not, however, bring the parties to a diagram of proportion after exchange has taken place, else the one extremity of the figure will have both superiorities assigned to it, but at a moment when the parties still retain their own products. They are thus equal and capable of trading, for proportionate equality can be established between them.' This vexed passage appears to describe the steps in a commercial transaction. There being a mutual need between producers of a different kind, their products require to be equalised. This is done by reducing the goods to a standard of inverse proportion. As a farmer to a shoemaker, so shoes to corn; thus, if a farmer's labour be 5 times better than a shoemaker's, then 5 pair of shoes = a quarter of corn; or if a pair of shoes = 10 shillings, then a quarter of corn = 50 shillings. When this process of equalisation has been effected (ὅταν ἱσασθῇ)—which is done by 'demand' or the higgling of the market,—then simple retaliation, or 'tit for tat,' begins. After an exchange has been made, or, in short, after the price of an article has once been expressed in money, it is no longer the time to talk of 'the quality of labour,' or for either side to claim an advantage on this account. If he did he would have 'both superiorities' reckoned to him, i.e. his own superiority over the other producer, and the superiority of his product over that of the other (see § 8, οὖν ὁ χωλεὶ κριτῶν ἄναι τὸ θετέρον ἔργον). Having enjoyed the superiority of price already, in which the quality of labour was an element, he would now proceed to claim the superiority of labour by itself, which would thus be reckoned to him twice over. 'Ὅταν ἄλλαξονται can mean nothing else than 'when they have exchanged,' ὡστ' with the sorist implying a completed act. It seems unnecessary to say that the value of a thing is not to be settled after it is sold. Rather it is after the goods have come to market, and had a market price put upon them, that considerations of their production must cease. The expression, therefore, is not clear, but the above interpretation seems the most natural that
can be given of the passage. The words ἄλλα οὖν ἔχων τὰ αὐτὰν are opposed to ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται. The punctuation therefore has been altered above, in concurrence with Fritzschel and with the learned paper by Mr. H. Jackson in the Journal of Philology (vol. iv. p. 316), the other conclusions of which are not accepted. "Ἀξιων above seems to mean 'one of the extremities of the figure' (ἐφ' ὅ Ἁ, κ.τ.λ.). 'Both the superiorities' must be those named or implied in § 8–10, the superiority of the one product over the other, and the superiority of the one producer over the other.

13 δι' ἡ χρεῖα—λαμβανομαι 'And that mutual want like a principle of unity binds men together, this fact demonstrates, namely, that when men are not in want of each other, whether both parties or one be thus independent, they do not exchange; whereas, when some one else wants the commodity that a man has (they effect an exchange), one party wanting, for instance, wine, and the other being will-

ing to give it for an export of corn; and then an equality has to be brought about.' Some MSS., and the paraphrased, read ἑαυτῷ, 'and giving for it an export of corn.' Διδόναι ἑαυτῷ, 'to grant an exportation,' occurs in Theophrast. Char. xx. : διδόμενος δι' ἑαυτῷ ἑαυτῷ ἔδωκος ἀνέλεοις.

14 ἵππερ δὲ—μᾶλλον] 'But with a view to future exchange, supposing one does not want an article at present, money is a security that one will be able to get the article when one wants it, for with money in his hand a man must be entitled to take whatever he wishes. It is true that money is under the same law as other commodities; for its value fluctuates, but still its tendency is to remain more fixed than other things.' On these excellent remarks nothing farther need be said. The term ἑγγυητὴς is quoted from the sophist Lycoiphron by Aristotle, Pol. iii. ix. 8, in application to the law.

15 τούτο δ' ἐκ ἑωθεὶς 'Conventionally' opposed to ἀκλίνως, cf. Eth.
The money is strongly stated by Aristotle, *Pol. 1. ix. 11*: "Or there is no man alive who is at all a master of money, and who has no fear of it; for it is a misfortune to be poor, and a misfortune to be rich, and a misfortune to be in the middle."

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υποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία Α, μναὶ δέκα Β, κλίνη Γ. τὸ δὴ Α τοῦ Β ἦμον, εἰ πέντε μνὸν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἵππον· ἢ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τοῦ Γ τοῦ Β· δῆλον τοῖνοι τόσαι κλίναι ἵππον οἰκία, δὶ 16 πέντε. δὶ δὲ οὗτος ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἡ πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἡ κλίναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ή ὅσον αὐτὸ πέντε κλίναι.

17 ἢ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὶ τὸ δικαίον ἐστίν, εἰρήνη. διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦτων δῆλον δῆλον ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἄδικος καὶ ἄδικος ἐστὶ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλαττὸν ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσοτῆς ἐστὶν οὐ

iv. ix. 7. The mere conventional character of money is strongly stated by Aristotle, *Pol. 1. ix. 11*: "Or there is no man alive who is at all a master of money, and who has no fear of it; for it is a misfortune to be poor, and a misfortune to be rich, and a misfortune to be in the middle.

The origin of commerce seems taken from this place by Paulus, *cf. Digest. 1. De Contr. Empt.*: 'Origo emendii vendendi a permutationibus coepit; olim enim non ina erat nummus, neque aliud merx aliud pretium vocabatur, sed unusquisque secundum necessitatem rerum ac temporum utilibus inutilis permutabat, quando plerumque evenit ut quod alteri superest alteri desit; sed quia non semper nec facile concurrebat ut, quum tu haberes quod ego deserideres, invicem ego haberem quod tu accipere velles, electa materia est cujus publica ac perpetua estima influentialibus permutationum aequalitate quantitatis subveniret.'

17 τὶ μὲν οὖν—εἰρήνη] 'We have now stated what is the nature of the unjust and the just abstractedly.' A fresh division of the book commences here; after discussing the various kinds of justice objectively, that is, as principles which manifest themselves in society, the writer proceeds to consider justice subjectively, that is, as manifested in the character of individuals.

ἡ δικαιοπραγία—ἀδικία] 'Just treatment is plainly a mean between injuring and being injured. Δικαιοπραγία is formed on the analogy of εὐφροσύνη, and as εὖ πράττειν is used ambiguously to denote both 'doing' and 'faring well' (cf. *Eth. 1. iv. 2*), so δικαιοπραγία includes both the doing and the receiving justice.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσοτῆς κατ' ἐκλ.] 'Justice is a mean state or balance in a different sense from the other virtues. It is not a balance in the mind, but rather the will to comply with what society and circumstances pronounce to be fair (τὸ μέσον στάτη). Justice, according to this view, is compliance with an external standard. While in courage, temperance, and the like, there is a blooming of the individual character, each man being a law to himself, in justice there is an abnegation of individuality, in obedience to a standard which is one and the same for all. It must be remembered that the account of *true* in this book supplements that of justice and takes off from its otherwise over-legal character.
V.—VI.] ΗΟΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] V. 123

tὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, ἄλλῳ ὧτι μέσων ἐστὶν· ἡ δ’ ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ’ ἕν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαιρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀλλὸν καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἔτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὡστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐλλάττων δὲ τῷ πλείον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ’ ἀνάπαλιν, ἄλλα τοῦ ἰδίου τοῦ κατ’ ἀναλογίᾳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἀλλόν. ἡ δ’ ἀδικία τούτου τίνος τοῦ ἄδικου. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν 18 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις τοῦ ὕφελμον ἡ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὡς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλειψεως ἐστὶν, εἰ δ’ αὐτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὕφελμον, ἐλλειψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀλλών τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὑποτέρως ἐτυχεῖν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τῷ μὲν ἐλλάττων τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν 19 δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τὰ ἐκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήνη τούτων τοῦ τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἄδικου καθόλου.

Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα 6 ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἡ ἄδικος ἐστὶν ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν, ὁδὸν κλέπτης ἡ μοιχὸς ἡ λῃστής; ἡ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διόστει; καὶ

18 διὸ ὑπερβολῆ—ὑποτέρως ἐτυχεῖν] 'Hence, too, injustice is an excess and a defect, because it is a principle that aims at excess and defect, in one's own case the excess of what is beneficial absolutely, and the defect of what is hurtful; but in the case of others, while the general result will be similar, it will not matter in which of these two ways proportion is violated.' That is, an unjust award may be made by giving a person too much good as well as too little, and too little evil as well as too much. Injustice is here said to be an extreme ὑπερβολῆς ἐστίν, just in the same way as justice was before said to be a mean state δι’ μέσου ἐστίν.

VI. This chapter, which is written confusedly after the manner of Eudemus, apparently has for its object to restrict the term justice yet more definitely than has hitherto been done. We are now entering on the second division of the book, and the question is, what will constitute an individual unjust? This question tends to elucidate the nature of justice and injustice as individual qualities. But before answering it, there is a digression. It must be remembered, says the writer, that we are treating of justice in the plain sense of the word, that is, civil justice, not that metaphorical justice which might be spoken of as existing in families. On the nature of this justice, proper or civil justice, and on the metaphorical kinds, some remarks are given.
γὰρ ἂν συγγένειοτα γυναικὶ εἴδως τὸ ἥ, ἄλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ προα-2 ρέσεως ἀρχήν ἄλλα διὰ πάθος. ἄδυκεί μὲν οὖν, ἄδυκος δ᾽
οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτης, ἐκλεψε δὲ, οὐδὲ μοιχός,
3 ἐμοίχευσε δὲ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. τῶς μὲν οὖν
ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐξηρται πρότερον·
4 δὲ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς
dίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ κοι-
νωνων βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθερών καὶ ἰσων ἡ
κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν. ὡστε οὔτοι μὴ ἔστι τοῦ-
το, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον,
ἀλλὰ τῷ δίκαιον καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον,
οῖς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτοὺς· νόμος δ᾽, ἐν οἷς ἀδύκει· ἡ γὰρ

3 τῶς μὲν οὖν—πρότερον] The allu-
sion is to ch. v. § 4–6, and the mean-
ing appears to be simply, in the variety
of cases that may occur, punishment
by simple retaliation will not do. The
sentence, however, appears irrelevant.
4 δὲ δὲ μὴ—κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν] 'Now
we must not forget that the object of
our inquiry is at once justice in the
plain sense of the word (ἀριθμοῦ) and
justice as existing in the state. But
this exists amongst those who live in
common, with a view to the supply of
their mutual wants, free and equal,
either proportionately or literally.'
Τὸ ἀριθμοῦ δίκαιον is opposed to καθ'
ὁμοιότητα. It is not meant here to
separate τὸ ἀρ. δίκ. from τὸ πολ. δίκ.,
rather it is implied that they are both
the same. The only justice that can
be called so without a figure of speech
is that between fellow-citizens, who
have mutual rights and some sort
of equality, cf. Ar. Pol. iii. vi. 11,
where it is said that all constitutions
that aim at the common advantage
ὁμαλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἀριθμοῦ
 δίκαιον. Proportionate equality be-
longs to aristocracies and constitut-
tional governments, numerical or
exact equality to democracies. Cf.
Ar. Pol. vi. ii. 2.

4–5 ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον — τίτρανοι]
'For what is just exists among those
who live under a common law, and
law is where there is injustice (for
legal judgment is a decision between
the just and the unjust). Now
wherever there is injustice there is
wrong dealing, but it does not follow
that where there is wrong dealing
there is injustice. Wrong dealing
consists in allotting oneself too much
absolute good and too little absolute
evil; and hence it is that we do not
suffer a man to rule, but the imper-
sonal reason, for a man does this for
himself (i.e. rules, cf. τίτρανοι below),
and becomes a tyrant.' This
passage does not give the origin of
justice, but the signs by which you
may know it. Justice could not not
be said to depend on law (especially
as law is said to depend on injustice, for
we should thus argue in a circle), but
where law exists you may know that
justice exists. The argument then is
that justice exists between citizens
who have a law with each other,
and not between father and children
between whom there is no law. Law
implies justice because it springs out
of cases where a sense of wrong has
been felt.
δική κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἄδικου. εὖ οἷς δ' ἄδικα, καὶ τὸ ἀδίκειν ἐν τούτοις, εὖ οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδίκειν, οὐ πάσιν ἄδικα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἁγαθῶν, ἐλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν· διὸ οὖκ ἐωμεν 5 ἄρχειν ἀνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, διὰ εἰςτὰ τοῦτο τοιεὶ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἐστὶ δ' ὁ ἄρχων φυλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπει δ' οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον 6 εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἰπερ δικαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἁγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἀνάλογον ἔστιν· διὸ ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ καὶ διὰ τὸ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἁγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρὸτερον. μωθὸς ἄρα 7 τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμῆ καὶ γέρας· ὁτῷ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὸν τὰ τουαίτα, οὕτω γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν 8 δικαίον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταύτων τούτως ἀλλ' ὁμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἄδικα πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτήμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἐὼς ἀν ἢ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χρωσθῇ, ὁσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτῶν δ' οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ 9 οὐκ ἐστιν ἄδικα πρὸς αὐτῶν. οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὔδ' δικαίον

ἐν οἷς δ' ἄδικα κ.τ.λ.] This seems to mean that law has not arisen merely from the fact of unequal dealings (ἀδικεῖν), but from a sense of the violation of a principle (ἄδικα). Thus the principle of justice is prior to all law and not created out of it. Τοῦτο δ', i.e. τὸ ἀδίκειν. Following up this conception of the a priori character of justice, the writer says we must be governed not by a man, who may act selfishly, but by an impersonal standard of the right. That selfish rule is tyranny, Aristotle asserts in Pol. π. vii. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μορφὰ Πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ του μορφαχώτατον. Cf. also Pol. π. xiii. 3: τὸν δ' ἀρα νόμου ἄρχειν αἰτιωτέρων μάλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα τινά· δ' ἡ μεν ὅτι τοὺς κελεύς δοκεῖ κελεύς ἄρχειν τὸν θεόν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, δ' ἄθροισιν κελεύς προςίθηκε καὶ θηραλ. ή τ' γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τουχόντων, καὶ δ' θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἄριστους ἰδίος. διάπερ ἄνευ ἀρέσεως πολὺς ὁ νόμος ἔστιν.

6 εἰπερ δ' οὐθὲν—γέρας] The apodosis to εἰπερ is μωθὸς ἄρα. From οὔ γαρ το πρότερον is parenthetical. 'But since he does not seem to gain at all, if he is a just man (for he does not allot to himself more of the absolutely good than to others, unless it be proportional to his own merits, and hence he acts for others, and justice thus is said to be the good of others), we must give him some reward, and this comes in the shape of honour and reverence.'

καθάπερ ἐλέχθη το πρότερον] The reference is to ch. i. § 17.

8 τὸ δὲ—δομον. 'Now the justice of masters and parents is not identical with what we have gone through (τοῦτοι i.e. ἀρ. καὶ τολμ. δικ.), but is only analogous to it.'

9 δια—ἀρχεθείη] 'Hence a man cannot have a spirit of wrong towards
himself; nor civil justice or injustice; for this is, as we have said (ἥπερ), according to law and among those who can naturally have law; namely, those, as we said (ἵστοι), who have an equality of ruling and being ruled.'

VII. Continues the discussion as to the nature of civil justice, in which there are two elements, the natural (φυσικὸν) and the conventional (νομικὸν). They are distinguished, and arguments are brought against the sophistical position that all justice is merely conventional. The chapter as above is not conveniently divided. We need not have had a fresh commencement with § 1, τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ, which is a carrying on of the same digression before made; and we might well have had the end of a chapter at § 5, κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἄριστη, after which there is a return to the main question as to justice and injustice in the acts and the characters of individuals. In his later edition Bekker makes one undivided chapter including Chaps. VI, VII, VIII, of the present edition.

1 τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ — διαφέρει] "Now in civil justice there is a natural element and a conventional element; that is natural which has the same force everywhere, and does not depend on being adopted or not adopted (τῷ δοκεῖν ἠ μὴ); while that is conventional which at the outset does not matter whether it be so or differently, but when men have instituted it, then matters." The distinction here drawn is like that between ὁ ὅσον and κοινὸς νόμος in Aristotle's Rhetoric, 1. xiii., and also that between moral and positive laws in modern treatises. Natural justice is law because it is right, conventional justice is right because it is law. Τὸ νομικὸν is not to be confused with τὸ νόμμα (cf. ch. 1. § 8), which is justice expressed in the law, and which is nearly equivalent to πολιτικὸν δικαίον, containing therefore both the natural and conventional elements. In the early stages of society all law is regarded with equal reverence. Afterwards, in the sceptical period, the merely conventional character of many institutions is felt, and doubt is thrown on the validity of the whole fabric. Afterwards the proper distinction is made, and the existence of something above all mere convention is recognised. The idea of 'nature' as forming the basis of law, which was started in the school of Aristotle, was afterwards developed by the Stoics, and still further drawn out by Cicero and the Roman jurists. It became a leading formula in the Roman law, and hence has influenced the modern school of continental jurists, until a reaction was made against it by Bentham.
μῶς λυτροῦσθαι, ὅ τὸ αἷμα θύειν ἄλλα μὴ δῦνο πρόβατι, ἔτι δόσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκατὰ νομοθετοῦσιν, οἶον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματῶδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνδοι εἶναι 2 ταύτα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινοῦμεν ὀρόσιν. τοῦτο δ' 3

σημαίνει λυτροῦσθαι] Herod. (vi. 79) speaks of two minas as the ransom, ἀρνίῳ ἐστὶ Πελοποννησίωσι δύο μὲν τεταγμέναι κατ' ἄθροι αἰχμάλωτον ἵκτίνης.

τὸ αἷμα θύειν] Cf. Herod. ii. 42: ὅσοι μὲν δὴ Διὸς Θεβαίων πάροικοι ἰδίων ἡ νομοῦ Θεβαίων εἶται, οὕτως μὲ

ν πάντες ἄθροι ἀπέχομεν αἰγαὶ δίωσιν.

τὸ δὲ κατ' Βρασίδα, cf. Amphipolis, Thucyd. v. xi.: καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπόλικοι περιέρχονται αὐτὸ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὃ ἢ ἄροι το επέμεναν καὶ τιμᾶς διδάσκασιν ἀγάπης καὶ ἑγεσίας θυσίας δικαίων τὸν Βρασίδαν σωτῆρα σφίσι γεγονότας.

2 δοκεῖ δ' ὅρωσι] 'Now some think that all institutions are of this character, because, while the natural is fixed and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns equally here and in Persia), they see the rules of justice altered.' Καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τοῖς Πέρσαις. This appears to have been a common formula, cf. Plato, Minos, p. 315 β: ἐγὼ μὲν (νομίζω) τὰ τὸ δίκαια δίκαια καὶ τὰ δίκαια δίκαια. οἷον καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν ὦ τοις ἐνθάδε δικίζεται; — καὶ δὲ οἷον καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις;—καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις. In the same dialogue, p. 513, are given specimens of the different laws and customs in different times and places (ν): Μυρία δ' ἐν τῷ ἔχου τοιαῦτα εἰσείη. πολλή γὰρ εὐρυχωρία τῆς ἀποδίδεσθαι, ὅτι οὕτω ἡμῖν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἔλαβε καὶ τοιάδυ τομόμεν οὕτως ἀλλήλους διὰ ἀμφότερον. The variety of customs and ideas is brought for-ward by Locke and Paley to dispute the existence of an innate 'moral sense.' This variety is generally overstated, and the list of aberrations is mainly obtained from the usages of barbarous tribes. On the origin of the opposition between 'nature' and 'convention,' and on the use made of this by the Sophists, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 149.

3 τοῦτο δ' — οὐ φώνει] 'But this is not the case (i.e. that justice is mutable), though it is so to a certain extent. May be among the gods justice is immutable; but with us, although there is somewhat that exists by nature, yet all is mutable. Though this does not do away with the distinction between what is by nature and what is not by nature.' The writing here is very compressed, ἀλλ' ἐστιν δὲ, i.e. τὰ δίκαια κινοῦται, to which also δικαίως afterwards must be referred. The answer given to the sophistical argument against justice consists in denying the premises that 'what is by nature is immutable.' This might be the case, it is answered, in an ideal world (παρὰ λείαθεοί), but in our world laws are interrupted, and the manifestation of them is less perfect (κατὰ τὸν μὴ τῶν πάντων). Again, 'nature' must be taken to mean not only a law but a tendency (see note on Eth. ii. i. 3), as, for instance, the right hand is 'naturally,' but not always, stronger than the left, while merely conventional institutions exhibit no natural law (οὐ φώνει ἀλλά
οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁρῶς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὡς. καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἰσως οὐδαμῶς· παρ' ἦμιν δ' ἐστὶ μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κυνηγὸν μέντοι πάν. ἀλλ' ὠμοις ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσε 
4 τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποιον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχει, καὶ ποιον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθηκῇ, εἴπερ ἀμφότεροι κινητὰ ὁμοιῶς, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ 
αὐτὸς ἀρμοστή διορισμὸς· φύσει γὰρ ἢ δεξία κρείττων, 
5 καίτοι ἐνδεχεται τινὰς ἂμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι, τὰ δὲ 
κατὰ συνθηκὴν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὁμοιὰ ἐστὶ 
τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ παιναχοῦ Ἰσα τὰ οἰνοπνεῦμα καὶ στηρί 
μέτρα, ἀλλ' ὤδ' οὐ μὲν ὦνοινται, μεῖξε, οὐ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, 
ἐλλαττόω. ὁμοιῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπων 
δίκαια οὐ ταύτα πανηγυρίων, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτείαι, ἀλλὰ 
6 μιὰ μόνον παιναχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἁρίστητη. τῶν δὲ δικαίων 
καὶ νομίμων ἐκαστὸν ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἐκαστὰ 
ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἐκεῖνων δ' ἐκαστὸν 
7 ἐν' καθόλου γὰρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον 
sυνθήκην, and are like weights and measures, which entirely depend on 
the convenience of men.

παρὰ γε τοῖς θεοῖς] Of course there is nothing theological in this allusion. 
In Eth. x. viii. 7, the notion of attributing justice to the gods is ridiculed. 
The present mention of the gods is not meant to convey anything about 
their nature, it merely contrasts a divine or ideal state with the human 
and actual. An exactly similar mention of the gods is made below, ch. ix. 
§ 17.

4 ἐνδεχεται τινας] Bekker reads τινας, Zell and Cardwell πάντας, all 
without mentioning any variation in their MSS. The latter of the two 
readings is supported by the Paraphrase and also by the author of the Magna 
Moralia (1. xxxiv. 21): λέγω δ' οἷον εἴ τι δριστερὰ μελετῶμεν πάντες δει 
βάλλουν, γινομεθ' σει συμβίων. In either case, the sense is nearly the 
same, πάντας implying 'any one out of all,' as above, κυνηγὸν μέντοι 
πάν.

5 ὠμοία τοῖς μέτροις] The meaning appears to be, that measures differ in 
size in the producing (οὐ μὲν ὀφείλει) and the consuming (οὐ δὲ 
πωλοῦσιν) countries.

ὁμοιῶς δὲ — ἁρίστητ] 'So, too, 
those institutions which are not based on nature, but on human will, are not 
the same in all places, for not even 
are forms of government the same, 
though there is one alone which for 
all places is naturally the best.' From 
the primary difference in governments 
will follow manifold other differences 
in conventional usages. For the 
Aristotelian idea of the one best 
government, see Politics iii. viii. xi. 
&c.

6 τῶν δὲ δικαίων — καθόλου γάρ] 
'Now every just and lawful rulestands 
like the universal in relation to the 
particulars, for while actions are mani-
fold, the rule is one, being universal.'
We have a transition of subject now, a return from the digression on civil justice to inquire into individual responsibility, &c. The transition is made by saying that the principles of justice and injustice (τὸ δικαίωμα and τὸ δίκαιον) are universals and differ from just and unjust acts. At first the writer makes δικαίωμα stand to δίκαιον, as δικαιοσύνη to δίκαιον. Afterwards he substitutes δικαιοπράγμα as a more correct word, as δικαιώμα had another special meaning to denote the setting right of injustice—legal satisfaction. It is not improbable that Eudemus here is correcting phraseology of Aristotle, who at all events in his Rhetoric, i. xiii. 1, uses δικαίωμα as the opposite of δικαιοσύνη, merely to denote a just action. Τὸ δ’ δικαιματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλθομεν, κ.τ.λ.

VIII. The general principles of justice having now been defined, the question is what constitutes justice and injustice in the individual? In one word the will. This chapter adds some needless remarks on the nature of the voluntary, and distinguishes between the different stages of a wrong done, according to the amount of purpose which accompanied it. The same act externally might be a misfortune, if happening beyond calculation; a mistake, if through carelessness; a wrong, if through temptation; the act of an unjust man, if through deliberate villany (§§ 6–8). This distinction is illustrated by the legal view with regard to acts done in anger (§§ 9–10). All voluntary just acts are just. Some involuntary acts are still unpardonable.

3 λέγω δ’ ἐκόσιον μὲν, ὡσπερ καὶ πρῶτον εἴρηται] The reference is to the Eudemian Ethics II. ix. 2: "Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἄντι ὑπὲρ μὴ πράττειν πράττειν μὴ ἀγνώσω καὶ δ’ αὐτῶν, ἐκόσια ταύτ' ἀκάπηλται, καὶ τὸ ἐκόσιόν τούτ' ἐστὶν: δειδ’ ἂν ἀγνώσω καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνώσω, ἄκως."
εὑρίσκειν οὖν τῶν εἴδων καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττην μὴτε δὲν μὴτε δ' μὴτε οὐ ένεκα, οἶον τίνα τύπτει καί τίνι καί τίνος ἐνεκα, κακέων ἐκαστον μὴ κατά συμβεβηκός μυδὲ βία, ὑστερεὶ εἰ τις λαβὼν τὴν χειρα αυτοῦ τυπτοι ἔτερον, οὐχ ἐκών οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτομένον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἡ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοείν. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διώρισθω καί ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ένεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πράξεν ἄλην. τὸ δ' ἀγνοούμενον, ἡ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μέν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὅν, ἡ βία, ἀκοῦσιν. πολλὰ γὰρ καί τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἴδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, οὐν οὐθεν οὐθὲ ἕκοσιον οὔτ' ακούσιον ἐστιν, οἶον τὸ γηράν ἢ ἀποθνησκεῖν.

ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός καὶ γὰρ ἄν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοῦτι τις άκος καὶ διὰ φόβον, οὐν ὡστε δικαίων πράττειν ὡστε δικαιοπαρείων φατέον ἄλλῳ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ 5 ἀδίκα πράττειν. τῶν δὲ έκοσιον τὰ μὲν προελμένοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελμένοι, προελμένοι μὲν ὡστε πρὸ-6 βουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροϊετα δὲ ὡστα ἀπροβολευτα. τριῶν δ' οὐσίων βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ'

The same illustration is given in the *Eudemian Ethics* π. viii. 10, where the discussion has a great affinity to the present chapter. τῶι τὸν οὐ ένεκα] See the note on Eth. π. i. 18.

πολλὰ γὰρ—ἀποθνησκεῖν] 'Since we knowingly both do and suffer many of these things that happen to us by nature, none of which are either in our power or voluntary, as, for instance, growing old or dying.' Obviously old age and death are ἀκοῦσια (cf. π. i. 3). So there must be something wrong in the text. Rassow conjectures οὐ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ' ἐκοδώσιν, which has been adopted above. Cf. π. π. v. 7, δ' οὐν μὴν. ἐφ' ἡμῶν δει μὴν ἐκοδώσια. It is characteristic of Eudemus to turn to the consideration of physiological facts; see the notes below on Eth. vii. ch. xiv.

It is characteristic of Eudemus to turn to the consideration of physiological facts; see the notes below on Eth. vii. ch. xiv.

6 τριῶν δ' οὐσίων βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις. 'Therefore there being three kinds of harm that may be done in the intercourse of men,' &c. Really four kinds are specified, but the last (διὰ μοιχησίαν) seems to be an addition to the old list, consisting of the misfortune, the error, and the wrong, which division is to be found in Aristotle's Rhetoric, 1. oh. xiii. The present discussion is promised in Eth. Eud. π. x. 19: ἵσταται δ' ἐκ τοὺς νοεῖν φανερῶν καὶ δή καλῶς διαφέρεται οὐ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκοδώσια τὰ δ' ἀκοῦσια τὰ δ' ἐκ πρωτολας.
αγνοίας ἀμαρτήματα ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε δι' ἥματε ὁ μήτε ὁ ἀνθ. ὁ ἐνεκα ὑπελαβεῖ πράξη, ἢ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἢ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ οὐκ ἐνεκα δράση, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐδὲ τοῦτο γῆθη, οἴον οὐχ ἴνα τρώῃ ἀλλ' ἴνα κευτησῃ, ἢ οὔχ δὴν, ἢ οὔτ' ὡς. ὅταν μὲν ὁδὸν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβη 7 γένεται, ἀτύχχη, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἀνεύ δὲ κακίας, ἀμάρτημα, ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δὲ ὅταν ἐξωθεῖ. ὅταν δὲ εἴδος μὲν μὴ 8 προβούλευται δὲ, ἀδίκημα, οἴον οὐσ τε διὰ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ἀλλὰ πάθη, οὐσα αναγκαῖα ἡ φυσικὰ, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδίκηματα ἐστίν, οὖν μέντοι τω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη. ὅταν 9 δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοιας κρίνεται οὐ γὰρ ἀρχεῖ ὁ θυμὸς ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἐτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἡ 10 μὴ ἀμφιβατεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δίκαιου. ἐπὶ φαινομένη γάρ ἀδίκια ἡ ὀργὴ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπέρ έν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἡν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, διὸ δὲ διὰ λήθην αὐτῷ δρῶσιν. ἀλλ' ὀμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρου δίκαιον ἀμφισβητοῦσι. δὲ ἐπιθυμεύεισα οὐκ ἄγνοιει, ὡστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δὲ οὐ. διὸ δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψει, ἄδικε. καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ἦδη τα ἄδικηματα 11

νομοθετοῦσινε' εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακρι- βοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπιτυλλεῖ γα τῆς ἀλήθειας ἀλλὰ περὶ μὴν τῶν τῶν ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐπι- στήμης.

9-10 δο καλῶς—ἄδικει] 'Hence too acts done from anger are well judged not to proceed from purpose, for not he who acts in anger, but he who provoked the anger is the beginner. Again, the question is not about the act having taken place or not, but about the justice of it; for anger arises on the appearance of injustice. It is not as in contracts, where men dispute about the thing having been done, and where (if the thing has been done) one of the parties must be a villain, unless they have done it in forgetfulness. But (in the present case) agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which side justice is. Now he that has laid a plot against another cannot plead ignorance (in mitigation of the charge of injustice against him), so that B (the party who commits an act of wrathful retaliation on A, whom he alleges to have plotted against him) maintains that he has been injured, while the other party, A, denies it. But if A has purposely hurt B, he is certainly
guilty of injustice towards him.'

Owing to the obscurity of expression, this passage has given great trouble to the commentators. The context is a carrying on of the distinction between ἀδίκημα, ἀκούσμα, and ἀδίκος. What distinguishes these is the amount of purpose they contain. This, says the writer, is illustrated by the way in which acts of anger are treated legally. In violations of civil contract the question is merely as to fact,—did the contract exist, and has it been consciously violated? But in cases of assault, &c., committed in anger, the fact is admitted, but justification is pleaded in respect of some act of injustice, which provoked the acts complained of. Thus the question is moved off from the acts themselves, and is entirely concerned with their antecedents. Was it a real injustice that gave rise to them? That this is what the writer means, is shown by the words of the text (§ 10) ἀμφοειρετέατι—περὶ τὸν δικαλὸν ἐτὶ φαινομένη γαρ ἄδικη ἢ ὀρθή ἦσσον. According to the text, when an act of wrathful retaliation has been committed, the question is, was the act that provoked this retaliation an act of injustice or not? And this turns very much on the question whether it was a harm done knowingly and on purpose? (ὁ ἐναυλολείπος ὅπερ ἄγονεὶ—ὁ δὲ ἐκ προανέργεια βλαχαρί, ἄδικεὶ.) We thus return to the general proposition (§ 11) that injustice of act requires only voluntariness, but injustice of character deliberate purpose. The reference here is to the point of view of the law-courts, and may have been suggested, like so much else in this book, by the discussions in the Politics of Aristotle. Cf. Pol. iv. xvi. 1-5, where the different kinds of law-courts are specified, and it is mentioned as one of the cases that fall to be treated of in a criminal court,—where homicide is admitted, but its justification is pleaded: θυρησκοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶνη, ἂν τ' ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἂν τ' ἐν ἀλλοις, περ' τε τῶν ἐκ προαναλοοι καὶ περ' τῶν δικαυκίων, κ.τ.λ.

ἐκ φαινομένη γαρ ἄδικη] This is a reasonable deduction from Aristotle's definition of anger, Rhet. ii. ii. 1, δρεῖς μετὰ λόγης τιμοράς φαινόμενης διὰ φαινόμενην διάλογον, κ.τ.λ. If anger arises from a sense of wounded amour propre, the idea of injustice and wrong must certainly be counted among the most common causes of its being excited.

12 ἀγνοούντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μὴν φυσικὸν μὴν ἀνθρωπικὸν] This would seem to imply a state in which moral insensitivity and temporary mental obscuration have been caused by an access of brutality (Ψιθωίας) as described in Eth. vii. v. 3. αὐθαίρετα μὲν θυμοῦσα, αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ νόσους γίνονται καὶ καρδίας ἐνός, διότερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθερέτους καὶ φαγόν, καὶ ὁ τὸν συν- δολου τὸ σταρ. The police courts afford frequent instances of the infliction of brutal injuries, which are 'not forgivable,' though the perpetrators seem hardly responsible beings.
IX. This chapter, by means of mooting and answering certain difficulties and objections with regard to the nature of justice and injustice, completes and deepens the conception of them that has hitherto been given. These questions are as follows: (1) Can one be injured voluntarily? §§ 1–2. (2) Is the recipient of an injury always injured? §§ 3–8. The latter question is first generally answered, and then, §§ 9–13, it is re-stated in the form of two other questions, namely, Is the distributor of an unjust distribution, or he that gains by it, unjust? and, Can a man injure himself? By mooting these points it is at once shown that justice implies a relationship of two wills, and that an act of injustice implies a collision of two wills: a loss on one side and a gain on the other. The chapter ends with some remarks correcting popular errors, and deepening the conception of justice. (1) Justice is no easy thing consisting in an external act. It consists in an internal spirit, § 14. (2) To know it is not like knowing a set of facts. It implies a knowledge of principles, § 15. (3) The just man could not at will act unjustly. The character of the act depends on the state of mind, § 16. (4) Justice is limited to a human sphere, § 17.

1 ἀπορήσεις ὅ ἐσ—ἐκάστης Ἡ ἕν χοίρων ἀκόμαν, ἡ δέλοικεν ὡς ἑκὼ, ἢ ἑλοικεν ὡς ἐκὼ,
HoiKoN [EYAHMION] V. [Chapter]

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστὶν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἦ οὐ ἄλλῳ ἀκούσιον ἀπαν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄδικειν πὰν ἐκούσιον. καὶ ἃρα πᾶν οὗτος ἦ ἐκείνος, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄδικειν πὰν ἐκούσιον, ἦ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δὲ ἀκούσιον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιώσθαι, τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πὰν ἐκούσιον, ὡστ' εὐλογον ἀντικείσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἐκάτερον τὸ τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιώσθαι ἦ ἐκούσιον ἦ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἀποτελοὺς δὲ ἄν δισεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιώσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἔνοι γὰρ 3 δικαιώσταται μὲν ἐκόντες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειν ἂν τις, ποτέρον ὡς τὸ ἄδικον πεποιθῶς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ὡς ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπὶ ἀμφοτέρους μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄδικων· οὐ γὰρ ταύτων τὸ τάσκα πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιώσθαι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ 4 δικαιώσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ

Bellerophon. Wagner writes them as a dialogue, supposing the persons to be Alcmene and Pegasus. He conjectures κατέκτα, which appears more probable than the usual reading κατέκτα, and which accordingly has been adopted in the above translation.

2 The passive terms are not opposed to each other in respect of voluntariness in the way that might be expected from the opposition between the active terms under which they stand.

ἀδικεῖν—δικαιοπραγεῖν ἀδικεῖσθαι—δικαιοῦσθαι.

For ἀδικεῖσθαι is always involuntary, but δικαιοῦσθαι is not always voluntary. A man may be 'treated unjustly' by being hanged.

3 Not every one who suffers what is unjust is injured, for injury implies intention on the part of the injurer. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. I. xiii. 5: ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν.

4—6 εἰ δ' ἐστιν—πράττειν 'Now, if to injure is simply defined "to hurt any one willingly," and "willingly" means "knowing the person, and the instrument, and the manner," and the incontinent man hurts himself willingly, then it follows that one can be willingly injured, and it will be possible to injure oneself. But this was one of the points in question, whether it is possible to injure oneself. Again, one might from incontinence be hurt willingly by another who was acting willingly, so that in that way it would be possible to be injured willingly. But shall we not rather say that the definition is not correct, but that we must add to the formula "hurt any one willingly, knowing person, instrument, and manner," the terms "against that person's wish?" It is true one is hurt and one suffers injustice willingly, but no
one is injured willingly. For no one wishes (harm), nor does the incontinent man, but he acts against his wish. For no one wishes for what he does not think to be good, and the incontinent man does not do what he thinks to be good.'

ἀζωγή is opposed to κατά πρόοθεσιν as implied in προοθεσιν. Cf. vii. iv. 2–3.

to βλάπτειν] Harm does not constitute injustice without a violation of the will. Cf. Ar. Eth. l. xiii. 6: ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικομένον βλάπτεσθαι, καὶ ἀκολουθία βλάπτεσθαι.

ό δ' ἀκρατῆ] The incontinent man may harm himself, or be led into ruin by others. The phenomena of incontinence appear to have constantly occupied the attention of Eudemus. They do not only form the main subject of Eth. Book vii. (Eth. Eud. vi.), but they are also mixed up with the discussion on the voluntary, Eth. Eud. ii. viii.

ό ὁστε γὰρ βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] In his inmost self every one wishes for what he thinks good. Thus the incontinent man, following his desire, acts against his own real wish. This is the same point of view as is taken in the Gorgias of Plato (p. 466 sqq.) It is rather different from that in Eth. III. ch. iv. (on which see notes), though the word ἀεται prevents an absolute collision. The terms παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν are rather awkwardly introduced in the text, for it is said they are necessary to turn mere harm into injustice, but with regard to the incontinent man, while acting voluntarily he receives 'harm—against his wish.' Yet he is not injured voluntarily, because the terms 'against his wish' constitute him an involuntary agent. In short, in this case παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν is made to qualify, not the harm, but the voluntariness of the recipient. There is a slight confusion in the expression, but on the whole the tendency here is to attribute a less degree of voluntariness to weak and foolish acts than was done by Aristotle in his discussions on the voluntary; Eth. III. l. 14, &c.
οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ’ ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. 8 περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικείσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσων, ἔδηλον.

"Ετι δ’ ὁν προειλόμεθα δ’ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερον τοῦ ἀδικείς ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεόν ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ 9 ἐστιν αὐτῶν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν’ εἰ γὰρ εὑρέθηται τὸ πρότερον λεγθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν, εἰ τις πλέον ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδῶς καὶ ἐκὼν, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὐτῶν ἀδικεῖ. ὅτερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν: ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλπιττικός ἐστιν. ἡ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεονκεῖτε, ἄδον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλῶς. ἔτι λύσει καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικείν’ οὐθὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὅστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον.

10 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων αἰτί. οὐ γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἀδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν τοῦτο δ’ ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχή τῆς πράξεως, ἢ 11 ἐστιν εν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ’ οὐκ εν τῷ λαμβανοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἐστιν ὡς τὰ ἄνυχα κτεῖναι καὶ ἢ χεῖρ καὶ ὁ οἰκείης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὖν ἀδικεῖ 12 μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἀδικα, ἐτί εἰ μὲν ἄγνωσθεν ἐκρίνειν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὖθ’ ἀδικος ἢ κρίσις ἐστιν, ἐστι δ’ ὡς ἀδικος. ἐτέρων γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρώτον εἰ δ’ ἐγινόσκων ἐκρίνειν ἀδικος, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ

8-13 ἐτι δ’ ὁν προειλόμεθα δ’ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν] 'But of the questions which we determined on there remain two to discuss,' namely, (1) whether the distributor of an unjust distribution does the wrong, or he who gains by it? (2) Can a man injure himself, as for instance by taking less than his share? These questions are as good as answered already; it is already clear that no one can injure himself. Again the act belongs to the distributor and not to the receiver. If the distributor acts from corrupt motives he is unjust, if unconsciously and by accident he is not unjust, though justice may have been violated by his decision.

11-12 ἐτι ἐπεὶ—πρῶτον] 'Again, as the word doing is used in more senses than one, and there is a sense in which inanimate things kill—or one's hand—or the slave who does his master's bidding—so the distributor may be the instrument of doing injustice, without himself incurring. Again, if he decided in ignorance, in the eye of the law he is not guilty of injuring, nor is his decision unjust, though from another point of view it is unjust, for justice according to law is distinct from abstract justice.' The
Typed out from book:
17 ἔστι δὲ—ἔστιν] 'Now the relations of justice exist between those who share in what are commonly called goods, but with regard to them can have both too much and too little. For some cannot have too much, as perhaps the gods; and to others again no portion is advantageous, but all is hurtful—I mean the utterly bad; while there is a class who can receive goods up to a certain point. Hence justice is human.' Two ideal states, one of the absolutely good, the other of the absolutely bad, are here depicted in contrast to the condition of human society. The idea of property cannot of course be connected with God (cf. Ἐθ. x. viii. 7), who has and is all good (cf. Ἐθ. i. vi. 3, ix. iv. 4); nor again with those who are so degraded that they could not receive any benefit at all from what are called goods (cf. ch. i. § 9). The passage is a curious one, and may remind us of the position assigned by Aristotle (cf. Pol. i. ii. 14) to man in his social condition, as something between the beast and the god.

X. Some account of equity (ἐπιείκεια) forms a suitable complement to the theory of justice, and we find the subject so treated in Aristotle's Rhetoric, i. xiii., from which it is not improbable that the present chapter may be partly borrowed. Professor Spengel is mistaken in saying that this chapter is out of place, being introduced into the midst of the δικαιον on justice. Evidently it is chapter xi., and not chapter x., that is out of place. Spengel thinks that the words περὶ δὲ ἐπιείκειας, would come in well after the words πῶς μὲν ὥς ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεισθεὶς πρὸς τὸ δικαίον, εἰρηταί πρὸς (which occur ch. vi. § 3), as if first retaliation and then equity should be discussed in relation to justice. But it is evident that they stand on a different footing, as treated in this book. Retaliation is a principle existing in justice and with certain modifications constituting it; equity is something outside justice and correcting it.

'Ἐπιείκεια has a close connection with what is called γνώμη (consideration), Ἐθ. vi. xi. 1, cf. Rhet. i. xiii. And thus it is treated of by the author of the Magna Moralia amongst
the intellectual qualities, and is coupled
with what he calls ἐγγραμμοτητή, Magna
Moralia, ii. i. 1, sqq.

To us the contents of this chapter
appear natural and easy to appre-
 hend. The idea of equity as the com-
plement of law and justice is to us
perfectly familiar, but the writer saw
a difficulty in saying how logically
(τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι) equity could be
praised if it contradicted justice. The
answer is well given above, that equity
is a higher and finer kind of justice
coming in where the law was too
course and general. The best illus-
tration of this conception is to be
found in the beautiful description
given in Rhet. i. xiii. 'It is equity to
pardon human failings, and to look to
the lawgiver and not to the law; to
the spirit and not to the letter; to the
intention and not to the action; to
the whole and not to the part; to the
character of the actor in the long
run and not in the present moment;
to remember good rather than evil,
and good that one has received, rather
than good that one has done; to bear
being injured (τὸ διέξεσθαι ἀδικο-
μένων); to wish to settle a matter
by words rather than by deeds;
lastly, to prefer arbitration to judg-
ment, for the arbitrator sees what is

equitable, but the judge only the law,
and for this an arbitrator was first
appointed, in order that equity might
flourish.'

I ὡσ′ ἐνδο—and ἀγαθὸν't Sometimes we
praise what is equitable and the
equitable character in such a way,
that we transfer the term and use it
instead of the term good in praising
people for all other qualities besides.'

The word ἐπιεικής is constantly used
merely in the sense of 'good'; cf. Eth.
iv. ix. 7, ἐν ὑποθέσεωσ ἐπιεικῆς,
and above, ch. iv. § 3, &c.; but it is a mis-
take to consider this the later sense
of the word, as if 'equitable' were the
primary sense. 'Ἐπιεικῆς (from ἐλεός)
first means 'customary,' as in Homer;
then 'seemly,' then 'good' in general;
afterwards it is probable that an asso-
ciation of ἔλεος, 'to yield,' became con-
nected with the word, and hence the
notion of moderation and of waiving
one's rights arose, and τὸ ἐπιεικῆs
was constantly contrasted with τὸ
δίκαιον. Thus in Herod. iii. 53:
καλλος τῶν δικαίων τὴν ἐπιεικήτερα
πρωτειθείων. Cf. Plato, Laws, p. 757 D:
τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ἐξουσιών τὸν
tελέων καὶ ἀκριβῶς παρά δίκην τὴν
ὁρθήν ἐστι καταρεθραμμένων, &c. Out
of this contrast the idea of equity was
developed.

There are some cases for which it is impossible to legislate; you require a special decree to meet them. The phusia, like the exercise of equity, was a remedy to make up the insufficiency of laws. On its special character cf. ch. vii. § 1, and Eth. vii. viii. 2, see also Arnold on Thucyd. III. 36.

The rule for what is indefinite must be itself indefinite, like the leaden rule in the Lesbian architecture—the rule is not fixed, but shifts itself according to the shape of the stone, and so does
the decree according to the nature of the case.' 'Lesbian architecture' appears to have been a kind of Cyclopian masonry, which may have remained in Lesbos from the early Pelasgian occupiers of the island. Polygon stones were used in it, which could not be measured by a straight rule; cf. Æsch. Fragem. 70.

Δδ' ὁ μὲν τις Λέσβων
κύμα ἐν τριγώνου ἐκπεραιώτων ῥυμοῖς,
where κύμα means a waved moulding.

XI. This chapter, which is merely an instance of Eudlian mal-arrangement, starts by discussing an already settled question, Can a man injure himself? Amidst the somewhat feeble reasonings and the repetitions which it presents, it is not quite without interest in the view that is taken of suicide, §§ 2, 3, and in the saying that it is a mere metaphor to speak of justice between the higher and lower parts of a man.

II. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων i.e. ch. i. §§ 12–20. The question is complicated by introducing a mention of universal justice (τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετήν), and the extraordinary assertion is made that 'whatever the law does not command it forbids.' We might well ask, Did the Athenian law command its citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c.? 2–3 The suicide sins against the state, not against himself. This is proved by the fact that the state affixes infamy to the deed. In Æschines, Chreiph. p. 636, § 64, it is mentioned that the hand of a suicide was buried apart from himself. And in Plato's Laws, ix. p. 873 c, sqq., regulations are laid down for the burial of suicides. In the words δίκει δρα, ἄλλα τίνα; there is a change of meaning from the intransitive δίκει, to 'do wrong,' to the transitive verb to 'injure.'
άδικων καὶ μὴ ὀλος φαύλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικήσαι ἑαυτόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου. ἔστι γὰρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὀστερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὀλὴν ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὡστε οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ· ἀμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐίη ἀφήγησαι καὶ προσκείσαι το ἄντω· τοῦτο δὲ ἄδικατον, ἀλλ’ ἂν ἐν πλείσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδικον. 5 ἔτι δὲ εκοινοίον τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον. ὁ γὰρ διότι ἐπαθεῖ, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὕτος ἄντων, τὰ αὐτὰ ἀμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἰη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἀνεῦ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ’ οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. ὅλος δὲ λύτει τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὴν διορισμὸν τῶν 7 περὶ τοῦ ἐκοινοίου ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἁμφω μὲν φαύλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἄδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττων τὸ δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὀστερ ὑγειών μὲν ἐν ἰατρίκῃ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ· ἀλλ’ ὅμως χείρον τὸ ἄδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας

4 ἀμα γὰρ—ἀδικων] 'For it would be thus possible for the same thing to be gained and lost by the same person; but this is not possible, justice and injustice must always take place between more persons than one.' Cf. ch. iii. § 4.

6 ὅλος δὲ λύτει κ.τ.λ.] A verbal repetition of what was said above, ch. ix. § 9.

7-9 The chapter ends by touching upon two points which have an apparent reference to Plato: (1) the assertion that to injure is worse than to be injured, which the writer here qualifies with a consideration; (2) the conception of justice existing between the different parts in the mind of an individual, which is here pronounced to be a metaphor.

7 καὶ ὀστερ —γυμναστικὴ] This sentence is parenthetical and elliptic. The train of thought appears to be: 'Injuring and being injured are both bad, they are both departures from the mean, and it is (with justice) as with health in medicine and good condition in training,' namely, it is a state of balance between excess and defect. Cf. Eth. ii. ii. 6.

ἀλλ’ ὅμως χείρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν] This is exactly the point which is urged by Socrates in the Gorgias of Plato (p. 473 A, 509 0), and seems to his hearers a paradox. It is qualified above by the admission that being injured might be in its consequences (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) a worse evil than injuring; just as a stumble might cause a man's death, and so be accidentally worse than a pleurisy. Is it then worse to be ruined by the cheating of others, or to cheat some one of a sixpence? The writer above acknowledges that moral science will maintain the severity of its verdict, and say cheating is the worse (ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ κ.τ.λ.). Of
course being deprived in mind is the worst of all evils. It is not this (ἀδικέω εἰμι), but a single act of wrong (τὸ ἀδικεῖν), that will bear comparison with the evil of being injured.

ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις  ἑστὶν πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὸς ἔσωτὸν ἀρέτεις. ὅσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλα δικαίον τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἥδικῶν ἀρετῶν ἰδιότι ἡ τῶν τρόπων τούτων a contradiction of their respective inclinations; i.e. then, like ruler and ruled, they have a sort of justice among each other.'
PLAN OF BOOK VI.

TURNING to the contents of this Sixth Book, we see at once that it includes two subjects, and that the intermixture of these two has given rise to some little confusion. The questions are: (1) What is the moral standard? (2) What are the intellectual ἀγώνας?

Commencing with the former question, the writer goes off into the latter. And thus Thought (φιλοσοφία) is treated of at some length as a perfection of the moral intellect, but is hardly touched upon with regard to its operation as the moral standard.

After the two above-mentioned questions have been proposed, without any statement of their connection, the discussion of the intellectual ἀγώνας commences by a division of the reason into scientific and calculative. Ch. I.

Truth is the object of both, but truth is divided into practical and specu'lative. The former enters into and becomes an element in the decisions of the will. Ch. II.

Truth of whatever kind is attained by only five organs of the mind—Science, Art, Thought, Reason, and Philosophy. These then are severally discussed; and Philosophy, after being treated independently, has Thought brought in again in contrast to itself. Ch. III.—VII.

The relation of Thought to Economy and Politics is then discussed. Ch. VIII.

Prudence (σοφία), Apprehension (σύνεσις), and Considerateness (γνώμη), as being component elements of Thought, are severally treated of, and some remarks are added on the natural and intuitive character of these practical qualities. Ch. IX.—XI.

The book ends by the statement and solution of difficulties with
regard to Thought and Philosophy, their respective use, and their relation to each other in point of superiority.

With regard to the use of Thought some important though not very clear remarks are made on its inseparable connection with Virtue. Though inseparable, it is not, however, identical with Virtue, as Socrates wrongly asserted. In relation to Philosophy, Thought is concerned with the means, while Philosophy is concerned with the end. Ch. XII.—XIII.

The upshot of the book, then, is, that it treats of the intellectual epural. These are two—not five, as some would say, reckoning as such the five organs of truth, nor again an indefinite number, as Aristotle would seem to say, admitting 'Apprehension,' &c. (Eth. x. xiii. 20); but two essentially, Philosophy and Thought. These are contrasted with each other, but in such a way that Thought, though the least excellent, is brought into prominence, and is the real theme of the book. With all the discrepancies of statement which are apparent between different passages in this book, 'Thought' comes out in its general outlines as the perfection of the practical reason combined with the will; as inseparable, if distinguishable, from Virtue itself. The picture of this quality and of its growth in the mind is made the occasion of many interesting remarks; but the question how the mind acts in determining the mean, and what is the nature of the moral standard, is left still unanswered.

For the term φύσις, as used in this book, it is not possible to find an exact equivalent in English. 'Prudence,' which is generally employed for this purpose, is not suitable; for φύσις, according to Platonic views, included the contemplation of absolute existence (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 194). 'Thought' is the equivalent for φύσις in its general Greek sense, and it has been thought better, in the following notes, to take 'Thought' in a peculiar and technical sense to represent the peculiar and technical application of φύσις, which here occurs.
ΘΕΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VI.

ΕΠΕΙ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖται καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἐλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τούτῳ διέλομεν. ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἔξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐστὶ τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὅν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τῶν λόγων ἔχον ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίσω, καὶ τις

I. This chapter states, though somewhat indefinitely, the question which is to be answered in the ensuing book. Referring back to a previous mention of 'the mean,' it proposes now to discuss 'the right law' by which the mean is determined. For only to know that action must be 'in the mean, and according to the right law,' is a mere blank formula which requires filling up (ἀληθὲς μὲν, οἴδατε δὲ σαφές). What then is the right law, and what is the standard of it (τίς τ’ ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτων τίς δροε;)? In answering this question, the procedure must be to discuss the most perfect developments of the intellectual faculties, for by so doing we shall learn the proper function of each (ὅπως ὁ ἐκατέρω τούτων τίς ἡ βελτιώστη ἔστι· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρω, ἡ δ’ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ὀλυμπίων). As the inner nature of man was before divided into two parts, the rational and irrational, so we may now subdivide the rational part into two elements, the scientific and the calculating, in accordance with the two classes of objects which are presented to the mind, and which we may conclude are dealt with by separate faculties, namely, the permanent, which is dealt with by the scientific element in us, and the contingent, which is the object of calculation, or deliberation.

I ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες] The reference is to Eth. Eud. II. v. 1: ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἔστι δὲ ἦς πρακτικῶς τῶν βελτιστῶν καὶ καθ’ ἧν ἀρατα διάκειται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἀριστῶν τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ.

Εῷ πάσαις γὰρ—λόγων] 'For in all the states of mind which we have described, as also in all others, there is a certain mark to which he who is in possession of "the law" (ὁ τῶν λόγων ἔχων) looks, and tightens or relaxes (the strings) accordingly, and there is a certain standard of those mean states which we say are between
excess and deficiency, being in accordance with the right law.' Ἡστιώνει καὶ ἀνήρ συν εἰναι τὴν ὑπερβολήν καὶ τὴν ἐπιλέψεως, οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὄρθον λόγον. ἦστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀλήθες μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφῆς καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαὶς ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὧν ἦστι ἐπιστήμη, τούτως ἀλήθες μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὕτω πλεῖον οὕτε εἶπεῖν ὅτε ποιεῖν οὐδὲ ῥαθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὄρθος λόγος τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἀν τὰς οὕτως ἀν εἰδεὶς πλέον, αὐτὸ ποιὰ δὲ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα,


2 ἦτο δὲ—σαφῆς. 'Now to say this is to say what is true enough, but not explicit.' This same expression, with the same illustration of the medical art, is repeated Eth. Eud. viii. iii. 13: ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρότεροι εὐλογήτης τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος τοῦτο δ' έτιν ὀσπερ ἐν τοῖς τούτο εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ λαυμὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης. τούτο δὲ ἀληθεῖς μὲν, οὐ σαφῆς δὲ. Cf. Id. I. vi. 2: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν ἑγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δὲ προκύψειν οὕτω καὶ τὸ σαφῶς. In the present place there is an apparent protest against the indefiniteness and relativity of Aristotle's moral theory of 'the mean' and 'the law.' Eudemus does not seem (according to the statement here) to give greater explicitness to the idea of the 'law' by the development of the idea of the wise man who is its impersonation. But he asks (separating σκοτὸς and δρος from the λόγος), 'What is the mark to which one possessing the law must
look?' What is the standard of the law? In reality these questions get no answer. They only cloud the subject by introducing a confusion of formula.


καὶ ὅπωςλαθε—αὐτοῖς] Ἀνδρεῖο ἄριστος] And let us suppose that the parts possessing reason are two, one by which we apprehend such existences as depend on necessary principles, and one by which we apprehend contingent matter, for to objects differing in genus there must be different members of the mind severally adapted, if it be true that these members obtain their knowledge by reason of a certain resemblance to and affinity with the object of knowledge. We have here a division of the mind in accordance with a division of the objects of which the mind is cognisant. And as a justification of this we have the assumption that knowledge implies a resemblance and affinity between object and subject. With regard to this, Aristotle (De Anima, i. ii. 10) says that 'those philosophers who wished to account for knowledge and perception identified the ψυχῆς with the principles of things, because like is known by like.' Ὅσα δ` ἐστὶ τοῦ γνώσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθησιοῦ τῶν ὄσων (ἀποκλεισμοῖς), οὐδὲν δὲ λέγουσι τῇ ψυχῆς τὰς ἀρχὰς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, οἱ δὲ μιᾶς ταύτης, ὅτερος ἴση ὁμοῦ τῶν σταχελῶν πάσων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχής τοῦτον, λέγων οὗτων γὰρ μὲν γὰρ γαίᾳ ὅπωςμεν, διατει δ` δεδομ. αἰθέρα δ` αἰθέρα διαν, ἀτὰρ πολὺ πολύ ἀξίηλον, στοργή ἐκαί στοργῆ, νεῖκος δὲ τε νεῖκει λυρψ.
ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ φ' τὰ ἑνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἑτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἑτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον περιφοκός, ἐπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τινα καὶ οἰκειό-
τητα ἡ γνώσις υπάρχει αὐτῶς. λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ 6 μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογιζεσθαι ταύτων, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ

really different from one another in genus (τῷ γένει ἑτερά), before we con-
clude the existence of different parts, faculties, or elements corresponding to-
them, else we may attribute to diffe-
rent principles in the mind phenomena 
that were only modifications of each 
other, and not by any means implying a 
diversity of principle.

6 λεγεσθω δὲ—ἔχειν] 'Of these, 
let one be called the “scientific,” the 
other the “calculative” part, for deli-
berating and calculating are the same, 
and no one deliberates about neces-
sary matter. The calculative part, 
then, is one division of the rational.’ 
The psychology here is an advance in 
dogmatic clearness of statement be-
yond what we find in the writings of 
Aristotle. The terms τὸ ἐπιστημονι-
κὸν and τὸ λογιστικὸν are not opposed 
to each other in the De Animal. Λογι-
στικὸν has not there taken the definite 
meaning which it wears in the present 
book. Rather it is used in a general 
sense to denote ‘rational.’ Thus in 
saying how the ψυχὴ is to be divided, 
Aristotle says (De An. III. ix. 2): ἔχει 
δ' ἀπορολα ἐπίθετ πώς τε δὲ μόρα λέγει 
tῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. Τρόπον γὰρ τις 
ἀκερα φαύνεται καὶ φό μόσον ἡ των 
λέγουσι, διορίζεται, λογιστικῶν καὶ θυ-
μικῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῶν (i.e. Plato, Re-
pub. pp. 436–441), οἱ δὲ τό λόγον ἔχον 
καὶ τό θλογον. Cf. Ib. III. ix. 5: ἐν 
tῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βολήσις γίνεται. 
Ib. III. x. 10: φαντασία δὲ πώς ἡ 
λογιστικὴ ἡ αἰσθητική. Cf. Topics,
v. v. 4, where in stating the various ways in which the logical property may be predicated of a substance, it is said, ἧ ἀπλών καθάπερ ξυόν τῷ βιν, ἧ κατ' Ὀλλα, καθάπερ ψυχῆς τὸ φρύμων, ἤ ύπ τῷ πρώτῳ, καθάπερ λογιστικοῦ τὸ φρύμων (φρύμων and λογιστικοῦ being here both used most probably in a general sense for ‘thought’ and ‘reason’). Again, τὸ ἐπιστήμων is used, not as here opposed to τὸ λογιστ., but generally. *De Anm.* III. x. 3: τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμων οὐ κεινέται ἄλλα μᾶλλον. However, the distinction here given is already prepared in the *De Anm.*, and is even stated (though less dogmatically) in a place which was probably borrowed by the present writer. *L. iii. x. 2*: οὐκ δὲ οὐκαί τοι λογιζόμενοι καὶ ὁ πράκτικος διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει.

οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλευόται, κ.ά.] Cf. *Eth. Eud.* II. x. 9: περὶ δὲν οὐδεὶς ἀν οὐδὲν ἐγχειρήσει βουλευότατα μὴ ἀγαθοῖς. Περὶ δὲν δὲν ἔδεχεται μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ, ἄλλα καὶ τὸ βουλευ-

σαι τόσο αὐθαίρετος. We before observed (cf. *Eth. iii. iii. 3 note*) that Aristotle, in the parallel passage, did not use the terms τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα and τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα. To combine logical with psychological formula is the characteristic of Eudemus.

II. The last chapter having divided the reason into scientific and calculative, the present chapter proceeds to bridge over the interval between the intellect and moral action. This is done by assuming three principles in man—sensation, reason, and desire. Sensation merges into the other two, and then it is shown that in purpose, the cause of action, there is the meeting point of desire and reason, not of the pure or speculative reason (answering to the ‘scientific part’ of the last chapter), but the practical reason aiming at an end (which answers to the ‘calculative part’ in the former division). Thus there are two kinds of truth, one pure, the other having a relation to the will, and ‘agreeing with right desire.’ This distinction is a great step towards answering the question with which the present book is concerned. Truth having been divided into pure and practical, it only remains to see the forms under which the mind deals with these two kinds, and the highest developments of the mind will be disclosed, arranged under a twofold head.

II τρία δ' ἐστιν] Cf. *Ar. De Anm.*, III. x. 1: φαντασάται δὲ γα ταῦτα κινοῦτα, ὅ ὁρεῖς ὡς ὕμνοι, εἰ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθέναι ὡς ὕμνοι τινα... . . . . . . ἄμφω ὡς ταῦτα κυριεῖκα καθὰ τότων, καὶ ὁρεῖς. Νοίᾳ δὲ οὐκαί τοι λογιζόμενοι καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. . . . . . . Καὶ ὁ φαντασάς δὲ ὡς τών κυρι, ὡς καὶ ὃς ὅριεῖ

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minators of truth and action as three, with one merged in the other two, instead of calling them two with a third implied. **Tootδν δ ἡ αἰσθησις κ.τ.λ. answers to καὶ ἡ fantasia κ.τ.λ.**


ἐπερ ἐν διανοιᾳ κ.τ.λ.] All this is a compressed result of Aristotle's discussions, De Anima, π. x.—xi.


is, practical intellect. This controls the productive intellect as well, since he that produces, produces for the sake of some end, and the thing produced is not an end in and for itself, but is only an end relatively and for a particular individual. But the thing done is an End in itself, since well-doing is an end, and this is what we desire. Hence purpose may be defined as desiring reason, or as rational desire, and such a principle as this is man." We have here a resumé of Aristotle’s views in *De Animā, l.c.* Another division of the intellect, however, is introduced, that into practical, productive, and speculative, which is to be found implied in *Eth. l. i. i.*, and is stated *Metaphys. v. i. 5.*: *ὅτεν εἰς πάσα διδασκαλία ἡ πρακτική ἡ ποιητική ἡ θεωρητική εἰ.α.* It is here shown that the productive faculties of man are subordinate to the practical thought, since no artist produces anything purely and solely for its own sake; however much he may seem to do so, still his art as a part of his life falls under the control of his will and reason.

*διάφορα δ’ αὐτή ἀδέν ὁμακει, ἀλλ’ ἡ ἐνεκτίν τοῦ*] There is a slight confusion here. Aristotle had said (*De An. iii. ix. 10, iii. x. 2, iii. x. 4,*), that the reason dealing with ends differed from the speculative reason, that reason neither speculative nor practical was the moving cause of action (*III. ix. 10*: ἀλλὰ μὴ οὖσα τὸ λογιστικόν καὶ τὸ καθηγήμενον νοῦς ἔστιν ἃς καὶ δὲ μὴ γὰρ θεωρητικὸν οὖσα νοῦς τὸ πρακτικόν — οὖσα δὲν θεωρή τι τονδῶν κ.τ.λ.), and that intellect could not move anything without desire conjoined (*III. x. 4*: *καὶ δέ ὅ μὴ νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται καὶ δέν ἐνεκτίν*), but Eudemus mixes up these points. He says that ‘intellect by itself moves nothing,’ and then as if in opposition to intellect by itself he puts ‘but practical intellect does.’ He should have said ‘practical intellect plus desire.’

*καὶ πρακτική*] *Kai* is used here denoting identity. *Eth. v. vi. 4*: *τὸ ἀκλότῳ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολιτικόν δίκαιον.* *Ar. De An. iii. x. 2*: *νοῦς δὲ ἐνεκτίν τὸν λογιστικόν καὶ τὸ πρακτικόν.*

*ἐνεργεῖ*] On the ambiguity of this term, of *Eth. l. iv. 2.* note.

*οὖν ἐστι δὲ προαιρετῶν οὖσσι γεγονότι*] ‘Now nothing that is past is ever the object of purpose.’ This assertion with the quotation from Agathon to illustrate it, appears certainly to be a digression. The nature of purpose had been quite sufficiently
explained already, especially in reference to the present context. However, to exclude the past, and circumstances which though contingent have become historical, from the sphere of deliberation, is an addition to Aristotle’s list of exclusions (Eth. iii. 1–10), and on this account probably Eudemus was glad to introduce the above remarks.

III. This chapter proposes to consider the two parts of the reason (scientific and calculative) from a fresh point of view (ἀρξάμενοι—πάλιν). It accordingly gives a list of five modes under which the mind attains truth; namely, art, science, thought, philosophy, and reason. It then proceeds to give some account of science. This account will be found to be a mere censo of remarks from the logical writings of Aristotle. The chief points specified are as follows. Science deals only with necessary matter. It is demonstrative, starting from truths already known, and proceeding by means of induction or syllogism. Its premises are obtained by induction, but they must be more certain than the conclusion, else the knowledge of the conclusion will be not scientific, but merely accidental.

[It seems in the highest degree probable that this list was suggested by a passage in Aristotle’s Post. Analytics (l. xxxiii. 8), where, after a discussion on the difference between science and opinion, it is said: τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῶν δει διακειμένα ἐκ τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ φυσῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τεχνῆς καὶ φυσικῆς καὶ σοφίας, τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς τὰ δὲ ῥητικῆς θεωριῶν μᾶλλον ἐστὶν. It will be observed that Aristotle in this passage does not propose six terms to be distinguished from each other, but three pairs of terms which are to be separately discussed, part of them (i.e. probably the two first pairs) by psychology (φυσικῆς θεωρίας), and part of them (i.e. σοφία and φιλοσοφία) by ethics. Eudemus, taking up the whole list, has omitted διάνοια, which he does not distinguish from φώς, and has given the rest as an exhaustive division of the modes by which the mind apprehends truth. By so doing
he has made a cross division, for 

soon as it is out of our ken, we cannot tell whether it be so or not. 

Therefore the object of science is necessary matter."

tais ὠμοιώσεων] i.e. the various analogical and inaccurate uses of the word 'knowledge.' 'كسبήμι is to be defined ἄλλως and not καθ' ὠμοιώσεως, cf. Eth. v. vi. 4. The present passage is taken from Post. Anal. i. ii. i: 'Ἐπιστήμην δὲ ὕλην ἐκαστὸν ἄλλως—ὅταν τὴν τ' αἱρεῖν ὁλόμεθα γινώσκειν δ' ὅν τὸ πρῶτον ἔστω, ὅτι ἐκαίνω αἰτία ἐστὶ, καὶ μή ἐνδέχεσθαι τούτι ἄλλως ἔχειν.—ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλως ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην, τούτι ἀδιάθετον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

'ἐξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν] 'Out of the reach of our observation.' θεωρ. here contains more of its original sense of 'seeing' than generally; cf. e.g. ch. i. § 5: ἐν μὲν ὁ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιοῦτο k.t.l. Eth. i. vii. 21. In the following chapter, § 4, θεωρεῖ is used for to 'consider' or 'speculate,' though not in the special sense of philosophical speculation.

tὰ δ' ἀδιάκατον k.t.l.] For a specimen of 'things eternal' cf. Eth. iii. iii. 3, and see note.

3 ἐτι διδακτῇ—συλλογισμῷ] 'Again all science appears capable of being imparted by demonstration, and the matter of science appears capable of
III. ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥ∆ΗΜΙΩΝ] VI.

διδασκαλία, ὅσπερ καὶ εν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐπαγωγή, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμός. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἀρα ἄρχαι ἐξ δὲ ὁ συλλογισμός, διὸν οὐκ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρα. ἡ μὲν ἀρα ἐπιστήμη 4 ἐστιν ἐξ ἀποδεικτικῆς καὶ ὁσα ἀλλα προσδοκιζόμεθα εν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γὰρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι

being so apprehended. But all demonstration depends on pre-existent knowledge (as we say in analytics also), for it proceeds either by induction or syllogism.'

ὅσπερ λέγομεν] This is a general mode of expression, not a particular reference; some MSS. however read ἔλεγομεν. Eudemus, as we know, wrote a book on analytics (cf. Vol. I. Essay I. p. 32). In his Ethicus, ii. vi. 5, he speaks, as here, generally of analytics, δήλων δ' ἐπιχειροῦμεν διὰ ἀναγκαίων, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν. In the present passage he is borrowing, not quoting, from the opening of Aristotle's Post. Anal. Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μᾶθησις οἰκονομική ἐκ προοιμίας γίνεται γνώσεως. It is the first proof of knowing a thing to be able to impart it, cf. Metaph. I. 1. 12: διὰ τοῦ σημείου τοῦ εἴδους τὸ διδάσκαι διδάχηται. Hence, by association with the idea of science, διδασκαλία comes to be almost identical with demonstration, cf. Sophist. Encl. ii. 1: Ἔσσο δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγων τέταρτα γένος, διδασκαλικόν καὶ διαλεκτικόν καὶ περιεκτικόν καὶ ἐφησικόν, διδασκαλικὸν μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἐκάστου μαθημάτως καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τῶν ἀποκραμμάτων δοξῶν συλλογιζόμενοι, δὲ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μαθημάτων. Cf. id. i. 11.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐπαγωγή κ.λ.λ.] This is taken from Post. Anal. i. i. 2: where Aristotle, having said that all demonstration depends on previous knowledge, adds that this is true with regard to the mathematics, and also in dialectical arguments, ὅπως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ λόγου οἱ δ' εἰς διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δ' ἐπαγωγῆς ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγνωσικομμένων ποιούστη τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοτεν ὡς παρὰ ξωνίστην, οἱ δὲ διευκόνου τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἐκάστου. What Aristotle had said of dialectical arguments, Eudemus applies to science, which he accordingly asserts to be sometimes inductive. His further assertion that the principles of deductive science are obtained by induction is inconsistent with the conclusion of ch. vi., though it agrees with Ar. Post. Anal. ii. xix. 6. In fact ἐπαγωγή seems to be used by Aristotle in the Post. Anal. as equivalent to that amount of experience which is the condition, not the cause, of necessary truths. Cf. id. i. i. 4.

4 ἡ μὲν—ἀναλυτικοὶ] 'Science, then, is a demonstrative state of mind, with all the other qualifications which we add in analytics.' Cf. Ar. Post. Anal. i. i. 2: Ἀνάγνωσις καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρῶτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμοτήτων καὶ προτερῶν καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος. Aristotle, in his account of science, represents it from its objective side as a deduction of ideas rather than as a state of mind.

ὅταν—γὰρ ἐπιστήμη] 'For a man knows when he is convinced, and is
sure of the premises; since if he is not more sure of them than of the conclusion, the knowledge which he has will be only accidental.' Taken from Post. Anal. i. ii. 1: 'Επειδή λόγοι δὲ πραξέων ἐξειρομένοι συμβεβηκέν, ἵνα τὴν συνειδησίαν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

4. 'Τού δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλος ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν καὶ 2 πρακτόν, ἐπεροῦ δ' ἐστὶ ποιητὸς καὶ πράξεως πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. ὡστε καὶ ἢ μετὰ λόγου ἔξις πρακτικὴ ἐπερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἔξως. διὸ οὐδὲ περεγεννηται ὑπ' ἄλληλων οὐτε γὰρ ἢ πράξεις ποιητῆς οὐτε ἡ ποιητικὴ πράξεως ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀτέχνη τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶ οὐτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἤτες οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἔξις ἐστίν, οὐτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, ταύτων ἄν

IV. Eudemus altered the list of mental operations given by Aristotle (Post. Anal. l.c.) only by the position of νοῦς, which in first stating his list Eudemus places at the end, probably because, having separated it from διάνοια, he was uncertain about its admission; afterwards he discusses it before σοφία, as being prior to it in order of time. The list then appears in Aristotle, διάνοια νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη τέχνη, φρόνησις σοφία; in Eudemus, ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς (afterwards νοῦς, σοφία). This chapter, in treating of art, gives but a scanty account, apparently borrowed from different passages in the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Art, like action, belongs to the sphere of the contingent, but its difference from action is universally recognised (πιστεύομεν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ. λόγ.) As shown by an instance, it consists in 'a productive state of mind in harmony with a true law.' It has to do with producing and contriving the production of things that fall neither under the law of nature nor necessity. Rather art deals with the same objects as chance, by which it is often assisted.

1-2 τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου — λόγοι] 'Now contingent matter includes the objects both of production and action, but production and action are different. On this point even popular notions sufficiently bear us out.' With regard to 'ἐγερόμενον λόγον, cf. Eth. i. xiii. 9, and see Vol. I. Essays, Appendix B.

3 ἐνα δ' —ποιητῆς] 'But since architecture is an art, and may be defined as (διέρ) a certain state of mind rationally (μετὰ λόγου) productive, and there is no art which is not a rationally productive state of
mind, nor again any such state which is not an art: art must be the same as "productive state of mind rightly directed." The procedure here is to take a species of art, and, abstracting what is peculiar, to leave the generic conception remaining, which thus is taken as the definition of the genus.

διπλα [A logical formula implying identity, convertibility of terms, cf. 

Ebd. vii. xii. 1: o διπλα δε φησι διπλα καλω τι ειναι την δησαι.

οστε τοιατη η ου τεχνη] This is a slight discrepancy from Aristotle, who speaks of three modes of production, art, faculty, and intellect, without, however, specifying the difference between them, Metaphys. vi. vii. 3: πασαι δ’ ελαιν αι ποιησεις ή απδ τεχνης ή απ’ δυναμεως ή απδ διανοιας. Ibd. vii. 3: ποιησις μεν γαρ εν τω ποιουται και ου τη ποιουμενη της κυριειος η αρχη, και τουτ ουτω εστε τεχνη τις εν τι άλλη τις δυναμις.

4 ουτε δε — ποιουμενη] 'Now all art is about creation, and the contriving and considering how something may be created of those things whose existence is contingent, and whose efficient cause exists in the producer and not in the thing produced.' There is not any distinction intended between τεχναιην and θεωρειν. The absence of the article before θεωρειν shows that these belong to the same idea; they are both only an expansion of the term γένεσις, and are not to be separated from it, as if the writer was describing different stages in the process of art. We find τεχναιηαν used by Aristotle simply in the sense of 'contriving,' Pol. i. xi. 12: αμφότεροι γαρ εκαυσι τεχναιαν γενέθαι μονοκαταλαν Ιbd. vi. v. 8: τεχναιηαν ου δε αν ευπορα γενοντο γράμματα.

δε η αρχη κτ.λ.] Taken from Aristotle, Metaphys. x. vii. 3 (L.) Cf. 

v. i. 5: των μεν ποιησιων εν τω ποιουται η αρχη η ουτος η τεχνη η δυναμις τις, των δε πρακτικων εν τω πραττοντι δε πραδεσις. There is the same classification of causes here as in Ebd. iii. 7, into nature, necessity, chance, and the human intellect. On Aristotle's conception of nature, see Vol. i. Essay v.

5 και τροπον τυρ—τεχνη] 'And in a way chance and art are concerned with the same objects.' Eudemus, taking this observation from Aristotle, illustrates it, after his own fashion, with a quotation from Agathon. Cf. 

Metaphys. vi. vii. 4: των ουκ (ποιησιως) δε τατε γινονται και απδ ταυτοματων και απδ τεχνης παρατηςιως θεσπερ εν των ουδ φοσις γεγορων. Ibd. vi. ix. 1, where the following question is started: αποροθαι δ’ ου τις δια τι τα μεν γινονται και τεχνη και απδ ταυτοματων, ου δια των ουκεια, τα δ’ ου, οουν oikia. The answer is, that there is a...
principle of self-movement in the matter to be operated on in the one case, but not in the other. That the devices of art are often suggested, and its results assisted, by chance, need not be confirmed by examples; but while art is thus assisted by chance, on the other hand, it is the main object of art to eliminate chance. Cf. Metaphys. I. i. 5: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησί Πώλος, ὁρθῶς λέγων, ἡ δ' ἀπειρα τέχνη. The theory of art is but meagre in the writings of Aristotle. His great defect with regard to the subject is, his not having entered into the philosophy of the imagination. Yet still he gives us remarks of far greater interest than what is contained in the brief resume of Eudemus, cf. especially the saying, Metaphys. VI. VII. 4, that 'all things are done by art, of which the idea exists in the mind,' ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται διὸς τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, and add Post. Anal. II. xix. 4: ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παραγόμενον ἐρμή- σαρτος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὑπὸ παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, δ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ αὐτοῦ, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, τὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, τὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ δό, ἐπιστήμη.

V. Thought (φρόνησις) is next discussed. Its nature we learn from the use of the word 'thoughtful' (φόνομα) to denote those who take good counsel with regard to the general ordering of life. This subject admits of no scientific demonstration; again, it is different from art. We see the quality of 'thought' exemplified in such men as Fericles, who know what is good for themselves and others. This knowledge and insight is preserved by temperance, which hence gets its name (σωφροσύνη). Art admits of degrees of excellence, but 'thought' does not. Voluntary error in art is better than non-voluntary, but the reverse in 'thought,' which thus is shown to be more than a mere quality of the intellect,—it becomes part of ourselves (φρόνησις οὐ διτί λήθη).
tinas legomven toun fronimous. dokei de fronimous einai tò dunamev kalos bouleusasvai peri tà aitò ágathà kai symféronta, ów katà méros, oin poià pròs ùgieian ësçhyn, allà poià pròs ëth ùgieian. òmeion ò 3 òti kai 2 toun peri tì fronimous legomven, òtan pròs tèlos tì stpoudaion ëth loygizontai, òn ùlì èstì téchyn. òste kai òlous èn ëth fronimous ó bouleusikos. bouleusvai ò 3 oudeis peri 3

Kai ëthetain kai ñèvov kai tòn òllòn tòv òstèv tòv tòvòv tòv tòvòv. xúmatemv òe frònvescov kai ãllastomv ìstì allèv òllèv, ìpì stigamáv tì ëe ëth tòvòv òtret cvt ëe ìstì òtèvòv òtretov. Òs òrnei, 'thought,' however, he defined as the contemplation of the absolute (Plato, p. 79 d), and thus identified the moral consciousness with philosophy (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 194).

Aristotle, as we have already seen (Post. Anal. I. xxxiii. 8, quoted on ch. iii. 1), proposed as a subject for discussion the distinction between pròsèvus and sôphia. With him pròsèvus was gradually coming to assume its distinctive meaning as practical wisdom; but this was not always clearly marked. Cf. Topics, v. vi. 10, where it is said to be the essential property of pròsèvus to be the highest condition of the reasoning faculty (tò logiston), just as it is of temperance to be the highest condition of the appetitive part. In another place of the Topics (vii. ii. 2) it is incidentally mentioned that some think pròsèvus to be both a virtue and also a science, but that it is not universally conceded to be a science. Dokesi ògar ìnou ëth pròsèvus òreti tì kai ìstetimv ìstev, kai oðèterov tòn ìnov ònò oðèterov pèrékevrouv: òde nò ìnov tòvòv ëth sýnygevntai tì frònves ìstetimv ìstev. In the Politics, iii. iv. 17, it is said to be the only virtue properly belonging to a ruler. 'H òe pròsèvus òretòv ìnov òretì mònuv: tìn ògar

Allas èthkev ãggivov ëthoi kòv kai tòn ërhimov kai tòn ërhimov. 'Arxomèvov òe ìnov ìnov òretì ërhimov, ìllà ðàta ìllèvòs. Thus it is used for practical wisdom, but in a broad general sense, with reference to state affairs rather than to individual life, implying, however, an absolute consciousness as opposed to ìllèvòs ðàta. Frequently Aristotle uses pròsèvus simply to denote 'thought' or 'wisdom,' without reference to its sphere. Cf. Eth. l. vi. ii. vii. 6, &c. Finally, it appears in its distinctive sense, De An. i. ii. 9. 'Anaxagoras says that all animals possess ròtov; they certainly do not all possess equally the reason that gives what we call 'thought.'" oò ðèvntai ò 3 òe ètì ëth ènnòv ërhimovè nòv ðòsv ðìsòv ìnov ìnov ùdrèvov. Rhet. l. ix. 13: pròsèvus ò ìnov òretì ðiavoleov, kai òvì ìnov ëth bouleuvov ðèvntai peri ìnov ìnov kai ñàvòv tòn ërhimovè èll èddimèvov. Eth. x. viii. 3, where there is a contrast between the life of contemplation and of practical virtue, pròsèvus is spoken of as inseparably connected with the latter, while the happiness of contemplation by the pure reason is something apart. In the present book we have the Eudemian exposition and development of Aristotle's theory, which entirely contrasts pròsèvus with sôphia, and limits the former to the regulation of individual life.

3 bouleusvai ò 3 oudeis] A verbal
tων ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πράξει· ἀστὶ εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ᾽ ἀποδείξεως, ἀλλ᾽ ἀρκαί ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἐστίν ἀποδείξεις (πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν), καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑποκοίτων), οὐκ ἂν εἰς ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὑποτεθεὶς τοῦ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτῶν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ᾽ ὑποτεθεῖ τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λειτατεί παρὰ αὐτῷ εἶναι ἐξεῖν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικῆν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἔστερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἰς ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἡ ἐστραφεῖα τέλος. διὰ τούτῳ Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἶομεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἰναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγομένης τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς. ἐνθέν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τοῦτο προσά: 6 γορεύμενον τῷ ὑπόματι, ὡς σάμιουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑποληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπασαν ὑποληψιν

repetition of ch. i. § 6. Cf. Eth. Eud. ii. x. 9 (l.c.)
4 τῆς μὲν γὰρ] A repetition of ch. ii. § 5.
5 διὰ τοῦτο—πολιτικῶν] Hence we consider such men as Pericles “thoughtful,” because they have a faculty of perceiving what is good for themselves and good for men in general. And we attribute the same character to those who have a turn for the management of households and of state affairs.” On φρόνησις as a quality for the ruler of a state, cf. Ar. Pol. iii. iv. 17 (l.c.), and on the connection established by Eudemus between thought for the individual, for the family, and for the state, see below, ch. viii. § 1, note.

ἐνθὲ—ὑπολήψιν] Hence it is that we call temperance by its present name (σωφροσύνη) as preserving one’s thought (σώζομαι τὴν φρόνησιν), and this is the kind of conception which it preserves, i.e. a moral conception (περὶ τὸ πρακτῶν) about the right and wrong, or, as it is here put, about ‘the end’ (τὸ ὑπὸ ἔσκεπα) of actions. The false etymology here given comes from Plato’s Cratylus, p. 411 b, where, after a sportive derivation of φρόνησις, that of σωφροσύνη is added: Η φρόνησις· φοράς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ρογνήσις. Ἐστὶ δὲ ἃ καὶ δηνομένωσιν ὑπολαβεῖν φοράς· ἄλλα ὀν περὶ τὸ τὸ πολίτης ἔστι. ἐλ βοιλεῖ, ἡ γνώμη παράλληλὰ δηλοὶ γνωρὶς σκέψεων καὶ νόμοψεων· τὸ γὰρ κοιμᾶται καὶ τὸ κοιμόμενον ψυχῆς. οὐ γὰρ νόμος τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἑσαρίσκει, άλλ᾽ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἢ ἰδεῖ λέγειν δόγμα, νόμοψεων· σωφροσύνη δὲ σωφίστρια ὅπως τὴν ἐκείμεθα, φρονήσεως. Of course σωφροσύνη merely means ‘sound-mindedness.’ But the whole conception of the relation of Temperance to ‘Thought’ here given agrees with Plato, Repub. 518, 6-2.
It must be added, that while in art there are degrees of excellence, there are none in thought; and while in art he that errs voluntarily is the better, he that does so in thought is the worse, as is the case with the virtues also. Therefore it is plain that thought is a sort of virtue and not an art. "Ετοιμον, as contrasted with αιρετότερος, stands for ἴττον αιρετός. The phrase ἀρετὴ τέχνης occurs again ch. vii. § 1. The present passage probably has reference to Topics, iv. 2 (l.c.), δοξεῖ γὰρ εἶναι ἡ φρόσις ἄρετή τε καὶ νευτήματα ἐμάστικα, where ἐντυθήμαι answers to τέχνη in the place before us. To say that there are no degrees of excellence in 'thought' gives it an absolute character, just as it is said that there are degrees in the understanding, but not in the reason. Common language would admit of degrees in thoughtfulness. Cf. Αρ. Μεθ. i. 1. 2: δά τούτο ταύτα φρονμότερα καὶ μαθητικότερα τῶν μὴ δυσμάλων μυμπαραίσ ἐστίν. De Αρ. i. ii. 9, l.c. But here 'thought' is considered as something ideal, just as afterwards, ch. xiii. § 6, it is said to imply all the virtues.

Eudemus seems often inclined to betake himself to VOL. II.

a small antagonism against Platonic doctrines; whether in detail this was original, or borrowed from oral remarks or lost writings of Aristotle, we cannot tell. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 16, v. xi. 9, vi. xiii. 3, &c. Here there seems to be an allusion to the Socratico-Platonic paradox which forms the subject of the Hippias Minor, that to do injustice voluntarily was better than doing it involuntarily (see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 169). Here the contrary is assumed with regard to 'thought,' and the conclusion drawn is, that 'thought' is not an art, in other words (as is said more distinctly afterwards), not merely intellectual. If 'thought' were merely intellectual, then voluntary error in action would not be error at all, because knowledge would remain behind unimpaired; but if 'thought' is a state of the will as well as of the intellect, then voluntary error, as implying a defect of the will, is the worst kind of error. The worst kind of error, morally, is considered to be sinning against knowledge, knowing the right and doing the wrong, which some philosophers deny to be possible. See below, Book vii. ch. iii.

And as there
are two parts of man's nature which possess reason, thought will be the highest state of one of these, namely, the opinionative part, for opinion and thought both deal with the contingent. We must add that it is not merely an intellectual state (ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου), the proof of which is that while such states admit forgetfulness, thought does not.' To doxaistic answers to τὸ λογισμὸν, ch. i. § 6. That opinion deals with contingent matter we are told, Ar. Post. Anal. i. xxxii. 2: λειταριστά δόξα ἐδώκαν τῷ ἀληθείᾳ μὲν ἢ υἱόν, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλοιπον ἔχειν. After associating opinion with thought, the writer separates them, just as Aristotle separates προφανεία from δόξα, Eik. iii. ii. 11. In the present passage there is a great want of clearness. We are told that thought is an excellence, or highest state, of a part of the intellect. Hence we should naturally conclude that it was λόγος τις (cf. ch. xiii. § 3), but the formula throughout used is, that thought is ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου. This formula, in the sense of 'accompanied by inference,' 'able to give an account of itself,' is applied by Aristotle to ἐπιστήμη (see notes on the next page); and so too Plato, Theatetus, 201 D: τῷ μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ἐθνα. Cf. Eik. Eik. viii. ii. 3; οὐ γὰρ λόγος ἡ φρόνησις, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει λόγον διὰ τὸ ὁμοίως πράττει. Thought then is first defined to be 'a reasoning state of mind'; afterwards we are told that thought is not simply a ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου, by which the writer evidently means to say, that thought is not a mere state of the intellect. It may be indeed true that the moral intellect cannot be separated from the will and personality (cf. ch. xii. § 10), but what is to be complained of is, that the formule used for expressing all the truths connected with this subject are so very imperfect. 

σημεῖον 82 ὑπὶ λῃθή] Cf. Eik. i. x. 10, where it is said that 'the moments of virtuous consciousness in the mind are more abiding than the sciences,' and see note. To φρόνησις in the Platonic and general sense, of course forgetfulness might attach. Cf. Laws, p. 732 B: ἄνδρας ἐς ἐστὶν ἐπαρχηθεὶς φρόνησις ἀπολείποντος.

VI. This chapter treats of reason, but goes no further into the subject than as follows,—science implies principles, and we cannot apprehend these principles by science itself nor by three out of the other four modes of mind which give us truth. It therefore remains, on the grounds of exhaustive division, that reason must be the organ by which we apprehend first principles.

On examination it will be found that the contents of the chapter are borrowed almost verbatim from Aristotle's Post. Analyt. ii. xix. 7: 'Εσι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ζέων, ἃς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν δὲ ἀλήθεια εἶναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστήμην περὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός,
καὶ τῶν ἑξ ἀνάγκης δυντῶν, εἰσὶ δ’autš ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστήμητος οὐτ' ἄν ἐπιστήμη ἐν οὕτω τέχνη ὑπὲρ φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμητον ἀποδεικτὸν, οἱ δὲ τυχαῖνοντες οὐσιν περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστὶν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ εἶναι ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μὴ ἡ πράξεις διαφέρει δόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστί καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τοὺτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μὴν ἐνδεχεσται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις 7

Also he is at variance with his own statement above, ch. iii. § 3. 1 μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη] 'For science implies inference.' This is evidently the meaning of the present sentence, taken as it is from Post. Anal. l.c. Λόγος is frequently used to denote 'inference.' Cf. ch. viii. § 9: ο μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων, ὅποι ἐστὶ λόγος: καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὗ λόγος, &c.

οὐδὲ δὴ—ἔστω] 'Nor of course does philosophy apprehend these principles, for it is the part of the philosopher to possess demonstration about some things.' It need hardly be said that this is a very poor ground for establishing the point in question.

VII. What 'philosophy' is may be learnt from the use of the word σοφός, as applied to the arts. It denotes 'nicety,' 'subtlety,' 'exactness.' Philosophy, then, is the most subtle of the sciences. It embraces not only deductions, but also principles. It is 'a science of the highest objects with the head on.' It is above both practical thought and science. It is one and permanent, while they
are manifold, relative, and changeable. It is higher, as the cosmos is higher than man. Philosophy and not practical thought was the reputed property of men like Thales and Anaxagoras, who were thought to know strange and out-of-the-way, but useless things. On the other hand, 'thought' (φρόνησις) is good counsel about human things. It implies knowledge of particulars as well as of universals. Indeed, the knowledge of the particular gained by experience is its most important element, though it includes the universal also, and in its own sphere, namely, that of action, it is supreme and paramount (ἀρχιτεκτωνική)

1–2 τὴν δὲ σοφίαν—σοφία] 'The term σοφία we apply in the arts to those who are the most finished artists, as, for instance, we call Phidias a consummate (σοφός) sculptor, and Polycleitus a consummate statuary, and in this application we mean nothing else by σοφία than the highest excellence in art. But we conceive that some men possess the quality in a general and not a particular way,—"nor in aught else accomplished,"' as Homer says in the Iliad—

"Not skilled to dig or plough the
Gods have made him,
Nor in aught else accomplished."

We may argue, then, that σοφία, in the sense of philosophy, is the most consummate of the sciences.' On the meaning of ἀριστεία as applied to the arts, and on the transition of meaning when it is applied to philosophy, see Ἐκλ. i. vii. 18, note, and ii. vi. 9, note.

3 ὡστ' εἰη—τιμωτάτων] 'So that philosophy must be the union of reason and science, as it were a science of the highest objects with its head on.' This excellent definition does not appear to have anything in Aristotle exactly answering to it. There are two chief places where Aristotle treats of σοφία, namely, Metaphysics, Book i. i.–ii., and τὸ Book x. ch. i.–vii. Metaph. Book I. opens by showing an ascending scale in knowledge,—perception, experience, art, and the theoretic sciences, or philosophy. Of philosophy we are told that it is the science of first causes, it is most universal, most exact, and most entirely sought for its own sake, &c.
Philosophy begins in wonder, wonder at first about things near at hand, afterwards about the sun, moon, and stars, and the creation of the universe (Ib. § 9). It ends in certainty and a sense of the necessity of certain truths (Ib. § 16). We may see that this account is perfectly general—it does not distinguish in philosophy between mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. It even attributes a practical scope to philosophy, saying that philosophy, by taking cognisance of the good, determines the object of the other sciences (Ib. § 7), ἀρχαιολογία ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μέλλων ἀρχικά τῆς ὑπερήφανότητος, ἡ γνωστικά τῶν ἔκτισεν ἐστὶ πρακτικῶν ἑκάστος· τοῦτο ἦ ἐστὶ ταγιαθοῦ ἐν ἑκάστοις, διότι ἐκ τοῦ ἄρσεν ἐν τῇ φύσει πάση. From a certain immaturity thus shown, it would be difficult to believe that the account in Metaphys. Book I. was written after that in the present chapter of the Ethics. In Metaphys. Book x. the subject is taken up anew, and treated much more fully. Physics, practical science, and mathematics, are now separated from philosophy proper. Ib. i. 4: ὄφει περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐφημερίσας αἱ ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπομνήματι ἐπιστήμην θετόν. Οὕτω γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὁποῖον ἦκεν· τὸν θεοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα, τοῦτο ἦ ἐν τοῖς πρακτικῶς ἐπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ὁσίοις ἐν καθεστώτι. Ib. i. 7: ὅπερ μὲν περὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν—χαριστέων γὰρ αὐτῶν ὀφθέν. These, however, are branches of philosophy, Ib. iv. 3: δὲ καὶ τὰ ῥητά (τὴν φυσικήν) καὶ τὴν μαθηματικὴν ἐπιστήμην μέρη τῆς φυσικάς εἶναι θετόν. Cf. Met. III. iii. 4: ἦστι δὲ σοφία τοι αὐτὴ τῆς καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' ὅπως πρῶτη. Hence we get the famous division of speculative sciences, Met. x. vii. 9: δὴ οὖν τὸν ὅτι τρία γένεσιν τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἦστι, φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική. Βλήστων μὲν οὖν τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν γένος, τοῖς δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεξίθεσι· περὶ τὸ τιμώτατον γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δοτῶν, βέλτιστων δὲ καὶ χεῖρων ἑκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἷον ἑκάστην. Philosophy, then, in the highest sense, may be called theology, or the science of the divine, that is, of pure, transcendental (χωριστή), immutable being. It is the science of being qua being (τοῦ ὅτι ἐν ἑπιστήμῃ). Eudemus, following in the wake of this discussion, has adopted as much of its results as suited his purpose. He speaks of philosophy as having the highest objects (τῶν τιμώτατων, cf. Met. x. viii. 9, L. C.), but he does not distinguish its different branches. He includes in it both physical and mathematical ideas (§ 4, τὸ δὲ λεγόν, καὶ οὕτω ταῦτα δὲ: Ib. εἴ δὲ τὸν κόσμον συνέτυχεν), though he uses σοφίς once in its special sense to denote a metaphysical, as opposed to mathematical or physical, philosopher. Ch. viii. § 6: μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένος' ἢ, σοφίς ἦ ἡ φυσικὰς οὖ. In short, his object is rather to contrast philosophy with practical thought than exactly to define it. His attributing to it a union of intuition with reasoning seems however a happy result of his present method of discussion. (See Vol. I. Essay I. p. 53, sq.)
And if it be said that man is the best of the animals, this will make no difference, for there are besides other things far diviner in their nature than man, such as, to quote the most obvious instance, the parts out of which the symmetry of the heavens is composed.' On the Aristotelian view of man's position in the scale of dignity in the universe, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 287. On Aristotle's doctrine of the divine nature of the stars, &c., cf. De Coelo, i. ii. 9: 'Εκ τε δη τοιων φανερων δι' αυτων περι τους ουσια σωματων δια τοις ἐντασθενα ευνυτης, θεοτερα και πρωτερα των άτομων (this has given rise to the notion of the 'quintessence'). Ib. i. ii. 11, which repeats the same. Ib. ii. iii. 2: 'Εκαστον εστιν, δι' αυτων δηρον, εσκα του δηρου. Θεων δ' ενεργεια ἀθανασια· τοιων δ' εστι γοι αποθεων. 'Ως' ανάκτη της θελη κυριων αποθεων υπάρχειν. 'Εστει δ' ο αρχαιός τοιωθος (σώμα γαρ τι θειον) δι' αυτων εχει το εγκυκλιον σώμα, δ φοσιν κυνονται κληφει δει. Cf. Mel. ἱ. viii. 5: 'Η τε γαρ των άτομων φοσις αποθεων εστι. Ib. i. vi. 8: 'Ολων δ' άτομων εκ του φανερου τα δευρα μεταβαλλοστα και μεθενοστα διαιμεριστα εν τοις αυτοις, εκ των περι της αληθειας της ειρειας ποιεωθεια. Δει γαρ εκ των δει κατα τοιων εξωμενων και μεθελιας μεταβαλλοντο συνομενων ταλθες δηρεωθει. τοιαυτα δ' εστι κατα των κοσμων. 5 διο 'Αναξαγόραν και Θαλει και των τοιων τοιαυτων σφοιν μεν φοσιμοι δ' ου φασιν ειναι, οταν δωσων αγνοουντας τα συμφερονθε εαιτοις, και περιττα μεν και
VIII. This chapter fulfils a promise made before in the Eudemian Ethics (i. viii. 18), by distinguishing 'thought' from other modifications of the same practical quality, namely, economy and the various forms of politics. This distinction would at first sight tend to reduce 'thought' to mere egotism (§ 3, δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκατόν) and thus to isolate the individual within himself. In order to obviate this, the writer brings forward arguments to show that the welfare of the individual is bound up with that of the family and the state (§ 4). He urges the difficulty of knowing one's own interest, hence concluding that 'thought' is no mere instinct of selfishness. 'Thought' implies a wide experience, on which account boys
cannot attain to it, no more than they can to philosophy, though they are often clever in mathematics (§§ 5–6). ‘Thought’ is a sort of deduction with a universal and a particular element (§ 7), and yet we must distinguish it from science on this very account, that it deals with particulars (§ 8). It is the opposite to reason, which is of first principles, while thought is rather an intuition of particular facts (analogous to apprehending a mathematical figure). At all events, one form of thought is of this character.

1-3 ἵνα διδάσκαλις ‘Now politics and “thought” are really the same faculty of mind, though they would be defined differently. Thought dealing with the state is divided into first,—legislation, which is the master-spirit as it were; and secondly, politics in detail, which is practical as being deliberative (for a “measure” is like the practical application of a general principle), and which usurps the common name of politics; hence too they who are concerned with particular measures alone get the name of politicians, for these alone act, like workmen under a master. Just so that appears to be especially “thought” which is concerned with the individual self. And this kind usurps the common name of “thought,” while the other kinds I have alluded to may be specified as—first, economy; second, legislation; and third, politics (in the restricted sense), which may be subdivided into the deliberative and the judicial.’ This distinction was pro-

mised before, Eth. Euk. 1. viii. 8: Ἡ ἴσος τῶν δὲ οὐ καθότι τὸ ᾠδάτο τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρακτικόν. Τούτῳ 3 ἦν τὸ ἵνα τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. Αὕτη 3 ἦν τῶν πολιτικῆς καὶ οἰκονομικῆς καὶ φύσεως. Διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὕτη αἱ ἡμῖν πρὸς τὰς Οἰκονομίας τοιαύτα δεν ἐναὶ πρὸς ἡ ἀλλὰ τε διαφέρουσα, ἄριθμον λαθέον. It would appear that Eudemus by a sort of afterthought united the conception of φύσεως, which was developed later, to that of πολιτικῆς, to which Aristotle had assigned the apprehension of the chief good for man (cf. Eth. ii. 5). But in so doing he had to bring together two different things; for φύσεως was a psychological term expressing a faculty of the mind, but πολιτικῆς was merely one of the divisions of the sciences. In order to make them commensurate, Eudemus alters the signification of πολιτικῆς. He treats it as a state of mind (ἐνεργοῦ), as a mode of φύσεως, dealing with the state either universally or in detail. From the same later point of view he adds also οἰκονομικῆς; cf. Ar. Pol. i. iii. 1: Ἅριον à οὐκ ἑορτάζειν ἐ̄ οἰκονομικὴν ἔμμερον. 2 ὡς τὸ ἔργατον] The ἐνεργοῦ or particular measure is here compared to the minor term in a syllogism, i.e. it constitutes the application of a general principle. Cf. Eth. v. 6.

On the use of ἔργατον in this purely technical and logical sense, cf. §§ 8–9: Ar. Met. i. 9: τὰς γὰρ λόγους καὶ πάντα ἐνεργοῦν τῶν καθολικῶν

3 The classification here intended is as follows,—φρονήσεις or thought being

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Thought</th>
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<td>About oneself</td>
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<td>'Thought'</td>
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<td>Universal áρχητεκτονική</td>
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<td>Legislation</td>
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<td>Deliberative</td>
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4 εἰδος μὲν οὖν—πολτείας] 'Now it must be considered a species of knowledge to know one's own interest, but this opens matter for controversy. The man who knows his own concerns and occupies himself with these is commonly considered thoughtful, while politicians are called busybodies, and hence Euripides wrote:

Small wisdom were it in me to aspire,
When well I might, mixed with the common herd,
Enjoy a lot full equal with the best.
But ah! how full of vanity is man!
The restless meddling spirits in the state

Are gaped at still and made the country's gods.

Men with these selfish principles seek their own advantage, and this, they consider, is what they have to do. From this notion the idea has grown that they are the thoughtful. And yet, perhaps, the welfare of the individual is inseparable from the regulation of the household and from the existence of a state.'

τὸ ἀβρῷ ἐλέναυ] Fritzche reads τὸ τὰ ἀβρῷ with the authority of two MSS., adding 'Ceterum in hâc quoque praefectâ orationis brevitate qui multum Eudemi Moralia diurnâ nocturnâque mans volutavit Eudemi stilum agnoscat necesse est.'
αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβουν φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης

τῶς δὲ τοῖς φρονεῖν, ἢ παρῆν ἀπεργάσιαν
ἐν τοῖς πολλῶν ἠγισθήθην στρατοῦ
ἰσον μετασχεῖν;
τοὺς γὰρ τερμάτους καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον. . .

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸν, καὶ οἶδον τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ τούτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τοῦτος
φρόνιμος εἶναι· καὶ τοῖς ίσοις οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸν εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδὲ ἄνευ πολιτείας· ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὸν πῶς δεῖ
5 διακεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. σημείων δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρήμενον καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ
γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αὐτὸν δὲ ὅτι τῶν καθ’ ἐκατά ἐστίν ἡ φρόνισις, ἡ
gίνεται γνώριμα εἰς ἐμπειρίαν, νέος δ’ ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἐστιν.
6 πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνον ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἂν τις σκέψασθαι, διὰ τῇ δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ’ ἂν,
σοφὸς δ’ ἡ φυσικὸς οὖ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δ’ ἀφαιρέσεως

tολυπράγμονες] This is often opposed to τὰ αὐτὸ τράπεται. Cf. Plato,
Gorgias, p. 526 c. ψυχοφόρου τὰ αὐτὸ πράττεται καὶ οἱ πολυπράγμονες
ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Republic, p. 433 a.: τὰ τὰ αὐτὸ τράττεται καὶ μὴ πολυπράγμονες.

Εὐρυπίδης] in the Philoctetes; the
later lines are thus filled up by
Wagner, Fragm. Eur. p. 401:—

ἰσον μετασχεῖν τὸ συφωτάτου τόχης;
οδήν γὰρ οὕτω γιαρον οὐκ ἐνη ἄφι 
τοῦς μὲν περασοῦν καὶ τι πράσσοντας
πλέον
τιμῶμεν ἄνθρωπον ἐν τοῖς κομβοῖς.

The Scholiast and Paraphrase both
conjecture Ζεὺς μοι ὁ πολιτικὸς διαγείρο
This would give no metre, and
only a very inferior sense.

4-5 ἢ:] “Moreover the
directing one’s own affairs is by no
means simple; it is a subject for much
consideration. In proof whereof we
may allege that while boys learn
goometry and mathematics, and be
come clever in such things, no boy
seems to attain to “thoughtfulness.”

The writer is arguing against the iden
tification of “thought” with an instinct
of selfishness. If it were so simple,
why should not boys possess it? did
is for ὅτι as in Eth. Eth. vii. x. 20 :
Ἀνὴρ δὲ τοῦ μαθήσεως, διότι καλλωπὸς
μὲν ἡ ἡθική ἕφιλα, αμαρκιστέρα δὲ ἡ
χρησιμος. Of. Ar. Meteor. iii. iii. 5 :
Σημεῖων δὲ τούτου διότι ἑπεῖθεν γίγνε
tαι ἡ ἡμερὸς ὅθεν ἀν ἡ κυρλα γέγορη
diaphore. Ib. 1. xiii. 23: Τὸ τε ἐν τοῦ
toos δραμα ἔχουσα τὰς πηγὰς ματρυρεί
diότι τὸ συρρεῖν ἀπ’ ἀλλοὺ καὶ κατὰ
μικρὸν ἐν τοῖς κομβοῖς διαβίδωσιν ὁ
tότος καὶ γίγνονται ὅτως αἰ τηγας τῶν
κομβῶν.

6 σοφὸς δ’ ἡ φυσικὸς οὖ] ‘But not a
metaphysician or physical philoso
pher.’ Σοφὸς is here used in a dis
tinctive sense, ‘philosopher’ par ex
cellence, with a science above physics
and mathematics; cf. ch. vii. § 3, note.

η δ'—άδηλον] ‘The reason surely is that the former matters (i.e. mathematics) are abstract, while the principles of the latter (physics and philosophy) are got by experience; thus boys repeat truths of the latter kind, without being really convinced of them; while the nature of the other subjects is easy to comprehend.’

δ' αφαίρεσιν] The form in Aristotle is either εν αφαίρεσιν ἢ εξ αφαίρεσιν. He constantly applies these terms to denote the mathematics. The locus classicus on this subject is Metaph. x. iii. 7: Καθαπερ δ' ἐν μαθηματικῷ περὶ τὰ εξ αφαίρεσιν τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται, περεύεσθαι γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἀληθὴθα θεωρεῖται, ὅπως βρότοι καὶ κοινότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ τοῦπατρίτων, ἢτι δὲ καὶ κεραυνότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ ἀληθήθα ἐκατόνως, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ ποισιν καὶ πυρεχέσι, κ.τ.λ. Cf. De Osto, iii. i. 11: διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐξ αφαίρεσιν λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως. De Animm, iii. vii. 10: οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικὰ ὡς κεχωρίσμενα νοεῖ, ἵππος ὁ ἐκεῖνον. πιστεύουσιν] Cf. ch. iii. § 4, note, and Eth. vii. iii. 5: οἵ πρώτοι μαθητεύεις οὐκεῖρον μὲν τοῖς λόγους, ἵππος δ' οἴκεται.

7 Another argument to prove the complex and difficult character of ‘thought’ is that it implies a kind of syllogism, wherein both the major premise and the minor equally admit of error.

tὰ βαρόσταθμα δύτες φαύλα] This was probably a medical notion of the day. Cf. Problems, i. xiii., where a similar superstition is maintained: Διὰ τὶ τὸ τὰ δύτα μεταβάλλειν νοσόδες φασιν ἐναι, τὸ δὲ τὸν ἀέρα οὐ;— δηοτοὶ μὲν τολλά ἐθνη ὅτι καὶ διάφορα καθ' αἱτία, ἀέρος δὲ οὐ, ὡστε καὶ τὸντο αἴτιον.

δ' τοιοῦτον] ‘But (though implying a syllogism) it is plain that “thought” is not science, for it deals with the particular, as we have said, the action being of this kind.’

ἀντικεῖται — εἰσόδο] ‘To reason, indeed, it forms the opposite pole; for while reason deals with those terms which are above all inference, “thought,” on the other hand, deals with the particular, which is below demonstration, and is apprehended by perception; not the perception of the separate senses, but analogous to that faculty by which we perceive that the immediate object presented to us in mathematics is a triangle. For on this side also demonstration must cease. However, it is rather this particular mode of thought which is a perception, the other presents a different form.’

ἀντικεῖται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ] Having
alluded to the syllogistic nature of 'thought,' the writer seems to have been reminded to distinguish it from science; and thus, having before (ch. v. § 8; ch. vii. § 6) contrasted it with art and philosophy, he is led on to finish the round by placing it in contrast with reason.

οὐχ ἢ τῶν ἴδιων, ἀλλ' οἷα ἀλογισμοῦ,] This is the same as Aristotle's famous distinction between the 'separate senses' and the 'common sense.' His own words are clear on the point; cf. De Animā, ii. vi. 2: Λέγω δ' ἴδιον μὲν (ιδοηθνον) ἵνα ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρα αἰσθησις αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπαθηθῆναι, ὅπως δέχεται τὸ κρόνος καὶ ἀκοή ψύχους καὶ γεώς χυμοῦ.—Τὰ μὲν τῶν τοιαύτα λέγεται ἡμι ἔκαστον, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἁρμα, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος, τὰ γὰρ τοιαύτα οὐδεμιᾶ ἐστὶν ιδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσας· καὶ γὰρ ἀρτι κίνησις τὰ ἐστὶν αἰσθητή καὶ δήλη.

It will be seen that figure (σχῆμα) is one of the objects of the 'common sense,' the text gives as an instance of this the perception of a triangle. In De An. iii. i. 6, Aristotle adds 'unity' to the list of 'common sensibles,' but he reduces them all to modifications of the perception of motion: ταύτα γὰρ πάντα κίνησις αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ καὶ σχῆμα, μέγεθος, γὰρ τὰ σχῆμα, τὸ δ' ἥρμισθαι τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι· δ' ἀρμοδίως τῇ ἀπόφασις τοῦ συνομοῦ, κ.τ.λ. He admits (De An. ii. vi. 4) that 'common sensibles' can scarcely be said to be apprehended by sense at all, τῶν δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ιδια κύριοι ἐστὶν αἰσθητά; cf. Ib. iii. i. 6, where it is said these are apprehended acci-
dentally or concomitantly by the senses. This is surely the true view; we see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object. It would follow then that the senses cannot really be separated from the mind; the senses and the mind each contribute an element to every knowledge. Aristotle's doctrine of κοινὴ αἰσθησις would go far, if carried out, to modify his doctrine of the simple and innate character of the senses, e.g. sight (cf. Eth. ii. i. 4), and would prevent its absolute collision with Berkeley's Theory of Vision. On the general subject of κοινὴ αἰσθησις, see Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, pp. 828–830.

ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον] This has been frequently understood to mean that 'the ultimate or simplest possible figure is a triangle.' But the Paraphrase does not so explain it: his words are τοῦτον δὲ τὸ τρίγωνον καὶ ἀ μαθηματικὸ τὸ αἰσθητὸν γινώσκοντες τρίγωνον, κ.τ.λ. And referring to Dec. Post. Anal. L. i. 4, we find exactly this instance given of a particular knowledge, the result of observation, ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν τρίγωνων ἐχει δυσὶν ἀρθαὶ Λος, προφέρετο· ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἡμικλίῳ τρίγωνῷ ἐστιν ἄυμα ἐναγωγὸς ἐγγυότερος. The term ἔσχατον is used in the very next line: ἐνόλιον γὰρ τοῦτον τὸ τρίγωνον ἡ μαθησις ἐστι, καὶ ὃν δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ ἔσχατον γνωρίζον. It is true that in different places Aristotle uses ἔσχατον in different senses, as denoting with various applications.
the end of a series; thus cf. De An. iii. x. 2, where it means 'final cause;' Eik. iii. iii. 11, 'the last step in analysis;' Metaph. vi. iii. 6, 'matter,' &c. But in the place before us τὸ ἔχων has been already appropriated to the logical meaning of 'particular,' 'minor term,' 'immediate truth;' cf. § 2 and § 8.

συνανταὶ γὰρ εἰς\[1\] For on that side too (i.e. in dealing with an object of the sense as well as an intuition of reason) demonstration must stop.' Τοιαύτης is a common logical form, it is opposed to προϊόμει εἰς ἄξιωμα, and is frequently impersonal; cf. Post. Anal. i. iii. 1: ἄδειον γὰρ τὸ ἄριστον διείσθαι. Εἰ τε τοιαύτης καὶ εἰς ἐνεκλησίαν, et al. Met. ii. iv. 22, &c.

'All' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φύσις] Three of Bekker's MSS. read ἢ φύσις, and this seems most natural, and to give the best sense (though ἢ is supported by the Paraphrase). What the writer means is apparently to add that only one kind of thought can be called analogous to the apprehension of a triangle; αὕτη refers to ἡ καθ' ἱκανον φύσις, mentioned above, ch. vii. § 7: δὲ ἄρμον ἑξεστὶ τὰ ὁπλαὶ μᾶλλον. There is another kind (ἐκείνης), namely, the possession of universal ideas (τῶν καθόλου) (i.e.), which is of a different nature.

IX. This chapter commences the examination of a set of faculties cognate to 'Thought,' or forming part of it. The first of these is good counsel (εἰσοδία). This, says the writer, is to be distinguished from science, which does not deliberate; from guessing (ἐκτοτις), which is too quick; from sagacity (διαχώρια), which is a kind of guessing; and from opinion, which is too definite. It consists, then, in a certain 'rightness;' it chooses the right means to a good end. The conception of this end 'Thought' itself must supply. There is a great assumption here of the manner of Aristotle. The chapter seems formed after Eik. iii. ii.; § 6 reminds us of many similar passages in Book IV., and § 7 is after the manner of Eik. i. iii. 5. There is an advance upon Aristotle's account of deliberation (Διάλ. iii. iii.) in two points: (1) the process is illustrated here by the logical formula of the syllogism; (2) there is a mention here of the faculty whereby ends are apprehended, which Aristotle had left unnoticed. See Eik. iii. iii. 1, note.

1 It is an abrupt, awkward commencement of the chapter to say, 'inquiring and deliberating are different, for deliberating is a species of inquiring.' But what is meant apparently is, to bring 'good counsel' under the head of inquiring, which separates it at once from both science and opinion.
2 φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δὲν ταχὺ κ.τ.λ.] Fritzschke quotes Isocr. Demon, p. 9, c. § 35: βουλευῶν μὲν βραδείως ἐπιτελεῖ δὲ ταχῶς τὰ δόξα. Herod. vii. 49; ἀλλ' ἂν ὅπως ἔρχεται, δήλω ὅτι ὅρθοτης τις ἡ εὐθυλία ἐστιν, οὕτω ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὖτε δόξας; ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὅρθοτης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), δόξας δ' ὅρθοτης ἀλήθεια; ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀριστεῖ ἡ ἄδικον οὐ δόξα ἐστὶν. ἀλλὰ μὲν οὕτω ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐθυλία. διανοιὰς ἄρα λείπεται; αὕτη γὰρ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος τῇ νόμοις καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ

amount to decision. Opinion is not an inquiry, but is already a kind of decision. On the other hand, he that deliberates, whether well or ill, is inquiring after something and calculating.'

ἐπιστήμης] This is said here just as it was before said, ch. v. § 7, that there were no degrees of excellence in Thought.

dόξης δ'] Cf. Eth. III. ii. 13, and above, ch. ii. § 2, note.

diavolas ἄρα] Plato, Repub. p. 511 D, proposed to confine the term διανω to the discursive understanding as opposed to νοῦς, the intuitive and speculative reason, διδόμενοι δὲ καλῶς 

οὗτος δὲ διανώμενος τῇ γνώμῃ τῷ ποιεῖται τῇ ἄρει, ἄλλ' ὁ νοῦς, ὅπως μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τῇ διανω ὁσῶν. Aristotele probably had the same distinction in view, Post. Anal. i. xxxiii. 9 (i.e.), τὸς δὲ διανώμενος ἐπὶ τῇ διανώμενος κεῖνος. But he did not maintain the distinction in his works, and certainly it is not observed by Eudemos in the present book, where both νοῦς πρακτικὸς and διανωθερμωτικὴ are spoken of. In the place before us διανω apparently means the exercise of the reason.
4  ἔτει δ’—βεβουλεύοντα] ‘But since the term “rightness” is used in more senses than one, it is plain that “good counsel” does not answer to all the senses. For the Incontinent or bad man will obtain, by his calculations, what he proposes to himself to obtain, so that he will have deliberated rightly, yet secured a great evil. Whereas, to have deliberated well is generally thought (δοκεῖ) to be a good.’

*πλεωναχῶς* i.e. rightness of means, either respective or irrespective of rightness in the end; or, again, rightness of end (§ 5), whatever may have been the means.

δ’ γὰρ ἄρατες] It would seem rather the abandoned man (ἀκόλαστος) who by calculation attains bad ends. The Incontinent man would not generally have deliberation attributed to him; cf. *Ebd.* vii ii. 2. But the characters cannot be kept very distinct.

† ἰδεῖν] δεῖν, which some have proposed to read for ἰδεῖν, makes no better sense. Rassow conjectured τυχεῖν, and as Bekker gave this conjecture his sanction, it has been adopted in the above translation.


5 ἀλλ’ ἔστι—ἐίδει] ‘But, further, it is possible to obtain what is good by a false syllogism, and to hit on doing what one ought, not however by the right means, but with a false middle term.’ It is an inaccuracy to speak of a ‘false middle term.’ Falsehood or truth is the attribute of a proposition, not a term; cf. De Interpret. i. 3: περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσι καὶ διαλεγόν ἐστι τὸ γεῦδο καὶ τὸ ἀπέλες. If the conception of the end be right and yet the syllogism wrong, it follows that the minor premis must be false, thus:

Preservation of health is good:
Abstinence from intellectual labour is preservation of health:

the result of which syllogism will be the preservation of health, but by the sacrifice of mental culture.
6-7 The writer first raises good counsel to the rank of one of the virtues, by the mention of all the qualifications necessary; afterwards he seems to modify this by saying that, besides the absolute good counsel which aims at the absolute end, there is also such a thing as relative good counsel aiming at relative ends.

One might have thought that it was unnecessary to give so separate a psychological existence to excellence in deliberation. However, the quality here described answers more nearly than prudence to what we call 'prudence.' Prudence, we are here told, is the conception of ends, and afterwards (ch. xii. § 9) it is shown to be the faculty of means. In truth, it is both, according to the Aristotelian views (as far as we can discern them); it implies both prudence (εὐδοκία), and also a certain moral condition (ἀῤῥήτη), and it is implied by both of them. As compared with the one it is of ends, and as compared with the other it is of means.

X. This chapter treats of another faculty which forms an element in wisdom, and yet may be distinguished from it, namely, apprehension (σώφρωσις). Apprehension is not mere opinion (else all would possess it), nor is it a science, for it deals with no separate class of objects whether necessary or contingent (οὐχ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ὅσων καὶ ἐκινήσεως ἢ σώφρωσις ἤστιν, οὐθεν περὶ τῶν γνωμῶν στοιχείων). It deals with all that can be matter of human deliberation, in short, with the same objects as Thought. But Thought commands; it is concerned with right action; in short, it belongs to the will as well as to reason. But apprehension only judges, it is merely intellectual. It is neither the having nor the getting Thought, but rather it is the application of one's knowledge to give a meaning to the dicta of wisdom. It is 'understanding;' as its name implies, or 'putting things together' (συνέφειά) when another person speaks.

Aristotle had spoken of σώφρωσις as one of the intellectual excellences, Eth. i. xiii. 20: σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σώφρωσιν καὶ φρονήσων διανοητικῶς. Eudemus does not apply the term ἀῤῥήτη to this, or to any of the other intellectual qualities which he treats of, except Thought and Philosophy. He gives here a psychological account of σώφρωσις, the operation of which he confines to intellectual insight with regard to moral subjects, apprehension of
the meaning of moral dicta and critical judgment thereon. That there is such a faculty of apprehension, and of sympathetic or critical understanding, quite distinct from moral goodness in people, the experience of life seems to show.

The author of the Magna Moralia gives a much inferior account of σώσεις (I. xxxv. 17), making its characteristic to be that it deals with small matters, περὶ μικρῶν τε καὶ μερικώς κρίσεις.

1 ἕδα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει. It is used nearly equivalently to φρονήσεις by Thucyd. 1.140: Δικαίου τοῦ καυτοῦ δόξασσο, ἂς ἄρα ὁ καὶ σφαλλώμενα, βούθειν, ἢ μὴ, κατάροισίς τις ἣν γενέσθαι μεταποιεῖσθαι.

2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ἐπιτατική ἡττών—ἡ δὲ σῶσεις κριτικὴ μόνων. The opposition of these terms involves a distinction that Aristotle argues is content with a knowledge and judgment about numbers, whereas the architect (ἄρχιτέκτων) must go on to apply his knowledge by directing the workmen—thus that all science may be divided under the two heads of critical and manda-
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σύνεσις, καθ' ἴνα εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν. Λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνεῖναι πολλάκις.

11 ὁ δὲ καλομένη γνώμη, καθ' ἴνα εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἐχειν φαμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρῖσις ὀρθή. σημείον δὲ τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστα φαμέν εἶναι συγγνώμονον, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἐχεῖν περὶ ἑαυτά συγγνώμην. ὁ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή, ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

2 Εἰτὶ δὲ πάσαι αἱ ἐξεῖς εὐλόγως εἰς ταύτῳ τείνουσαι. λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἡδή καὶ φρόνιμους καὶ σωτέρους. πάσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἔκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς

XI. This chapter (which is not conveniently divided as it stands) opens with a mention of the quality of considerateness (γνώμη), and proceeds to point out how various qualities unite in 'thought,' and what are the natural and intuitive elements which it contains.

1 ὁ δὲ καλομένη γνώμη] By the progress of psychology, this term came to bear the special meaning of 'considerateness.' At first it meant knowledge in general, cf. Theognis, vv. 895 sq.

Γνώμης δ' οὖν ἀμείωτον ἀνήρ ἔχει αὐθεν ἐν αὐτῷ,
Οὐδ' ἀγνωστότης, Κύρον, ἀδυνηρῆτερον.

In Thucydides it bore a variety of significations, especially when used in the plural, standing for almost anything mental, 'minds' as opposed to bodies, 'thoughts' as opposed to deeds; 'feelings,' 'principles,' 'maxims,' &c. In Aristotle's Rhetoric, π. xxii. 2–15 γνώμη is used for a moral maxim (such as those of the so-called Gnomic Poets); so also for all popular sayings, Soph. El. xvii. 17. It was probably from the association of συγγνώμη that γνώμη came to have its distinctive meaning. The author of the Magna Moralia calls it εὐγνώμονη, and makes it a sort of passive form of ἐπιεικεῖα (π. ii. 1): ἐστι μὲν οὖν οἷοι ἀνευ ἐπιεικείας ἡ εὐγνώμονη, τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρίνει τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς.

In the text above, it is said that 'considerateness is a right judgment of the equitable man. Pardon is a right critical considerateness of the equitable man.'

ὁρθῇ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς] 'Now by a right considerateness is meant a true one.' This must be the import of the sentence, but the writer says not ἀληθ-, but τοῦ ἀληθοῦς—probably 'by attraction' to τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς. But it is an inaccuracy of language to speak of 'a true man' in the sense of 'a man whose judgment is true.' Stahr translates τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς as if it were neuter. But the 'equitable man,' here apparently gives the standard for γνώμη, as the φρόνιμος for virtue, Eth. π. vi. 15.

2 εἰτὶ δὲ—Ἀλλω] 'Now all the (above-mentioned) conditions of mind
naturally tend to the same point; we apply (έπιφορτες) the terms considerateness, apprehension, thought, and reason to the same persons, and say (λέγομεν) that they have considerateness, that they have attained to (ἔνθη) reason—that they are thoughtful—that they are apprehensive. For all these faculties deal with ultimate truths (τῶν ἐσχάτων) and particulars; and it is by being able to judge of those matters with which the thoughtful man is concerned that a man is apprehensive, considerate, or forgiving. Equity extends itself over all the forms of good which consist in a relation to one's neighbour.'

νοθν ἔνθη] What this means is not quite clear. It may refer to what is said in § 6, ἔθε τῇ ἕλικῃ νοθον ἔκει. Thus it might be nearly equivalent to our saying of a person that he had 'attained to years of discretion.' Or again, it may refer to the moment of action, and ἔνθη would be thus equivalent to the French voilà. 'There is reason exhibited.' ἔνθη is used similarly to denote the present moment, Eik. Eud. ii. viii. 11: Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκεφαλούμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἔνθη, καὶ γείρει τῷ ἄγνηκτῳ ἕλικῃ, ὅτι διέτερον ὑφελέσθη, ἢ καὶ ἔνθη ὑφελέσθην ὑγίας.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιστή] This is said because γνώμη and συγγνώμη are acts of equity. Cf. Eth. v. x. 1, note.

4–5 καὶ ὁ νοθὸν τῶν ἐσχάτων—

νοθή] And reason is of the ultimates at both ends of the series. Both the first and the last terms are apprehended, not by inference, but by reason. On the one hand, the scientific and demonstrative reason (ἐν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις) apprehends those terms which are immutable and primary. And on the other hand, the practical reason (ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς) apprehends the ultimate (ἐσχάτου) and contingent truth, and the minor premise. For these constitute the sources of our idea of the end, the universal being developed out of the particulars. Of these particulars, then, one must have perception, and this perception is reason.' The writer having before (in § 3) connected the faculties of 'apprehension,' &c., with 'Thought,' on the ground of their all being concerned with ultimate truths, proceeds to include reason (νοθῆ) under the same category, and says that this apprehends ἐσχάτα at both ends of the series. But now comes in a piece of confusion which is thoroughly Eudemian, for he goes on to say that the scientific reason apprehends first truths or principles (cf. ch. vi.), while the practical reason apprehends last terms or particulars. To mix up considerations of the scientific reason with the present discussion is to introduce what is entirely irrelevant. We see
here a bringing together of two things which were before placed in contrast with each other (ch. viii. § 9), namely, the reason which apprehends first principles, and thought apprehending particular facts (ἐγκατῴων). In the present passage, what was before called thought (φρόνησις) is called reason (νοῦς), and it is said that reason is the faculty which perceives or apprehends the particular in moral subjects (ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς). This, then, is the main purport of the present remarks. Setting aside as irrelevant what is said of the scientific reason, we learn that the moral judgment is intuitive, that moral intuitions are to be attributed to the reason, and that out of these particular intuitions the moral universal grows up. When stripped of its ambiguities of statement, the sense of the passage becomes unexceptional. We may compare it with the incidental observations of Aristotle, Eth. i. iv. 7: Ἀρχή γὰρ τὸ δι᾽ ἐν τούτῳ φαίνεται ἀρκοῦντος, οὗτοι προσδέχεται τοῦ δι᾽ ἐν τούτῳ, καί ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἦλθον ἐν ἀρχῇ ῥήματα. Ἂθ. vii. 20: λέγων ἐν τῷ τὸ δι᾽ εἰς ἀρχήν καλῶς, οἷον καὶ πρὸ τό ἄρχας, τὸ δὶ τοῖς πρῶτος καὶ ἀρχὴ. The expression of Eudemus is not so strong as that of Aristotle. Eudemus says ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἐκκατα τὸ καθὸν, while Aristotle said ἀρχὴ τὸ δι᾽. The latter must be true if reason be the organ by which the fact is apprehended, for reason is in itself universal, and whatever it apprehends must be of the nature of the universal.

Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τοῦ ὁδεγεῖ αὐτὰ. This is similar in form of expression to ch. iii. § 3: ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ καθολοῦ. On ὁ ἐκκατα see below, ch. xii. § 10, note.

ἀστὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ νοῦς] To say that 'reason is a perception of particulars' is only the counterpart of Aristotle’s saying that we can have 'a perception of universals.' Eth. i. vii. 20: τῶν ἀρχῶν μὲν ἀποθέσεις δεισοῦνται. Aristotle expresses the intuitive character of reason by saying that it 'touche[s] its object. Cf. Metaphys. viii. x. 5, τὸ μὲν θυγατρὶ καὶ φάσαν αἰλήθες . . . τὸ δὲ ἀγνοοῦ μὴ βιγγάνειν. Ἂθ. xi. vii. 8, αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ δὲ νοεῖ κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ ροποτού. ροποτὸς γὰρ γίνεται βιγγάνων καὶ νοεῖ, ὡστε ταῦτα νοεῖ καὶ ροποτόν. That reason, while it is on the one hand intuitive, is on the other hand developed by experience, we learn from the discussions in Poet. Αναλ. ii. ch. xix. The same is expressed above in the saying that 'reason is the beginning and the end.' 5–6 διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ—ἀρθῶν] 'Hence it is that these faculties are thought to come naturally, and that although no one without conscious effort (φόες) gets to be a philosopher, men do get naturally to have considerateness, and apprehension, and
XI.—XII.] ΗΟΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VI. 181

télos nòs: ek toútwv gár ai ápodeixeis kai peri toútwv. óste dei prosochéi tòv empiéiron kai prosvbiteron h frô-
níou twn ánatoideíktois fássei kai dóxas oux hýttov twn
ápodeixewn: dia gár to éxew ek tis empiéiras ñmma órða-
sin órðos. tì mén oñ ñstiv h frônìsia kai h sôfia, kai 7
peri tìna ékatera twngvânei õdvs, kai õtì álloû tòv
ψυχῆς moriôn árhoû ékaterâ, épíntai.

Διαπορίσεις δ’ ãn tìs peri avtôn. tì xhrîsmiôi eîsvn. 12
h mén gár sôfia ouvèn thewreî eîz õw õstai eîdâmwn ánthrò-

reason. A proof of this is, that we
think they ought successively to appear
as age advances, and (we say that)
such and such an age possesses reason
and considerateness, as if these things
came from nature. Hence reason is
the beginning and the end, the matter
of premises and conclusions is the
same. Thus we must pay regard to
the unproved assertions and opinions
of the elderly and experienced, or of
the thoughtful, no less than to demo-
strations. For, from having obtained
the eye of “old experience,” they see
aright.” In these excellent remarks
the subject is brought round again
to the contrast between Philosophy
and Thought. The former never
comes naturally, but the latter does.
The nature of reason, and its growth
in the mind, is illustrated by the
common fact of the respect paid to
age.

I. iii. 4: peri toútwv kal ἐκ τούτων
λέγονται. The ‘subject’ of the
demonstration is the conclusion, cf. Eth.
I. viii., Ἐκπετών... οδ. μίνων ἐκ τοῦ
συμπεράσματος καὶ εἰς ὄν δ λόγον.

ἐμα] Cf. Eth. I. vi. 12, ὥτ γάρ ἐν
σώματι δύοις, ἐν ψυχῇ χάριν. Plato,
Repud. p. 533 B, ἐν βορβώρῳ βαρ-
βαρκῷ τῷ τῷ ψυχῆς ἐμα κατο-
ρωμαγένον ἡμᾶς ἔλει καὶ ἀνάγει
ἄνω.

XII. In this and the following
chapter, by mooting the question, Of
what use are Thought and Philosophy?
the writer shows the relation of the
two qualities to each other, and the
inseparable connection existing be-
tween thought and virtue. The fol-
lowing difficulties are first stated.
(1) Philosophy is not practical, it does
not consider at all the means to
happiness, how then can it be useful?
(2) Thought, on the other hand,
thought it treats of happiness, might
be said to be mere knowledge. It
might be said that a man no more acts
well from having this knowledge of
the good, than he is well from having
a knowledge of medicine. (3) Or
again, if thought be useful for telling
us how to be good, why not get this
advice from others? Why should it
be necessary to have thought, any
more than it is to learn medicine,
when one can go to a doctor? (4) If
philosophy be better than thought,
how is it that the latter controls the
former? The answer to question (1)
is, that both philosophy and thought
are good in themselves, and desirable
as being perfections of our nature,
even though they were not useful as
means to anything beyond. But they
are not without results. Philosophy,
if it does not serve as an instrument
to happiness, is identical with happi-
ness itself. Questions (2) and (3) are answered by showing the relation of thought to virtue. Virtue gives the right aim, and thought the right means. They are inseparable from one another. Thought without virtue would be mere cleverness, apt to degenerate into cunning, and virtue without wisdom would be a mere gift of nature, a generous instinct capable of perversion. While thus inseparable from virtue, thought is not to be identified with it. In this respect an advance has been made beyond the crude formula of Socrates. Wisdom accompanies the virtues, and is a sort of centre-point to them all (ἀμα τῷ φρονήσει μὰ ὁσή πάσαι ὑπάρχουσιν, xiii. 6). Question (4) is easily answered, since wisdom rather ministers to philosophy than thinks of controlling it.

I οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἐστὶ γενέσεως] Suggested perhaps by Εἰκ. x. vii. 5, where it is said of the θεωρία τῆς ἁγίας — οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι. Πρ. § 7: δοκεῖ . . . παρ' αὐτὴν οὖν ἐφίστασθαι τέλος.

ἐπερ ἢ μὲν φρονήσεις ἐστιν ἢ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ]

'It thought be that which is concerned with things just and beautiful and good for man.' Ἡ is indefinite, being probably feminine on account of the preceding φρονήσεις. This passage is the first that asserts strongly the moral nature of 'thought.' We are told here that it takes cognisance of the just and the beautiful; before it was only said to be concerned with what was good (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθά, ch. v. § 6). These concluding discussions about φρονήσεις show the inadequacy of the term 'prudence,' by which it has been so often translated, really to represent it.

οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτερον τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὸν] The answer to this objection has virtually been already given, ch. v. § 8: where φρονήσεις was said not to be a merely intellectual quality.

2 ei δὲ μὴ—πείθεσθαι] 'But suppose we assume that a man is thoughtful not for this object (i.e. mere knowledge of virtue), but with a view to becoming (virtuous), we must then concede that to those who are virtuous thought will not be useful,—nor any more so to those who have not got (virtue), for there will be no difference whether they have (thought) themselves, or follow the advice of
others possessing it. The compartmentalization used here is quite in the style of Eudemus, and so is the confusion caused by the careless writing in τοῦ μή έχουσιν: οὔδεν γὰρ διόλευ καθότι εἴχεν, where έχουσιν and έχειν appear to refer to two different things.

3 el χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἐσται] This difficulty may have been partly suggested by the prominent position assigned to Thought in the present book (cf. ch. vil. § 7: εἰς δ' ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ἔννοιαν ἀρχηγοῖς), partly by the authorizing character attributed to politics by Aristotle, Ἐθ. I. ii. 4-6: δέεις δ' ἐν τῇ κυριωτέρᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχηγοτοικῇ ταυταίτερᾳ δ' ἐν πολιτικῇ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato on the βασιλείᾳ τῆς, Eth. III. p. 291 B quoted Vol. I. Essay III. p. 191.

4 Thought and Philosophy cannot be otherwise than desirable, as they are the best state of the human mind. And the mind must necessarily (ἀναγκαῖον) desire its own best state.

5 ἐπειτ' — εἰδαίμων] Furthermore they do produce happiness—philosophy produces it, not in the way that medicine produces health, but rather it operates like health itself. Being a part of the entire well-being (τῆς ἄληθες ἀρετῆς) of man, it makes one happy by the consciousness of possessing it.


τῆς ἁρετῆς καὶ ἐνεργείας] 'Energéia added on to ἐχοσθαί expresses the fruition, as well as the possession, of philosophy. It implies that philosophy exists not only in, but for, the mind. See Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 243 sq.

6 ἢ τούτοι] ‘Again, man’s proper function is discharged by an
accordance with thought and moral virtue. For virtue makes the aim right, and thought the means to the attainment of this.' The conception of τὸ ἐργον is taken from Ar. Eth. i. vii. 10. The rest of the psychology here is different from that of Aristotle (see Eth. iii. v. 1, note), but is identical with that adopted by Eudemus in his earlier books. Cf. Eth. Eud. ii. xi. 1: τῶν ἐπὶ διαμαρμένων λέγομεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀμαρτητὴν ποιεῖ τὴν προάρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὅρθον, οὕτως ὡστε οὐκ ἐνκα διερείσθαι. Η ὡστε δοκεῖ τι, τὸν λόγον. 'Εστι δὲ τούτῳ εὐγράμμεν. αὕτη γὰρ ὁ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον. 'Εστι δὲ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐγράμμα ετέρων. Λεκτέω δὲ πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν (this refers to ch. v. § 6, where, however, σωφροσύνη is substituted for εὐγράμμα). I. d. § 3: πότερον δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τῶν σκοπῶν ἡ τὰ πρὸς τῶν σκοπῶν; τιθεμένα δὲ τὴν σκοπῶν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἦστι συλλογισμὸς ὁδὲ λόγος. I. d. § 6, quoted below.

τὸ δὲ τεταρτού κ.τ.λ.] The parts are: (1) the scientific reason, (2) the practical reason, (3) the moral nature (λόγου μετέχων), (4) the vegetative element,—'Ἀρετὴ τουοτή, ι.ε. 'moral virtue,' The vegetative soul has its own ἀρετὴ or 'excellence,' in a general sense.

7 The first step to prove the use and practical necessity of thought, is to show that moral action implies consciousness and a conscious purpose.

8 τῆς μὲν—διδασκαλίας] 'Now virtue makes the purpose right, but the means to this (ὅσα εἴκοσι ἔννεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι) do not belong to virtue, but to another faculty.' There is some confusion here in speaking of the means to a purpose, προάρεσις itself being in the Aristotelian psychology a faculty of means; but cf. Eth. Eud. ii. xi. 5–6, where προάρεσις is said to imply both end and means, and whence the present passage is repeated almost verbatim. 'Εστι γὰρ πάνα προάρεσις των καὶ ἔνεκα των. Ὁδὲ ἐνδὲ ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον εἶστιν, ὁδὲ αὐτὰ ἡ ἀρετὴ τὸ (τῇ, Fritzche, ε οονὶ) προάρεσθαι ὃν ἔνεκα. 'Εστι μέντοι ἡ προάρεσις ὁδὸς τούτων, ἀλλὰ
one cannot possess “thought” unless he be good.’


Demonst. Ο. Ι. p. 9: πανοῦργος ὡς καὶ δεινὸς ἀθρώπος πράγματι χρήσατο. Rassow refers to Plato, Hippias Min. p. 365 Ε, for the popular identification of φρόνησις with δεινότης.

10 ᾧ δ’ ἔχει τῷ ὄμματι τοῦτοι] The whole conception of reason, ‘the eye of the soul,’ being capable of being perverted into worldly cunning or of being kept pure by good moral habits, comes, originally, no doubt, from Plato, Republic. 518 ε: ἂν δὲ τῷ φρονίμῳ ταύτῳ μᾶλλον δεινότροφο τῶν τυγχαίνων, ὡς δεικνύει, δὴ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀκαλλιασά, ὡς δὲ τῷ περιγυμνήθης χρήσιμον καὶ ὄφελιμον καὶ ἄρχοντος αὐτικαὶ βλαβεροῦ γίγνεται, ὡς ὀντων ἐνεπειδήκας, τῶν λεγομένων πανοῦργον μὲν, σοφῶν δὲ, ὡς δρμῷ μὲν βλέπει τῷ ψυχράν καὶ ἄξιον διόρθω ταύτα ἐφ’ ἄτραπται, ὡς οὖν φαίνει ἔχει τὴν ὅμοια, κακία δ’ ἡγακασμένον ὑποτείνειν,
13 Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα· οὐ ταῦταν μὲν, ὁμοιον δὲ· οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. τὰ πάντα γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐκαστὰ τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει ποὺ καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ

ἔστε δοὺς ἂν ἐξότερον βλέπη, τοσοῦτῳ πλέον καὶ ἄργασέμενον; ὁς εἴρησα τὸ] Ch. ii. § 4: διὰ οὖν ἂν ἔντοι καὶ διανοιάς, οὖν ἂν ἡ κήπις ἐστὶν ἔξως ἡ προαίρεσις. Εἰδ. Ευδ. ii. xi. 5: διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὄρθον εἶ οὕτω τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν]
The form of the practical syllogism is similarly given, Εἰδ. Ευδ. ii. xi. 4: ὅσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ, οὕτως καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. ἐκείνη δὲ τῶν ὑγιείων, ἀνάγκη τοις ὑπάρχῃ, εἰ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος, ὅσπερ ἐκεῖ, ἐὰν ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθά, ἀνάγκη τοις εἶναι.


XIII. 1 Σκεπτέον δὴ—κυρίαν] 'We must consider, then, over again, the nature of virtue. For there is a relation in virtue analogous to that borne by 'thought' to cleverness. Cleverness, though not the same as 'thought,' is similar to it, and this is the way in which natural virtue stands related to virtue proper.' The doctrine of the natural element in virtue was clearly given by Aristotle, cf. Εἰδ. ξ. ix. 6–8: Γίνεσθαι δ’ ἄγαθον οὐσία, οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ’ ἐθεὶ, οἱ δ’ διδαχῇ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινὰς θελας αὐτὰς τοῖς ὀλίγον εὐτυχίων ὑπάρχει—Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἥδε προκαθέλθων τοις νεκρέων τῆς ἀρετῆς, στερῶν τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖον τὸ αἰσχρὸν. In the present passage, the analogy between the development of the reason and of the moral will is well drawn out. At first, there is the intellectual faculty, cleverness, undetermined as yet for good or bad, but requiring a right direction to be given to its aims. This the moral feelings can alone supply. On the other side, there is the generous instinct, the impulse to bravery, justice, and the like, but this is deficient in consciousness and in the idea of a law, which reason can alone supply. The joint development of these two sides gives, on the one hand, 'thought,' on the other hand, virtue, in its complete and proper form. What there is difficult or strange in the doctrine is, that virtue has apparently assigned to it the intellectual function of apprehending the end of action. This appears an inversion. 'Aretē seems now to have changed places with λόγος. But, at all events, the point is clearly established that an intellectual side and a moral side are entirely inseparable.
καὶ γὰρ παιδὶ—ἀρετῇ] 'For the natural dispositions belong both to children and beasts, but without reason they appear harmful. At least this seems evident, that as a strong body, if moved without sight, comes into violent collisions because it has not sight to guide it, so is it in mental things (ἔναθδα). If the natural qualifications have reason added to them, they then excel in action, and the state, which (before) was a semblance of virtue, now becomes virtue in the true sense of the term.' Φυσικαὶ ἦσει is used inaccurately for φυσικά διαθέσεις, cf. Ἐθ. π. vii. 6, note. On the moral qualities of brutes Aristotle often speaks; cf. Hist. Ἀν. i. 1; ix. i. &c. The 'courage' of brutes, being undirected, is no doubt harmful, so the generosity, &c., of boys. That fine natures are capable of the worst perversion, is an opinion to be found stated in Plato's Republic, p. 491 Χ: Ὑπόκοιν, ἦν δ' εὖ, ὃ Ἀδελίματε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐθυντιτας καθή παιδαγωγιας τυχοῦσας διαφερόντως κακάς γλυκέσας; ἦ οἰε τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκραν

πονηρῶν ἐκ φαῦλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ μακρινῆς φόνεως τροφῆ διαλομής γλυκέσας, ἀδελίμη ὅ ἐφὼ, μεγάλων ὀπίνες ἀγαθῶν οὕτω κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτε ἔσοφτο; οἰε τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκραν πονηρῶν ἐκ φαῦλης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ μακρινῆς φόνεως τροφῆ διαλομής γλυκέσας, ἀδελίμη ὅ ἐφὼ, μεγάλων ὀπίνες ἀγαθῶν οὕτω κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτε ἔσοφτο; 3-5 δὲνερ—μετὰ λόγον] 'Hence it is that some say that all the virtues are manifestations of thought; and thus Socrates was partly right and partly wrong in his investigations. He was wrong in considering the virtues manifestations of thought, but perfectly right in holding that they were inseparable from thought. The same point is testified to by the fact that, at present, persons, when they wish to define virtue, add the terms "state (specifying the particular object), according to the right law.") And that law is right which is in accordance with thought. All men therefore seem to have a presentiment that a particular state in accordance with thought is virtue. But a little alteration is necessary. Not merely the state according to the right law, but that which is conscious of (metā) the right law constitutes virtue. Now in such matters thought is right law. Socrates, then considered that the
virtues were laws (for he defined them all as sciences), but we consider that they are conscious of a law.'

_καὶ Σωκράτης_ On the doctrine of Socrates that 'virtue is science,' see Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 165, sq. In _Eth. iii. viii._ 6, the phrase is _θεου καὶ οὐκ Σωκράτης_, on which Bishop Fitzgerald remarks, that by prefixing the article Aristotle appears to have indicated the Socrates of Plato's dialogues, the dramatic, and not the historical, philosopher. Thus speaking similarly of characters in books, Aristotle says, _Eth. iii. viii._ 2, _τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἐκτόρα_. _Ib. i. i._ 3, _η Καλυψό. i. i. 6, πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην._ And contrariwise of real persons he speaks without the article. _Eth. i._ iv. 5, _Εὐ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ᾠδέρει. ib. i. v._ 3, _ἠμαυσάθην Σαρδανακάλω. i. vi._ 8, _οί δὲ καὶ Στρατήσατοι. i. x. i_, κατὰ _Σέλωνα._ All through the first book of the _Metaphysics_, when writing the history of philosophy, Aristotle speaks of the different philosophers without the article, and so too elsewhere in contrasting Socrates with Plato, &c.
The only exceptions to this rule are the cases of renewed mention. Cf. _Met. xii._ iv. 5: _Δίῳ γὰρ ἰσίων ἐπὶ τὸν ἄριστον_ ἀλλ' _ὁ_ _καὶ Σωκράτης_ ἐπιτύμβως. _Met. xii._ vi. 14, _ἐξίστη_ _Σωκράτης_, the actual and historical Socrates is designated.

_καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάσης_ i.e. since the establishment of the Peripatetic doctrine. Eudemus (_§ 5_) refines upon the usual Peripatetic formula, substituting _μετὰ λόγου_ for _κατὰ λόγου._ On the meaning of this alteration, see _Eth. i._ vii. 14, note.

_6 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος—ὑπάρξεως_
Thus the opinion is refuted of him who would argue that the virtues are separated from one another, that the same man is not equally gifted by nature for all the virtues, so that he will acquire one now and another later. This is possible with regard to natural good qualities, but not so with regard to those which constitute a good man absolutely; for together with Thought, which is one, all the virtues will be in his possession. The same perfect character is attributed to Thought below, Eth. vii. ii. 5: πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος τῶν γὰρ εὐχάριων τι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐχων ἀρετὰς. The theory is, that he who has thought can do no wrong. It will be seen how nearly this approach to the Stoical idea of the 'wise man.'
PLAN OF BOOK VII.

THIS last of the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books consists of two parts, of which the one is a necessary complement to Aristotle's ethical system; the other superfluous, being little more than a modification of Aristotle's (far superior) treatise on Pleasure.

Part I. having enumerated the moral states which are above, below, and between virtue and vice, mentions six ordinary opinions on these states (Ch. I.), points out the difficult questions to which those opinions give rise (Ch. II.), and proceeds to elucidate them.

In Ch. III. the question is discussed, How is Incontinence compatible with a knowledge of the right?

In Ch. IV. the question, Whether Incontinence is confined to any definite object-matter?

Chs. V. and VI., pursuing the same inquiry, treat of certain morbid and unnatural kinds of Incontinence, and of Incontinence (analogously so called) in the matter of anger.

Ch. VII. compares generally Incontinence with Intemperance, treats of the subordinate forms of the intermediate moral states (endurance, softness, &c.), and traces Incontinence to two separate sources in the character.

Ch. VIII. continues the comparison between Intemperance and Incontinence, reverts to two questions before mooted, namely:—(1) Is Intemperance more curable than Incontinence? (2) Is Incontinence to be regarded as absolutely bad? and gives a negative answer to both.

Ch. IX. §§ 1–4 discusses the question mooted in Ch. II., Does Continence consist in sticking to an opinion or purpose, right or wrong? In answering this question, a good distinction is drawn between Obstancy and Continence.

Ch. IX. § 5—Ch. X. winds up the previous discussions, and
formally settles the remaining questions of Ch. II. Is Intemperance the same as Incontinence? Can the thoughtful man be incontinent?

These chapters form, as we have said, a necessary complement to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of view (ἄλλην ἅγχυς) than that which would divide mankind simply into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states; and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction between the 'Intemperate' and the 'Incontinent,' as the use of these English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to give a certain special and technical meaning to the word 'Intemperate' in order to make it stand as the representative of ἄχραστος.¹

A subtle, but not always clear psychology is employed to explain the phenomena of moral weakness, and it is observable that physical and medical considerations are prominently appealed to throughout this book. The remarks on bestiality, cretinism, or morbid depravity (βουδήρν) here made have attracted the notice of modern writers on the psychology of insanity (as, for instance, Dr. Thomas Mayo).² And the interesting allusions here made to the

¹ The attributes assigned (c. vii. § 2) to the Intemperate man, who 'of deliberate purpose pursues excessive pleasures, for their own sake, and never repents of doing so, and thus is incurable,' make this a sort of ideally vicious character. A similar conception of ideal vice in its extremest form, with the element of cruelty added, is to be found in Shelley's portrait of Count Cenci: see *The Cenci*, Act i. sc. i.

As to my character for what men call crime,
Seeing I please my senses as I list,
And vindicate that right with force or guile,
It is a public matter, and I care not
If I discuss it with you.
All men delight in sensual luxury,
All men enjoy revenge; and most

² 'Now, according to this view of the subject, we have a class of persons, differing from the majority of mankind in their incapacity for moral distinction, differing from the insane, in not labouring under any suspension of the power of will. On the first of these grounds, they have a right to a place in our system of mental pathology. On the last, they must constitute a distinct head from insanity. I am not at present considering this class generally; I exclude indeed that

Over the tortures they can never feel;
But I delight in nothing else. I love
The sight of agony, and the sense of joy,
When this shall be another's and that mine.
And I have no remorse, and little fear,
Which are, I think, the checks of other men, &c.
PLAN OF BOOK VII.

melancholic or bilious temperament might be illustrated, not only from Aristotle's Problems, but also from Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy. The chief thing that we have to complain of in this book is the too vague way in which incontinence is treated. For the sake of forming a more definite notion of the standard of Greek morality, we could have wished a graphic portrait of the continent man, in the style of Aristotle's fourth Book. As it is, we must be content to know that the continent man yields to temptation less, and the incontinent man more, than people in general.

Part II. consists of that superfluous treatise on Pleasure, the authorship of which has been so much disputed. While professing to treat of pleasure as falling under the philosophy of human life, the writer seems to confine himself almost entirely to a refutation of three positions maintained by the Platonic school: 1st. That pleasure is in no sense a good. 2nd. That most pleasures (i.e. physical pleasures) are bad. 3rd. That no pleasure can be the chief good.

The first and third of these positions are refuted in Chs. XII. and XIII., and the second in Ch. XIV. The subject is treated in this book under a more physiological and practical aspect than in the tenth book of the Nicomachean work.

section of persons, in whom the absence of principle is obviated by the harmlessness of their tendencies. I am speaking of persons destitute of the moral faculty, and also vicious in their propensities. For these I have borrowed the designation given to them by Aristotle: and I call them brutal.' —Mayo, Elements of the Pathology of the Human Mind, p. 127.
META δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην πουρσαμένους ἀρχήν, 
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τά ἡθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δήλα· τὸ 
μὲν γὰρ ἁρετήν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλούμεν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν 
θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἄν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς 
ἁρετήν, ἡρωικὴν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὡσπερ "Ομηρος περὶ 
"Εκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἢ 
ἀγαθός.

I. This chapter proposes a new 
field of inquiry (ἄλλην ἀρχήν) in 
Ethics, namely, to consider those 
intermediate states, continence and 
incontinence, together with their sub-
ordinate forms (softness, luxury, and 
endurance), which are 'neither iden-
tical with virtue and vice, nor yet 
wholly distinct from them.' After 
an enumeration of the moral states 
above, below, and between, virtue and 
vice, the writer announces that his 
method of inquiry will be, as else-
where, to collect current opinions on 
the subject, to raise doubts and ob-
jections to them, and by a process of 
sifting to reject such existing opinions 
as are untenable, and to leave a residue 
of 'sufficiently demonstrated' theory. 
He accordingly mentions six com-
mon notions about the states in ques-
tion.

1 τά δ' ἐναντία κ.τ.λ.] A scale of 
the moral states is here drawn out, 
which stands as follows: 1. Divine 
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 virtue, or pure reason. 2. Virtue 
(afterwards called temperance, σω-
φροσύνη), or the perfect harmony of 
passion subjugated to reason. 3. 
Continence, or the mastery of reason 
over passion after a struggle. 4. In-
continence, or the mastery of passion 
over reason after a struggle. 5. Vice 
(afterwards called ἄκολοσία, intem-
perance), or the perfect harmony of 
reason subjugated to passion. 6. 
Bestiality, or pure passion. It is 
remarkable that the terms σωφροσύνη 
and ἄκολοσία, which in this book 
certainly supply the place of ἁρετή 
and κακία, are actually introduced 
extremely late. Cf. ch. v. § 8.

ἡρωικὴν τινα] Cf. Arist. Pol. vIL 
xiv. 2, where the gods and heroes are 
mentioned as excelling men. Dr. 
Hampden, in his Bampton Lectures, 
mentions that, in the canonisation of 
a Roman Catholic Saint, it was cus-
tomary to declare that he had gradu-
ated 'in heroico gradu virtutis.'

B B
οὐδὲ ἐξέκει

οὐδὲ εἰς καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ διὰ ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἐν εἰς δὴ λόγον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ στροφαὶ οὐδὲ θεοῖν ἐστὶ κακία οὐδὲ ἀρετή, οὐτως οὐδὲ θεοῖ, ἀλλὰ ἡ μὲν τιμιότερον ἁρετής, ἢ δ’ ἑτερῶν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θείον ἁνδρὰ εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Δάκωνες εἰῶθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἄγαθως σφόδρα τοῦ (σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν), οὕτω καὶ οἱ θηριώτης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιο. μάλιστα δ’ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔστιν, γίνεται δ’ ἐναι καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ προσότες· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπίσυφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως υστερον πουτέον τινα μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας ἐμφαντάζεται πρότερον περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὕτω γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐξευθεῖα τῇ ἁρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθεῖ-5 μία ἐκτέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὐθ’ ὡς ἑτερον γένος. δει

attributed to λυθῆς τὰ δυσχερη, which might either refer (1) to the rejection of ideas that involved a difficulty; or (2) to the clearing up of difficulties attaching to any of the popular ideas. The former interpretation would seem best to suit the context, and to be justified by the actual procedure of subsequent chapters, and accordingly the following is the way in which the passage is rendered by the Paraphrast.

 لدينا من δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸν τρόπον καθ’ ὃν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰςμεν· ἐκπρομήθεα γὰρ τοὺς δοκοῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν λόγους, διὸ τοὺς μὴ συμβαλλόμενας τῇ ἀληθεῖᾳ ἐλέγχομεν, τοὺς μέλητα εῦδοκοι καταλείπομεν βεβαιώμενησι· καὶ οὕτως εἰσταί φαινετο δ’ περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον. But on looking below we find a sentence answering to, and in fact repeating, the present one in such a way that we cannot help taking it as a decisive guide as to what is here meant. After a statement of the
δ’, Ὅσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τυθέντα τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορεύσατας οὐτὸς δεικνύει μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριότατα· εἰώ γὰρ λύπη τε τὰ δυσχερή καὶ καταλεῖπται τὰ ἐνδοξά, δεδείγμενον ἐν εἴῃ ἰκανός.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ἡ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρπεία· τῶν σπουδαίων 6 καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἀκραίας τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ οὗ ἀυτὸς ἐγκράτης καὶ ἐκμενετικός τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκραῖς καὶ ἐκστατικός τοῦ λογισμοῦ. καὶ οὐ μὲν ἀκραίας εἴδος οτι φαύλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὡς ἐγκράτης εἴδος οτι φαύλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σῶφρονον μὲν ἐγκράτης καὶ καρπείκον, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σῶφρονα οἱ

various ideas, and of the difficulties which they suggest, the writer adds aί μὲν οὖν ἀπορίας τοιαύτας τινες συμβαίνουσας, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεί, τὰ δὲ καταλεῖπεν· ἡ γὰρ λόγιος τῆς ἀπορίας εἴρεσις ἐστιν (ii. 12). The words before us, λόγια τὰ δυσχερῆ, correspond with τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν (τῶν ἄπορων) and with ἡ λόγιος τῆς ἀπορίας. It is to be observed, however, that καταλείπειν is used in the one place to refer to the popular ideas, and in the other to the objections (ἀπορίας) urged against those ideas. τὰ φαινόμενα, as shown by what follows, is here equivalent to τὰ λεγόμενα in § 7, the common sayings and ideas of men. It is used in the same sense, Eth. Eld. i. vi. i: περατέων δὲ περὶ τοῦτον πάντων ζητεῖν τὴν πιστὰν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαργυροὺς καὶ παραδείγματε χρώμενον τῶν φαινόμενως.

6-7 The common ideas are now enumerated. They are six in number:

1. 'That continence and endurance are morally good, while incontinence and softness are morally bad.'

2. 'That the continent man is he who sticks to his opinion, while the incontinent man is he who departs from his opinion.'

3. 'That the incontinent man errs through his peculiar state, knowing all the while that he is doing wrong; while owing to this knowledge the continent man abets.'

(4) 'That temperance is the same as continence, and in like manner incontinence is sometimes confused with intemperance.'

(5) 'It is occasionally maintained that "thoughtful" and clever men may be incontinent.'

(6) 'That there is such a thing as incontinence of other things beside pleasure, e.g. of anger, of honour, and of gain.'

6 δοκεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Xenophon, Memorab. i. v. 4-5, where it is said that Socrates considered ἐγκράτεια the foundation of the virtues. (Cf. Ibd. iv. v. i, iv. v. 3-7, 11.)

καὶ τῶν σῶφρονον μὲν ἐγκρατῆς καὶ καρπερίκον The distinction between σωφροσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, and καρπεία, was not accurately maintained either by Xenophon or Plato; cf. Memorab. iv. v. 7, π. i. i, &c. Plato, Gorgias, p. 491 D: τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἄρχοντα λέγεις; οὐδὲν τοικλᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὄσπερ οἱ τολλοὶ, σῶφρονα δεῖ καὶ ἐγκράτης αὐτὸν ἑαυτῶ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐκθυμών ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Rep. p. 430 E: κόσμος ποῦ
The page contains a passage from ancient Greek, discussing philosophical concepts. It introduces an objection to the idea that the thoughtful man may be incontinent, and explores the nature of thought and its connection to incontinence. The text is part of a larger work, possibly a dialogue, and delves into themes of knowledge, temperance, and moral character.
thing, as Socrates thought, if knowledge were in a man, that anything else should master him and twist him about like a slave. Socrates, in short, was totally opposed to the idea, (arguing) as if incontinence did not exist at all, for he said no one with a conception of what was best could act differently from that best, but he could only so act through ignorance.' On this doctrine of Socrates, and on its connection with the rest of his ethical views, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 166. The omission of the article before Σωκράτης seems to show that the real man, and not the personage of Plato's dialogues, is referred to (see above, note on Eth. vi. xiii. 3), but yet the words of the passage before us have obvious reference to Plato's Protagoras, p. 352 B: διοι δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐπιστήμης τινῶν οὐκ ἠκούσαν υἱόν, όπερ ἢγερον οὐδὲ ἡγεμονίας οὐδ' ἀρχῇ εἶναι οὐδὲ όπερ ὑπὲρ τοιούτων αὐτῶν δοσών διανοοῦντα, ἀλλ' ἐνότης τόλλας ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμης, οἶ δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοῦ μὲν θυμόν, τοῦ δὲ ἱδονή, τοῦ δὲ λύπην, ἐκποίει δὲ ἔρωτα, τολλασίας δὲ φόβον, ἀτέχνων διανοοῦμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, διὸν ἐπερὶ ἄνθρωπον, περιλεξιόμενα υπὸ τῶν ἀλλων ἀπάντων.

διανείπνητο] This is repeated in strong terms by the author of the Magna Moralia, II. vi. 2: ἦκα τε καὶ πρεσβύτης ἄγρει διδόκει καὶ ὅπερ ἐκή ἐκείνης εἶναι, λόγον δὲ οὐδεὶς εἶναι τὰ καλά δὲ κακά ἐλιὰν ἔλεγεν ἄρα. Cf. Plato, Protag. p. 357 B: ἢ δὲ ἐξαμαρτωμένῃ πράξεις ἐνεργήσῃ ἐπιστήμης ὑπὸ του καὶ αὐτοῦ ὁμολογηθεί σαφῆνες, &c.

2 οὗτος μὲν οὖν—ϕανερόν] 'Now this reasoning is manifestly at variance with experience, and we require to ask with regard to the state, supposing it to arise from ignorance, what manner of ignorance it is that takes place, for it is plain that the person who acts incontinently does not at all events think (that he must so act) before he gets into the particular state.' Φανερώς here refers no doubt to the actual facts of life, and accordingly the rendering of the Paraphrast is οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκαίνες ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς. And yet there is probably some allusion also to the φανερόν mentioned above (I. 5); we may represent the double allusion of the word by translating it 'experience,' comparing with it also the use of τὰ ἡπάρχοντα, Eth. i. viii. 1.

οὖν ὁσείν γε] There seems to be an ellipsis of δείκνυσιν ἔρχεται. Cf. below, iii. 2: ὅ δὲ ὁσείν μὲν, δικαίον δέ. The writer argues that if incontinence be ignorance, it is a peculiar kind of ignorance, an ignorance that comes on (γινείναι), not a consistent ignorance; for the incontinent person does not think ignorantly, i.e. wrongly, before the time of temptation. On


5 πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι—ἀφετάτο] 'And besides, it has been previously demonstrated that the thoughtful man is emphatically (γε) one who acts, for his province is to deal with particulars, and he possesses also all the virtues.' πρὸς τοῖς, cf. Eth. vi. vii. 7, vii. viii. 8; τῶν ἐγχάτων is here the genitive of the object, as, in the place just quoted, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγχάτου ἐστιν (ἡ φρονήσις).

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχουν ἀρετάς] Cf. Eth. vi. xiii. 6; καὶ τὰς ἄλλας is equivalent to καὶ αὕτη πάσας. See the note on Eth. ii. 1. 4.

7 The rough and hasty conception of continence which would confound it with obstinacy is here refuted by showing that absurdities would follow from it. Continence would be sometimes an evil, and incontinence sometimes a good. From this point of view, the conduct of Neoptolemus (who first promised to deceive Philoctetes, and afterwards abandoned the design as unworthy) must be called incontinent and at the same time right. The
II.] HEIKON [EYDHMIWN] VII. 199

allusion is repeated below, c. ix. § 4. For the sake of observing more accurately the ‘noble incontinence’ of Neoptolemus, it is worth while to quote at length the passage referred to (Soph. Phil. 895-916).

N. πατα' ν τι δή ών δρφήν ἐγὼ τού-θενδε γε;
Φ. Τι δ' ἔστιν, καὶ παί; τοῦ τον' ἐξέβης λόγων;
N. οὐκ οὗτ' δέντο χρῆ τάπορον τρέπειν ἐτος.
Φ. ἀπορεῖς δὲ τοῦ σο; μή λέγῃ δ' τέκνον, τὰδε.
N. ἀλλ' ἐνθάδ' ἤδη τοῦδε τοῦ πάθους κυριάρχησε
Φ. οὐ δὴ σε δυσχέρεια τοῦ νοσήματος ἔπεισεν δοτε μή μ' ἐγείναν καύτην ἢ; Ν. διαφθοράς δυσχέρειας, τὴν αὐτοῦ φόβον ὅταν λυτῶς τις δράζῃ γα μὴ προσε-κτικά.
Φ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ φυτεύσατος ὅγεν δράζῃ οὐδὲ φωνεῖται, ἑσθολὼν ἄνδρ' ἕτοιμον.
N. αἰσχρὸς φαινομαί τούτ οὖν ἄνωβαι τάλαι.
Φ. οἰκοῦν ἐν οἷς γε δρασῖν ἐν οἷς δ' αἰδής ἕκατῳ.
N. ὁ Ζεῦ, τί δράσω; δεύτερον ληφθὼς κακός,
κράτισθαι β' καὶ μή δει καὶ λέγων
ἀσχολήτ' ἐτών;
Φ. ἀνήρ δ' εἶ, εἰ μή 'γεν κακός γνώμην
ἐκφέρει,
προδοτικός μ' ἑκεὶ κάκλεπτων τῶν
πλοῦτον στελεῖν.
N. λιτωμ' μὲν οὐκ ἔχωγε· λυπηρός δὲ μή
τέμπο σε μᾶλλον, τοῦτ' ἄνωβαι
τάλαι.
The great difficulty in the passage before us is caused by the word θεωδόμενος. This is explained either to be (1) an additional adjective to ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος, in which position it has an awkward appearance, or (2) to refer to the well-known puzzle of Eubulides the Megarian, which was called ὁ θεωδόμενος, and in logic books 'Mentiens' or 'the liar.' The puzzle was as follows: 'If a man says that he lies, does he lie or speak the truth?' to which course of simple answer can be given. He may lie, and yet speak the truth in saying that he lies; for if he lies in saying that he lies, then he speaks the truth. This was a specimen of the 'oristic' of the Megarians, which consisted to a great extent in drawing out the difficulties that beset the common forms of language. Chrysippus wrote six books on the puzzle of 'the Liar;' and Philetas of Cos is said to have died of vexation from failing to solve it. Hegel (Geschichte der Philos. II. 117) compares it to the squaring of the circle. But clearly this puzzle has nothing to do with the subject under discussion in the text. Indeed one might almost fancy that the word θεωδόμενος was an interpolation which had crept in owing to the occurrence of the words ἐκ τοῦ λυπεῖται θεωδόμενος in the line before. The acquaintance of the copyist with the fallacy 'Mentiens' might have tended to shroud the mistake. Evidently the words εὐμβαίνει δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων are an explanation of ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος, and the Paraphrast, seeing this, ignores the word θεωδόμενος altogether. Supposing, however, that it be allowed to stand, we must interpret it in a logical sense, not as if it had anything to do with the fallacy of Eubulides. The explanation of it is to be found in the Sophist. Elench. of Aristotle, iii. 1-2, where it is said that the aims of the Sophists and Eristics are five in number, θεγχως καὶ ψευδός καὶ παράδοξον καὶ σολευκμον (making one talk bad grammar), καὶ τέιμαν τὸ τοιχία ἀδολεχήσαι (making one repeat the same thing over and over)... μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ προμοσύνατα φαίνεται εὐλγχως, δειτερον δὲ θεωδόμενον τι δεικνύων, τρόγον εἰς παράδοξον ἐγχως, ἐ.τ.λ. In the above passage we see that the writer has brought together two of these separate terms, speaking of παράδοξον εὐλγχως. It is possible that he may also have qualified the 'sophistical reasoning' with another of these logical formulae. The above-mentioned fallacy is an instance of the Sophists' way of tampering with moral notions in order to be thought clever.

δεδεται ἡ διδωμα] Cf. Ar. Metaph. II. i. 2: λέει δ' οὖν ἔστων ἀγνοοῦτας τὸν δειμον' ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοας ἀκροια ἄγηλον τοῦτο πέρι τοῦ πράγματος' ἵ γὰρ ἀκροὶ ταῦτα παραπλησίων πέτωκεν τοὺς δεδεμονίους' ἀδίκων γὰρ ἀμφιέρω τοιούτου εἰς τὸ πρόθεσιν. i If we grant the premise that continence is sticking to an opinion of whatever kind, we cannot 'get loose' from the conclusion forced upon us by the Sophists.
οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαὶ πράττων καὶ διώ
κων τὰ ἱδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἄν δοξεῖν τοῦ μὴ
dιὰ λογομον ἀλλὰ δὲ ἀκρασίαν εὐπατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ
μεταπεισθῆναι ἢν. ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῆς παρομία ἐν ἃ
φαμέν "ἄταν τὸ ὑδρ πυγὴ, τί δὲι ἔπιπινεῖν," εἰ μὲν
γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο αὐτῷ πράττει, μεταπεισθεῖν ἄν ἐπαυχατο-
νὰ δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀλλὰ πράττει. ἔτι εἰ ἢν
περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς
ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἐξεῖ τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμέν
ὁ δὲ εἶναι τινὰς ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαύται τίνες 12
συμβαίνουσιν, τοίτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνέλειν δεῖ τὰ δὲ κατα-
λιπεῖν: ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὑρεῖς ἐστιν.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκέπτεσθαι τὸτεν εἰδότες ἡ οὗ, καὶ τῶν 3
εἰδότες, εἰτα περὶ ποίᾳ τῶν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τῶν ἐγκράτη θετέον,

οἱ ῥήματα, ἀλλὰ πράξει] 'Again he who on conviction and with full
purpose acts and pursues pleasure would seem to be in a better state
than he who does so not from reason-
ing, but from incontinence; for (the
former) is more curable, since there
is a possibility of changing his con-
victions, whereas the incontinent man
is open to the saying, "When water
chokes, what must one take to wash
it down?" Had he not been convinced
before with regard to his actions,
there might have been a hope of his
mind being enlightened and his ces-
ing so to act; but as it is, with all
the conviction in the world, he still
acts contrary to it." This is a reduc-

tio ad absurdum of the saying that in-
continence means never acting on
your conviction, and that continence
means sticking to your conviction.
If it were so, incontinence (ἀκολοχία)
would seem to be a sort of continence,
and, on the other hand, incontinence
would seem incurable. The reverse,
however, of all this is true. See
below ch. viii.

el μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο] Some MSS.
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omit μη, which is not to be wondered
at, as there is a transition of meaning
in the use of ἐπέπειστο: (1) the in-
temperate man is said to act τῷ πε-
πεισθαί, i.e. with a wrong conviction,
thinking bad to be good; (2) the in-
continent man acts ὁ τῷ πεπεισθαί,
not by reason of a conviction that
he ought to do so as he does; (3) the
incontinent man πεπεισθαί ὁ πράττει,
has a full conviction with regard to
what he does (i.e. that it is wrong),
but does not abide by that conviction.

12 al μὲν οὖν—ἐστιν] 'This then
is the kind of difficulties which arise;
part of them we must explain away
(ἀνελεῖν), while we leave part un-
answered, for resolving a difficulty is
finding something out.' Cf. Ar. Meta-

gyre. II. i. 2: ἄτι δὲ τοῖς εὐπαρχοῖ
βουλομένους προβροχὸν τὸ διαπεράσει
καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὅστερον εὐπαρχία λάτι
τῶν πρότερον ἀπαρχομένων ἄτι, λειαν
ἄν οὖν ἄνοιξαν τῶν δειμῶν.
See above, ch. i. 5, note.

III. This chapter discusses that
which is really the most important
and interesting question with regard
to incontinence and the whole nature of the moral will, namely, how is it possible to know the right and yet do the wrong? It treats of the third of the popular opinions mentioned above (ch. i. § 6), and the difficulties arising out of the same (ch. ii. §§ 1–4). The commencement of the chapter is rather confused, as it touches on, without discussing, the nature of the object-matter of continence and incontinence, &c. With § 3 the main question is opened, namely, the relation of knowledge to incontinence, and a preliminary step is taken by the assertion that it makes no difference whether it be right opinion or knowledge which the incontinent man possesses, since opinion may be held quite as strongly as knowledge.

In §§ 5–8 it is shown that the real point to be ascertained is, what is meant by knowing or having knowledge. A man may have knowledge which is in abeyance, either because he does not apply a minor premise to his general principle, or because he is under the influence of asleep, wine, madness, or the like.

9–14 A more intimate examination tells us that there may be two syllogisms in the mind, the one leading to continence and the other to incontinence. The former is not drawn out, but remains in want of a minor premis; the latter through the instincts of sense and desire becomes realised and is acted on. However, the former knowledge cannot be said to have been present in a complete form to the mind, and therefore Socrates was not wrong in denying that knowledge of the right could exist, and yet be overborne.

1–2 There is something awkward in the way in which the questions to be discussed in succeeding chapters are here propounded. The writer might have made it his ἄρχη τῆς σκέψεως to consider what is the exact point of difference between continence and incontinence, but as a matter of fact he has not done so. There is a want of art in the sudden announcement (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγετάς, κ.τ.λ.) of the distinction between intemperance and incontinence. The same want of art, proceeding from whatever cause, marks
the whole of these two sections, and the main business of the chapter only commences with section 3.

3-4. *περὶ μὲν ὁν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ κ.τ.λ.* Cf. above ch. ii. §§ 3-4. We must dismiss any idea that the phenomena of incontinence can be explained by saying that the incontinent man has only moral opinions, and that opinions are weak. 'Heracleitus shows' that opinions may be as strongly held as scientific certainties. Of course neither Aristotle nor his school would wish to do away with the distinction which Plato had established between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη. It is only as connected with the will, and as forming a ground for action, that opinion can be considered as strong as science.

*δηλοὶ δ' Ἡράκλειτος* Heracleitus had a reputation with the ancients for pride and dogmatism; cf. Diog. Laert. ix. i. 5: ἡκουσε τε οὖνδε φύο αὐτοῦ ἢδη διήθησαν καὶ μαθηύς πάντα παρ' ἑαυτόν. Ἡθ. ix. i. 1: μεγαλόφρων δὲ γέγονε παρ' ὑπαρχόντι, ὅσι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συγγράμματος αὐτοῦ ἐθνικὸν ἐν χρώματι στοιχείον πολυμαθείᾳ νόν σοι διδάσκει. 'Ἡσίοδος γὰρ ἐν ἑθνικῇ καὶ θεωρίᾳ, ἀπὸ τὴν ζευγαρίαν τε καὶ ἐν θαλάσσῃ, εἶναί γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σοφῶσι ἐπιστασάθην γνώ-

₉υ ὅτε ὁ ἐγκουσῆς πάντα διὰ πάντων.

5 ἂλλ' ἐτεὶ διψὸς—θεωρὸν] 'But since we use the term "knowing" in two senses, both to denote the man who possesses without applying, and the man who applies knowledge, there will be a difference between doing what is wrong, when you have the knowledge but do not attend to it, and doing the same when you have the knowledge and pay attention to it. The latter case seems strange, but not so if you act without attending.' This distinction between the possession and the application of knowledge, which is of the utmost importance for explaining moral weakness, was perhaps first started by Plato in the Thetétēs, pp. 197-198, where he introduces his famous image of the pigeon-house. Every knowledge once acquired by the mind is like a bird caught and placed in a pigeon-house; it is possessed, but not available, till it be chased within the enclosure and captured anew.

*μὴ θεωροῦντα] θεωρεῖν is used to express "direct observation," just as in Ἐθ. vi. iii. 2: ὅταν ἐξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται.
6 μὴ θεωρῶν. ἦτι ἐπὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἄμφοτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρά τὴν ἐπιστή-
μην, χρομένον μὲντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ 
μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἐκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ 
τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἐστοῦ τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ 
τοῦ πράγματος ἐστιν, οἷον ὃτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὃτι 
οὕτως ἀνθρώπους ἢ ὃτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον· ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ 
τοιοῦτον- 
δὲ, ἡ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τὲ δὴ τούτων διοίκει 
τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὡστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἴδειν 
7 μὴθὲν ἄτοπον, ἀλλος δὲθαυμαστόν. ἦτι τὸ ἐχεῖν 
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· σὲ τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρησταθαί 
δὲ διαφέ-
ρουσαν ὡς ὅμως τὴν ἔξων, ὡστε καὶ ἔχειν πῶς καὶ μὴ 
ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθευδοῦντα καὶ μανικέμονα καὶ οἰνωμένον, 
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· 
θυμοῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισιῶν καὶ ἔνα τῶν τοι-
οῦτων ἐπιθῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ

6 ἦτι ἐπὶ—θαυμαστόν] Ἀγαν

since the premises (in a syllogism) 

are of two modes, nothing hinders a 

man acting against knowledge, al-

though he possesses both these, if he 

apply only the universal premises, but 

not the particular, for it is particulars 

which are the objects of action. More-

over there is a distinction which may 

be made in the universal itself; part 

of it applies to the subject (ἐφ' ἐστιν), 

and part to the object (ἐπὶ τοῦ πρά-

γματος); for instance (you may have 

the universal) “dry things are good 

for all men,” and (the minor premise) 

“this is a man,” or “such and such 

is dry;” but (the farther knowledge) 

that “this object is such and such,” 

the person either has not or it is not 

realised. According then to these 

different modes of the premises there 

will be an immense difference (in the 

way one knows), so that there is 

nothing paradoxical in (the incontinent 

man) “knowing” in the way I have 

specified, but that he should know 

otherwise would be marvellous.” This 

section well points out the number of 

particular applications which have to 

be made before a general moral prin-

ciple can be realised and acted on. 

Else it remains in abeyance, and the 

man who possesses it may yet act 

against it.

7 ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν—οὕμων] Ἐν 

the case of having and not using we 

see that the having (ἡν ἔχω) becomes 

quite a different thing, so that in such 

cases a man has (knowledge) after a 

manner, and has it not, as for instance 

in sleep, in madness, and in drunken-

ness. ἔχω is used here simply as the 

active verbal noun of ἔχειν, as it is in a 
passage of Plato, already alluded to, 

which the writer possibly had before 

his mind, Theaetetus, p. 197 a: ἀλλ

—Τοιοῦτον ὅπερ δὸν ἔφη πάροικοι 

μημονεύον.—Ἐπιστήμην ποὺ ἔχω φασὶ 

αὐτὸ ἐστι.
3 τὸ δὲ λέγει — ἀκρατευμένους\[Now repeating the words which belong to knowledge is no sign, for those also who are in the states I have mentioned repeat demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who are beginning to learn string the words together without yet understanding them; for (to be understood) a thing must be assimilated, and for this time is required. So in short we must suppose that men in a state of incontinence speak just like actors.' This is an extremely subtle observation. The writer having said that passion is like sleep or madness, which make one know and yet not know at the same time, proceeds to remark that men acting incontinently will often speak as if they were fully aware of the nature of their acts. They will say at the very moment of yielding to temptation, 'I know I ought not to do this.' But such words are no sign that the knowledge is really felt and realised; they are only like the verses of Empedocles which a man might mutter in his sleep; they are like the repetition of a schoolboy's task; they are hollow like the ranting of an actor.

ἀδὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην\[That are caused by, are the results of, science.' Cf. Met. L. iv. 4: ἄλλα ὡς ἐπιστήμην ἀδὸ ἐπιστήμην, 'they do it not because of science;' and see below, ix. ix. 6.


9-11 ἐτι καὶ ὅσν—μαθηματικήν [Again in the following manner one might psychologically consider the cause. There is first a general belief, and secondly a particular belief, which is no longer under the domain of reason, but under that of sense. Now when out of these two a third is created, it is a necessity that the mind should on the one hand assert the conclusion, and in the sphere of practice should straightway carry it out. As, for instance, if (there be the general proposition) "one ought to taste all that is sweet," and the particular one "this thing is sweet," it is a necessity that he who is able, and is not hindered, should at once proceed to act upon the knowledge. When therefore there is in the mind one universal which forbids tasting, but another which says, "all that is sweet is pleasant" (having a minor),"this thing is sweet," and thus the second universal is realised,—and supposing that desire happen to be there; (in this case) the first universal says, "avoid this," but desire leads us on (to take it), from the power which it has of setting in motion every one of our organs. Thus the result is that one is incontinent under the sanction as it were of reason and belief, and a belief too which is opposed not directly but only acciden-
tally (to the true knowledge). For it is desire, and not the intellectual belief, which is opposed to the right law. And this consideration leads us to see why it is that brutes are not incontinent, namely, because they have no conception of universals, but only an image and a memory of particulars.'

This passage gives an admirable explanation of the way in which a man under temptation may ignore his moral principles. Action (as the writer implies) always depends on a syllogism in the mind, and, if a minor premise were applied to the right moral principle, wrong action could never take place. But it is equally true that the man who acts wrongly does so under some sort of shadow of reason. The story of the temptation of Eve is typical of all similar cases of yielding. There are always arguments and considerations on which the mind, self-deceived and blinded by desire, may form a syllogism. And as the writer observes, the misleading principle thus applied is not directly false or contrary to what is right. The saying 'sweet things are pleasant' is not in itself contrary to the principle 'intemperance is to be avoided.' Accidentally and in their effects the two propositions are brought into collision, though not originally opposed.

*φυσικῶς] Perhaps 'psychologically' is the most representative translation which we can give of this word in the present passage. Psychology, up to a certain extent, was considered as a branch of physics by Aristotle, see Vol. I. Essay V. p. 295, and cf. Eth. ix. ix. 7. *κύρια*] A circumlocution is necessary to express what was probably here meant by this word. Cf. Eth. vi. xi. 2. *ἐνθά μὲν* i.e. in the sphere of the reason, to which ἐν δὲ ταῖς παντρικαῖς is opposed. For the latter phrase we should have expected to find ταῖς παντρικαῖς, a formula which occurs Eth. vi. xi. 4. But in the Eudemian Ethics, ii. xi. 4, exactly the same usage is found: ὥστε γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὀπόθενες ἀρχαῖ, ἀθρωποὶ καὶ ταῖς παντρικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχῆς καὶ ὑπόθεσις. It is not easy to say what substantive is understood. Perhaps αἱ παντρικαῖ (or παντρικαὶ) ἐπιστήματι was the original phrase.

*ἀδίκησι—πράττειν ἐδόσι*] On the doctrine of the practical syllogism, see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 263–270. *τῶν μορίων* i.e. 'the parts of the body.' This is mixing up a physical explanation with the account of mental phenomena. The same thing is done
in the Peripatetic treatise De Motu Animalium; especially with the present passage 1b. viii. 5: διὰ τούτο δ' ἴματι ὡς εἰκὼν νοεῖ ὅτι τοῦτον καὶ παρεῖσται, ἐν μὴ τῇ ἠμοίωσι ἑτέρῳ. τῷ μὲν ἦλθεν ἀργιακὰ μέρη παρασκευαζέω ἐπιταχθεὶσα τὰ πάθη, ἢ δ' ἔρειξ τὰ πάθη, τῷ δ' ἔρειξ ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοσήματος ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως.

11 The mere intellectual knowledge that a thing is pleasant is not opposed to the moral law. It is only when this knowledge has become desire, i.e. part of the will, which implies acting, that an opposition is felt. Brutes act on desire, but their intellectual apprehension being entirely of particulars, there is a harmony between desire and the data of perception which prevents our attributing incontinence to brutes.—It might be said that there are dawns of the moral faculty, traces of a sense of right and wrong, in some animals, for instance, dogs; but the writer here does not enter upon this subject. On the meaning given by Aristotle to φαντασία, see note on Eth. III. v. 17.

12 'Now to explain how the oblivion (ἀγνοία) of the incontinent man is stopped, and how he comes again to the use of his knowledge, requires no special account peculiar to this condition, but the same account as is to be given about (the recovery of) the intoxicated man or the sleeper, for which we must inquire of the physiologists.' The most interesting relic of the speculations of the old physiologists upon the above question which has come down to us, is the account given by Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. vii. 129) of the opinion of Heraclitus, who thought that our rationality depended upon our communion through the senses with the universal reason that surrounds us; in sleep we become foolish because cut off from all communication with this, except through the act of breathing alone, but on awaking we are again replenished. Τούτων δὴ τῶν θεών λόγων καθ' Ὑπάκλειτος δ' ἀναπνεύσατε σπάσαστε νεοροι γνώμης, κατὰ δὲ ἐγκεραὶ πάλιν ἐμφρονεῖ. εἴ γὰρ τὸς ὑπάνθος μυστικῶν τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, χωρίεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περέχον συμφέρον, ὅ ἐν ὑμῖν νους, μόνῃ τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνεύσα τροφήσεως σωματικῆς, οὐσεῖ τοιοῦ μορίας· χωρισθεὶς ταῖς αἴτιοις τῶν πράτερ οἴκει μαμονωτίκη δύναμις. εἴ δὲ τρίτης ἐγκεραντὶ πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων, ὧσπερ διὰ τῶν θυρίων προκύψαι καὶ τῷ περέχοντι συμβάλλως λογικὴ ἐσώτερος δύναμις.
ἔντως ἔχει ὡς ὦκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὀσπερ ὁ ὁικώμενος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μὴ ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἐχατόν ὄρον. καὶ ἔσκεν ὦ ἐξήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπίστημης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' ἄπτη περίελκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μῆ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατευόσθαι, τοσάττα εἰρήσθω.

and being what determines action,—this is either not possessed by a man in the condition we have been describing, or he possesses it in a way in which, as we said (ὡς οὐκ ἦν), possession is not knowledge, but is only a form of words, like the drunken man spouting Empedocles. And since the minor term is not universal and has not the same scientific character as the universal, the question raised by Socrates seems really (καὶ) to be substantiated. For it is not knowledge properly so called that is present when the condition arises, nor is it this which is twisted about by the condition of mind that comes on,—but only perceptual knowledge.' This section winds up the discussion of the compatibility of knowledge with incontinence. The first sentence is clear enough, but there is some little obscurity in the saying that perceptual knowledge is present in incontinence, and is overborne by passion. What is meant apparently is, that passion prevents that perception which would cause the moral principle existing in the mind to be realised. Hence, in short, there is a moral oblivion, and it is quite true that Socrates was justified in saying that incontinence could not take place if knowledge of the right were really present to the consciousness of the actor.

καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου] Lambinus, followed by Fritzschel, places a full stop before these words, and connects them with καὶ ἔσκεν ἡ Σωκράτης. This punctuation has been adopted in the above translation as making far better sense. It must be confessed, however, that the Paraphrast favours the punctuation of Bekker. The occurrence of καὶ before ἔσκεν would naturally lead to a full stop being placed after ὄρον, but καὶ is rather to be explained as giving emphasis to ἔσκεν συμβαίνει; cf. ch. x. 2: διὸ καὶ δοκοῦν ἔσκοροι κ.τ.λ. Εἰκ. III. viii. 6: ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Ιδ. § 10, ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Ομήρος.

ἡ τελευταλα πρότασις] This phrase is equivalent to ἡ ἐτέρα πρότασις, Εἰκ. vi. xi. 4. The minor premises is so called as containing the ἐχατόν ὄρον, or minor term, which is mentioned shortly after.

ὡς οὐκ ἦν] With this use of the past tense, cf. Εἰκ. v. vi. 9: κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, 'for this is, as we have said, according to law.'

δ ἐξῆτει] This is sometimes translated 'what Socrates meant,' for which the Greek would have been δ ἐφελε or ἐμούλεο λέγειν. δ ἐξῆτει must mean 'the questionings' or 'doubts' of Socrates, i.e. as to the possibility of acting against knowledge. Cf. Εἰκ. i. iv. 5: ἐδόρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐπέρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξῆτε.

ἡς αἰσθητικὴ] The phrase αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη would to some philosophers
be a contradiction in terms, as they would hold that sensible things cannot be known. A doctrine was attributed to Speusippus, of which we may be here reminded, viz. that besides science there is 'scientific perception.' Cf. Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. vii. 145: Ἐνεδίοντος δὲ, ἐπεὶ τῶν προγάμων τὰ μὲν ἀληθὴτα δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ ἀληθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν ἀληθὴν, ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ ἀληθῆν ὑπελήφη καθεστῶν τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τὴν κατὰ τῶν λόγων ἀληθέαν.

IV. This chapter discusses the question mooted above (ch. i. § 7, ch. ii. § 11), as to whether incontinence is an absolute term, having a definite object-matter, or is merely relative. The answer is very simple. Pleasure is divided into necessary and desirable (§ 2), or into good, bad, and indifferent (§ 5). Incontinence, in an absolute sense, applies only to the necessary or bodily pleasures. It has then the same range of objects as were before assigned to Temperance and Intemperance, and differs from Intemperance chiefly in that it goes against the reason and the will, instead of carrying them on its side. Having thus laid down a definite notion of Incontinence as something absolute and positive, it is easy to see that the idea and the term may be applied in a sort of analogous sense to mean an ill-control of the desires for other kinds of pleasures also, beside the bodily pleasures, e.g. wealth or honour. In such applications we must recollect that the use of the word Incontinence is metaphorical.

2 perì ᾣ τὴν ἀκολοείαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην] Cf. Eth. Eud. iii. ii. 5: Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὗ σωφρόνων εστὶ περὶ ἱσόντα, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἀπόφημας τών αὐτῶν εἰσάγεται. Δὲ δὲ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνας. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας ὡδὲ περὶ ἄστασα τὰ ἱθία ὁ σωφρόνων εστὶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δὲτρεῖ περὶ δύο τῶν ἀληθητῶν, περὶ τοῦ γενετοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀπτῶν, τῇ δ’ ἀληθεία περὶ τὸ ἀπτῶν, κ.τ.λ.] This is of course taken from Eth. Nic. iii. x. 3–8.

τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἤρα Here commences the apodosis to ἐπεὶ δὲ εστὶ, which is a complicated sentence with two parentheticals (λέγω δὲ τὰ τουατα—σωφροσύνην) and (λέγω δ’ οὖν—ἡδεῖν).

τοῦ μὲν—ἐγερος ὅριοι Those then who with regard to these latter objects
(i.e. good pleasures) transgress that right law which they have within themselves, we do not call simply "incontinent," but we add a qualifying term (prostatheies) and speak of them as incontinent of wealth, gain, honour, rage,—not as absolutely incontinent, because they are different from this and are only called incontinent by analogy, as in the phrase "Man that has been victor at Olympia;" there the general conception (of man) suffered but little from the special conception of the individual in question, and yet still it was different. The meaning of this passage is clear, not so however, that of the illustration which closes it. It is plain that the word ἀκατῆς when spoken of in relation to anger, money, &c., has a somewhat different sense from the unqualified term ἀκατῆς, which implies a certain moral weakness with regard to bodily indulgence. But what is meant by saying that ἀουρωτός ὁ τὰ Ὀλυμπιακὰ πεντάκακος is different from the general conception Man? There appear to be only two explanations possible: (1) that supported by the Scholiast on this place and also the Scholiast on Eth. v. 1,—by Alexander Aphrod. ad Topica i. xvi., by Suidas, and by Eustathius on Niad, λ. p. 847: namely, that there was a certain Olympionides whose name was Ἀουρωτός. It might be said that this name Ἀουρωτός was not more distinct from the general term 'Man,' than the term ἀκατῆς in the phrase ἀκατῆς θυμῶι is from the general conception of incontinence. The historical tenses διέφερον and ἔστερ ς are in favour of this interpretation. (2) It might be argued that these very tenses had given rise to a conjectural fiction about a person called "Ἀουρωτός. The Paraphrast takes no notice of the tradition, and treats the illustration as a logical one, which would come merely to this, 'the conception of an individual implies a certain diversity from the conception of the genus.' If this be accepted, the past tenses of the verbs must be understood to mean a reference to some previous logical discourse with which the school was familiar. In short, the passage must be considered to bear traces of being a scrap from some oral lecture—a hypothesis not to be entirely set aside with regard to parts of the Ethics of Aristotle.
IV.

**ΘΗΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΩΝ] VII.**

παρὰ τὴν προάρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατῆς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ἀλλ’ καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ 4 ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ’ οὐδεμιᾶν. καὶ διὰ τούτ’ εἰς ταύτον τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σῴφρονα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνων οὔδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς πὼς ἱδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἔναι· οἱ δ’ εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταύτα, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἐστὶν τοῖς, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ’ οὐ προαιροῦνται, διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἢ ἐπομενει, ὡστες μὴ ἐπιθυμών ἢ ἡρέμα διάκει τὸς ὑπερβολᾶς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τούτων ῥήσει διά τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἦν ἐκείνος ποιήσειν εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανίκη καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναί τις ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας; ἐπεί δὲ 5 τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἱδονῶν οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σκοπαμών· τῶν γὰρ ἱδέων ἐνα φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ δειλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρυσάνθε καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἀπαντά δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα καὶ τὰ μεταξύ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλ’ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλλειν.

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3 κατὰ πρόσθεσιν] See note on Ἐἰλ. π. iii. 5.

καθάπερ ὀργῆς] Frîtsche quotes Thucyd. iii. 84: ἢ ἀνθρωπεῖα φύσει—ἀκρατῆς οὖν ὀργῆς οὐδαμά πρεπεῖσθαι δὲ τῳ δικαίῳ.

4 ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐκείνων οὔδένα] i.e. not one of those mentioned in § 2, who are immoderate in giving way to a fondness for riches, honour, ὡς.

διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον κ.τ.λ.] It is more intemperate to pursue luxury, ὡς, in cold blood, than to do so under the influence of passion. It shows that luxury has become more a part of the mind itself.

5–6 The remainder of this chapter is little more than a repetition of what has gone before. Indulgence in the good pleasures is no harm, except it be to excess; even excess in them is rather folly than vice, and is not to be called by the name of incontinence, except as a sort of metaphor. ἐπεί δὲ—ὑπερβάλλειν] 'Now since some desires and pleasures are in their kind beautiful and good—according to our former division of pleasures into the naturally desirable, the naturally detestable, and the intermediate—as, for instance, wealth, gain, victory, and honour (are good); with regard them to all such, and the intermediate pleasures, men are not blamed for feeling, desiring, and loving them, but for some sort of excess in them.' The present division of pleasures can hardly be said to have been made 'before,' though it can be harmonised with that given above in § 2. The φύσει αἰρετά (of which wealth and honour are specimens) answer to the αἰρετά μὲν καθ’ αὐτά ἔχουσα δ’ ὑπερβάλειν; while τὰ μεταξὺ
διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἡ κρατοῦνται ἡ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμῆς μάλλον ἡ
dei σπουδάζοντες ὅ περι τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα
tῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπινοοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλ' ὁμοιός ἦστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἰ τις ὀσπερ
ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἡ ὀσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ
φιλοπάτωρ ἑπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λιὰν γὰρ
ἐδόκει μιαράινεν. μοχθηρίᾳ μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ
ἔστι διὰ τὸ ἑιρμένον, διτὶ φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἐκαστὸν ἔστι
d' αὐτῷ· φαύλα δὲ καὶ φευκτὰ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ.

οἱ όμοιως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστὶν. δι' ύμοιοτητὰ δὲ τοῦ πάθους
προσπειτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἐκαστὸν λέγουσιν, οἷον
κακὸν ἀστρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκρίτην, ὅν ἀπλώς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι
cακον· ὀσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι
ἐκαστὴν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον όμοιοι, σάθω δὴ
ὅτι κακεὶ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἑγκράτειαν εἶναι
ἡτε ἔστι περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολογίᾳ,
περὶ δὲ θυμὸν καθ' ὀμοιοτητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες
ἀκρατὴ θυμοῦ ὀσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

5 'Επεὶ δ' ἐστίν ἐνα μὲν ἥδεα φύσει, καὶ τοῦτων τὰ μὲν

here correspond with the ‘necessary or bodily pleasures’ of the former
passage. The writer has here intro-
duced a mention of pleasures ‘natur-
ally detestable,’ by which must be
meant the bestial pleasures which are
discussed in the following chapter.
The formula τὰ δ' ἐναρτία, τὰ δὲ μεταξάθι
is used by Eudemus in Eth. Enk. ii. x.
24: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ
dιαστροφὴ οὐκ εἰς τὰ τιχῶν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ
ἐναρτία καὶ τὰ μεταξάθια. Later in the
present book (ch. xiv. § 2) there is a
mention made of pleasures which are
not only good in themselves, but do
not admit of excess.

Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ] Of this per-
sonage nothing is known. The story
given by the Scholiast is, as Fritzache
observes, not worth repeating.

μοχθηρίᾳ μὲν οὖν] This is an ana-
colonth. The sentence ought to
form an apodosis and supply a verb
to διὸ δοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. We therefore
require μοχθηρεῖ μὲν οὐκ εἰς εἰς, &c.

6 δ' ὀμοιοτητὰ δὲ] The writer seems
here to make a mistake about the
history of the word ἀκρατῆς, just as
before (Eth. v. x. 1) about the history
of the word ἑιρμένη. Ἀκρατῆς in a
limited and special sense, to denote
want of control over a particular set
of desires, is certainly later than the
general use of the word, as in the
phrase ἀκρατῆς ὑργῆς, &c. Hence
the latter is not to be regarded
(historically) as a metaphorical ex-
tension of the former.

V. This chapter discusses those
ἀπλῶς τά δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζώων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τά δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τά μὲν δία πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δὲ ἔθη γίνεται, τά δὲ διὰ μοχθηρᾶς φύσεις, ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐκαστὰ παραπλησία ἰδεῖν ἐξεῖς. λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις, οἷον 2 τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἂν λέγουσι τὰς κυνούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ παῦδα κατεσθίειν, ὡς οἷος χαίρειν φανεῖν εἴνισ τῶν ἀνθρωμένων περὶ τῶν Πόντων, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοίς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῦδα δανείζειν ἄλληλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ὡς τὸ περὶ Φάλαρν λεγόμενον. αὕται μὲν θη-3 ριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ τὰ νόσους γίνονται καὶ μανίας εἴνισ,

kinds of incontinence which are something more than incontinence, being morbid or bestial. Certain pleasures are specified which imply a depravity either of nature or habits. A sort of classification of these is suggested, but the whole style of the chapter is careless and inaccurate.

1 ἐκαθ᾽ ἐξεῖς  ‘Now while some things are natural pleasures, either absolutely so, or relatively to the different races of animals and men, other pleasures are not natural, but depend on physical defects or habits or depravity of the nature; and we may see moral conditions corresponding to each of these latter kinds.’ The apodosis to ἐκαθ᾽ ἐξεῖς καὶ περὶ τούτων. The things which are ‘pleasures absolutely’ are for instance life and consciousness; while it depends on the constitution of the race whether it be pleasant to live on land or water, &c. In this passage φώσει is used in two senses, (1) φώσει = in accordance with the entire constitution of things, not only what is, but what ought to be. (This corresponds with head V. in the note on Eth. Il. 1. 3.) (2) φώσει means individual natures, not as they ought to be, but as they are. (See the same note, head IV.)

2 τὰς θηριώδεις i.e. ἐξεῖς. τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἢ. The female.' The word ἀνθρώπως (in the feminine) was applied contemptuously, as, for instance, to female slaves. Here it denotes the monstrous nature of the person in question, who was not to be called ‘a woman.’ Perhaps for the same reason it was applied by Herodotus to the gigantic Phye. Book I. ch. 60: καὶ ἐν τῷ δοσεὶ παιδέμενοι τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν θεὸν προσεύχομαι τε τὴν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἑκάστου τὸν Πεισίστρατον. Cf. Mag. Mor. I. xv. 2: Οἷς φασί ποτὲ τινα γυναῖκα φίλτρων τινι δούναι πεῖν εἰτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ φίλτρου, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἄπορφω. τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῦδα δανείζειν ἄλληλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν ἢ. And others (they say) lend their children to each other (in turn) to be served up as a banquet.’ Cf. 2 Kings vi. 26–29, where the same horrible arrangement is said to have been made under the compulsion of famine. The shores of the Black Sea seem to have had a character for cannibalism. Cf. Ar. Pol. viii. iv. 3: πολλὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν ἢ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχέρωτοι ἔχειν, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοῖ τε καὶ Ἡλιοχόος. τὸ περὶ Φάλαρν λεγόμενον Some story now lost, which is apparently referred to again in §7. 3 αἱ δὲ διὰ τὰ νόσους—αἱ δὲ νοση-
διδασκαλίαν τῶν ἀλματικῶν, καὶ ἄλλων ἀλάματα ἐπὶ ἐκεῖ. ἔγραψεν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπον πάντας ἐπιστάσθηκεν, ἀδικοῦσαν καὶ τὸν παρθένον ἀδικεῖσθαι, τὸν ἀθάνατον ἀδικεῖσθαι, τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἀδικεῖσθαι. Καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀλματικῶν ἀλάματα ἐπὶ πάντας ἐπιστάσθηκεν, ἀδικοῦσαν καὶ τὸν παρθένον ἀδικεῖσθαι, τὸν παρθένον ἀδικεῖσθαι, τὸν παρθένον ἀδικεῖσθαι.
V.—VI.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VII. 215

dε τὴν γαλήνην ἐδείει διὰ νόσου· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ
φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῷ αἰσθήσει ζώντες θηριώδεις,
όποτε ἔστα γένε τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους,
οῖον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἡ μανίας νοσημάτωδες, τούτων 7
δ’ ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινά ἐνοτε μόνον, ἡ κρατεῖσθαι δὲ, λέγω
δὲ αὐτοῖς εἰ Φαλάρις κατέιχεν ἐπιθυμημάτων τακτὸν φαγεῖν ἡ
πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτομον ὄνομα· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι,
μὴ μόνον ἔχειν. ὃσπερ οὖν καὶ μοιχηρία ἢ μὲν κατ’ 8
ἀνθρωπον ἀπλῶς λέγεται μοιχηρία, ἡ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεναι,
ὅτι θηριώδης ἡ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ’ οὖ, τὸν αὐτοῦ
τρόπον δὴν ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν θηριώδης ἡ δὲ
νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ’ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν
μόνη. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἑγκράτεια ἐστὶ μόνον
περὶ ἀτερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ 9
ἀλλὰ ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἴδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μετα-
φορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δηλον.

"Ὅτι δε καὶ ἤτον ἁισχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἡ ἢ 6
τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεορήσωμεν. ἐσκε γὰρ ὁ θύμος ἀκούει
μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούει δὲ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν
dιακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκούσαι πάν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν,
εἰτὰ ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν
σκέψασθαι εἰ πιλος, ἀν μόνον ψοφίσῃ, ἀλατοσχευ-
ωτός ὁ θύμος διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχύτητα τῆς ψυχῆς
ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ’ ἀκούσας, ὀρμᾶ πρὸς τὴν

effects of an ill-regulated life, the distinc-
tions of right and wrong are no longer applicable. Cf. ch. vii. 7.
7 el Phalaris katêixe] 'Had Phalaris refrained.' With this use of
katêixe, cf. Aristoph. Peace, 944, where it is applied to a wind lulling :

ἐκείγετε νῦν ἐν δωρ
σοβαρᾷ θεόθεν κατέχει
τολέμου μετάτροπον αἴρα.
And Soph. Ἐδ. Rec. 782 :

κάδῳ βαρβαρίς τὴν μὲν ὄσον ἱμέραν
μόλις κατέχει.

VI. It having been repeatedly laid
down that there are some kinds of
incontinence not simply to be called
so without a qualification, there now
follows a comparison of some of these
kinds, from a moral point of view,
with incontinence proper. Inconti-
nence of anger is not so bad as incon-
tinence of lust, (1) because there is
more semblance of reason in anger;
(2) because anger is more a matter
of constitution; (3) it admits of less
deliberate purpose; (4) because anger
is exercised under a sort of pain, and
not in wantonness. As to the rest,
incontinence which exceeds the pale
of human weakness is more horrible,
but at the same time is rarer and
less mischievous, than vice.
timorían. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἡ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὅβρις ἡ ὀλγυρία ἔδηλοσεν, ὁ δὲ ὀστερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπάνει δὴ εὐθὺς· ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία, εάν μόνον ἐπὶ ὑδό τῷ λόγῳ ἡ ἡ ἀσθένεια, ὀρμᾶ πρὸς τὴν ἀτόλωσιν. ὅσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ τὼς, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὖ. αἰσχύνοι οὖν, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς τοῦ λόγου τὼς ἠττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου. ἐτὶ ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν

1 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος—οὖ] 'For first (μὲν) reason or fancy tells that there is insult or slight, and then (anger) drawing a sort of conclusion, "I must fight with such and such," forthwith rages accordingly. But desire, if reason or sense merely assert that a thing is pleasant, rushes to the enjoyment of it; so that anger in a way follows reason, but desire does not.' Φαντασία here seems nearly to correspond to our word 'fancy,' which has of course grown out of the Greek term, though it has come to imply widely different associations. We are told in Ar. De An. iii. 15 that φαντασία may be mistaken. See the note on Eth. iii. v. 17.

The present passage might seem discrepant from ch. iii. § 10, ὅστε συμβαίνειν ὅτῳ λόγῳ πῶς καὶ δόξῃ ἀκρατεύωσαι, where incontinence is said to have some sort of reasoning in what it does. And if the comparison were exactly carried out, it would probably appear that incontinent anger had no more reason in it than incontinent desire. But it is true that anger is fundamentally based on an idea of justice, however wild that idea may be. Hence there is a peculiar force in συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δὲ. And hence, too, anger is a less immediately selfish passion than desire. It is less debasing in the long run to the character. On anger, cf. Eth. v. viii. 10: ὁδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἡ μὴ ἀκρατεύωσαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἐκτὶ φαντασία γὰρ ἀδικία ἡ ἄργη ἐστιν; and Ar. Eth. ii. ii. 1: 'Εστώ δὴ ἄργη δρεῖς μετὰ λόγους φαντασίας φαντασίως δὴ φαντασίως διλογορραί. The illustrations in the text comparing anger to an over-hasty servant who runs off before he has heard half the message, or to a dog who barks without waiting to see who it is, are most admirable.

2 The next plea urged in favour of anger is that it is more natural (or, we might say, constitutional) than desire: in support of which two humorous stories are told in the text (see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 217). The argument appears somewhat contradictory to Eth. ii. iii. 10: ὅτι δὲ ἀκρατοτερῶν ἡδή μάχουσαι ἢ θυμοῖ, καθ' αὐτοτ ἀκρατοτερῶν ἡδή ἐπικρατεῖται. However, when we look closely at the text, we find that it is 'excessive and unnecessary desire' with which anger is here compared (τῶν ἐπιθυμίων τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀσκητῶν). This no doubt makes the above assertion true, but it gives a new conception of incontinence as compared with the mention of ἀσκητεία ἡδή, c. iv. § 2. It sets incontinence too much in the light of θρησκεία. But indeed the vagueness of the term ἀσκησις, and the uncertainty as to what it exactly implies, must be felt throughout the present discussions.

With regard to anger, it is true that hot temper is frequently consti-
tutional. It appears more difficult to
tame down and eradicate, even with
the help of time, than other passions.
The Stoics gave peculiar attention to
its control.

3 ἐν διάκωτέροι—κακία ποιή ΐAgain
there is more wrong where there is
more craft. The angry man and
anger are not crafty, but open; while
lust is crafty, as they say Aphrodite is,

"The wily Cyprian goddess."

And Homer sings of her embroidered
girdle (that on it is wrought)

"Allurement which can steal the wise
man's sense."

So that if this kind of incontinence is
more wrongful than incontinence of
anger, it is also worse, and thus
deserves to be called by the simple
name "incontinence," and amounts to
a sort of vice."

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While he who wants is acts with pleasure.

There seems to be a double meaning in this passage to the word ἱδιους, exactly as there might be to our word 'wantonness.' It first means 'to act insolently' or 'wanton only' in a general sense, and secondly, it means to 'act wantonly' in a particular sense, i.e. lasciviously.

6 autōn de toūtw tās diaphorās λητητεων i.e. the difference between continence and incontinence, which with other things is treated of in the next chapter. There is a want of method about the sequence of different parts in this book. The reference which follows, ὡσπερ εἰρηται κατ' ἀρχάς only goes back to ch. v. 1, and gives colour to a suspicion that the book may have been put together out of separate pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of which may have commenced with the fifth chapter.

Hence we do not call brutes either temperate or intemperate, except by a metaphor, and where it happens that one whole race of animals in comparison with another is remarkable for wantonness it may be (τίς), or lechery, or voracity; for (animals) have no purpose or reason, but are beside themselves like madmen. Different races of animals have good or bad moral characteristics ascribed to them. The goat, the ass, and the monkey have a bad reputation for wantonness, and the shark, &c., for voracity. It is not quite clear what is meant by εξετάζει τής φύσεως. Perhaps it may best be taken to imply not that animals transgress their own nature, but simply that they get into a state of ecstasy, like madmen, and have no senses nor any principle which would justify their being called either temperate or intemperate.

7 ἐξαττον δὲ—ἡριω [Now brutality is a less evil than vice, though it is more fearful, for in it the good principle is not corrupted, as in a man, but does not exist. Therefore (comparing
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φθαρταί τὸ βελτιστον, δόσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὃμοιον οὖν δόσπερ ἁψυχον συμβάλλει πρὸς ἁψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀνεκετέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότητι αἰεὶ τοῦ μῆ ξενοτος ἄρχην, ὦ δὲ νοῦς ἄρχη. παραπλησιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἀνθρώπον ἁδικιν.· ἐστι γὰρ ὡς ἐκάντερον κάκιον· μιμοπλάσια γὰρ ὑπὲρ κακὰ τούτων ἀνθρώπων κακοὶ θηρίων.

Περὶ δὲ ταύς δὲ ἁρῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἱδωνας καὶ λύπας καὶ 7 ἐπιθυμιας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ δὲ ἦ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἐστι μὲν οὖτως ἔχειν ὡστε ἅττασθαι καὶ διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἐστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὕπερ οἱ πολλοὶ ἡττους· τούτων δὲ μὲν περὶ ἱδωνας ἀκρατις ὦ δ' ἡγκρατίας, ὦ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὦ δ' καρτεροκός. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἐξις, κἂν εἰ ῥετος μᾶλλον

brutality with vice) is like comparing what is inanimate with a living thing, and asking which is worse. Evil is always less harmful when it has no guiding principle, and reason is the guiding principle. So it is just like comparing injustice with an unjust man; each is in a different sense worse. A bad man will do ten thousandfold more evil than a beast.'

ἐχεὶ] so. το θηρίον. The whole passage is briefly expressed, but perhaps requires no further comment.

VII. This chapter, after a general comparison between intemperance and incontinence (§ 1–3), makes some remarks on endurance, softness, and childhoodness (§ 4–7); and ends by distinguishing two kinds of incontinence, of which the one proceeds from impetuosity, the other from weakness of character.


ἕτερ—χελισον] 'It is possible to be in such a state as to yield to things that most men are superior to, and again it is possible to overcome things that most men yield to. Of those who possess these opposite dispositions with regard to pleasures, the first is an incontinent man, and the second a continent man; with regard to pains, the first is soft and the second enduring. But the state of the majority of mankind lies between these opposites, albeit men verge rather to the side of the worse.' Moral designations may be fixed either in relation to the standard of what is, or of what ought to be. Cf. Eth. III. xi. 4: τῶν γὰρ φιλοσοφών λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαλέων ἢ μὴ δει, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. Eth. iv. iv. 4: ἐπέκεισε μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ, φέγγονε δ' ἐπὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δει. The above passage fixes the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent' relatively to what is, as implying more or less continence than people in general have. And yet there is evidently some reference beside to the standard of what ought to be, else it could not be said that people in general verge rather to the worse side. To represent the majority of mankind as possessing a mediocre moral character, neither eminently
good nor bad, but inclining to weakness, was in accordance with the Greek point of view. Widely different from this was what may be called the Semitic point of view, which, regarding man with greater religious earnestness, attributed to him "desperate wickedness." The latter feeling was not confined to the Jews and to the pages of the Bible, but in some degree made itself known to the world in the Stoical philosophy. See Essay VI. p. 357, &c.

2 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐναι τῶν ἴδιων ἀναγκαίαι εἰσὶν αἱ δ' οὖν καὶ μέχρι τιμῶς, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαι οὖν, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διόκων τῶν ἴδιων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δὲ ἑτερὸν ἀποβαίνον, ἀκόλουσον· ἄναγκη γὰρ τούτων μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικῶν, ὥστε ἄνισον· ὃ γὰρ ἀμεταμελητὸς ἄνισος. ὃ δ' ἐλλείπουν ὃ ἀντικείμενος, ὃ δὲ μέσος σώφρον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δὲ ὑπάνει ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρεσιν. τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρομένων ὁ μὲν ἀγεταὶ διὰ τὴν ἴδιον, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμ,
mías, ὥστε διαφέρονσιν ἄλληλοιν. πατὴ δ' ἂν δόξεις χεὶ-
ρον εἶναι, εἰ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἥρεμα πράττοι τι ἀσχρόν,
ἡ εἰ σφιδρὰ ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὄργυξάμενος τύπτοι ἡ
 eius ὄργυξάμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἔποιει ἐν τὰθεί ὑν; διὸ ὁ ἀκό-
λαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατῶς. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν
μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ 4
μὲν ἀκρατεῖ τὸ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακό τὸ καρτερικός· τῷ
μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ὁ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν
τῷ καρτείν, ἑτερον δὲ τῷ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατείν, ὅσπερ καὶ
τὸ μὴ ἡπτάσθαι τοῦ νικῶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετῶτερον ἐγκρά-
τεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐκλείπειν πρὸς δ' οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ 5
ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὐτὸς μαλακός καὶ τρυφών· καὶ
γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τῆς ἐστίν· διὸ ἔλκει τὸ ἰμάτιον, ἵνα
μὴ πονηρή τὴν ἂπο τοῦ οἵρειν λύπην, καὶ μμοῦμενος τὸν
κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιοις εἶναι, ἄθλιρ δόμιοις ὑν. ὁμοίως 6

3 ὡστε διαφέρονσιν ἄλληλοιν] 'So that they are distinct from one
another,' i.e. on the one hand the
reprobate (ἀκόλαστος), in his two
forms of systematically seeking plea-
sure, and of systematically avoiding
pain; and, on the other hand, the
morally weak, whether in the form
of yielding to the allurements of plea-
sure (ἐκρατής), or flying from the
pressure of pain (μαλακός). The compari-
on is not between the two forms of the
μὴ προαιρομένοι, but these are
together contrasted with ἀκολασία.

πατὴ δ' ἂν δόξεις] A repetition of
ch. iv. § 4, on which see note.

τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας
εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος] The
temptation is great to refer τῶν δὲ
λεχθέντων to τῶν μὴ προαιρομένων,
and to read ἐκρατής for ἀκόλαστος,
taking the sentence in connection with
what follows. But when we consider
(1) the unanimity of MSS. ; (2) that
μαλακία has been already distinguished
from ἀκορασία, in § 1 ; (3) the import of
μᾶλλον (cf. Еκδ. vii. viii. 9, σαῦ
μᾶλλον αὐθεντής ἡ φρόνησις, ἔκκλησις δ'
ἄλλο εἶδος), we shall be led to see that
the sentence comes in, though rather
in a disjointed way, to wind up the
comparison here made generally be-
tween incontinence and intemperance
(cf. ch. vi. § 5, and above, § 1). In-
continence may be said to be more
like a kind of softness, while deter-
minate vice is something different.

Мαλακία, according to this interpa-
tation, is used here in a general sense,
in the next section with a special and
limited import.

4 Continence, it is argued, is finer
than endurance, just as victory is
finer than holding out. This argu-
ment is not sound, since continence
is in reality nothing more than hold-
ing out against temptation. To noble
natures continence would doubtless
cause a greater struggle than mere
endurance of pains, and in this sense
it might be called finer.

5 δ' ἐκλείπειν—δόμιοι ὑν] 'Now
he who faints before things against
which most men hold out and are
strong, he is soft and luxurious (for
luxury, it may be added, is a kind
of softness), he, for instance, who trails his cloak rather than have the trouble of lifting it, and who imitates the languor of an invalid, without seeing that it is miserable to be like one who is miserable. This passage is somewhat in the style of the Characters of Theophrastus. To illustrate the affection of weakness described above, Coret quotes from Athenaeus a story of the Sybarites, one of whom said that he had been in the fields, and that 'to see the men digging had given him a rupture.' To which his friend replied, that 'the very mention of it gave him a pain in his side.'


Καρκίνος. Of this tragic poet nothing appears to be known.

Ζευσφάντης. Giphanius finds in Seneca, De Ira, ii. 2, a mention of Xenophon as a musician of Alexander the Great.

ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσα ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος] Aesopius for Skutus reads Perus. But the commentators refer us to Herodotus L. 105: τοὺς δὲ τῶν Σκυθῶν συλλέγει τὸ ἱερὸ τὸ ἐν Ἀσκάλων καὶ τοὺς τοῦτον ἀπὸ ἐκείνου ἑκάστην ἦθος θήλεως νοῦν διὰ τοῦτο σφεατοῖς. Hippocrates gives a description of this malady, which appears to have been a kind of impotence (De Aer. Aqu. et Loc. vi. 108): εὐθυγιαί γίνονται καὶ γυναικῶν ἐργάζονται καὶ ὠραίας διαλέγονται τῇ ὁμοίᾳ, καλείναι τὲ οἱ κυμοτὸς ἀναιρεῖται. 'This impotency Hippocrates ascribes to venescation, but he mentions that the natives believed it to be a judgment from the gods. It is said that traces of the disease are still found among the inhabitants of Southern Russia.'—See Rawlinson's Herodotus, Vol. I. p. 248.

καί ὃς τὸ βθλὺν] Cf. ch. v. § 4. 8 ἄρσης δὲ—φαντασίας] 'Now incontinence is sometimes impetuosity
Πάθος, οἶ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύομαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. ἔνιοι γὰρ, ὅσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαιθόμενοι καὶ προηθόντες καὶ προεγείραντες έαυτούς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐκ ἥττονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὕτως ἀν ἂν οὐ σώματι ἄν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ οξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προετοὶ ἀκραίαν εἰς ἄκρατες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχύτητα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθήσαντι εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

and sometimes weakness. Some men when they have deliberated, do not abide by their deliberations, owing to the state into which they are thrown, (and this is weakness): while others, from never having deliberated, are carried away by their feelings. Some, on the contrary, like the beginners in a tickling match, who cannot be tickled—having presence, and foresight, and having roused up themselves and their reason beforehand, are not overcome by their feelings, whether pleasant or painful. It is especially persons of a quick or bilious temperament who are subject to the impetuous kind of incontinence, for the one through the rapidity, and the other through the intensity, of their nature, do not wait to see what is the law of right, because they are apt to follow impressions.

ὡσπερ οἱ προγαργαλίσαντες] The Paraphrast understands έαυτούς, rendering the passage ὡσπερ τὰ προηθόντα καὶ προγαργαλίσαντα μηλὶ οὐ γαργαλίζονται. And two of Bekker's MSS. read οἱ προγαργαλίσαντες. It might be possible by previous tickling to exhaust the irritability of the cuticle, but this would not be a usual process, and in one of the Problems attributed to Aristotle (xxxv. vi.) it is discussed, 'Why cannot a man tickle himself?' To which the answer is, 'For the same reason that they cannot be tickled by anybody else if he knows that it is going to happen. For laughter implies a sudden revolution and a surprise.' Surely this is exactly what is meant in the text.

οἱ οξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ] An account which seems at first sight the opposite of this is given by the author of the Magna Moralia (II. vi. 43): 'Εκείνη μὲν οὖν (the impetuous kind of incontinence) οὐδὲν οἷον άκρατον ψευτής· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θυμάσιοις ἡ τιμιάρα ἀγαλματικόν εἰναι, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εὐφώνοις· ἡ δὲ (the weak kind) ἐν τοῖς ψυχρώις καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ ταυτὰς ψευτοῖς. If however we consult the curious disquisition on μελαγχολικός and the μέλαια χάλιν in Δ. Probleme, xxx. i., we shall see that both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different manifestations of the same strange temperament.

Π. xxx. i. 18: "Ὅσος δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει συνήθως κραίνει τοιαῦτα, εὐδόκει οἶκα τὸ θέρμον γίνεσθαι παραβασιλεύει, ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλην κράειν. οὐκ δένοις μὲν τολή καὶ γυμνὰ υπαρχέ τις, κυριότερο καὶ μερός, οὕσει δὲ λανα τολή καὶ θερμή, μεξικότας καὶ εὐφώνιοι καὶ θρησκευτὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐνέργιας, ξύνα δὲ καὶ λαλοὶ μάλλον. With the moderns the term 'melancholy' is restricted to the cold and depressed mood; while the ancients much more commonly applied the term μελαγχολικός to denote
warmth, passion, and eccentricity of genius. Cf. Plato, Repub. 573 ο: 
Τυραννικός δὲ, ἂν δ' ἐγύ, ὃ δαιμόνε 
ἀνὴρ ἀκριβός γίγνεται, διὰ τὴν ἰδέαν ἢ 
ἐπιτεθέμαισαν ἡ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικὸς 
τε καὶ ῥωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικὸς γένε 
ταί. Cf. also Ar. Prob. xi xlviii: 
τὸ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀκολουθεῖν ταξιόω τὸ 
μελαγχολικόν εἶναι ἀτών. In the lan 
guage of our own day, 'The passionate 
heart of the poet is whirl'd into folly 
and vice.' For more remarks on 
μελαμα χολὴ, see below.

VIII. This chapter is not separated by 
any marked logical boundary from 
the preceding one. Rather it is a 
continuation of the same subject, as it 
goes on comparing incontinence with 
temperance. Two previously mooted 
questions are now discussed, namely, 
is temperance more curable than 
incontinence? (which is answered in 
the negative), and, is incontinence to 
be regarded as absolutely bad? (See 
above, ch. ι, § 6.) This is also an 
swered in the negative.

1 'Εστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὡσπερ 
The continuity of the subject is 
preserved, if we consider that the 
writer, having mentioned the various 
ways in which incontinent people 
submit to temptation, next reflects that,
where it is said of Ajax, ἐκστασις ἔγεντο παντελῶ (i.e. mad). Cf. above, ch. vi. § 6. ‘Ἐκστασις is used presently (§ 5) in a different sense to express ‘departing from’ a purpose, as also before, ch. i. § 6, and ii. § 7.

οἱ τῶν λόγων ἔχοντες] On this phrase see Eth. vi. i. 1, and note.

dιαίως γὰρ—οἱ πολλοί] ‘For the man who is weakly incontinent is like those who are soon intoxicated, and by a small quantity of wine, less than intoxicates people in general.’ Ὁ ἀκρατῆς seems used in this sentence as if specially applicable to the weak kind of incontinence. It is in contrast to ἐκστασις. Weakness is worse than being carried away by passion, for it is acting against warning and with less temptation.

3 Incontinence is not vice, though it resembles vice in what it does (κατὰ τὰς πράξεις), but it goes against the will, while vice goes with the will. It is like the saying of Demodocus against the Milesians: ‘The Milesians are not fools, but they are just as if they were fools.’ The incontinent are not bad, but they do wrong.

Δημοδόκου] This was an epigrammatist of the island of Leros, not far from Miletus. Some of his epigrams against different cities are preserved in the Anthology. A slight change in the reading shows the above to be in verse:

Μιλήτων ἄξυντον μὲν
Οὐκ ἐλείριν, δρῶσιν δ' οἶκαν ἄξυντοι.

4 η γὰρ ἀρετὴ—ἐννοιος] ‘For virtue, on the one hand, preserves, while vice destroys the major premise. Now the end is in action just what the hypotheses are in mathematics, namely, a major premise on which everything depends; hence, neither in the one case nor in the other is it the chain of inference (ὁ λόγος) that demonstrates the major premise, but in the case of action (ἐννοια) it is virtue, either natural or acquired, to which a right opinion with regard to the major premise is due. He who possesses this is temperate, while the contrary person is intemperate.’ This passage comes in as a final argument against the notion that incontinence is more curable than intemperance. In the latter the fountain-head of action (the ἀρχὴ) is destroyed. While the temperate man has in himself the source of all good action, the intemperate man is the direct opposite, and the
Incontinent man is something intermediate.

Incontinent man is something intermediate.

Aristotle, Post. Anal. i. ii. 7, defines thesis or assumption as an immediate syllogistic principle, undeniable, but not (as the axioms are) a necessary antecedent to all reasoning. He divides these into hypoteses and definitions, which differ in that the former assert existence or non-existence, while the latter do not. The hypothesis, then, is a peculiar principle (οἶκεια ἀρχή), and differs from an axiom, (1) in that it varies in the different sciences; (2) in that it is wanting in recognisable necessity. (Cf. Post. Anal. i. x. 6: οὐκ ἦστε δ' ὑπόθεσις . . . δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι δ' αὐτῷ καὶ δοκεῖν ἀνάγκη.) The Aristotelian hypothesis is, however, widely different from the hypothesis of the moderns, which means, in short, little more than a conjecture. For more particulars on this subject see Mr. Poste’s Logic of Science (Oxford, 1850), p. 139-143.
VII.—IX.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ [ΕΥΔΗΜΙΩΝ] VII. 227

ἀκολάστον, οὐδὲ φαύλος ἀπλῶς· σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλοι δὲ ἐναντίον, ὁ ἐμμενετικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκτάτικός διὰ γε τὸ τάδε. φανερῶν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατῆς ἐστιν ὁ ὀποιοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὀποιοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἡ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατῆς δε ὁ ὀποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὀποιοῦν λόγῳ ἡ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ, ὡσπερ ἠπορίθη πρότερον; ἡ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκός ὀποιοῦν,

5 ἄλλοι δὲ ἐναντίοις κ.τ.λ.] Incontinence having been shown to be an intermediate state not so bad as intemperance, it is here added that the true opposite to the incontinent man is he

‘Who, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw;’

i.e. not the temperate, but the continent. And though incontinence is not absolutely bad, yet relatively, if you compare it with its opposite, you must call one bad and the other good.

IX. The first part of this chapter (§§ 1–4) takes up again the question before started (ch. i. § 6, ch. ii. § 7–10), Does continence consist in sticking to any opinion and purpose, whether wrong or right? After some refinements, which are perhaps unnecessary, as to the continent man ‘accidentally’ or ‘non-essentially’ maintaining a wrong opinion, a good distinction is given between obstinacy and continence. Obstinate people (ἐχθρογνώμονες), if not mere dullards (κατά ἐμμένης καὶ ἐχθρογνώμονες), are self-opinionated, which state of mind is rather incontinence than continence, for it is a yielding to the desire for victory and self-assertion. The continent man, on the other hand, is not at all deaf to the voice of persuasion; it is only the voice of passion when opposed to reason which he resists. Nor is a man to be called incontinent if he deserts a resolution even for the sake of pleasure, since Neoptolemus deserted his resolution to deceive in order to obtain the noble pleasure of preserving his honour.

1 ἡ δ' τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ] Various solutions have been proposed for the difficulty involved in this sentence. (1) Aspasius, followed by Argyropulus, Fritzche, &c., think that ἐμμένων is to be understood as carried on from μὴ ἐμμένων in the line before. But this will not do. The ἀπαρτῆ cannot be said to ‘abide by a false opinion.’

(2) Some understand the clause as applying to cases like those of Neoptolemus, ‘Is a man incontinent who does not stick to a false opinion?’ But all this is implied in ὁ ὀποιοῦν κ.τ.λ. And moreover this interpretation would give a new sense to ἡ, making it a particle of apposition instead of a particle of contrast, which is required for the sake of correspondence with the opening sentence. (3) One of Bekker’s MSS. reads τῷ μὴ ψευδεὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ. This is a very natural correc-
tion to make, and it seems followed by
καθ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεί λόγῳ καὶ τῷ ὁρθῷ προαρέσει ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοιὸ διὰ τοῦ ἀρίστου τοῦ διώκει καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ ἀρίστεται, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ, ὅστε ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ὁποιαδήποτε δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει 2 ὁ δ’ ἐξισταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῷ ἀληθεί. εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς καὶ ἐμμελετικοί τῷ δόξῃ οὐς καλοῦσιν ἵσχυρογνώμονας, οἶον ὄστις ἐπιστωτοὶ καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάτευστοι: οἱ δ’ ομοιοί μὲν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεί, ὡστερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἔλευθερῳ καὶ ὁ θρασύς τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ’ ἐπερου κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸ ὅρθον καὶ ἐπιτυμίαν οὐκ ἐμβάλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατής, ἐπεὶ εὐπεστός, ἔταν τυχόν, ἔστα τὸ ἐγκράτης: ὁ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιτυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγουν τοιοῦτοι 3 ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδὼνών. εἰσὶ δὲ ἵσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμάθεις καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες οἱ ἰδο- νῦν καὶ λύπην χαίροντες γὰρ νυκτὶς, εἰν μὴ μετατεί- θωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται, εἰν ἂν καρα τὰ αὐτῶν ὁ ὡστερ ψηφίσματα: ὡστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεὶ εὖ καὶ ἂν τῷ 4 ἐγκρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς οἱ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσι καὶ ὁ δ’ ἀκρασίαν, οἶνον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους οὗ

the Paraphrasist, who has ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων τῷ ὁρθῷ. But since the correction is so natural, why should such a preponderance of MSS. have failed to adopt it? Though the sense absolutely requires some such reading, it seems better to conclude that there is some original confusion in the text. The author may have carelessly written as above from a mistaken antithesis to ἢ δ’ τῷ ὁρθῷ in the former sentence.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ τὸ πρῶτερον One chooses the means ‘accidentally.’ This is a mere illustration of the import of καθ’ αὐτὸ and συμβεβηκός. The whole paragraph seems perfectly irrelevant. It may be compared with Ἐθ. ν. χ. 8: καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν οἶνον τὸ ἀδίκεισθαι ἦττον φαίνει, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δ’ οὖν καθότι μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν, which is a weak qualification of the moral principle, that to injure is worse than to be injured.

2 ὡστερ ὁ ἄσωτος κ.τ.λ.] The same illustrations are coupled together in the Eudemian Ethics, III. vii. 14: τὸ ὁμοφερέων ἦττον ἐνταύτων φαινεται, οἶνον κέρευε τὸ βάρος πρὸς τὸ βάρος καὶ ἄσωτα πρὸς ἔλευθερότητα. οὗ δὲ οὐ—ἡδονῶν] ‘But the obtinate man (is immovable), not from the influence of reason, for such men assuredly admit desires, and many of them are carried away by the allurement of pleasures.’ The curious phrase ἐπιτυμίας λαμβάνοντι occurs in the Eudemian Ethics, III. ii. 13: πάντες γὰρ τοῖς φόβοι τε χαίροντες, καὶ ἐπιτυμίας λαμβάνουσι. 4 οἶνον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτῃ] See above, ch. ii. § 7, note.
IX.

Νεοπτόλεμος. καὶ τοί δ' ἠδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεῦεν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἑτείριθ᾽ ὅ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέα ψευδοθεοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ τὰς ὃ δ' ἠδονὴν τι πράττων οὐτ' ἀκόλουστος οὐτ' φαίλος οὐτ' ἀκρατῆς, ἀλλ' ὃ δ' ἀισχράν.

'Επεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οὗς ἤττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σω-ματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμέμενον τῷ λόγῳ τούτοις, τούτω καὶ τοῦ ἁκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατῆς· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατῆς οὐκ ἐμέμενε τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὕτως δὲ διὰ τὸ ἤττον τι· ὃ δ' ἐγκρατῆς ἐμέμενε καὶ οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἐτέρων μεταβάλλει. Δεῖ δὲ, εἰπέρ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαίον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ζεισὶς ψυχῆς εἶναι, ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸν ἐτέρων ἐν ὁλίγοις καὶ ἀλλὰς ἐκεῖ φανερῶν, ὡσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ.

ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ 6

5—ch. x § 5. In his later edition Bekker makes this portion of the text into a separate chapter, which seems a better arrangement. We have now a winding up of the previous discussions. Continenec is not only the contrary of incontinence, but is also a sort of mean. It bears an analogy to temperance, but must not be identified with it. Neither must incontinence and intemperance be confounded (see above, ch. i. § 6). Nor must it be thought possible that the 'thoughtful' man can be incontinent, though the clever man may (see ch. i. § 7). Incontinence is like sleep or drunkenness, not a state of wakeful knowledge (see ch. iii. §§ 6–8). Its acts are voluntary, but yet it is not absolutely wicked, since it implies no deliberate purpose. The incontinent man is like a state which has good laws, but does not act upon them. The bad man like a state with a bad code, which she carries out. Both the terms incontinence and continence are used comparatively, as implying more firmness than is common, or less. Of the two kinds of incontinence, that which is caused by passion is more curable than that caused by weakness; that which proceeds from habit is more curable than that which is natural.

5 καὶ οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἐτέρων μεταβάλλει] This is an Atticism for καὶ δι᾽ ὁδικτεροῖν. The attempt to make continence into a mean' can hardly be called successful. It can only be done by assuming the same ἀθλείας for this quality as for temperance. You will have one set of terms, ἁκολασία, σωφροσύνη, ἀναιθωσία, and another set ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια, ἀναιθωσία. It is plain that ἐγκράτεια is not a mean, in the sense of being a balance or harmony of the mind. It is only imperfect temperance; it is temperance in the act of forming.

6 ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ σωφροσύνου καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡ ἀκολούθησεν ἡ ἁκολούθησεν] 'The "continence" of the temperate man has come to be called so derivatively ἡ ἁκολούθησεν and by analogy.'
2 τὸν εἰρημένον πρότον ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις] Cf. Eth. vi. xiii. 8—9. The phrase ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι is used by Aristotle, Eth. iv. iv. 1, 4, in reference to the Second Book of Ethics. It must mean something more than πρότερον, one would think. It seems to point to a sort of interval between the later passage and that referred to. Cf. ch. i. § 1: ἀλλὰ παρασμένους ἀρχιν.
3 καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν] Cf. Eth. v. ix. 4—6, where the question is discussed, Does the incontinent man voluntarily do wrong and injury to himself as well as harm?
het γὰρ προαιρεσίς ἐπισκεφτὴ] Προαιρεσίς here must mean the general state of the will. It is only one form of incontinence, which errs against a definitely formed purpose. Incontinence is always para tòv βουλήνων (cf. Eth. v. ix. 6): in passionate natures it is ἀνεν προαιρέσεων. The Aristotelian psychology seems however to have admitted the formation of προαιρέσεις which are not carried out into action, and the question thus arose, Are purposes or actions most decisive as constituting virtue? See Eth. iii. ii. 1, note, and Eth. x. viii. 5.
ὡς ἡμικύρστος] 'So that he is only half deprived.' This epithet occurs in Ar. Pol. v. xi. 34: ἔτι δὲ αὐτῶν (the monarch) διακεῖσθαι (ἀναγκαῖοι) κατὰ τὸ ἢδος ἄτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετήν ἡ ἡμικύρστον ὁτα, καὶ μη τηρήσω ἀλλ'
μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁὐκ ἐμεμεντικὸς ὦς ἂν βουλέσθηται, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὦς. καὶ έσκε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατής πολεί ἡ ψυχή γένεσθαι μὲν ἀπαντά τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδάιους, χρήται δὲ οὐδὲν, ὁσπερ Ἀναξαγορᾶς ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλις ἱβυύλλη, ἡ τόμων οὐδὲν μιλεί·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοὺς νόμους, πονηρός δὲ χρωμένη. 4 ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ἀπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἔξως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ὑπτεύστην τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως, εὐεργετοῦρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασίων, ἤν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευμένων μὲν ἐμμένοντων δὲ, καὶ οἱ δ' ἐθιμοῦ ἀκρατείς τῶν φυσικῶν· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῷ φύσει έσκεφα, ὁσπερ καὶ Ἐυήνος λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνων μιλήτην ἐμμαί, εἶλε, καὶ δὴ τάχθην αἰθρώκτως τελευτῆσαι φύσιν ἑλεί.

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τὶ ἀκρασία καὶ τὶ καρπείρια 5 καὶ τὶ μαλακία, καὶ τῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἔξως αὐτὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἐφηρται.

Ἀριστοτέλης. In Plato, Repub. p. 352 c, the term ἁμαρτονοῦν is used in proving that there must be honour even among thieves.

ὁ γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ] Though lust as compared with anger is called ἐπιθυμεῖ (cf. ch. vi. § 3), yet it is true on the other hand that the incontinent man is not a designing character.

ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός] Cf. above, ch. vii. § 8, ch. viii. § 2.

ὁσπερ Ἀναξαγορᾶς] A Rhodian comic poet, who is said to have satirised the Athenians. Aristotle mentions one of his plays, the Γεροτομαία (Rhet. iii. xil. 3). Also a famous saying of his (Ib. iii. xi. 8), 'Ἀναξαγορᾶδου τὸ ἐπανομόμενον—

καλὸν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὸν θανάτου δρόμον ἄξιον.

And another witticism (Ib. iii. x. 7). Cf. Athenaeus, Deipn. ix. 16.

4 τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως] Cf. ch. vii. 1, note.

ὁσπερ καὶ Εὐήνοι] An elegiac and gnomic poet of Paros, who appears to have been a contemporary and friend of Socrates.

φημὶ πολυχρόνων κ.τ.λ.]

‘Habit sticketh long and fast,
Second nature 'tis at last.'

μιλήτην] 'That which is acquired by culture and habit.' That habit is 'second nature' we are told by Aristotle, De Mem. ii. 16: ὁσπερ γὰρ φῶς ἔσσε τὸ έθος, διὰ τὰ πολλὰς ἐννοομένης ταχὰς ἀναμμηνήσαμεν· ὁσπερ γὰρ φῶς τὸ μὲτὰ τὸ ἐκεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργεῖα τὸ δὲ πολλὰς φώσις ποιεῖ.
XI. We now come to a treatise upon the nature of Pleasure. With regard to the authorship and character of this treatise see the remarks in Vol. I. Essay I. pp. 64–65, and Essay III. p. 250. A notable scholium, discovered by Professor Brandis in the Vatican, and quoted by Spengel and Fritzsche, attributes it to Eudemos, though in a merely conjectural way; see below, ch. xiii. § 2, note.

In the outset of the Eudemian Ethics, a discussion on Pleasure is promised in terms which correspond both to the contents and the position of the present chapters (Eth. Eud. i. v. 11). τούτων δ’ (i.e. with regard to the three kinds of life) ἢ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῆς, καὶ τις καὶ ποια τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τινῶν, οὐκ ἄθλημα, διὸ τὰ τάξιν εἰς ἕνα διὰ τότεν ἢ μὲν περὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῆς, καὶ τις καὶ ποια τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τινῶν, οὐκ ἄθλημα, διὸ τὰ τάξιν εἰς ἕνα διὰ τότεν ἢ μὲν περὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονῆς, καὶ τις καὶ ποια τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τινῶν, οὐκ ἄθλημα.

There are three reasons given here for discussing pleasure: (1) Because it has claims to be ‘the end.’ (Cf. Eth. Eud. ii. i. 1, where as a reason for discussing psychology it is said, φύσις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονή ἐν ψυχῇ, ὅπως ἡ πάση τέλος ἐστι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.) (2) From the connection before shown to exist between pleasure and morality; cf. Eth. Eud. ii. iv. 2–4. (3) Because the idea of pleasure is involved in the common idea of happiness, as shown by the etymology (a false one) of μακάριος.

ἄρχιτέκτων τοῦ τέλους] i.e. to conceive in a grand and liberal way, independently of details, that supreme human good at which a state should aim. Cf. Eth. i. xiii. 1–3, and i. i. 4, note.

άπλως λέγουσι] There is some con-
fusion in this expression, for though things are called good in reference to the supreme end, yet they are not called so absolutely. All such goods are merely means, and therefore goods relatively. What is here meant is more definitely expressed in Eth. Bud. L viii. 18, where the ὑδόνα is called 

1. That pleasure is in no sense a 
good. (a) because it is a state of be-
coming (γένεσις) ; (β) because the temperate man avoids pleasures ; (γ) because the thoughtful man aims not at pleasure, but at a painless condition ; (δ) because pleasure hinders thought ; (ε) because there is no art of pleasure ; (ζ) because children and brutes 
follow pleasure.

2. That some pleasures may be good, but that most are bad ; supported by instances of morbid and hurtful pleasures.

3. That pleasure is at all events not the chief good ; because it is not an end-in-itself, but a state of becoming.

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in all probability had before him Aristotle's treatise on Pleasure (Eth. x. i.–v.) He deviates from it slightly, and exhibits that kind of differences which might be expected under the circumstances. He does not, like Aristotle, state the positive view (held by Eudoxus) that pleasure is the chief good, but commences with the opinions of the objectors to this view (i.e. Speusippus and the Platonists of his school). The principal argument which he attributes to them (that pleasure is a γένεσις) is given, though not in such a definite form, Eth. x. iii. 4. Argument (i) appears to be implied in the objection against Eudoxus which is mentioned Eth. x. ii. 4. Argument (e) may be the same perhaps as that given Eth. x. iii. 2 (that pleasure is δόμος). The other arguments are not taken from Aristotle; they may perhaps have been derived from the books of Speusippus on this subject (καὶ ὅσον ἄρα ἄρα ἀρετῶν ἄλλα γένεσις. See Vol. I. Essay III. p. 218).

The second view belongs probably to a more moderate section of the Older Academy. It still, however, requires qualification, and to this effect the writer argues below, in ch. xii.

The third view—that pleasure, however good, cannot be the chief good,—was held by both Plato and Aristotle (though the argument by which it is supported, ὅτι ὄν τὸν ἄλλα καὶ ὁμοίως ὅτι μὲν ὁμόνομα σχέδον ταύτῃ ἐστίν.

in Ch. xii. § 1, ch. xiii. § 2.

XII. The arguments used in this chapter are as follows: (1) Before deciding on the goodness or badness of pleasure, a distinction has to be made between absolute and relative goodness or badness, and then various degrees have to be admitted among the relative kinds of goodness, § 1. (2) We must allow that real pleasure consists in life itself (ἐνέργεια), not what merely produces life (γένεσις). Hence all the arguments founded on defining pleasure to be a γένεσις fail to the ground. Those processes which restore nature are only pleasures in a subsidiary and accidental way. And even in them what is pleasant is the life (ἐνέργεια) which accompanies them, §§ 2–3. (3) Some pleasures may be morbid or they may hinder thought; but this only proves that from one point of view they are not good; but again the pleasures of thought are an assistance to thought, §§ 4–5. (4) There is no art of pleasure, because art is of conditions, not of functions, not of life itself, § 6. (5) The arguments about the thoughtful man, the temperate man, and the child (ch. xi. § 4), all apply merely to the inferior and subsidiary, that is, the bodily, pleasures, § 7.

The course of procedure here is like that in Eth. x. ii.–iii., where the objections of the school of Speusippus are answered before Aristotle gives his own theory of the nature of pleasure. The arguments above are rather confused in statement. Those in § 1
are apparently meant to answer the assertion that no pleasure is good, 

\[\text{οὔτε καθ' αὐτό οὔτε κατὰ συμβαίνεις.}\]

The writer wishes first to urge that pleasure may be relatively good, if not absolutely so; he afterwards goes on to maintain that it is absolutely good.

Other passages of Eudemus bear a similarity to this; cf. Eud. Euk. III. I. 7: \[\text{αὐτὴ ἡ ὁμοιομορφία τὸ ὕποκομπον λέγεται, διὸνερ καὶ τὸ ἤδος καὶ τὰ γάμαθα, διχώς. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἄπλως, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἤδεα καὶ ἀληθὰ ἕστω, ἄπλως δ' οὖ, ἄλλα τοῦπατριπ τῶν φαίλα καὶ ὁχὲ ἤδεα, διὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ὑφέλια, καὶ διὰ ἤδεα τῶν παῖδων ἦ παιδία. VII. ii. 4–7, ἐκ.}\]

\[1 \\ 

\[\text{δι' ἐστὶν ὑποκομπον—καμπότονον}\]

'But that it does not follow from these arguments that (pleasure) is not a good, nor even that it is not the chief good, will be seen from the following considerations. First, the term “good” has a double import; it means either the absolute or the relative good; in accordance with this distinction, different constitutions and states will be either absolutely or relatively good, and so too the processes of change and transition (which produce them). Thus some of these processes which appear bad may be so in the abstract (ἀπλῶς), while they are not so relatively (ῥεῖ), but are desirable for the particular individual. Others again cannot be called desirable even for the particular individual, except on occasion and for a short time; others are not pleasures at all, but only seem so, being accom-

panied by pain and being (merely) for the sake of relief; as, for instance, the pleasures of the sick.'

\[2 \\ 

\[\text{εἰς ἐστὶν—ἀπὸ τοῦτον}\]

'Secondly, "good" may be either the state or the operation of a state, and so the processes which restore any one to his normal state (ὕποκομπον ἐστὶ) are pleasurable (not in themselves, but) accidentally (and by association). In fact, there is an operation or vital action in desire, namely, that of the powers in us which remain unimpaired (τῇ ὑποκομπω τῶν εἴσω καὶ φῶςω). (And it may be proved that pleasure depends not on want and desire, but on vital action) because there are pleasures which do not imply want and desire, as, for instance, the pleasures of thought, which take place when the nature is in no respect deficient. A proof (that the processes before-mentioned are only accidentally pleasurable) is to be found in the fact that men do not find delight in the same pleasure while their nature is being recruited (ὑποκομπωμένη) and when it is in a settled condition, but when it is settled they delight in things which are absolutely pleasant, and during the other processes in things that are even quite the reverse; as in sharp and bitter things, which are not naturally nor abstractedly pleasant. Nor is the enjoyment of them natural, for as pleasant things, regarded objectively (τὰ ἤδεα), are to one another, so are the subjective feelings which these excite (ὕδοι).'}
This passage is expressed so elliptically as to require several links of thought to be supplied. In the above translation this has been attempted. A bare rendering of the sentences into English would leave them utterly unintelligible.

αἱ καθοιστῶσι [i.e. αἱ κυρεῖσι καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, carried on from the previous section. The argument is that it is only life and the vital action (φύσική ἐξίς καὶ ταύτης ἐνεργεία) which is good and pleasant; the restorative processes are only secondarily, non-essentially, and by a sort of inference, pleasant. The words καθοιστῶσι and καθοιστηκὼς correspond with the term καθότσειας, which is used of pleasure in Αρ. Ῥητορικ. 1. xi. 1: καθότσειας ἄρθρα καὶ αἰσθήματα εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν.

τῆς ἰσολοτικῆς ἑξισι[The argument goes on to add that even in these restorative processes there is vital action (ἐνεργεία), namely, of those organs that remain unimpaired. The Paraphrast and others understand ἰσολοτικόν to mean 'deficient,' and as being equivalent to ἐκθεόν in the next line. But the above translation is not only more suitable to the doctrine of the Peripatetics (see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 247-250), but it is borne out by c. xiv. § 7: Λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἢτοι τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύοντα τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ἕνωσις πράττοντος τι, διὰ τούτου ἢδυ δοκεῖ εἶναι. Cf. Eel. x. iii. 6.

ἐξίς καὶ τυροῖς] Mentioned as an instance of things only pleasant during a morbid condition of the body. Cf. Eel. x. iii. 8.

3 ἐτὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη—ἐστὶ δ' ἐτερον] Moreover it does not follow that there must be something better than pleasure, as some argue, in the same way that the end is better than the process which leads to it. For all pleasures are not transition-states nor the accompaniments of such, but they are rather life itself and the end itself. They do not result from our coming to our powers (γυμνόμενωι), but from our using those powers (χρωμένωι); and it is not true that all pleasures have an end separate from them; this is only true of such as are felt by persons in the process of being restored to their normal condition. Hence it is not right to define pleasure as a "sensible transition," but rather we should call it "a vital action of one's natural state," and
instead of "sensible," "unimpeaded." Now pleasure appears to people to be a transition-process from its being good in the full sense of the term, for people confound the ideas of process and action, whereas they are distinct.¹

1. ἡσσερ τινὲς φασι] In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings of Speusippus, are here alluded to. Nowhere in Plato do the exact words of this definition of pleasure occur ( γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητῆ), but they represent his views, though perhaps carried rather farther. The present section places in opposition to each other the theories of the Platonic and the Aristotelian school, of whom the one considered pleasure to be a relief from pain, a return from depression, an addition to the vital powers; the other considered it to be the play of life itself, the flow of life outward rather than anything received. On these two divergent theories see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 247–250. The same subject may be found worked out at greater length, and with interesting notices of the opinions held by later philosophers, in Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. II. lect. xliii. pp. 444–475.

1. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέων ἐνέργειαν] Aristotle when writing accurately distinguishes pleasure from the moments of life and consciousness (ἐνέργεια), from which it is inseparable. Cf. Eth. X. v. 6: αἱ δὲ (ἥδειαι) σύνεγγυ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιδραστοί οὖσαν ὅστε ἐξεῖν διαφοράς ἔτη ταῦτη ἢ παρὰ ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἴδιος., οὐ μὴ δοκεῖ γε ἢ ἴδιος διάδουμε ὡς οὐδ' αἰσθητσί' ἄποικον γάρ; ἀλλὰ διὰ τῷ τῇ χωρίζονθαι φανερατί τοι ταύτα. He however does not more specifically define it than as ἐνεγκυρωμένοι τοίς τέλοις (τῇ ἐνεργῇ), Eth. x. iv. 8, 9c. Eudemus does not preserve the distinction, but simply says that pleasure should be defined as 'the unimpeaded play of life.' Aristotle himself occasionally writes in this way; cf. Metaphys. xi. vii. 7: εὖτε καὶ ἡ ἴδιον ἐνεργεία τούτου.


doκεί δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, διὶ κυρίων ἀγαθῶν] At first sight there appears to be a contradiction in saying that pleasure is thought not to be a good, because it is a γένεσις (ch. xi. §4); and that it is thought to be a γένεσις because it is a good. The explanation is that the latter clause refers not to the Platonists, but to the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics, who considered pleasure the chief good, defined it as an equable process in the soul. Plato accepted this definition, and turned it against them, arguing that by the very terms used the Cyrenaics had proved pleasure not to be the chief good. The Platonists then were originally
γὰρ ἐνέργεια γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἐστὶ δὲ ἔτερον. τὸ δ’ εἶναι φαύλας ὑπ’ νοσώδη ἐνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπ’ ἄνθρωπον τρόπος χρηματισμὸν. ταῦτ’ οὖν φαύλα ἀμφότερον, ἀλλ’ οὐ φαύλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, ἐπει καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν 5 ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγιεῖαν, ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ’ ἐξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἢ ἄφθονος ἢ ἄνακριτος, αλλ’ αἱ ἀλλ’ ἄλλοτρια, ἐπει αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον πούσσουσι 6 θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἐργον ἡδονῆς μοναχόμενον εὐλογίως συμβεβηκένν οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾷς τέχνη ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ τῆς δυνάμεως’ καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυροκινήτωρ τεχνικὴν καὶ ἡ ὑφαπτικὴ δοκεῖ 7 ἡδονῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σωφρόνα φεύγουσι καὶ τὸν φρόνι- μον διώκειν τὸν ἀλυτόν βιον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ

indebted for their definition of pleasure (ἀληθῆ γένεσις) to the Cyrenaics. See Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 176-177.

4-5 τὸ δ’ εἶναι φαύλας—μανθάνειν[1]

To say that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying (health is bad) because some healthy things are bad for money-making. From that point of view it is true they are both bad, but they are not on account of this incidental badness bad simpliciter, since even thinking is sometimes injurious to health; but neither thought nor any other state of mind is impeded by its own pleasure, but only by foreign pleasures; for the pleasures of thinking and learning will make one think and learn more.” The argument here is that a thing good in itself may be relatively bad, e.g. health, and thought itself. One good may clash with another, and be from that point of view (ταῦτα) bad. The writing is elliptical; we might have expected ἀληθῆ to be added to φαύλα. The last clause in section 5, which asserts that a mental function is rather assisted than impaired by its own proper pleasure, is taken from Ar. Eth. x. v. 2-3. Νοσώδη seems to mean ‘producing disease;’ cf. ch. xi. § 5: as νοσματωθαὶ before (ch. v. § 3, &c.) means ‘produced by disease.’ Φρονήσει is evidently used above as the verbal noun of φρασίν, in the general sense of ‘thought,’ and not in the restricted sense which is given to it in Book vi. Cf. Eth. l. vi. 11; Eth. Eud. II. i. 1 (quoted above).

6 τὸ δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ.] Cf. ch. xi. § 6. An answer is now given to an argument probably occurring in the works of Speusippus. This argument, if fairly represented here, must have had a false major premise, namely, ‘All that is good is the subject of art.’ The answer consists of two different pleas: (1) pleasure, like life, is above art, which can only deal with the conditions tending to these things. (2) In another sense there are arts of pleasure, e.g. the cook’s or the performer’s art.

7 Most of the arguments against pleasure ignore the distinction between different kinds of pleasures, the one kind being of the nature of life, and the end, and therefore good in themselves (§ 3); the other kind being
connected with inferior conditions of our nature, with pain, want, &c., and being therefore only secondarily and accidentally good (§ 2). This latter kind of pleasures, and excess in them, are made the ground of reproaches against pleasure in general.

XIII. In this chapter, after refuting (§ 1) the objection of Speusippus (that pleasure may be the opposite of pain without being a good), Eudemus urges the claims of pleasure, of the highest kind, to be considered the chief good, because from the terms of its definition it is inseparable from, and indeed identical with, happiness (§ 2). It is a mere paradox to talk of a man being happy in torture, &c. Happiness requires prosperity, that an ‘unimpeded function’ may be obtained, i.e. pleasure, though there must not be too much prosperity, else happiness is ‘impeded’ in another way (§§ 3–4). The instinct of all creatures testifies to pleasure being the chief good (§ 5); and it is a mistake to think that bodily pleasure is the only kind that exists (§ 6). In short, that pleasure is necessary for happiness proves that it is a good (§ 7).

But we may go further—it is universally agreed that pain is an evil, and detestable—for it is either absolutely an evil, or is so relatively as impeding the individual in some way or other. But that which is contrary to the detestable in that very point which makes it detestable and evil is good. Therefore it follows that pleasure must be a good. For the answer of Speusippus to this argument does not hold, that ‘(pleasure is contrary to pain and to the absence of pain) in the same way that the greater is contrary to the less, and also to the equal.’ For no one could ever say that pleasure is identical with any form of evil. That pleasure is a good because it is the contrary of pain, is an argument attributed to Eudoxus, Eth. x. ii. 2. Aristotle there (ib. § 5) mentions the answer to it, and refutes that answer as above. Eudemus, in accordance with his usual style, adds the name of Speusippus. Aulus Gellius, ix. 5, mentions this doctrine: ‘Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicit opposita inter esse: bonum autem esse quod utrisque medium forsit.’ Accordingly, the neutral state between pain and pleasure would have to be regarded as good. Aristotle and Eudemus reply that the point of contrariety between pain and pleasure is that the one is φανερός and the other αλπερός, therefore the one must be considered an evil, the other a good.
We are probably to understand 17, with the Paraphrase and Scholiast. Speusippos would have said that pleasure is an evil. Cf. *Euth. x. ii. 5.

This admission is directly contrary to the conclusions of Aristotle (cf. *Euth. x. iii. 13). It is to be explained as an after development of the system of Aristotle, and an attempt to bring different parts of that system into harmony with each other. Aristotle having used the same formula (ἐνέργεια) to express both pleasure and happiness, Eudemus from the force of the terms identifies them. In this he is quite justified, for it is impossible to distinguish the highest kind of pleasure or joy from happiness, especially if we consider peace (ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀκοπής) to be a mode of joy. It is in accordance with the rest of the Eudemian Ethics to speak in this way of pleasure as being an essential element in, and as inseparable from, happiness. Cf. *Euth. Bud. I. i. 6-7, i v. 11-12 (quoted above), VIII. iii. 11, &c.

The Vatican Scholium on this passage speaks of it as being merely dialectical (but this is from an unwillingness to recognise the discrepancy between Books VII. and x.) It proceeds to attribute the present treatment conjecturally to Eudemus. Diā μὲν οὖν τούτων δοκεῖ ταύτων ἀποφαίνει τάγαθαι καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὑπὸ μὴν ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας γένεις εἶναι ἡ φαίλας τινὰς τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ ἐναίσθητο τὸ ἁγαθὸν ἐνεγκύηται καὶ ἐνεχείρει ἑνδόν ὧν ἐναίσθητο τὸ ἁρματον λέγειν, εἴπερ γαῖ τοῖς Νικομαχείοις ἑνεὺς διέλειται καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἴρηκεν αὐτήν μὴ ταύτων ἐναίσθητο τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἀλλὰ παρακολουθεῖν ὅστερ τοῖς ἀκμαῖοις τὴν ὑπαρ. σμηνείων δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἴναι τοῦ 'Αριστοτέλους ἀλλ' Ἐδομίου τὸ ἐν τῷ κ' (Book X.) λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὑπὸ ὁδόντων περὶ αὐτῆς διεξελέγουν τὸν ἐνετ μὲ τὴν Ἐδομίῳ ταύτα ἐστὶν εἴτ 'Αριστοτέλους, ἐνδόσιμος εἴρηται. Διὰ τοῦτο λέγεται τὸ ἁρματον ἡδονῆς δι' ὅτι σὺν τῷ ἁρματον καὶ ἀχρόνιστων αὐτῶν. τοὐτῷ δὲ ἀμολογεῖ καὶ τὰ ἔξη. This, which is a remarkably favourable specimen of the Scholia, may serve to show the wavering and unprofitable character of the commentaries.

ὁστερ καὶ ἐνυτίθημεν] This must not be taken very strictly, since pleasure and knowledge cannot both be the chief good. Both, however, may be considered as forms of the absolute good. Cf. *Euth. i. vii. 5. The article is omitted at first with ἁρματον, but is added below. Knowledge is good, though some things it is better not to know.

τῶν εὐφραίνων καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν τύχην] This is the principle with regard to happiness which is laid down in Eth. Nic. 1. viii. 15-17. It was afterwards considered characteristic of the Peripatetic School. Cf. Cicero, De Fin. ii. vi. 19: ‘Ἀριστοτέλες virtutis usum cum vita perfecte prosperitate conjunctit.’

3 οἱ δὲ—λέγουσιν] ‘But they who allege that he who is being racked on the wheel, or he that is plunged in great calamities, is happy provided he be virtuous, talk nonsense, whether intentionally or not.’ Cf. Eth. Nic. 1. v. 6. The words ἔκοντες οὗτος λέγουσι answer to εἰ μὴ θὰν διαφημάτωσιν that place. The paradox alluded to was maintained by the Cynics, and afterwards by the Stoics (who denied that pain was an evil). Cf. Cicero, Tus. v. ix. 24: ‘Theophrastus quum statisset verbera, tormenta, cruciatus, patris eversiones, exaillia, orbitates, magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqu, quum humiliter demisseque sentiret.—Vexat autem ab omnibus primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quamobrem is, qui torquestur, qui crudetur, beatus esse non posset: in eo etiam putatur dicere in rotam beatam vitam non essendere’ (quoted by Fritzsche). Cf. also Cicero, Paradoxa, ii.

4 ταύτων εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία] Cf. Eth. Bud. 1. i. 4: ἡ δὲ τύχη—πολλαὶ γὰρ ταύτων φασί εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. This, together with the present passage, is taken from Eth. Nic. 1. viii. 17.

αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλονσα ἐμπόδιον ἔστων] A more forcible expression of what is said Eth. x. viii. 9: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὕτερος κ.τ.λ.

καὶ οὕτως—αὐτὴν] ‘And perhaps (when it is overweening) we should no longer call it prosperity; for the standard of prosperity consists in its being conducive to happiness. Cf. Eth. Bud. viii. iii. 12: τῶν φόνοι μὲν
6 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὕτε φύσις οὕθ᾽ ἐξή ἡ ἀρίστη ὦτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὕτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ᾽ ἡδονὴ διώκοντοι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴ μὲντοι πάντες. ἵως δὲ καὶ διώκοντοι οὐχ ἢν οἴονται οὐδ᾽ ἢν ἂν φαίεν. ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θείον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὅνουματος κληρονομιαί αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε

ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπανετεῦρον δὲ δεὶ τις εἴη διὸ καὶ ἔξεσι καὶ τῆς αἰρέσεως, καὶ περὶ φυγῆς χρημάτων πλῆθος καὶ δια-


5 καὶ τὸ διώκειν 5—θείον 'In short, that all things pursue pleasure, both beasts and men, is a proof that it is in some sort the chief good,—

"For mankind's universal voice can not

Be wholly vain and false."

Since however there is no one nature or state which is, or is thought to be, the best for all, so neither do they all pursue the same pleasure, but still they all pursue pleasure. Nay, perhaps unconsciously they are pursuing, not what they think, or would declare, but (in reality) the same; for all things have within them by nature a divine instinct. 'This is said, Eth. x. ii. i, to have been the argument of Euodorus: Ῥόδοκεος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθον φρόντις εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάντ' ὅραθ' ἑφικέμενα αὐτῆς καὶ ἔλογα καὶ ἔλογα. Ἰδ. § 4.

Aristotle justifies the argument against objectors in much the same terms as those adopted in the text.


6 ίως δὲ καὶ | Perhaps by a mys-
terious instinct all creatures, in seek-
ing life and joy, seek under different man-
ifestations one and the same prin-
ciple of good. Cf. the dream-images in Goethe's Faust:

'Einige glommen
Ueber die Höhen,
Andere schwimmen
Ueber die Seen,
Andere schweben,
Alle zum Leben ;
Alle zur Ferne
Liebender Sterne,
Seliger Huld.'

Aristotle, Eth. x. ii. 4 (which is the source of the above passage), does not go so far as to make all creatures aim at the same good, ίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαῖλοισ ἐστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖτ-
tον ἠ καθ᾽ αὐτά, δ᾽ ἐφείται τοῦ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθοῦ.

ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι—οὐκαίτε εἴημι 'But
bodily pleasures have usurped the possession of the name of pleasure, from man's most often resorting to them, and from all men partaking of them; hence because these are the only pleasures they know of, they think they are the only ones which exist.' παραβάλλειν appears to mean 'lay themselves alongside,' 'apply themselves to.'
παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμοις εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἠδονή ἄγαθον καὶ ἡ ἑνεργεία, 7 οὖκ ἔσται ζην ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαιμον· τίνος γὰρ ἐνεκα δέοι ἀν αὐτῆς, εἰπτε μὴ ἄγαθον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ενέχεται ζην; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὕτη ἄγαθον ἡ λύπη, εἰπτε μὴ ἠδονή· ὡστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγωι; ουδέ δὴ ἡδόνων ὁ βίος ὁ τῶν σπουδαίων, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἑνεργείαι αὐτοῦ.

Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέων τούτων 14. λέγοντι ὅτι ἐναι γε ἡδοναι αἱ ἑνεργείαι σφόδρα, οἶον αἱ

7 φανερῶν δὲ——αὑτοῦ] 'Finally, it is plain that unless pleasure and the action of life are a good, the happy man cannot live pleasurably. For why should he need pleasure if it be not a good, and if it is possible for him to live painfully? (and it will be possible), for pain will be neither evil nor good, unless pleasure is; so why should he avoid it? and hence it will follow that the life of the good man will not be more pleasurable than that of the bad man, if his moments of action are not more pleasurable.' This is a reductio ad absurdum of the position that pleasure is not a good. We shall be reduced to think: (1) that the happy man may live devoid of pleasure; for nothing that is not good can form part of happiness—or even he may live a life of pain, which is the contrary of pleasure; (2) that the good man will have no more pleasure than the bad man, unless pleasure attaches to good acts, in which case it will be part of the good.

XIV. Hitherto Eudemus has followed the lead of Aristotle, only in one respect making a slight development of his conclusions. He now discusses a subject untouched by Aristotle, but which he had proposed to himself in his first book; cf. Eth. Eud.
spiritual in us, we are unable to continue perpetually delighting in one pure pleasure, that is, the pleasure of thought. God alone is capable of this; to us, through a fault in our nature (οὐ γὰρ ἄπλη ὄδυ ἐπιεκτή), change appears sweet, because lower and contradictory elements in us require to be allowed their due action, §8.

1 τῶν ἀγωνίων ἦν ἐκεῖνοι τις τῶν ἀγωνίων τῶν ἀγοραστῶν, τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὸν πάθον. ἢ τὸν θαλασσάιαν ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ, ἢ τῷ ἔρωτιμονίῳ ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ.

2 τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν — ἔπειτα, ἢ τῷ ἔρωτιμονίῳ.
The first reason is that it drives out pain. When overwhelmed with pain, as a remedy men seek excessive pleasure, and in short bodily pleasure. Now remedies are naturally violent, and they are adopted because they seem to match (παρὰ) their opposites.' On the opinion that remedies are the opposites of the diseases to be cured, cf. Ἐπ. II. iii. 4.

It is on account of these two causes, then, that pleasure is thought not to be a good; first, that some pleasures, as we have said before (ch. v. 1.), are the actions of a depraved nature, whether congenital, like that of a beast, or acquired, like that of depraved men; secondly, that other pleasures are remedies, implying imperfection, since a normal condition (ἐχει) is better than the process of arriving at that condition, and some pleasures take place while we are arriving at a complete state of being, hence they are only inferentially and not directly (κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς) good.' This paragraph reverts parenthetically to the opinion of the Platonists.

The argument is now resumed from the sentence ending φαίνεσθαι. 'Another reason why physical pleasure is sought is its comparatively coarse and violent character, which suits those who require strong excitement. And indeed such men even create in themselves certain artificial thirsts for pleasure. If this does not hurt their health, it is no harm. Such men are incapable of enjoying the purer and simpler pleasures, and a neutral state of the sensations is to many painful by a law of nature. For the living creature ever travails, as the physiological books testify, telling us that the acts of seeing and hearing are laborious, only that we are accustomed to them (so they say). So also the young, in the first place, owing to the principle of growth in them, are like those who are intoxicated, and youth is full of pleasure. And again those of bilious nature are ever in need of an anodyne. Their body is continually fretted by reason of their temperament, and they are ever in vehement desire. Now pleasure, be it the opposite of a given pain, or be it what it may, provided it be strong
νων χαίρειν· αυτοί γούν αυτοῖς δίψας τινάς παρασκεύα-ζουσιν. ἦταν μὲν οὖν ἄβλαβείς, ἀνεπτιμητον, ἦταν δὲ βλαβερᾶς, φαύλον· οὕτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἑτερα ἐφ᾽ οἷς χαίρουσιν, τὸ τε μεθέπετον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν· ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὀσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὄραν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρὸν· ἀλλ᾽ ἦδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φαίνον. 6 ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὀσπερ οἱ οἰνομένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἦδη ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν αἰεὶ δέονται ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δικαύομεν διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρασίν, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρὰ εἰσίν. ἐξελαυνεὶ δὲ ἥδουν λυπην ἡ τ᾽ ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχώσα, ἐὰν ἦ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταύτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ 7 φαύλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ᾽ ἀνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ύπερ-

enough, drives out that pain. And hence persons of the bilious tempera-
ment become intemperate and vicious.' This passage gives two reasons to
e xplain why a neutral state of the
sensations is distasteful, first a general
reason: that the laborious action of
the human faculties calls for allevia-
tion; second, a special reason: that
certain periods of life and certain tem-
peraments produce a craving after
physiological indulgence.

δίψας τινάς] Fritzche, after the
Scholiast, understands this literally,
that some men make themselves
thirsty to enjoy the pleasure of
drinking. But the use of the plural
seems to indicate that we should
rather follow the Paraphrast and the
majority of the commentators in un-
derstanding it generally of artificial
desires for pleasure, ἐπισκευαστὰν ἐτύμωμας, as the Paraphrast calls
them.

ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ.] The best
commentary on this passage will be
found in Aristotle's Problems, bk. xxx.
ch. i., where a frequent comparison is
made between the effects of wine,
youth, and the melancholy (or bilious)
temperament, in producing desire. Cf.
§ 5: δὲ γὰρ αἰνεῖ δὲ πολὺς μὲλιστὰ φαι-
νεται παρασκευάζειν τοιοῦτον αἰνεῖ
λέγομεν τοῖς μελαγχολικοῖς εἶναι. § 10:
καὶ ὁ αἰνεῖ δὲ πνευματόθες τὴν δύναμιν.
διὸ δὴ ἐστὶ τὴν φύσιν δρομὰ δὲ τοὺς
cap τοῦ κρασίν, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Prod. iv. xxi.: διὰ
tὶ ἄφροδισιατικὸν οἱ μελαγχολικοῖς;
ἡ δὲ πνευματόθες, κ.τ.λ. The Scholi-
ast gives a vivid explanation of the
words δωσφεὶ οἰνομέν ἐνοῦ in the pas-
sage before us. Evidently, all that is
meant is to compare the desires of
youth with those of drunkenness and
of the melancholy temperament. We
may compare the lines of Goethe:

'Trunken müssen wir alle sein;
Jugend ist Trunkenheit ohne Wein.'

The principle of ἐξερήμις in youth is
represented as producing the same
results as the humours (χυμὸς τὸ μελα-
γχολικὸν—ἡ τῆς μελαγχολίς χολῆς κράσις)
in the bilious temperament.

7 – 8 at δ᾽ ἀνευ λυπῶν—ἐπισκευαστ']

'The pleasures unpreceded by pain do
not admit of excess, they are essen-
tial and not accidentally pleasures.
By the accidental pleasures, I mean such as are of the nature of a remedy. Because, when it happens that we are relieved, owing to some operation of that part in us which continues sound, the result is a sensation of pleasure. By the natural pleasures, I mean those which produce the action of any given nature. The same thing is never continuously pleasant to us, because our nature is not simple, but there is in us a second element, by reason of which we are destructible. Thus, when the one element is in action, it thwarts the tendencies of the second element. And when the two elements are balanced, the result appears neither painful nor pleasant. If there is any being whose nature is simple, the same mode of action will be continuously and in the highest degree pleasures to him. Hence God enjoys everlasting one pure pleasure. For there is a function not only of motion, but of rest; and pleasure consists rather in tranquillity than in motion. "Change," as the poet says, "is the sweetest of all things," on account of a certain fault in our nature. The bad man is fond of change, and of the same character is the nature which requires change; it is not simple or good.

In the above passage we see a reproduction, and to some extent a carrying out, of Aristotle’s doctrines in the tenth Book of the Ethics, cf. especially ch. iv. 9: Πώς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥθετα; ἢ κάμως; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀδιανείπει συνεχῶς ἑνεργεῖ. On the comparison between the compound nature of man and the purely divine nature of God, cf. ch. vii. 3: ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἄτι ἔτι βλος κρείττων ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἀνθρώπος ἐστιν οὕτω βιοῦσα, ἀλλ’ ἥθεν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ἔνδοξεῖ; διὸ δὲ διαφέρει τούτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἑνεργεία τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.
It is to be remarked that the present Book, which commences with a mention of *θέλα ἀπετή*, or the operation of reason unalloyed by passion, ends with a mention of *θέλα ἡδονή*, which is the consciousness of the same.

[*λοιπὸν — ἐρούμεν*] These words, which have caused, by their occurrence here, an obvious literary confusion in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (see Vol. I. Essay I. p. 56), are not even suitable to the Eudemian treatise. The clause is evidently an attempt to sum up and give unity to the preceding book, but it can hardly have been written by the author of the book. The *συν ἐρημαί τι ἐκατόν καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἄγαθα αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακὰ*, as being an inadequate and incorrect description of the discussions on Continence and Incontinence (cf. x. 5) and on Pleasure and Pain. With regard to the latter, it has been assumed (xiii. 1) that all Pain is an evil, and it has been argued (xiii. 2-7) that Pleasure, as being *ἐρήμων ἀνεμώδιος*, is identical with the chief Good. We trace, then, the work of a somewhat shallow and hasty editor. In the last chapter of *Eth. Eud*. it is said *καὶ περὶ ἡδονής δ’ ἐρημάτω καὶ πῶς ἄγαθον*, καὶ δι’ τὰ τε ἁπλῶν ἡδεά καὶ καλά, καὶ τὰ [τε] ἁπλῶν ἄγαθα ἡδεά, which seems to refer generally to chapters xii. and xiii. of this book. The editor may have had that passage before him.
PLAN OF BOOKS VIII.—IX.

A RISTOTLE'S treatise on Friendship, here contained, is quite continuous. The division of it into two books is merely artificial. There is really no break between the end of Book VIII. and the beginning of Book IX. The words ἵνα μὲν οὖν τὸν τρόπον ἰτεὶ τοι hend (VIII. xiv. 4) have been introduced, whether by the Author's or by an Editor's hand, to create a division and to constitute two books conformable in length to the other books of the Ethics.

The use of the phrase τὸ ἰτεὶ (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, IX. iii. 1), in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., has led some persons to suppose that this was originally an independent treatise. But nothing is more clear than that it was written to form a part of Aristotle work on Ethics. Besides general expressions of the author's purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view (see VIII. i. 7, IX. ii. 2), we find direct quotations of, or references to, the first books of the Nicomachean Ethics. (Compare IX. ix. 5 with Eth. Nic. I. vii. 14; and I. viii. 13, and IX. iv. 2, with Eth. Nic. III. iv. 5.)

The present treatise has a close connection with the first three books of the Nicomachean Ethics. But it is remarkable that it has no connection with Books V. VI. VII. Friendship is here treated in relation to Happiness and in relation to Justice. What is said of Happiness forms the complement to Eth. Nic. Book I., but what is said of Justice has no reference to Eth. Nic. Book V.; rather it appears written tentatively, probably before the Politics of Aristotle, from which the theories of Eth. Nic. Book V. seem to have been derived. (See VIII. vi. 6, VIII. vii. 2–3, VIII. ix. x., IX. i. 1–2.) Again, it is equally striking that there is no reference to Book VII. in the parts of this treatise where the phenomena of vice are
discussed (see IX. iv. 8–9, IX. viii. 6). Indeed the views taken here are inconsistent with those of Book VII., which contain a more rigid analysis. (Compare IX. iv. 8 with VII. viii. 1.)

The style of these two Books is certainly unlike that of Books V. VI. VII., while it bears a close similarity with that of Eth. Nic. I. and X. Not one of the 'Eudemian' forms of expression is to be found here.

The treatise on Friendship may be roughly divided into three parts:—

I. On the different kinds of Friendship, and on the nature of the highest and truest type. VIII. i.–viii.

II. On the connection of Friendship with Justice, (1) as arising (with certain exceptions, see c. xii.) out of political relationships, or coinciding with them; (2) as implying obligations to be repaid. VIII. ix.–IX. iii.

III. On other questions connected with the nature of Friendship, and especially on its relation to Happiness. IX. iv.–xii.

Though the treatise is continuous, yet it is easy to see that the writer's views became deeper and more definite as he advanced. (Thus compare IX. vii. with VIII. i. 4; IX. x. with VIII. i. 5; and VIII. vi. 2–3, VIII. viii. 7 with VIII. i. 6.)

At the same time we see what a powerful instrument was the Aristotelian analysis for producing clearness of view. By an analysis of the objects of liking (τὰ φιλίαντα, VIII. ii. 1), Aristotle clears away all the vagueness which the Lysis of Plato had left around the nature of Friendship. By an application of his own philosophical form ἰμήσου (IX. vii. 4–6, IX. ix. 5–6, IX. xii. 1), he obtains a profound theory of the operation of the highest kind of Friendship in relation to human happiness.

In these Books there is no allusion to the sentimental relationship, in vogue among the Dorians from the earliest ages, between a warrior and his squire (the ἀδερφήλης and ἀέρης, or 'inbreather' and 'listener'). All here is broadly human. And yet the idea of 'Friendship' is purely Greek. The Romans imitated it. But in modern times it has been much superseded by the idea of sympathetic marriage. Christianity ignores Friendship; and theoretically it now exists only as a temporary advantage for the young.
The discussion of Friendship is justified here (analogously to the way in which the discussion of the voluntary is justified, Eth. III. i. 1–2), first, on the ground of its connection with virtue, secondly, on the ground that it is a means to happiness (ἀναγκαίωτατον) in all conditions of life. As a commencement of the discussion, Aristotle mentions the difficulties raised on the subject in the Lysis of Plato: Does friendship depend on similarity or on contrast? Can bad men be friends to each other? and he adds another: Is there only one species of friendship, or are there more? Aristotle by his own analysis of the likeable (τὸ φιλητὸν) immediately cuts straight through these difficulties.

I. The discussion of Friendship is justified here (analogously to the way in which the discussion of the voluntary is justified, Eth. III. i. 1–2), first, on the ground of its connection with virtue, secondly, on the ground that it is a means to happiness (ἀναγκαίωτατον) in all conditions of life. As a commencement of the discussion, Aristotle mentions the difficulties raised on the subject in the Lysis of Plato: Does friendship depend on similarity or on contrast? Can bad men be friends to each other? and he adds another: Is there only one species of friendship, or are there more? Aristotle by his own analysis of the likeable (τὸ φιλητὸν) immediately cuts straight through these difficulties.

I ἄρετή τις ἡ μετ’ ἄρετῆς] We have here no reference to that harmonious manner in society, the mean between flattery and moroseness, which is included in the list of the virtues (Eth. II. vii. 13) under the name of φιλα, but is afterwards said to be nameless (Eth. IV. vi. 4) and to be devoid of the feeling of affection.

τι γὰρ ὄφελος—φιλα] 'For what is the use of that sort of abundance, if one is deprived of the power of doing good, which is exercised most especially, and in its most praiseworthy form, towards friends?'

2 σὺν τε δ ἄρχομενοι] The saying of Diomede when about to penetrate the Trojan camp, Iliad x. 224:
3 καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐν
πάρχει οὐκε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσασθαι καὶ
πρὸς τὸ γεγεννᾶν τῷ γεγεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὅρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ
tοῖς ὑμεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
θεῖν τοὺς φιλανθράπους ἐπανούμεν. ἵδοι ὃ ἦν τις καὶ ἐν
tαῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἄπας ἀνθρώποι ἀνθρώπω καὶ
4 φιλον. οὐκε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχει ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ
νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὕτην σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην,
ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὅμοιον τὴν φιλία οὐκε οἷον, ταύτης δὲ
μάλιστ' ἐφιέναι καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχον οὖσαν μάλιστα
ἐξελαύνονται. καὶ φιλον μὲν ὄντων ὀυδὲν δεὶ δικαιοσύνης,
δίκαιοι δὲ ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαιῶν τὸ
5 μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν
ἀλλὰ καὶ καλὸν. τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπανούμεν, ἢ τε
πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι, καὶ ἐνοι τοὺς
αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φιλον.

6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὕτης οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν


3 τοῖς ὑμεθνέσι[.] This word is applied here to brutes as well as men. In the same sense ὑμεθνὲσι is used, Eth. Bpin. vii. v. 3, and συγγενῆ, Ar. Rhet. l. xi. 25.

[ὅκε δ' ἰν τις—φιλον] 'And in travelling too one may see how near and
dear every man is to man,' i.e. one may see this both as a matter of gen-
eral observation, and as oneself meeting with kindness and hospitality.

4 καὶ οἱ νομοθέται[.] Cf. the speech of Lysias in Plato's Phædrus.

καὶ τῶν δικαιῶν—δοκεῖ[.] 'And the

height of justice appears to be of the
nature of friendship.' Under the
words τῶν δικαιῶν τὸ μάλιστα equity
(τὸ ἑπεξετάσθε) appears to be meant. Cf.
Eth. v. x. 6-8.

5 ἀλλὰ καὶ καλὸν[.] This is repeating in other words that friendship is δρατή
τις. The distinction between ἀναγκαῖον
and καλὸν is common in Aristotle, and
the one term suggests the other. Cf.
Eth. ix. xi. 1.

ἡ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ[.] 'To have
many friends is commonly thought to
be something beautiful.' This popular
opinion is considerably qualified on
further examination: cf. Eth. ix. x. 6.
καὶ ἐνοι—φιλον[.] 'And some think
that the term "good friend" is con-
vertible with that of "good man."
Cf. a similar form of expression, Eth.
v. ii. 11: οὐ γὰρ ἔσω τινὸν ἄνδρα τ' ἀγαθόν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς παρτί.

6 διαμφισβητεῖται[.] The questions
mentioned here are raised in the Lysis
ΘΕΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ VIII.

...
This question is started in the *Ethics*, p. 214 D: τοῦτο τοιούτων αἱ ἀλήθειας, ότι έμω δικαιοσύνη, δεί τοίχος, οἱ το δικαίωμα τῷ δικαίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ότι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δικαιοσύνης και δικαίωμα τοῖς φίλοις, δεῦ τοιοῦτον οὖσα και τοιοῦτον εἰς αὐτὴν φιλανθρωπίαν ἐρχεται.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὀλόμοις κ.τ.λ.] ‘For they who think that there is only one species of friendship, because it admits of degrees, trust to an insufficient proof. For things also that differ in species admit of degrees. But we have spoken about them before.’ Aristotle immediately proceeds to show that there are three distinct species of friendship, in accordance with the three objects of liking. He also says that the friendships for pleasure or profit are less friendships than that for the good (πολιτικά εἰσι, viii. vi. 7). All three kinds admit of the idea (λόγος) of friendship; thus they agree in genus and are comparable in point of degree. Cf. Ar. Categ. viii. 36: ἀντίστοιχος δὲ, ἡμικυκλικός ἐπιδέχεται ἀμφότερον τοῦ ἐπεξεργάζοντος λόγου, σοφία δὲ τὸν περιοχήματος λόγον, σωτηρία δὲ τὸν ορθογώνως μάλλον.

As there is no place in the *Ethics* where Aristotle has discussed this logical question before, a Scholiast says with regard to the last words of the paragraph: δεῦ τοιοῦτοι εἰς τοῖς εἰκονικοῖς τῶν ἠθικῶν. But most probably the words εἰς τοῖς εἰκονικοῖς are the interpolation of a copyist, who was perhaps thinking vaguely of *Ethics* viii. 5, to which the commentators generally refer. These words spoil the grammar of the sentence, as περί αὐτῶν is used in the next line with a different reference.

II. 2 ποτέρων ὁδὸ-περί αὐτῶν ἀγαθῶν] Aristotle here guards himself against the appearance of having admitted the Platonic theory, that the absolute good is always the object of human desire. Cf. *Ethics* vi. 1, and note.

ἐστι γὰρ—φιλανθρωπίας] ‘For in that case the object of liking will be an apparent and not an absolute object.’
II.—III.] HÉIKON NIKOMAXEION VIII. 255

φιλούσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ τῶν ἀψίχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλίησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκεῖνων ἀγαθῶν· γελοιον γὰρ ἢσος τῷ ὅψε φιλεσθαι τἀγαθά· ἀλλ' ἐπερ, σῶζεσθαι βούλεσθαι αὐτῶν, ἵνα αὐτῶς ἔχῃ. τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δείν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκεῖνὸν ἑνεκα, τοὺς δὲ βοουμένους οὔτω τἀγαθὰ εὐνός λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ταύτῳ καὶ παρ' ἑκείνου γίγνηται· εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντι-
πεποιῆθαις φιλίᾳ εἶναι, ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν: 4 πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν εὐνοεῖς οἰς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνοντι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἡ χρησίμων· τότῳ δὲ ταύτῳ κἀκεῖνως τις πάθοι πρὸς τούτον. εὐνοεῖς μὲν οὖν οὕτωι φαινόμενοι ἄλληλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἀν τις εὗτοι λανθάνονται ὡς ἐχουσίν ἑαυτοῖς; δαδ' ἀρα εὐνοεῖς ἄλληλοις καὶ βοουλέσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθανόντας δὲ ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Διάφερει δὲ ταύτα ἄλληλων εἶδε· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἃρα 3 καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδθη, ἑσάρθη τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἐκατόν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλίησιν οὐ λανθά-
νουσα. οἱ δὲ φιλουστεῖ άλληλοις βοουλείσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἄλλη-
λοις ταύτῃ δὲ φιλοῦσιν. οὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φι-
λοῦστε ἄλληλοις οὐ καθ' αὐτῶς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἃ γίγνεται τὶ αὐτῶς παρ' ἄλληλων ἀγαθών. ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ δὲ ἥ-
δονιν' οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτοι τινας εἶναι ἀγαπᾶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέ-
λους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴδεσι αὐτῶς. οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον 2
φιλοῦστε διὰ τὸ αὐτῶς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δὲ ἥ-

cf. ix. i. 4: τοῦτοις καὶ προσέξει, κάκεινου γε χάρων ταύτα δώσει.

3 τῷ τῶν ἀψίχων] Suggested by the Lysis of Plato, p. 212 D, where ὅσοι is mentioned as an object of liking: ὅσοι δὲ ρήθη τοῖς εὐσείς, ὅσοι δὲ οἱ ἔκτοι μὴ ἀντιφιλίησιν, οὐδὲ φιλοῦσιν, οὐδὲ φιλεῖσθαι γε καὶ φιλοῦσις κ.τ.λ.

4 ἢ—τοῦτον] 'Or we must we add the proviso that (this good feeling) must not be unknown! For many are kindly disposed to men whom they have never seen, but whom they suppose to be good or useful, and one of these latter might reciprocate the same feeling.' τοῦτω, being substituted for the plural πολλοί, gives definiteness.

III. 1 ταύτῃ δὲ φιλοῦσιν] 'According to the particular mode of their friendship.' The differences of mode are specified afterwards.

ωδ' καθ' αὐτῶς φιλοῦσιν] 'Do not love each other for their very selves.' This phrase καθ' αὐτῶς is rather a logical formula than an ordinary grammatical combination. It seems to have arisen from καθ' αὐτό, 'the absolute.' Cf. viii. iii. 7, and the use of δι' αὐτῶς, viii. iv. 6, ix. i. 7.
διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς ἥδυ, καὶ οὐχ ἦς ὁ φιλομενός ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἦς χρῆσιμος ἡ ἥδυ. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐτὰ ἐισίν: οὐ γὰρ ἦς ἐστὶν ὁ σφήνος, ἀλλ' ἦς τοῖς ταῖοις οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ τοι οἱ δ' ἥδονης.

3 εἰ ἐκάλυτοι δὴ αἱ ταὐτάτη ἐσίν, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· εὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἴδεις ὁ χρῆσιμος ὁ σφήν, παῦσαιν φιλοῦντες.

τὸ δὲ χρῆσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλωτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθεῖτος οὖν δὲ ὁ φίλου ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ η ἕδυ, ἄσις ἤσις τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἑκαῖνα· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς προσβύταις ἡ ταὐτή δοκεὶ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἥδυ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὕψιλον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων δοὺς τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνω δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζώσει μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδὲ εἰσίν ἴδεις· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέοντας τῆς ταὐτής ὀμίλιας, εἴη μὴ ὕψιλοι ὡσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ εἰσίν ἴδεις ἐφ' ὅσον ἀλήθεια ἐξουσίαν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενίκην

5 τιθέσων. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δὲ ἥδονην εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ἴσις, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν τῆς ἥμισις δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἴδεα γίνεται ἐτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίγνονται φίλοι καὶ παῦσαι· ἀμα γὰρ τῷ ἴδεῖ τῇ φιλίᾳ μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαῦτης ἰδοῖς ταχεία ἡ μεταβολῆ. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νεοί κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δὲ ἥδονην τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διότερο φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παῦσαι, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτής ἡμέρας μεταπιπτοῦστος.

6 Τελεία δ' ἐστιν τὴς τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τάγαθα ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἡ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοί δ' εἰσί καθ' αὐτοὺς· οἱ δ' βουλόμενοι τάγαθα τοῖς φίλοις ἐκεῖνος ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δ' αὐτοῖς γὰρ οὕτως ἐχουσί, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

2 καὶ οὐχ ἦς ὁ φιλομενός ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἦς χρῆσιμος ἡ ἥδυ] The reading surely should be ὁ φιλομενός ἐστίν, 'not by reason of the existence of the person who is loved, but by reason of his being useful or pleasant.' The personal existence of the friend is, according to Aristotle, the chief blessing of friendship. Cf. ix. ix. 10: ei δὲ τῷ μακαρῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετῶν ἐστι καθ' αὐτοῦ, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει δὲ καὶ ἡδόν, παραπληθῶς δὲ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἄν ευγ.
διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἐστιν ἃν ἀγαθοὶ δέον, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνην, καὶ ἠστιν ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθοι καὶ ἄλληλοις ὀφελείμαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ηδείς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ηδείς καὶ ἄλληλοι· ἐκάστορ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιοῦται, τῶν ἄγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἡ δόμαι. ἡ τοιοῦτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστιν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰνθ' ὡσα τοῖς φίλοις δεὶ υπάρχειν. πάσα γὰρ φιλία δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἐστιν ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴν, ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ἡμιονίτητα τινα· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ' υπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτοὺς· ταύτη γὰρ δόμαι καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τὸ τε ἀπλῶς ἄγαθον καὶ ἥδι ἀπλῶς ἐστίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταύτα φιλητά, καὶ τὸ φίλειν δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτως μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. . σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς 8 τοιούτας εἶναι· ὀλγοῦ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἐτὶ δὲ προσδέσται χρόνον καὶ συνθείας· κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστιν

6 ἐκάστω γὰρ—δόμαι] 'For to every man his own actions and those similar to them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are (to the good) identical with their own actions) or similar.' The friend being alter ego, the delight of friendship is that it gives an increased sense of existence.

7 συνάπτει] Neuter, as in viii. iv. 5: οὐ πάνη δ' αὖτι συνάπτοντις.

πάνα γὰρ—τως] 'For every friendship is for good or for pleasure; either absolute, or else relative to him who feels the friendship, and only bearing a certain resemblance to the absolutely good or pleasurable.' The comma should surely be omitted after τῷ φιλοῦντι. Aristotle is not here saying (as the commentators fancy) that every friendship implies similarity, but that every friendship, whether the genuine type or one of the secondary and reflected species, aims at either good or pleasure. This is made clear by the next chapter, § 4: πρῶτας μὲν καὶ κυρίος τῷ τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἢ ἄγαθοι, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ἡμιονίτητα.

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ταύτῃ δὲ—τὰ λοιπὰ] 'But this friendship has all the specified qualities essentially belonging to the persons who feel it (καθ' αὐτοῖς)—(I say essentially), for even the other kinds of friendship are resemblances of this (the perfect kind).’ This passage has vexed the commentators. Zell thinks that δόμαι may be referred to καθ' ἡμιονίτητα τινα in the previous sentence (which he mistakes), and explains, 'In this kind of friendship there is similarity and all the other requisite qualities.' But we surely then should have expected τὰ δόμαι. Cardwell, following Giphanius, Zwingler, and the Scholiast, reads ταύτῃ γὰρ δόμαι καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ. In this kind of friendship men are similar, ex cetera.' Stahr doubts the genuineness of the entire section. The common reading, as above explained, seems borne out by the opening of the next chapter, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἴδιον ἡμιονία ταύτης ἔχει. Cf. viii. vi. 7. "Ομοια here is in opposition to ταύτῃ—καθ' αὐτοῖς.

Κ Κ
εἶδησαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας συναναλώσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέχασθαι δὴ πρῶτον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἀν ἐκάτερος ἐκάτερφον φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βουλοῦνται μὲν φίλοι εἰναι, οὐκ εἰσί δὲ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοὶ, καὶ τοὺτ' ἰσασιν· βουλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχείᾳ φιλίᾳ γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὗ. αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταύτα γίνεται καὶ ὁμοία ἐκάτερφον παρ' ἐκάτερον, ὅπερ δὲ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν.

4 Ὅτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ἦδυ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἦδεις ἀλλήλους. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλους οἱ ἀγαθοὶ. μᾶλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίγνεται παρ' ἀλλήλους, οὖν ἢδονὴ, καὶ μὴ μόνον ὑπὸ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οὖν τοῖς εὐραπτοῖς, καὶ μὴ ὃς ἔρασθη καὶ ἑρωμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢδοναι οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν ὁρὸν εἰκὼν, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔραστος· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὄρας ἐνιότερον καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει· τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἦν ἤδεια ἢ ὅψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία. πολλοὶ δ' αἱ διαμένουσιν, εἰών εκ τῆς συνθείας τὰ ἢδη στέρ-ξωσιν, ὁμοίθεις ὑπῆς. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἦδυ ἀντικαταλλασσόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον εἰν τοῖς ἔραστοις καὶ εἰών ἢττον φίλου καὶ διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον ὑπὲρ φίλου ἀμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύουσι· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἰσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυτέλους. δὴ ἦδον μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον καὶ φαύλως ἐνδέχεται φίλοις εἰναι ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλους καὶ μηδέτερον ὑποτάσσοντα, δ' αὐτοὺς

8 τοῖς λεγομένους ἄλας] 'The salt of the proverb'; cf. Eth. Eud. vii. ii. 35: διὰ εἰς παραμικής ἐλλήνων ὁ μεθόμοις τῶν ἄλων. Cicero, Latius, ch. xix.: 'Verumque illud est quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitias munus expletum sit.'

οδ' ἀποδέχασθαι δὴ—φίλους] 'Nor indeed can they be satisfied that they are friends at all.' Cf. viii. v. 3: οἱ δ' ἀποδέχωμεν ἀλλήλους. ix. iii. 3: οὔ δ' ἀποδέχηται ὃς ἀγαθών. Xen. Mem. iv. i. 1: ἀποδέχεσθαι Σωκράτην.

9 εἰ μὴ—ἵσασι] 'Unless they are likeable (by one another), and are assured of this.'

IV. 2 καὶ εἰς ἦττον—διαμένουσι] 'Are both friends in a less degree and are (less) abiding.'

καὶ μηδέτερον ὑποτάσσον] 'And he who is neither good nor bad may be a friend
Either to the good or to the bad, or to him who is neither one nor the other. For the word μηδέτερος to express a neutral or intermediate state, cf. Eth. vii. xiv. 5: τὸ μηδέτερον, 'that which is neither pleasure nor pain.'

3 καὶ μόνη δὲ—γίνεσθαι] 'And in short, the friendship of the good is alone incapable of being disturbed by accusations. For it is not easy (for the good) to believe any person about a man whom they have long proved. And the sayings about "having faith," and that (the friend) "never could wrong one," and all the other points which are demanded in ideal friendship, are realised in the friendship of the good. But in the other kinds nothing prevents disturbances from accusations (τὰ τοιαῦτα arising.) Διαβάλλειν is 'to set two people by the ears.' Cf. Plato, Republic, p. 498 \\

4 ώ γάρ ἄγαθον τι καὶ δμοιον, ταύτη ἄνωτα] 'For so far as (these kinds of friendship exhibit) something good and resembling the good, so far (those who exercise them) are friends.' The commentators are again deceived by the word δμοιον, taking it to mean 'similarity of character.' See above, ch. iii. § 7, note.

5 οὖ πάνω—συμβεβηκός] 'But the above-mentioned kinds of friendship do not always coincide. Nor do the same men become friends for the sake of the useful, as for the sake of the pleasant. For things only accidentally connected are not always found together.' On συμβεβηκές, cf. Ar. Met. iv. xxx. 1: συμβεβηκές λέγεται δ' ὑπάρχει μὲν τινι καὶ ἄληθες εἴσεν, οὐ μέντοι οὖτ' ἐξ ἄντιγκτην οὖτ' ἐπὶ τὸ τουλ. See also below, § 6.
6. In this respect (i.e. as affording and seeking pleasure or utility) being like (the good).

V. I. I shall begin.—By exercise —
But those who are asleep, or who are separated by the intervals of space, do not exercise friendship, though they have all the disposition to exercise it. For the intervals of space do not destroy friendship, but only its exercise.

This is of course a most inadequate translation of ἐνεργεῖαν and ἔχουσιν.

These words must be understood by a study of Aristotle’s forms of thought.


3. of ἀποδεχόμενοι ἄλληλοι — They who are satisfied with one another.

Cf. above, viii. iii. 3.

δὴ ἦταν ἦταν δοκεῖ ἔχειν — And this (i.e. pleasure and sympathy) seems the property of companionship.

4. δ’ ἤγαθον τῷ ἄγαθῳ δ’ ἄμωμα ταύτα — Now the good man (is a

" εὐλαμπίς δὴ φιλίας ἀπειθείρια δίλειναν.

2. οὐ φαίνονται δ’ οὐδ’ οἱ πρεσβύται οὐδ’ οἱ στρατιωτοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι. Ἐβραίῳ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνεργεῖν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεί. μάλιστα γὰρ η ὁσίος φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίσθαι δὲ τῶν ἡδεῖς. οἱ δ’ ἀποδεχόμενοι ἄλληλοι, μὴ συζωτε τέλειοι, εὐνοῖς ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλίας ἐν οὐδὲν γὰρ οὐδώς ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ σύζην. ὑφελεῖας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεικτές ὁμογεντεύονται, συνεργεῖν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι. μονώσατε μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτο ἡκοίται προσθῆκεν. ἰσχύειν δέ μετ’ ἄλληλοιν οὐκ ἐστὶ μὴ ἡδείς ὅστατοι μὴ δὲ χαίροντας τούτων αὐτοῖς, δὲρ ἦταν ἦταν δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

4. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἦταν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ πολλάκις ἐρήται: δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλήτρον μὲν καὶ ἀρετοῦ τὸ ἀριστερὸς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδῆ, ἐκαύστη δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιούτων. δ’ δ’
friend) to the good man for the sake of both these things' (i.e. the absolutely good and the absolutely pleasant).

5 ἐστὶν δ'—[ἐστιν] 'Loving is like an emotion, but friendship like a settled disposition of the mind. For loving exists just as well towards inanimate objects; but when men reciprocate friendship it implies purpose, and purpose proceeds from a settled disposition of the mind.' In Eth. iv. vi. 5 (cf. ii. v. 2), Aristotle makes friendship to be an emotion, or characterised by emotion. The present passage does not in the least contradict this, as ἔστι, or a settled disposition of mind, is merely the result of regulated emotions, and the tendency to reproduce them.

ἡ δὲ προαιρεσις, κ.τ.λ.] In Eth. iii. ii. 1, Aristotle speaks of 'purpose' as the test of character; ἢ, § 11, as constituting character; ἢ, § 2, as not acting suddenly; ἢ, § 17, as implying reason and forethought.

ἐκάρτοσ—ἀδει] 'Each of the two then loves that which is a personal good to himself, and he makes an equal return both in wishing good and in (actual) pleasure.' Zell, following two MSS., reads ἐδει. But Bekker's reading (ἀδει) appears preferable: (1) because ἢν ἐδει would not be a natural expression; it confounds degree with kind; we should expect ταὐτὸν ἐδει; (2) because ἐδει gives very good sense, since it is one thing to reciprocate the motives or feelings of friendship, and another to give your friend the same amount of pleasure as he gives you.

λέγεται—ἰσότης] 'For equality is said to constitute friendship.' A Pythagorean saying, connecting moral ideas with the ideas of number. Cf. Diog. Laert. viii. i. 8 : εἶπε τις πρῶτος (ὅτι φησι Τιμαιος) κατὰ τὰ φίλων ἐναι, καὶ φιλίαν ἱσότητα.

VI. 1. This section is an awkward repetition of what has been said before, ch. v. § 2. This, however, merely shows that we have probably the uncorrected draft of Aristotle's treatise on Friendship.
2 The perfect kind of friendship, just as one cannot be in love with many at the same time. For a friend to many men on the footing of the perfect kind of friendship, as one cannot be in love with many at the same time. For (the perfect friendship) is a sort of excess of feeling, which naturally arises towards one person alone; again, it is not easy for many persons to be intensely pleasing to the same individual, and perhaps not easy that many should be good. He here would be nearly represented by the French word abandon; it implies the throwing away of limits and restraints, a giving up of one’s whole self. Cf. x. 6: η δυσμα της φιλει της προς αυτον δαιμονια. Of course there is an association of Aristotelian ideas (μετατηςις, ηλειψις, &c.) in the term. It is repeated Eth. ix. x. 5, where the question of the plurality of friendships is carefully gone into.

3 We should have expected, on the analogy of the last sentence, πολλοι τοις αυτω δρεσκειν, but the writing seems careless and the expression is inverted.


χρησιμους μεν ουδεν δεωνται: that care of the external means, Eth. i. viii. 15.

ουδεν αυτου το αγαθον, επι λυπηρων] If Aristotle had been capable of a
joke, we must have considered this to be meant as such. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of the Absolute Good as painful. But the argument is given in a merely matter-of-fact way. See Vol. I. Essay III. p. 216.

δὲi δ' ἵδως—ἀυτοῖς] 'And perhaps (in seeking friends) one ought (to require) that even good men should have this qualification (i.e. pleasantness), and moreover not in a merely universal way, but relatively to oneself.'

5 or δ' ἐν ταῖς—φιλίαι] 'Great potentates' (cf. Eth. I. v. 3), 'however, seem to make use of their friends separately;' i.e. they keep two sets of friends, one for profit or business, and another for pleasure.

6 ἵδως δὲ—γίνεσθαι] 'Now we have already said that the good man is both pleasant and useful at once. But such a man does not become a friend to his superior (in rank), unless he be surpassed (by that superior) in virtue also. Else he does not find himself in that position of equality which is produced by superiority in proportion to merit. Such persons however (as potentates who surpass the good in virtue), are not produced every day.' The commentators have strangely interpreted this passage, making ὑπερέχειν take for its nominative ὁ ὑπερέχων, as though Aristotle had said that a good man would not be a friend to a potentate, if that potentate had superior moral qualities; and as though 'equality' were produced by one man having all the merit and another all the power. On the contrary, Aristotle would have said that 'proportionate equality' is produced, according to the principles of distributive justice, by each man having in proportion to his merits; cf. Eth. v. iii. 6; Pol. III. ix. 15. There is no sense of inequality produced by the position of a man socially exalted, if he be also exalted in intellect and character; inequality is felt when a fool or a villain occupies a high social position. Cf. Pol. III. ix. 15:
ἀνθ’ ἐτέρων ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἱ οὖν ἦδονὴν ἀντ’ ὤφελείας. ὅτι δὲ ἤττον εἰσὶν αὕται αἱ φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι’ ὑμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταῦταν εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ’ ὑμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ’ ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἱδ’ ἔχει ἡ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ’ ὑπάρχει κάκεινη), τῷ δὲ τῇ μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταῦτα δὲ τἀχεῖος μετατίθεται ἄλλως τε διαφέρειν τολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι δι’ ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.

7 Ὅτερον δ’ ἐστὶ φιλίας εἰδὸς τὸ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν, οἶον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἔλασι πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεότερον, ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναίκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέροντι δ’ αὐτὴ καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεύει πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχόμενους, ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐδ’ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναίκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἀνδρα. ἔτερα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τοῦτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἐργὸν, ἔτερα δὲ καὶ δι’ ἀρχεῖσθαι. 2 ἔτερα οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλίαις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ταυτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίγνεται ἐκατέρω παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεὶ ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεύει μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέῃ δ’ δεὶ τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ νικῶσιν δ’ δεὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς εἶσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ’ εἰς πάσας ταῖς καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν οὕτως φιλίαι καὶ τὴν φιλίστην δεὶ γίνεσθαι, οἶον τὸν ἀμείβων μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ή φιλεῖ καὶ τὸν ὀφελιμότερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκατόρθον ὦμοιος· ὅταν γὰρ κατ’ ἄξιον ἡ φιλίστη γίγνεται, τότε γίγνεται πώς ἴσοτης ὁ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

3 Οὐχ ὦμοιος δὲ τὸ ἱσον εν τε τοίς δικαίοις καὶ εν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται έχειν· ἐστὶ γὰρ εν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἱσον πρῶτον τὸ κατ’ ἄξιον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσον δευτέρως, εν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσον πρῶτος, τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἄξιον δευ-

Διότερ τούτων τῆς πίλευς μετέστι πλείον—ἡ τοῖς κατὰ πλούτων ὑπερεχουσι, κατ’ ἀρετήν δ’ ὑπερεχομένως
7 εἴρηται] Cf. viii. iii. 2–3.

VII. 2 ἀνάλογον δ] The same principle of distributive justice, main-
tained above in § 6 of the last chapter, is again appealed to. Where friends are not equal, their friendship must be regulated by proportion.
3 οὐχ ὦμοιος—δευτέρως] ‘But equality seems to stand differently in justice and in friendship. In justice
proportionate equality is primary, and quantitative equality secondary; in friendship, quantitative equality is the first, and proportionate equality the second consideration." Distributive justice begins by presupposing inequalities between man and man, and by proportionate assignments it equalises these. Justice, however, cares little about bringing men to quantitative or exact equality. The latter kind of equality, at all events, is aimed at only in democracies, while the proportionate equality belongs to aristocracies and constitutional governments. Cf. Ar. Pol. vi. ii. 2. Friendship, on the other hand, begins by presupposing equality between the parties, and though a certain amount of inequality may be made up by proportionate assignment of affection, &c., yet a wide interval of inequality will render friendship altogether impossible.

5 ἀκριβῆ—οὐκέτα] 'In such cases there is no exact definition up to what point friendship is possible; for after many deductions (from equality) have been made, friendship still abides; but when (the one friend) is far removed from the other, as, for instance, God is from man, there is no friendship any longer.' It is indeterminate at what point, if you go on diminishing equality, friendship will cease, just as, in the old puzzle, at what point the heap ceased to be a heap.

6 δὴν καὶ—τάγαθά] 'From this the question has arisen whether friends wish for their friends the greatest of all goods, as, for instance, to be gods. For having attained this, they would no longer at all be friends to those who formed the wish, and therefore no advantage to them, for friends are an advantage. If, then, it has been rightly stated that the friend wishes all that is good to his friend for that friend's sake, it will be necessary for that friend to remain as he is, and then he will wish for him, being a man, the greatest goods. After all, perhaps, he will not wish
8 Οι πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βουλεῦσαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν, διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοὶ. ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἡ προστοιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι 2 δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφιένται. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸ δ' ἐοίκασιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμῶμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα. οἰονται γὰρ τεῦξονται παρ' αὐτῶν, ἀν τὸν δέωνται ὡς δὴ σημεῖο τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ. οὐ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδῶν ὅρε- γόμενοι τιμής βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφηναι περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὴ ὅτι εἰσίν ἁγάθοι, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειν ἂν κρείττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία 3 καθ' αὐτὴν αἱρετὴ εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· εἶναι γὰρ διδάσκει τὰ ἐστῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδίκεια, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' ὡς ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἴκανον αὐταῖς ἐσχέν εἶναι, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς εὖ πράττονται, καὶ αὐταῖ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ

him to have everything. For every one especially wishes for himself what is good.' Under the words διόρειται μὴ ποτ' ὦ is included a question both as to fact and cause. Ὅδε γὰρ denies the fact and states the cause, which is that if we wished our friend to become a god, we should wish him to be in a position where he can no longer be our friend. The last sentence (τῶν δ' ὦ πάντα) qualifies the previous statement, and guards against the notion that any human friendship can be utterly disinterested and selfless. The same topic is fully discussed in the eighth chapter of Book IX.

VIII. 1-2 Though the essence of friendship consists rather in loving than in being loved, the mass of men prefer the latter, as ministering to their vanity. Being loved is akin to being honoured. Parenthetically it may be observed that honour is sought not for itself but on account of things variously associated with it (καθ' συμ- 3 The active spirit of love, as op- bevalen. Parenthetically it be associated with it (καθ' συμ- 3 The active spirit of love, as op- bevalen. Parenthetically it
to be brought up by other persons, and go on loving them, though not even recognised by them.

4-5 It is this active spirit of love which constitutes the virtue of friendship, and which causes us to praise those who are of a friendly disposition. This then explains what was above stated merely as a fact, Euth. viii. i. 5. The same spirit serves as the equalising principle in unequal friendships, greater merit being met by greater love.

5-7 Friendship is based on equality and similarity, especially the friendship of the good. Friendships for the sake of pleasure or profit seem rather based on contrariety, as, for instance, on the contrariety of riches and poverty. But, after all, one would say not that the contrary seeks its contrary, but that the contrary seeks the mean.

5 μάλιστα μὴ ἡ τῶν κατ' ἄρετὴν ὁμοιότητα] Cf. the Lysis of Plato, p. 214, quoted above upon ch. i. 6.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν—ἐπιτρέπειν] 'For the good will neither do wrong themselves, nor permit their friends to do it.'

7 ὅρεξις τοῦ μέσου] This phrase is in accordance with the pantheistic side of Aristotle's philosophy, attri-
buting to nature a desire for the good. Cf. De Anima, ii. iv. 3: τάστα γὰρ ἐκείνῳ (τοῦ θεοῦ) ἄρα, κάκειν ἦνεκα πράτειν διά πράτει 
κατὰ φόσον. Ἐθ. x. ii. 4: Ἡ χρήματα ἀποστέρησε έταύρον δεινότερον ἡ πολίτην, 
καὶ μὴ βοηθήσαι ἄδελφον ἡ οὐκείο, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα 
ὑπνοῦν ἄλλον. αὐξέσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ 
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὥς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπαίτι καὶ ἐπ’ ἦσθον 
4 διήκοντα. αἱ δὲ κοινωνίας πάσαι μορίως εἰκασί τῆς 
πολιτικῆς· συμπεριέχονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινὶ συμφέροντι, καὶ 
πορίζομενοι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ
VIII.—X.] ΘΕΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ VIII. 269

κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καί έξ άρχής συνελθείν καί διαμένειν· τοῦτον γὰρ καί οἱ νομοθέται στοχαζονται, καί άκακον φασίν εἶναι τὸ κοινή συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν 5 οὖν ἀλλα κοινωνία κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος εφίενται, οἶον πλατήρες μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον συστρατώταν δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἶτε χρημάτων εἶτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καί φιλέται καί δημόται. ἔναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνίων δὴ ἡδονὴ δοκούσι γέγνεσθαι, θιασώτων καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὕτα γὰρ θυσίαι ἐνεκα καί συνονήσεις. πάσαι δ’ αὕτα ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν έοίκαιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἢ πολιτικὴ εἵμεραι, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀπαντὰ τὸν βίον, θυσίαι τε ποιοῦντες καί περὶ ταῦτα συνήδον, τιμᾶς ἀπομέμνετε τοῖς θεοῖς, καί αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μὲν ἡδονής· αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖα θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαινοῦνται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἶον ἀπαρχαὶ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχάλαξαν τοῖς καυροῖς. πάσαι δὴ φαινοῦνται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρα τῆς 6 πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολούθησον δὲ αἱ τοιαύται φιλία ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις.

Πολιτείας δ’ ἐστὶν ἑιδὴς τρία, ίσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις, 10 οἶον φθοραὶ τοῖτων. εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ μὲν πολιτείαι βασίλεια

5 θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν] Cardwell refers for illustration of these terms to Demosthenes, pp. 313, 23; 403, 19; 1355, 3; 1217, 14.

By omitting, with Friziche, Bekker's full stop after συνωνίας, and by placing the words οὖ γὰρ—τὸν βίον in a parenthesis, we see that the participles ποιοῦντες, ἀπομεμνημένοι, πορίζοντες are to be referred to κοινωνίας, as implied in κοινωνίων above. The passage which speaks of men ‘awarding honour to the gods, while providing recreation and pleasure for themselves,’ is highly characteristic of the Greek religion. This sort of thing can perhaps be best understood in the present day by those who have seen the religious festivals of the Hindoos. Cf. Plato's Republic, p. 364 B: θυσίαις τε καὶ ἐσχάλαξι—μεθ’ ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐποτῶν.

X. This chapter, containing a classification of forms of government and of the perversions to which they are exposed, can hardly have been written after the Politics of Aristotle. It has rather the appearance of a first essay, the conclusions of which were afterwards worked out into detail, and partly modified. Thus Aristotle in the Politics by no means conceives the position that monarchy is the best form of government. He argues, Pol. iii. xv. 4–16, that it is better for
a state to be governed by good laws than by the best individual will; further on, Pol. iii. xvii., he qualifies this by admitting that for some peoples monarchy is better suited.

1 σαρκίβασεις 'Perversions' or 'abnormal growths;' cf. Pol. iii. vi. ii, where a form of government is pronounced to be normal as long as it aims at the public good, abnormal when its end is private interest: φανερὸν τοῖν ὡς δειμένων μὲν πολιτείαι τὸ κοινόν συμφέρον σκοπόνων, αὐτὰ μὲν ὀρθά τυγχάνοντα ὁδοὺς κατὰ τὸ ἀπλὸν δίκαιον, δειμένων δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μοῖρον τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἡμαρτημέναι πᾶσαι καὶ σαρκίβασεις τῶν ὑπάρχον πολιτειῶν διεσπαρτικαῖ γὰρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστὶν.

Πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν εἰσώσασι οἱ πλεῖστοι καλεῖ 'But most people are accustomed to term it 'a constitution.'''

The word πολιτεία was used by the Greeks in a restricted sense, just as the word 'constitution' is in English, to denote a balanced form of government. Cf. Ar. Pol. iii. vii. 3: δεῖν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτείηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν δύον πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. Aristotle does not use the word in the Politics to denote a timocracy. In the ninth chapter of Book IV. he uses it to denote a mixed form between oligarchy and democracy. He also uses it to express his own ideal of a state, which was far from being a timocracy.

2 δ' ἔγερε μὴ τοιούτως κληρωτικὰ ἢ τις ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας 'For he who had not these qualifications would be a sort of ballot-box king.' It is difficult to express the word κληρωτικός, which as coupled with βασιλεῖος is certainly meant to be contemptuous. Aristotle does not appear to mean any definite form of monarchy, so we learn nothing from Pol. iii. xiv., to which the commentators refer us. Aristotle here says that the genuine king must be independent in property and position, and above all his subjects in this respect. Externally wanting nothing for himself, he will administer the state for the good of his subjects. If this is not the case, he will be no genuine king, but a pantepus, κληρωτικὸς τις, like a person who had been raised to the throne by the contingency of lot, and therefore insecure in his position, with perhaps only a temporary tenure of office. The word ἄλογος is coupled with μὴ κληρωτικός (as an epithet of πεισταις), Pol. ii. xi. 7. It is possible that in the present passage a notion of 'paid services' may be implied. If so, 'hireling monarch' would express the terms under notice.
κληρωτός ἂν τις εἰς βασιλείαν. ἦ δὲ τυραννὸς εἰς ἐναντίας ταύτης τὸ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει, καὶ φανερῶτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὑπὲρ χειρίστης κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ 3 βελτίστῳ. μεταβαίνει δὲ ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα, φαντάσθη γὰρ ἑστὶ μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς. ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεύς τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἁζίαν, καὶ πάντα ἡ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλούτειν. ὅλιγοι δὲ ἁρχούσι καὶ μοχθηροί ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσὶν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος γὰρ βουλεύτω καὶ τὴν τιμοκρατίαν εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἡκιστά δὲ μοχθηρῶν ἐστὶν ἡ δημοκρατία. ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβάλει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἴδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μᾶλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτείαι ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾴστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοίωμα δὲ αὐτῶν 4 καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἀν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς νεῖσ δούλων κοινωνία βασιλείας ἐχει σχῆμα τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ ὁμορός τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεῖ τῷ πατρικῇ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βουλεύσῃ. ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δὲ ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική. χρώται γὰρ ὅσο δούλως τοῖς νεῖσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότον συμφέρον εἰν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὐτῇ μὲν οὖν ὁρθῇ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη τῶν διαφορῶν γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναῖκος ἀριστο-5 κρατικὴ φαίνεται κατ' ἁζίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνήρ ἁρχεῖ, καὶ περὶ ταύτα δὲ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα ὡς δὲ γυναικὶ ἁρμοζει, ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνήρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθούσην. παρὰ τὴν ἁζίαν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοιεί, καὶ οὖχ ἃ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἁρχούσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπικληροὶ οὕται.

4 τῶν διαφορῶν—διάφοροι.] 'For those who differ should be governed differently.' And therefore the Persian system is wrong, which governs children as if they were the same as slaves.

5 γυναῖκες ἐπικληροὶ οὕται] The Greek feeling about 'heiresses' is strongly expressed in a fragment of Menander (Ly.): ὅτις γυναίκ' ἐπικληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβέι ν' ἐπικλήτη δεῖν, ἡ βουλὴ δ' ἀτυχεῖν, παρὰ γὰρ αὐτῷ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὖχ ἃ ἀμείνων.
οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ’ ἅρετὴν αἱ ἄρχαι, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον
καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ εὖ ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικὴ
δὲ ἔσκεψις τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἵσθι γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφ’ ὅσον ταῖς
ἡλικίαις διαλάπτουσιν, διότερ αὖ τολῆ ταῖς ἡλικίαις
diaφέρονσι, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκίσεων (ἐνταῦθα
γὰρ τὰντες ἔξ ἵσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ
ἐκάστῳ ἐξουσίᾳ.

11 Καθ’ ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτείων φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ’
ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευόμενους
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἐνεργείας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευόμενους,
eἰπέρ ἁγαθὸν ὄν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν’ εὖ πράττοσιν,
ὡστε νομεῖν προβάτων. δὴν καὶ ὁ Ομηρὸς τὸν Ἀγα-
μένων τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ η πατρικῆς,
diaφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἐνεργητικῶν· αὕτως γὰρ
τὸ εἶναι δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας·
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε ἄρχων
πατὴρ νῦν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγκύως καὶ βασιλεῖς βασι-
λευόμενοι. εὖ ὑπεροχῇ δὲ εἰς τὴν φιλίαν ἀνθρακοῦ,
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτῳ οὐ ταύτῳ
ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ’ ἄξιον· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὶ
δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτῆς φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατία.
καὶ ἅρετὴν γὰρ, καὶ τῷ ἁμείνον πλέον ἁγαθὸν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον
 viêm οὐτώ δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ
ἐταιρίᾳ ἔσκεψι· ἵσθι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικία, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δὲ
ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὅσʾ ἐπὶ τὸ πολ. ἔσκει δὲ ταύτῃ
καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατίαν· ἵσθι γὰρ οἱ πολίται
βουλοῦνται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ
ἐξ ἱσθι· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν,
ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐστὶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία

XII. 3 εἰς ὑπεροχῇ—γυναῖκ] 'All
these friendships imply superiority on
the one side, and hence it is that
parents are honoured, i.e. because
superiority demands honour, as well
as love.

5 ἵστι γὰρ—ἐκαί] 'For it is the
part of the citizens (in a timocracy) to
live equally and equitably with one
another.' To understand the full
meaning of ἐπιεικεῖς, see the fine pas-
sage from Ἐθ. I. xiii., translated in
the note on Eth. v. x. i., and cf. ix. x.
6. βουλοῦται expresses a natural ten-
dency, cf. viii. x. 3: πλήθουσι γὰρ βου-
λοῦται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι.
ε'στι, καὶ ἦκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινὸν ἔστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἄρχομενῳ, οũδὲ φιλία: οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἶν τεχνὴ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ἰσχὺ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσποτὴ πρὸς δούλουν ὥφελεται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλίᾳ δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὖν δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οὖν πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὖν πρὸς δούλουν ἢ δοῦλος. οὖν γὰρ κοινὸν ἐστὶν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἐμψυχὸν ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος. ἥ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἀνθρώπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνίσας νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δὴ, καθ' ὄσον ἀνθρώπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσις 8 αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἰσος οὖν.

Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ ἐρήματι. 12 ἀφορίσειν δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενείᾳ καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν. αἰ δὲ πολιτικὴ καὶ φυλετικὴ καὶ συμπλοκὴ, καὶ δοκεῖ τοιαῦτα, κοινωνικὰς ἐεἰκάσει μᾶλλον· οὖν γὰρ καθ' ὀμολογίαν τινὰ φαινονται εἶναι· εἰς ταῦτας δὲ τάξειν ἐν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν· καὶ ἡ συγγενεία δὲ φαίνεται πολὺ· εἰς ἐνεῖς εἶναι, ἡρτησθαί δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἅρτ' ἐκεῖνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον δ' ἐσαίσων οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἔξι αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὡς ἐκ τού·

6 ὥφελεται—δίκαιον] 'For though all these things receive benefit from those who make use of them, yet neither friendship nor justice is possible towards inanimate objects.' The corresponding passage in the Budianian Ethics serves as a commentary on this: Ἐχ. Ἐκ. τ. 11. x 4: συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ [o conj. Bonitz] ὄργανον ἐγγέλειας τυγχάνει, ἢ δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐκείνου ἐστι. The instrument receives just so much care from its master as will keep it in proper condition for the exercise of

its functions. The slave, who is treated not as a person but as a thing, receives the same kind of attention. Friendship and justice imply the recognition of personality; they imply treating men not as instruments, but as ends in themselves. On the slavery of the body to the soul, cf. Ar. Pol. 1. v. 6–8.

XII. 1 ἀφορίσειν δ' ἂν τις] In saying that all friendships imply community of interests, an exception is to be made of the friendships of relations
τῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον συνφρείωται τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ
tὸ γενόμενον τῷ τοιάσταντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀυτῶν οἰκεῖον τῷ
ἄφ’ οὗ, οἷον ὁδοὺς ἡ θρίζε ἡ ὁτιοῦ τῷ ἐχοντι· ἐκεῖνο δ’ οὐθὲν
tὸ ἄφ’ οὗ, ἡ ὑπτον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ
μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργονται, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα
τοῖς χρόνοις τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἡ αἰσθήσιν λαβόντα. ἐκ
τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δ’ ἡφιεύς μᾶλλον αἱ μμέρες.

3 γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς εαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐ-
tῶν οίνον ἑτεροι αὐτοῖ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ἐστὶ
ἂν ἐκεῖνον πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοί δ’ ἄλληλοι τῷ ἐκ τῶν
ἀυτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκείνα ταύτότης ἄλληλοις
ταύτωτείς· δὴν ἡφιεύς τῶν αἰμα καὶ μίζαν καὶ τὰ τοι-
αῦτα. εἰσὶ δ’ ταύτῳ ποσ καὶ εἰ διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς
φιλιάν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἥλιον· ἡμῖν γὰρ
ἡλίκα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἄδελφική τῇ ἑτα-
ρικῇ ὁμοιότητα. ἀνεφίλει δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ
tούτων συνφρείωται. τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰναι, γι-
γνονται δ’ οἱ μὲν οἰκεῖοτέροι οἱ δ’ ἄλλοριστεροί τῷ σύνεγ-
γυς ἡ πόρρω τῶν ἀρχηγῶν εἰναι. ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς
φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεοὺς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν
καὶ ὑπερέχον· εἰ γὰρ πεποικάσα τοῖς μέγιστα· τῷ γὰρ
εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ πανδεψάθη
tαι. 6 ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἣν καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλ-
λον τῶν οἰκείων, διὸ καὶ κοινότεροι ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς εὐστ. ἔστι
d’ οἱ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄδελφικῇ ἀπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταρικῇ, καὶ
μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπεικείσει, καὶ ἄλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, διὸ
οἰκείοτεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς υπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἄλλη-
λους, καὶ διὸ ὁμονοθέστεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι

and companions, which depend on
feeling rather than on any sort of
compact.

3 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἄλλη-
λοις ταυτόσειείς· 'For their identity
with the parents identifies them with
one another.' ἐκείνοι is in the neuter
gender on account of the words ἐκ
tῶν αὐτῶν to which it immediately
refers.

4 ἄνεψοι δὲ—ἐδοι] 'But cousins
and all other relations get their bond
of unity from these (i.e. the brothers);
for (it depends) on their coming from
the same stock. Relations are more
or less closely united to one another,
in proportion as their common an-
ccestor is more or less near.'

5 πρὸς θεοὺς ὡς πρὸς ἄγαθον καὶ
ὑπερέχον] Cf. Bιλ. viii. vii. 4, ix. i. 7,
supposes that of the state, which will accordingly be prior. In the same way, the family is more necessary as a means, the state as an end.

Friedrich quotes the saying of Isokrates to his wife in the Economics of Xenophon (vii. 13): 'τὸν δὲ θεὸν ἀλήθειας δὲ κόσμος ἠστίν. Ἐγὼ τὸ γὰρ, δεκα μον ἄστυ, ἀπατεῖ, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποφαίνω, σὺ τὲ δεκα ἡμέριμνα, πάντα εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατεδράκας.'

XIII. 1 εἰς ἀρχήν] Ἐκλ. viii. iii. 1.
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αμέανων χαίρον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἢδεις, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἵσαξοντες ταῖς ὕφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἰσοὺς μὲν κατ' ἵσοτητα δὲ τῷ φιλείν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἵσαξειν, τοὺς

2 δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑποχαγίαις ἀποδιδόναι, γίγνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλία ἡ μόνη ἡ μάλιστα εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δὲ ἀρετὴν φιλοῖ δύνεται εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται· τούτῳ γὰρ ἀρετὴς καὶ φιλίας. πρὸς τούτο δ' ἀμφιλομένων οὐκ ἐστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάξι τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς ὑπεχεράνει, ἀλλ' εἰν ἕν χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. δ' ἄντερβαλλων, τυγχάνων οὐ δέψεται, οὐκ ἐν ἐγκαλοῖ τῷ φιλῷ· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τῷ ἀγαθῷ

3 ἐφίεται. οὐ πάντως δ' οὖν ἐν τοῖς δ' ἢδονην. ἀμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὐ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγει χαίρουσιν. γελοῖος δ' ἐν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκάλων τῷ μὴ τέρποντι,

4 ἐξ' τοῦ συνδιαιρέουν· ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ' ὕφελεία γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλους ἀει τοῦ πλείονος δεύναι, καὶ ἐλαττον ἔχειν ὄντως τοῦ προσφυγοῦς, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ἄσων δέναι τοσούτων τυγχάνων ἄξοιν δεύτεροι οὐχ ὁ ποιοῦντας οὐ δύναται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσοῦτον ὃσον οἱ

5 πάσχοντες δέναι. ἐσφαλ' δὲ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον ἐστὶ διετόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δ' κατὰ νόμων, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ

2 τῶν γὰρ—ἐν δρών] 'No one takes it ill that one loves and benefits him, but, if he be of gentle mind, pays his benefactor back in good deeds.' The subject to ἀμώνεται is implied in ὀδεῖσιν. Fritzche quotes Horace, Sat. 1. i. 1.

Nemo quam sibi sortem
Seu ratio dederit, seu fors oboecurit, illa Contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentes.

χαρίες has nothing to do with 'gratitude.' It means much the same as is conveyed in the word 'gentleman.' Cf. Euth. v. 4: οἱ δὲ χαρίες καὶ παρακολ. iv. viii. 9: χαρίες καὶ ἐλεήμονες.

5 ἐσφαλ'-διαλούονται] 'Now as justice is twofold, the one unwritten, the other according to law, so also of utilitarian friendship there appear to be two branches, the one moral and the other legal. The complaints then (which arise) chiefly take place when men do not conclude their connection in the same branch in which they commenced it.' συπολλάττεσθαι is to make a contract, διαλύνεσθαι to wind up a contract by the mutual performance of the terms. Men who consider that they have entered upon a so-called friendship with a fixed stipulation (νομικῆ) of certain advantages to be received, will complain if the fixed stipulation is denied, and only a general moral obligation (θεωρη) to render services is admitted.
That which is on stated conditions then is legal (utilitarian friendship). One sort of it is wholly commercial, implying payment on the spot (ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεὶρα); another is more liberal, allowing time (εἰς χρόνον), but still on the understanding of a specified return. In this then the debt is plain and undoubted, but the delay which it admits of is friendly. Hence in some states no suits are allowed in cases of this kind, but men think that those who have contracted on faith should abide (by the issue)." ἀναβολὴ in commerce answers to 'credit'; cf. Plato's Laws, XI p. 915 b: μὴ εἶλ ἀναβολὴ πρᾶσιν μηδὲ ἄνθρο ποιεῖσαι. Or it may answer to buying or selling for future delivery. φιλίαν ('of the nature of friendship') stands here as a predicate. Cf. Eth. VIII. 1: τῶν δικαιῶν τὸ μελλόντα φιλίαν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

On the other hand, the moral (branch of utilitarian friendship) is not on stated conditions, but the gift, or whatever else it be, is made as if to a friend. Yet (the giver) claims to get as much, or more, as though he had not given but lent. And if he does not come off in the connection as well as he commenced, he will complain. Now this (sort of disappointment) takes place because all or most men wish that which is noble, but practically choose that which is expedient. It is noble to do good not with a view to receive it back, but it is expedient to be benefited.' This passage discriminately exposes a sort of vacillation between disinterestedness and self-interest, which occurs in utilitarian friendships. A man at one moment thinks vaguely (βούλεται) of aining at the noble, and makes a gift as if he expected no return. But presently the more definite bent of his mind (προαίρεσις) reverts to the profitable, and he claims to get back as good as he gave. On the distinction between βούλεσθαι and προαίρεσθαι cf. Eth. III. iv. 1, v. ix. 6, and the notes.

If one is able, then one ought to pay back the full value of what one has received;
δὴ ἀνταποδοτέων τὴν ἀξίαν ὁν ἐπαθεν, καὶ ἐκόντι ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. ὡς δὴ διαμαρτύρτα ἐν τῇ ἁρχῇ καὶ εὗ παθόντα ὑφ’ οὐ οὐκ ἔδει. οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος. διαθήκη οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐρέγητηντα διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσατι δ’ ἀν δυνάμεον ἀποδόσειν· ἀδυνατούντα δ’ οὖν ὁ δοὺς ἡξίωσεν ἀν· ὅστ’ εἰ δυνατός, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἁρχῇ δ’ ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ’ οὐ εὐρέγητειται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅτως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένῃ η μη. ἀμφισβητήσαν δ’ ἔχει πότερα δεὶ τῇ τοῦ παθὸντος ὠφελεία μετείκαι καὶ πρὸς ταύτῃ πουείσα εἰς τὴν ανταπόδοσιν, ἡ τῇ τοῦ δράσαν- τος εὐρέγησιά. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαυτά φασί λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐρέγετων ἀ μικρὰ ἡ ἐκάνοις καὶ ἐξὴν παρ’ ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασκευάζοντες· οἱ δ’ ἀνάπαυλ τὰ μέ- γιστα τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ τ’ παρ’ ἄλλοιν οὐκ η, καὶ έν κινδύνοις η τοιαύτας χρείαις. ἄρ’ οὖν δία μὲν τὸ χρη- σίμον τῆς φίλιας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθὸντος ὠφελεία μέτρον ἐστίν; οὕτως γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἑπαρκεί αὐτῷ ὡς κομιομένος τὴν ἰσθ’ τοσαύτη ὁν γεγενήται ἡ ἐπικουρία σοσ οὕτως ὠφεληται, καὶ ἀποδοτεον δ’ αὐτῶ διὸν ἐπηύματο, ἡ καὶ πλέον κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ’ ἄρετὴν

for one must not make a man a friend against his will (i.e. treat him as if he were disinterested, when he did not really mean to be so). (One must act) as if one had made a mistake at the outset, and had received a benefit from one whom one ought not to have received it from, that is to say, not from a friend, or from some one doing a friendly action: one must conclude the business therefore as if one had been benefited on stated conditions. And (in this case) one would stipulate to repay to the best of one’s ability;—if one were unable, not even the giver could demand it; so in short, if one is able, one should repay. But one ought to consider at the outset by whom one is benefited, and on what terms, so that one may agree to accept those terms or not.’ The words 

καὶ ἐκόντι are omitted in the above translation. They are left out by two of the MSS., and while they merely interrupt the sense of the passage, they may easily be conceived to have arisen out of the following words, ἄκοντα γάρ. The passage prescribes the mode of dealing with a person who having conferred a benefit (as described in the last section) expects a return for it. The accusative case διαμαρ- τύρτα is governed by the verbal ad- jective διαλυτέον which follows; cf. Eik. vii. i. 1: λεκτέον ἄλλον ποιησάμενον ἁρχήν. Some editions read ὁμολογήσασι ἀρχήν, which the commentators explain to be governed by δὲ, as implied in the verbal adjectives διαμαρτύρταν, διαλυτέον.

11 ἄρ’ οὖν—πλέον] ‘Surely, as the friendship is for the sake of utility,
Διαφέρονται δε και εν ταϊς καθ’ ὑπεροχήν φιλίας. ἀξιοὶ 14 γὰρ ἐκάτερος πλεόν ἐχειν, ὅταν δε τοῦτο γίγνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἷται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλεόν ἐχειν. τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεών ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ο ὑφελιμωτερὸς ἄρχειν γὰρ ὅτα οὐ φασίν δει ἰσον ἐχειν. λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ καὶ αξίων τῶν ἑργῶν ἐσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας. οἴονται γὰρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνία πλεόν λαμβάνοντων οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὔτω δεῖ καὶ εν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δὲ ἐνδείκνυσθαι καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπταλιν φιλον γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν. τί γὰρ, φασίν, ὀφεῖλον στουδαῖος ἡ δύνασθη φιλον εἶναι, μηδὲν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαίειν; ἐσκε δὲ ἐκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξίων, καὶ δεῖ ἐκάτερος πλεόν νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δε, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς, τῷ δ’ ἐνδείκνυσθαι τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ’ ἐνδείας ἐπικούρια τὸ κέρδος. οὔτω δ’ ἐχεῖν τοῦτο καὶ εν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται. οὐ δ’ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων τῷ κοινῷ γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τῷ κοινῷ εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δε κοινῶν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀμα χρηματικῆς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμῶν ἐν παλί γὰρ τὸ ἐλαττὸν οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὲ
περὶ χρήματα ελαττουμένω τιμήν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα τὸ κατ’ ἄξιον γὰρ ἐπανοικὸ καὶ σωζεῖ τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ ἐίρηται. οὔτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέοι, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὄφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν 4 τιμὴν ἀνταποδότευν, ἀνταποδίδοντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπίσητε, οὐ τὸ κατ’ ἄξιον οὔτε γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν πάσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἃν ποτε τὴν ἄξιον ἀποδοθή, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, διὸ κἂν δόξειν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι νῦν πατέρα ἀπείπασθα, πατρὶ δ᾽ οὐίον ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέναι, οὐθὲν δὲ ποίησαι ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργεμένων δέδρακεν, ὅστ᾽ αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἰς δ᾽ ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφείναι καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή. ἁμα δ᾽ ἵσως οὐδεὶς ποτ᾽ ἃν ἀποστήναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ, χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρόν ὄντι εῦ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βουλοῦνται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

4 ἀπείπασθα] 'To disown.' Cardwell quotes Herodotus i. 59: et tis ol τυγχάνει ἕως παῖς τοῦτων ἀπείπασθα. Demosthenes 1006, 21: (ὁ νόμος) τοῖς γονέας τοὺς κυρίου οὐ μόνον δέθεαι τοῦτον εἰ ἄρχῃ, ἄλλα καὶ τάλων ἐξελεύσαι ἐκ βουλοῦνται, καὶ τοῖς πρὸς τοῖς χωρὶς γὰρ—διωθεῖσθαι] 'For independently of natural affection, it is a human instinct not to reject the assistance (which he might derive from his son).' διωθεῖσθαι is used in the same sense, Eth. ix. xi. 6. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω] These words may have been written by Aristotle himself, with the view of dividing his treatise on Friendship into two books, of the same length as the books into which all his various writings are divided. Or, on the other hand, they may have been added, for the same purpose, by an editor.
ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ IX.

ΕΝ ΠΑΣΑΙΣ δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἵσαζε καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ ἐρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἁμοιότης γίνεται καὶ ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμομα, καὶ 2 πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τοῦτῳ μετρεῖται. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνότε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ύπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οעיני ἕχων, φιλητόν, εἰ οὗτοι ἐπιχεῖ, πολλάκις δὲ ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὓθεν ἐπτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα, ἐπειδὰν ὁ 3 μὲν δὲ ἡδονὴ τῶν ἐρώμενον φιλῆ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τῶν ἐραστῆν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἁμοφών ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὕσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνεται ὡν ἑνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐστεργοῦν ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρ- χοντα, οὐ μόνον διῆλθα· διὸ τοιαύτα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ’ αὐτὴν οὕσα μὲνε, καθάπερ ἐρηται. διαφέ−4

I. In heterogeneous friendships, equality is to be obtained by the rule of proportion. The same rule holds good in political economy, where the most heterogeneous products are equalised against one another. In political economy there is the convenience of a common standard, money, by which products may be measured. In friendship there is, unfortunately, no such standard.

I ἀνομοιοειδεῖς] This is not quite the same as ταῖς καθ’ ὑπερχών φιλίαις. It implies relationships in which the two parties have respectively different objects in view, as, for instance, in the case of the employer and the employed, the ἐρώμενος and the ἐραστῆς, &c.

καθάπερ ἐρηται] Cf. Eth. viii. xiii. 1. ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ] By the modern division of sciences, Political Economy has been raised into separate existence, so as in its method to be entirely independent of, and in its results subordinate to, Politics. On the Aristotelian theory of the law of value in exchange, see Eth. v. v. 8, and nota.

3 ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν] 'Moral friendship,' or 'friendship based on character,' the same as ἡ καθ’ ἀρετῆν φιλῆ. Cf. Eth. viii. xiii. 11: ἡ δὲ ταῖς καθ’ ἀρετῆς—τὰς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἡθουν,
ρονταὶ δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἑτέρα γίγνεται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὅπε- γινονται· δμοιον γὰρ τῷ μὴθὲν γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν οὐ ἐφείται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οὖν καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀμείνου ἁσειν, τοσοῦτω πλεῖστοι εἰς ἐω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἱδους ἱδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη, εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐξουλετο, ἰκανῶς ἀν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐχει ὁ δὲ μῇ, οὐκ ἄν ἐη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὃς γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτως καὶ προσέχει, κάκεινον γε χάριν ταύτα δώσει.

5 τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξιν ἐστὶ, τοῦ προϊέμουν ἡ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἐν ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φαί καὶ Προταγόρας ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειν ἀδίκ- ποτε, τιμήσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευς ὅσον δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπί-

k.t.l. Of course the above terms have nothing to do with the ‘moral’ branch of utilitarian friendship, mentioned Eth. viii. xiii. 5, 7.

4 οὖν· ἐφή· 'As in the case of him who promises (a reward) to the harper, and "the better he sang, the more he should have," but when the man next morning demands the fulfilment of his promises, said that "he had paid pleasure for pleasure." (i.e. the pleasure of hope for the pleasure of hearing music). The present tenses ἐπαγγελλόμενος, ἀπαιτοῦμεν seem to imply an oft-repeated and current story. The story itself is repeated by Plutarch (De Alexandri Fortun. ii. 1), where the trick is attributed to Dionysius. Διονύσιος γοῦν ὁ τέρπατος, ὃς ἐφασι, κιθαρῳδῷ τινος εὐδοκιμῶντος ἀκολού ἐπαγγελλέτο δωρεάν αὐτῷ τά- λαστον· το τῇ ὑπεραλή τοῦ ἀνθρώπον τὴν ὑπόχειου ἀπαιτοῦσι· χάθει, εἰσπε, εὐφραίνομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἑν τῆς χρόνον, εὐφράξει κἀγὼ σε τοῖς ἔλεγεν· ὥστε τὸ μισθὸν ἄν ἐπερε- ἀπελάμβανε εὐθὺς, ἀντιτρπήμενοι.

ἐπὶ γὰρ δεόμενο—δοῦσιν· 'For a man sets his mind on the things he happens to want, and for the sake of that he will give what he himself possesses.'

The beginning of the sentence (ἐπὶ γὰρ δεόμενο) is a general statement, the words ἐκεῖνον γε contain an application of the general statement to a particular case.

5 τὴν ἄξιαν δὲ· τοσοῦτον] 'But whose part is it to settle the value (of a benefit),—is it the part of the giver in the first instance, or of the reci-

pient?' (One would say it was the part of him who was the recipient in the first instance), for the giver seems to leave it to the other. Which they mention Protagoras as doing, for whenever he taught anything he used to bid the learner estimate "how much worth he thinks he has learnt," and he used to take exactly so much." ὁ προϊέμενος is used in a peculiar sense here to denote 'qui prior domum dedit,' in opposition to ὁ προλαβὼν (or ὁ προβασις, § 8), 'qui prior ab altero accepit.' Protagoras was said to be the first philosopher who taught for money. He probably found it not disadvantageous to assume a high and liberal attitude towards his pupils. On the wealth which he amassed by teaching, see Plato’s Meno, p. 91 d, and above, Vol. I. Essay II. p. 119.
6-7 \( \text{In such matters some like the principle of "a stated wage." Those, however, who take the money beforehand, and then do nothing of what they promised, are naturally blamed in consequence of their excessive promises, for they do not fulfil what they agreed. But this course the Sophists are perhaps obliged to adopt, because no one would be likely to give money for the things which they know,}' Protagoras had no fixed price for his teaching; he left it to the pupil. But some people prefer having terms settled beforehand, \( \mu \nu \dot{b} \nu \ \varepsilon \iota \rho \mu \nu \nu \alpha \nu \), as it is called in the line of Hesiod (Works and Days, v. 368): \( \nu \iota \sigma \theta \nu \nu \ \alpha \nu \nu \nu \nu \ \varepsilon \iota \rho \mu \nu \nu \nu \ \nu \iota \nu \iota \nu \nu \iota \nu \nu \iota \nu \iota \nu \iota \nu \nu \iota \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \nu \n
hound καθάτερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς,

8 τοῦ εἰσιὼν λεκτορικοῦ. μὴ τοιαύτης δ᾿ ὡσθὲς τὴς ὁδός, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἢσως δεὶ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γέγνωσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ’ ἄξιαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαίον δοξαίον ἄν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· δοσὺς γὰρ ὡσθ’ ὕβεθη ἢ ἀνθ’ ὅσον τὴν ἴδιον εἰλετ’ ἀν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβῶν ἔξεις τὴν παρὰ τοῦτον ἄξιαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἁνίοις ὡσθ’ φαίνεται γνώμη

9 νον, ἐναχθ’ τ’ εἰς νόμοι τῶν ἐκουσιῶν συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶλα ὡς δέον, ὃ ἐπίστευσε, διαλεύκαι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάτερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτράβηθη, τοῦτον οἰετὰ δικαιότερον εἶναι τάξια τοῦ ἐπίτροφου. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἢσου τιμᾶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λάβειν· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὸ διδάσκει εκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια. ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀν τάττωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. δει δ’ ἢσως οὐ τοσοῦτον τιμᾶν ὅσον ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον· ἀλλ’ ὅσον πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

2 Ἄποριάν δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε, οἶον πότερα δεὶ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πειθέσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ πειστέοι, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονησόν τὸν πολεμικόν· ὅμως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἡ σπουδαίᾳ ὑπηρετήσατον, καὶ ευρεγέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἡ ἐταιρὸς δοτέον, εἰών ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνεχθῆναι. ἄρ’ οὐν πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσται οὐ ράδιον· πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοῖας ἔχει διαφοράς καὶ μεγεθείς καὶ μικρότητα καὶ τῷ καλῷ

received by the intention of their teacher), for the worth of philosophy is not measured against money, and no amount of honour can balance it. But, perhaps, as also towards the gods and one’s parents, it is enough if one gives what one can.’ Aristotle, perhaps mindful of the twenty years which he passed in the school of Plato, places very highly the spiritual dignity of teaching in philosophy. After ἐως, πουτείον εἶναι is to be understood.

8 μὴ τοιαύτης δʼ ὡσθ’] ‘In the second place, when the gift is not of this kind,’ i.e. not ἀὐτός.

tὸν προέχοντα] ‘The first recipient,’ see above, § 5.

8–9 καὶ γὰρ ἐν—ἐκοινώσατο] ‘For this is what is done in the market (i.e. the buyer, who is the recipient, settles the price); and in some places it is the law that there must be no actions on voluntary contracts, it being right that one should conclude with a person whom one has trusted on the same terms as those on which one entered on the contract with him.’ Cf. Ἱα. viii. xiii. 6: κοινωθεῖν here is used in the same sense as συμβαίνειν there.
II. 5 διπερ οὖν ἐρήται—ποιεῖν] 'As I have said then, as a general rule the debt should be repaid, but if the giving (to some one else) preponderates in moral glory, or in the urgency of the case (over repaying), one must incline to this; for sometimes it is not even an equal thing to requite the former favour, (namely) when the one man knowing the other to be good has benefited him, but on the other hand, the repayment has to be made to one whom one thinks to be a scoundrel. For sometimes a man ought not even to lend money in return to one who has lent money to him. For he lent it to one who is good, thinking to get it back again, but the other does not hope to get it back again from a villain. If this be the real state of the case, the claim is of course not equal: and even if it be not, but the parties only think so, such conduct does not seem unreasonable.'

This and the other casuistical questions here discussed have very little interest.

ἐρήται] vide § 3.

προσφάρχη] 'that which was pre-existing,' here 'primary obligation.'


ὁ μὲν—τῶ δὲ] These words, by carelessness of writing, refer to the same subject.

ἐν' τούτω—ἐχει μὲν μὴ] This double protasis, instead of having as usual only one, has a double apodosis.

6 διπερ οὖν πολλάκις ἐρήται] Cf. Eth. i. iii. 1; ii. ii. 3, and above, § 2.
7 oude t'v Δω θυσται, ouk 'Adhλon' etpe d' etera goveusai kai aedelfoi kai etairois kai energetais, ekastos t'a oikeia kai t'a armpotonta apomephten. ou'to de kai poiein faivontai: eis gamos m'en gar kaloudi tous suggeneis- tou'tois gar koivn to genos kai ai perit touto dh' praxeis- kai eis t'a khdh de' maliost' oinontai de'n tous suggeneis
8 apantnav dia tauto. doxeie d' an trophi's m'en gonneusì de'n maliost' evparei, ws ofeIontas, kai tois aitiois tov ei'nai kalioin onn 'h eautois eis taut' evparei. kai timh
de gonneusi kathaper theois, ou tisai de' oude' gar t'nh aut'nh pateri kai metri'. ou'd' a'i t'nh tou sofoi 'h tou
straphtoù, alla t'n patrkh, omoios de kai t'n metaph-
9 rikh. kai panti de' tou proektetoro timh t'n kath'
holian, upanastasei kai kataklasei kai tois toiothe.
pros etairov d' a'i kai aedelvois parreistai kai apantnov
koustita. kai suggeneisi dh' kai philetai kai politai
tois loiptois apasin aiei peiratov to oikeioi aponevein,
kai suggrinein t'a ekastoi o'parchoi kai' oikeiotoitaton
10 kai aerithn 'h chrh. twn m'en ou' omojenevnoi m'en h
krisi, twn de diapheronton ergoivnestera. ou m'nh dia ge
touto apostatein, al'w' ois an enedhghetai, oouto dioristov.
3 'Echei d' aposthia kai per' tou diallusethi tvos philias
h m' prs touvs m' diamevonntas. h prs m'en touvs dia to

oude t'v Δω θυσται] 'Not even to Zeus are all things indiscriminately sacrificed.' It is given as an illustration of conventional right, Eik. v. vii. 1, that goats and not sheep are sacrificed to Zeus.

7 kai eis t'v khpai—dai tautov] 'And for the same reason men think that relations ought especially to meet at funeral ceremonies.'

8 trophi's evparein] 'To furnish subsistence.' Fritzschc quotes Xenophon, Mem. ii. vii. 23: ονομαται δε και χρηματων ώς μουν—κουνωνει, ἀλλα και ενπαρκεΐν ἀληφος.

9 upanastasei kai kataklasei] 'Rising up to greet them, and conducting them to the seat of honour.' Cf. Plato, Repub. p. 425 A: συγις τε των μετωτην παρα προευθείας, δε πρέπει, και κατακλίσεις και ὑπαναστάσεις.

10 των μἐν οὐν ὁμογενῶν μέχριν ή κρίσις] i.e. it is easy to compare a relation with a relation, a tribesman with a tribesman, &c., but to compare a tribesman with a relation would be more troublesome.

III. 1 prs touvs mh diamevonntas] 'who do not continue the same.' Cf. Eik. x. iii. 3: ἀλλ' ἀνεμείνη διαμένει ἐνώ τυφώ.

eykalwει δ'—ὁδος 'But one might complain if a man who liked one for
profit or pleasure pretended to like one for one's character."

ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἄρχῃ] This observation, that 'differences arise when men are not really friends to each other in the way they think,' has never been exactly made before. The commentators varyiously refer us to Eik. viii. iii. 3, viii. iv. 1, and ix. i. 4, none of which passages correspond.

2 οὖν μὲν οὖν διαψευδής τις] 'Whenever one is mistaken,' i.e. by his own misconception. Cf. Al. Metaph. iii. iii. 71: βεβαιωτάτη δ' ἄρχη πασῶν περὶ ἣν διαψευδής ἄδονατω. The word διαψευδής answers to διαμαρτήτων in Eik. viii. xiii. 9.

κιβδηλούσων] To counterfeit friendship, says Aristotle, is worse than counterfeiting the coinage. The commentators quote Theognis, vv. 119 sqq., where the same maxim occurs.

3 οὖτε δὲ φιλητῶν ποιημάτων οὐδὲ δει] The MSS. vary extremely about the reading of this passage, in which there is evidently something wrong. οὖτε δει is at all events an interpolation. Fritzche thinks that the whole is a double gloss upon φιλητώρων.

ἐπανάθεσις δ' ἑξευρεῖ] 'To those who are capable of restoration.'
δῆλον γίνεται, αἰών ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις. εἴ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένει τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δὲ ἀνὴρ εἰς οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶνεν φιλοὶ μὴ ἄρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μῆτε χαίροντες καὶ λυποῦμενοι; οὔ δὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, ἂνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φιλοὺς εἶναι. 5 συμβιβαῖον γὰρ οὐ χ ἂν τε. εἰρήται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὖθεν ἀλλούτερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκτένω ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἦ δεὶ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συμβιβασίας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὁθενοὶ οἰόμεθα διεῖν χαρίζομαι, οὖτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις αὐτομετέρω τι διὰ τὴν προογεγειμένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δὲ ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἢ διάλυσις γίνεται.

4 Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὀρίζονται, οὐκεκαί εἰς τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐλπισθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τάγαθα ἡ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκεῖνον ἐνέκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ θεῖν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν. ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόθηκαν, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρούκτες. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγωντα καὶ ταῦτα αἰροῦμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχάροντα τῷ φίλῳ μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δὲ τίνι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν 2 ὀρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἑκαστὸν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ

4 ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἰναι] 'But without these things it is not possible, as we said, that they should be friends.' On this use of the past tense ἦν in reference to what has been previously said by the writer, cf. Metaph. XI. vi. 1: ἐστι δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς φίλιαι. Eth. III. v. 3: τούτω δ' ἦρη τὸ ἅγαθον καὶ κακός εἶναι. v. i. 12: ἐστι δ' ὁ παράδομος δῶς ἦν, &c. Aristotle is here referring to Eth. VIII. iii. 9; VIII. v. 3.

IV. 1 διπερ αἱ μητέρες—προσκεκρούκτες] 'Which mothers feel towards their children, and which friends who have had a rupture (feel towards each other),' i.e. they quite disinterestedly, since in the latter case intercourse is precluded, wish each other to live. On the disinterested feeling of mothers, cf. Eth. VIII. viii. 3. On the use of προσκρούων, cf. Politics, II. v. 4: οἱ πλείονα διαφέρομεν εἰς τῶν ἐπὶ πιάτον καὶ εἰς μικρὸν προσκρούσωτε ἀλλήλους, ἢτι δὲ τῶνθεραποτῶντοι μᾶλιστα προσκροήμενοι, οἱ πλείονα προσχρύμεθα πρὸς τὰ διακοινὰς τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. 2 πρὸς ἑαυτὸν—εἰναι] 'The good man has every one of those feelings towards himself, and other men have them in so far as they set up to be good' (i.e. wherever they fall short in these feelings, they fall short also in their attempt to be good). 'For, as we have said, virtue and the good man are the standard for everything.' Cf. Eth. III. iv. 5; X. v. 10.
4 ἐκαστὸς δ᾿ ἐαυτῷ βούλεται—μάλιστα Ἦ. But every man wishes what is good for himself. No one, on condition of becoming another man, chooses that that new thing, which he should become, should possess everything (for God has now all good); but (every man desires to possess what is good) remaining his present self. And the thinking faculty would appear to be each man’s proper self, or more so than anything else. The usual punctuation of this passage has been altered to obtain the above translation, which has been suggested to the annotator, and which seems to give a more natural explanation of the text than has been arrived at by the commentators, who universally explain Ἦ δὲ τι ποτ’ ἐστιν to refer to the unchangeableness or to the personality of God. If the passage be read as above, it will be seen that the words ὃς δὲ τι ποτ’ ἐστιν are in opposition to γενόμενος δ’ ἄλλος. Aristotle says that to every man his personality is what is dear to him; he would not relinquish this to gain all the world, for by relinquishing it he would not gain anything. With a changed personality, he would no more possess any good thing, than he now possesses it because God possesses all good. All his wishes are made on the basis of being still what he is. The good man, who fosters his thinking faculty, most of all takes care of his proper self.

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6 ταύθ' υπάρχει. πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἡ οὐκ ἔστι

                                                      φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος. δόξειν δ' ἂν ταύτῃ
                                                      εἰναι φιλία, ἦ ἔστι δύο ἡ πλείω ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ ὅτι
                                                      7 ἡ ἵππειβολή τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁμοιώτατα. φαίνεται
                                                      δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς υπάρχει, καθερ οὖσι
                                                      φαίλοις. ἂρ' οὖν ἢ ἀφέκοσιν εἴατοι καὶ ὑπολαμβα-
                                                      νοῦσιν ἐπεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχονσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν
                                                      γε κοιμῶν φαίλων καὶ ἀνοσιούργων οὕθεν ταύθ' υπάρχει,
                                                      8 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαίλοις· δια-
                                                      φέρονται γὰρ ἐαυτοῖς, καὶ ἐτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα
                                                      δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀπὶ τῶν

6 πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ—ὁμοιώτατα] 'But whether friendship towards oneself
is, or is not, possible, we may leave undecided for the present. It would
seem to be possible in so far as two or more of the above-mentioned condi-
tions exist, and because the extreme of friendship resembles one's feelings
towards oneself.' Several commentators explain ἦ ἔστι δύο ἡ πλείω to
mean 'in so far as man consists of two or more parts,' and ἐκ τῶν εἰρη-

                                                      μένων they would translate 'in accordance with what we have before
said,' referring to Ἐθ. i. xii. 9. In this sense the passage would be a
parallel one to Ἐθ. v. xi. 9. But it is clear from the next section that ἐκ
τῶν εἰρημένων refers to the definitions of friendship, given in § 1 of this
chapter. ἀφείασθω is used as in Ἐθ. viii. i. 7. viii. viii. 7. We are not
here referred to the subsequent discussion in Ἐθ. ix. viii., where by no
means the same subject is renewed.

8 Σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαίλοις— ἐαυτοῖς] 'But one might almost say
that these things do not appertain to the bad at all. For they are at vari-
ce with themselves, and desire one set of things while they wish another,
just like the incontinent; instead of what seems to them to be good, they
choose the pleasant though it is hurt-
ful; and others through cowardice
and want of spirit abstain from doing
what they think to be best for them-
selves; and they who through wicked-
ness have committed many crimes
hate their life, and fly from it, and put
an end to themselves.' The 'desire' of
the wicked, as being of the particular
and subject to the dominance of the
senses (Ἐθ. vii. iii. 9), is at variance
with their 'wish,' which is of the
universal and implies a conception
of the good. Cf. Ἐθ. v. ix. 6. viii.
xiii. 8. The description of bad men
given here ignores and is at variance
with the conclusions of Book vii.
In that book the strength, and here the
weakness, of vice is represented. Thus
in Ἐθ. vii. viii. the bad man is de-
scribed as unrepentant, abiding by his
purpose (§ 1), having the major pre-
mise of his mind corrupted (§ 4), and
therefore having no wish for the good,
even in the universal. The account
in Book vii., which makes ἀδολαια
or abandoned vice free from all weak-
ness, is more theoretical and less drawn
from nature than the above descrip-
tion. All that is said here has a close
relation to, and was probably suggested
by, the words in the Ὑσίας of Plato, p.
214 c: τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς, ἀπερ καὶ λέγεται
δοκοῦντον ἐαντοὺς ἀγαθῶν εἰναι τὰ ὧδε βλαβερὰ ὄντα·
οἱ δ' αὐ τι δειλόν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ πράττειν ἁ ὀντα τοὺς βλητιστὰ ἐναι’ οἷς δε πολλὰ καὶ
dεινὰ ἀπετακτα διὰ τὴν μοχθριαν, μενοῦσι τε καὶ
φεύγουσι τὸ ἵνα καὶ ἀναρωσίν ἐαυτοῖς. ἡπτοῦσι τε οἱ 9
μοχθριοὶ μεθ’ ὀν συνδημερεύοντων, ἐαυτοὺς δε φεύγουσιν
ἀναμμηνίσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαύθ’
ἐτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ’ ἐαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ’ ἐτέρων δ’ ὄντες
ἐπιλαθάνονται. οὐθὲν τε φίλητον ἐχοντες οὐθὲν φιλικόν
πάσχοιν πρὸς ἐαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ
συναλγοῦσιν οὶ τοιοῦτοι ἐαυτοῖς· στασίαξα τὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἡ
ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθριαν ἀλγεὶ ἀπεχόμενον των,
tὸ δὲ ἢδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεύρῳ τὸ δ’ ἐκεῖσε ἐλκεὶ ὁσπέρ
διασπόντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οὖν τε ἡμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἠδεσθαι, τὸ
ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρὸν γε λυπεῖται ὦτι ἢδηθ, καὶ οὐκ ἂν
ἐβούλετο ἢδεα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ
φαίλοι γέμουσιν, οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαίλος οὐδὲ πρὸς
ἐαυτὸν φιλικὸς διακείσαθαι διὰ τὸ μὴν ἔχειν φίλοτον.
εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λιαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, τοικτέον τὴν
μοχθριαν διατεταμένοις καὶ πειρατέοις ἐπιεκτικὴ ἐναι’ οὕτω
γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἄν ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος
γένοιτο.

‘Ἡ δ’ εὐνοια φιλία μὲν ἔουκεν, οὐ μὲν ἐστὶ γε φιλία. 5
γίνεται γὰρ εὐνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ λαθάνουσα,

περὶ αὐτῶν, μηθέστωσε ἡμοιοὺς μή’ αὐτοὺς εἰναι, ἀλλ’ ἐμπληκτοὺς τε καὶ ἀσταθή-
tους.

9–10 στασίαζει — γέμουσιν] ‘For
their soul is in tumult, the one part of
it, through viciousness, grieves at ab-
staining from certain things, but the
other part is pleased (at this abstin-
ence), and the one pulls this way, the
other that way, as though tearing (the
man) in pieces. If it is not possible
to feel pain and pleasure at the same
moment, at all events after a little
while (the bad man) is pained that he
felt pleasure, and he ‘could have
wished that those pleasures had not
happened to him’;’ for the wicked are
full of repentance.’ This picture of
the mental struggles of the bad does
not recall either the phraseology or
the doctrines of Book vii., where
mochthria is contrasted with, and op-
posed to, ἀκρασία (cf. vii. viii. 1). The
metaphor στασίαζει occurs repeatedly
in Plato’s Republic, cf. i. p. 352 A:
(ἡ ἄδικα) ἐν ἐνὶ—ἐνδούρα—πρῶτον μὲν
ἄδικων αὐτῶν πράστευα παθεῖ στα-
σίαζοντα καὶ οὐχ ἀκρασίαν αὐτῶν
καὶ ἀντί παθεῖ ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἀκρασίας
cata loun. Cf. Eth. i. xiii. 15.

V. 1 ‘Η δ’ εὔνοια—ἀκολούθει] ‘Now
good-will is like friendship, but yet it is not friendship, for good-will is exercised both towards unknown persons, and when its own existence is unknown (to the object), which is not the case with friendship. But all this has been said already. It is not even the same as loving; for it exhibits neither violence nor longing, which are the accompaniments of loving. The Saxon word 'Good-will,' and not the Latin 'Benevolence,' which is too abstract and general, is the representative of εὐνα. Good-will, says Aristotle, is engendered by the appearance of noble qualities; it is rapidly conceived, but is passive in its character, and is only the prelude of friendship. There being no correspondent adjective to the substantive 'Good-will,' we must express εὐνα by 'Well-disposed.' Just as in Eth. iii. the cognitive faculties to Purpose, and in Eth. vi. the cognitive qualities to Thought are discussed, so Aristotle here introduces a discussion of the feelings which are cognate to Friendship.

καὶ πρότερον δὲ] VIII. ii. 3-4. διάσφρα] 'Intensity,' 'straining,' 'violence.' In the previous section διασφρασμένως means 'strenuously.' Cf. Ar. Pol. VII. xvii. 6: τὰ διασφραγιών τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμῶν, 'the violent passions and cryings of children.'

2 ἡ δὲ εὐνα — συμβαίνει] While loving implies acquaintance and familiarity, good-will is conceived instantaneously; thus men conceive good-will towards particular competitors in the games from their appearance, and are inclined to wish them success.

3 Good-will, says Aristotle, is the prelude of Friendship, just as the pleasure of the eye is the prelude of love. This however does not constitute love. The test of love is longing for a person in absence. Cf. Ar. Eth. i. xi. 11: where the same test is given. In accordance with the unhappy notions of the Greeks, ἀνόητα is here put in the masculine gender.

ἡ δὲ τῆς ἔνσεως] In Plato's Cratylus, p. 420 A, it is suggested that Εὐνα is derived from εἰρεῖν.—'Εὖρος ὅτε εἰρεῖ εἰσαγεῖ καὶ οὖν οἰκεῖ εἰς τὸν ἐν χυτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς διὰ τῶν δραμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰρεῖν Εὐνα τὰ γα παλαιόν ἐκαλεῖτο. Cf. Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act iii. Sc. ii.

'It is engendered in the eyes,
By gazing fed.'

And Romeo and Juliet, Act i. Sc. iii.

'I'll look to like, if looking liking move.'

οὗ τὴν δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον 'Good-will' is essentially disinterested in its character.
ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμη. οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους ὃ
οὐχ οἷον τ’ εἶναι μὴ εὗνος γενομένους, οἱ δ’ εὗνοι οὐθὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν. βουλοῦνται γὰρ μόνον τῷ γάρδα οὐ εἰσὶν εὗνοι, συμπταράξαιν δ’ ἂν οὐθὲν, οὐδ’ ὀχληθεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.
διὸ μεταφέρων φαίνει τῇ ἣν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένη δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἁπικυμονεῖ δίνεσθαι φιλίαν, ὡς τὴν διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ θο’ οὐδὲ γὰρ εὗνοι ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται, ο μὲν γὰρ εὐθυγειτηθεὶς ἀνθ’ ἂν πέπονθεν ἀπονείμη τὴν εὗνοιν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν. ο’
δὲ βουλόμενος τιν’ εὔπραγείν, ἐπὶ τίν’ ἑξει δι’ ἑκείνου, οὐκ’ ήπιον ἐνεκεῖν εἰναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἠατῦχ’
καθάπερ οὐδ’ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τὶνα χρῆσιν.
ὁδος δ’ ἡ εὗνοι δι’ ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιτείκειαν τίνα γίνεται, 4 ὅταν τῷ φαύλῳ καλός τοις ἡ ἀνδρείας ἡ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ
c καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀργοῦντος ἐπιτείκ

Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται· διότερ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ
μοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρ-
ξειν ἂν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ οἰκουν ὁμογενομονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν
φαίνει, οἰον τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὁμοιῶν (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ
περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φαίνει,
ὅταν τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογενομοιωὶ καὶ ταῦτα
προαρέσται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινὰ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ
πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμοουσίων, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγεθεί καὶ
tὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἦ πᾶσιν, οἰον αἱ πόλεις,
ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰτεῖται εἶναι, ἡ ἑρμαχεῖν
Δικαδαιμονίας, ἡ ἀρχὴν Πιττακὸν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἡθελεν.

VI. I φιλικὸν δὲ—ὁμοδοξία] 'Una-
nimity also appears to be of the
nature of friendship; therefore it is
not the same as agreement of opinion.'
Ον φιλικόν, cf. Eth. viii. 4; vili.

On φιλικόν, cf. Eth. viii. 4; vili.


III. 3: περὶ δὲ τῶν δίθον ὁδεῖς

βουλεύσαται, ὅν ὁν περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. Ἀρίσ-

τοτές arrides at his definition of οὐμοὼν

inductively, saying that we do not find

the name applied to agreement of

opinion in general, nor again to agree-

ment of opinion about every particular

subject, but we do find it used of states

whose citizens are unanimous on the

measures to be adopted for the common

weal. Hence we get the idea that

unanimity is 'political friendship.' Cf.

Eth. viii. 4, where ὑμῶν is used as

the opposite of στάσις.

2 ἡ ἀρχὴν Πιττακὸν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς

"Or (if all agree) that Pittacus

shall rule, (supposing this to be) during

the period when he himself was willing

to rule.' Pittacus, having held his
όταν δ’ ἐκάτερος ἐαυτόν βουληταί, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φων-ίσαις, στασιάζοντι· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ’ ὀρμονεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν δήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷὸν ὦταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρχεῖν. οὕτω γὰρ τάποι γίγνεται οὐ ἐφείνται. πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὀμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ 3 ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. ἔστι δ’ ἡ τοιαύτη ὀμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἐαυτοῖς ὀμονοοῦσι καὶ ἄλλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰκείν· τῶν τοι-οὺτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὡσπερ εὔριπος, βουλοῦντας τὰ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, 4 τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινὰ ἐφείνται. τοὺς δὲ φαίλους οὐκ οὗν τε ὀμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρὸν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφειμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλειπούντας· ἐαυτῷ δ’ ἐκαστὸς βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ καλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηροῦντω τὸ κοινὸν ἀπελλυταί. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐ-τοῖς στασιάζειν, ἄλλους μὲν ἑπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

7 Οἱ δ’ εὐεργεταί τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ως παρὰ elective monarchy for ten years, re- signed. Had the citizens after this period wished to re- reign, his own will would have been wanting to make unanimity in the state.


τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν δήποτε] The commentators illustrate this by the joke of the man who said 'that he and his wife had always perfectly agreed—in wishing to govern the house.'

3 ἐτὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, ὡς εἰκείν] 'Being on the same moorings, as it were,' as opposed to the ebings and flowings of a Euripus. Cf. Demosthenes, De Corona, p. 319, § 281, οὗκ ἐτὶ τῆς αὕτης ὄρμει τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἃν ἀνέχαιρεν.

4 This is a picture of the discord produced by evil passions, where every one grasping at the larger share in good things, and shirking his part in labours and services, watches (ἐξηράντες) his neighbour to prevent him encroach- ing. Thus men force each other to do what is right, while unwilling to do it themselves.

VII. Aristotle says, it is noticed as something extraordinary (ὡς πολὺ λόγον ἔφυγεται) that benefactors seem to love those to whom they have done a kindness more than the benefited persons love them. The common explanation of the paradox
VI.—VII.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ IX. 295

λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθά·
περ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ
eἶναι οἳ ὀφείλουσιν, οἳ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλειον
tῆς τῶν ὀφείλοντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐφρενῆ-
σαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κοιμομένους
tὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμέλες τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι.
Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀνθρωποκρατίας· ἁμήνωνε γὰρ οἱ
tολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὐ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίνεται. δόξας
δὲ ἄν φυσικότερον εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὖν μιχθὸν τῷ περὶ
tοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ
tοῦ σωφροσθαί βουλήσις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δὲ εὗ
pετοικοκτοῖς φιλῶσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας, καὶ
μηθὲν ὅσις χρῆσιμοι μὴν εἰς ὅστερον γένοιτ' ἀν. ὅπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνητῶν συμβεβηκέν· τὰς γὰρ τὸ ὦκεῖον
ἐργον ἀγατὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀγαπηθεῖν ἀν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐργοῦ
ἐμφύχου γενομένου, μάλιστα δὲ ἵσως τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ
tοιπότας συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπᾶσι γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ὦκεῖα

is, that benefactors look forward to obtaining a return for their kindness, they thus cherish the persons of those who are indebted to them. This selfish theory views mankind on the dark side (ἐκ τονηροῦ θεωμένου), but is not altogether devoid of truth. A deeper (φυσικότερος) reason, however, may be assigned for the phenomenon in question, namely, that as we can only be said to exist when we are conscious of our vital powers (ἐγεῖν ἐγερέσι), so anything which gives or increases the sense of those powers is dear to us. The beneficed person stands to the benefactor in the relation of a work to the artist, he is an exponent of the benefactor's self, and is thus regarded with feelings of affection, as being associated by the benefactor with the sense of his own existence (στέργει δὴ τὸ ἐργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι). These feelings, of course, cannot be reciprocated by the beneficed person. Again, the benefactor associates an idea of the beautiful (τὸ καλὸν) with the recipient of his good deeds; the other associates with him only an idea of the profitable, and this is a less loveable idea, especially when viewed in the past, and become a matter of memory. Again, the active part taken by the benefactor has more affinity to the active principle of loving.

1 τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις] This explanation is put by Thucydides (II. 40) into the mouth of Pericles: βεβαιώ
tερος δὲ ὁ θράσσει τὴν χάριν δου ὀφειλομένην δὲ εἴσοδος ἦ τὸ ἐπίθετον εἶσοδον. ὁ δὲ ἀνθρωπισμὸν ἄνθρωπος, εἴδως οὖ
ἐκ χάρων, ἄλλως εἰς ὀφειλήμα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδοθῶν.

Ἐπίχαρμος] The words ἐκ τονηροῦ θεωμένου seem to have been taken
out of some iambic or trochaic verse of the Sicilian poet, but the verse itself has not been preserved.

4 ταυτην δη—μηνουει] 'The case of benefactors seems then something of the same kind. For the object benefited is their "work;" they love this therefore more than the work loves him who made it. The cause of this is that existence is desired and loved by all, but we exist by consciousness, that is to say, by living and acting. Thus he who has made the work in question exists consciously, and therefore he loves the work, because he loves his existence. And this is a principle of nature; for that which exists potentially, the work proves to exist actually.' On this mode of paraphrasing ἐνέργεια, see Vol. I. Essay IV. Any work of art, or creation of the mind, or moral achievement, is here said to show us externally to ourselves. It causes us to exist ἐνέργεια, that is, not only in ourselves, but for ourselves. It thus becomes a union of the objective and the subjective. And this philosophical principle explains a whole class of homogeneous facts, not only the feelings of benefactors towards the benefited, but of poets towards their poems, of parents, and especially mothers, towards their children; and of those who have made fortunes towards their property. These facts were brought together, without being analysed, by Plato, cf. Republic, p. 330 b-c. Cf. Eth. iv. i. 20.

ἐνέργεια δη—τως] Many commentators understand these words to mean 'Therefore by means of conscious activity the maker is in a sense his work,' in which they are supported by Eustathius and the Paraphrast. This would not materially alter the general drift of the passage.

6 ησεια δη—ετι—μηνου] 'Now of the present the living reality is sweet, of the future the hope, of the past the memory.' In two classes of this sentence subjective words are used (ἐλπις and μην), but ἐνέργεια in the remaining clause hovers between the objective and the subjective. Cf. Ar. De Memoria, i. 4, where ἄλογος is used in an analogous sentence: τοι μεν παροτον (ἐτι) ἀλογος, τοι δε μελλοντος ελπις, τοι δε μηνουειν μην.
VIII. In this interesting chapter, Aristotle discusses the difficulty as to whether one ought to love oneself especially, or some one else. On the one hand, 'self-loving' is used as a term of reproach; on the other hand, one's feelings towards oneself are made the standard for one's feelings towards friends. These two points of view require reconciliation, which may be effected by a distinction of terms. For the word 'self' has two senses—the lower and the higher self, the one consisting in appetites and passions, the other in the intellect and the higher moral faculties. He that gratifies his lower self at the expense of others is 'self-loving' in the bad sense of the term. He that ministers to his higher self promotes at the same time the good of others, and is worthy of all praise. Such self-love as this may lead a man even to die for his friends or for his country. A man, grasping at the noble, may give up honour, power, life itself; and thus the greatest self-sacrifice will be identical with the greatest self-love. These considerations show in what sense one ought, and in what sense one ought not, to love oneself.

1 ως εις αιωρω| 'As a term of reproach.'

οδδην αφ έαυτω πράττει| 'He does nothing apart from himself.'

'Nihil a suis rationibus alienum.'

2 τοις λόγοις δε—οδක δλόγους| 'With these theories men's actions, not un-
ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ὃ βουλεύεται τάγαθά ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθείς εἰσται. ταύτα δὲ υπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάντ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· ἐξηταὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους δύκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὑμογενεμονοῦσιν, ὅποι τὸ 'μία ψυχή' καὶ 'κοινά τὰ φίλων' καὶ 'ισότης φιλότης' καὶ 'γόνι κῆνης ἐγγενοῦν'. πάντα γὰρ πάντα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλισθ' υπάρχει· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δὲ εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶις ἔπεσθαι, ἀμφότεροι ἐχοῦσιν τὸ πιστὸν. 3 ἵσωσ ὦν τοὺς τοιούτους δει τῶν λόγων διαρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον εἰκατέροι καὶ τῷ ἀληθεύοντι. εἰ δὴ λαβοῦμεν τὸ φιλαυτὸν πῶς εἰκατέροι λέγουσιν, τὰς ἄν 4 γένοιτο δήλω, οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὁπειδὸς ἁγγοῦτε αὐτῷ φιλαυτοῦς καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονεμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρῆσι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἠδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαίς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἁριστὰ ὑματα, διὸ καὶ περιμαχεῖ τοῖς. οἱ δὲ περὶ ταύτα πλεονεκτᾶται χαριζοῦνται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἀλώς τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. τοιούτοι δὲ εἰσίν οἱ πολλοὶ· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσθηρομα γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαίλου ὑμώς. δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὖντι φιλαυτοῖς ὀνεῖδε-5 ἕτει, ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονεμοντας εἶθάσι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαυτοῦς, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γὰρ τις ἂν στουδάξω τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὑποικοῦν ἀλλὰ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἁρετάς, καὶ ἀλως ἢ ή τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, ὀυδέπερ εἰς τούτον 6 φιλαυτοὺς οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δὲ ἄν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φιλαυτος· ἀπονεμεῖ γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ καλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἁγαθά, καὶ χαριζεται ἑαυτῷ τῷ κυρωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα

reasonably, are at variances.' To the list of the meanings of the word ἔργον given in the note on Eth. i. vii. 11, we must add the above use of τὰ ἔργα to mean 'actions' as opposed to theory. Cf. Eth. x. i. 3: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν εἰ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεις λόγοι ηττῶν εἰς πιστῶ τῶν ἔργον. X. viii. 12: τὸ δὲ ἄλγες ἐν τοῖς πράξεις ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται. Aristotle says that men do not ' act ' as if they considered self-love to be wholly bad, and he proves this by quoting popular proverbs, which support the contrary view.
τούτω πείθεται. ὁσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυρώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεί καὶ πάν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τούτῳ ἄγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ή μή, ὁς τούτῳ ἐκάστῳ ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγμένα δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἰκονοὶς τὰ μεταλόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ᾽ ἐκαστὸς ἵστιν ή μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιεικής μάλιστα τούτ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ. διό φιλαυτὸς μάλιστ' ἄν εἴη, καθ᾽ ἔτερον ἔδος τοῦ ὄνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὁρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ή τοῦ δοκοῦτος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἑπανοοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ αμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ καλλίστα πράττειν κοινῆ τ᾽ ἄν πάντ᾽ εἶη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ιδία ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστά τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐπερ ἡ ἄρετη τοιοῦτον ἐστίν. ἦστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεὶ φίλαυτον εἰναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅνησται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοὺς ὥφελνε· τὸν δὲ μοχ-θηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψῃ γὰρ καὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθειν εἶπομενος. τοῦ μοχθηροῦ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεὶ 8 ἃ δεὶ πράττειν καὶ ἂ πράττει· ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεὶ, ταύτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἐαυτῷ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικῆς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ φό. ἀλλὴς δὲ περὶ τοῦ 9 σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἑνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς παρτιδος, καὶ δὴ ὑπεραποθῆκειν προῆσται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ὀλὼς τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά,
IX. Does the happy man, who is all-sufficient in himself, need friends or not? To prove the affirmative of this question, Aristotle uses the following arguments:

1 A priori, we might assume that, as happiness is the sum of all human goods, the possession of friends, one of the greatest of external goods, would necessarily be included (§ 2).

2 Friends will be required by the happy man, not so much as the givers, but rather as the recipients, of kindness.

3 We might assume also that the happy man should neither be condemned to be a solitary, nor to live with strangers and chance people (§ 3).

4 Those who take the negative side in the question have an unworthy conception of friends, as persons affording profit or pleasure. The happy man is almost independent of such (§ 4), but yet he may want friends in a higher sense. Happiness consists in the play of life (ἐνθρόπευν), and he that sees before his eyes the virtuous
acts of a friend has a delightful sense of the play of life, seeing harmonious action and identifying it with himself (ἕνας καὶ οὐκείος, § 3).

5 Again, the sympathy and excitement of friends enables a man to prolong that vivid action and glow of the mind which is the essence of happiness (§§ 5-6).

6 It also confirms him in the practice of virtue (§§ 6-7).

7 Finally, a deeper reason may be assigned for the necessity of friends to the happy man; it depends on our love of life. That sympathetic consciousness (συναισθάνεσθαι) which we have of a friend’s existence, by means of intercourse with him, is, only in a secondary degree (παράτλησις), the same as the sense of our own existence.

1 αὐτάρκεσις] The quality αὐτάρκεσις is claimed for happiness, Eth. i. vii. 6, where Aristotle guards himself against the supposition that it implies a lonely life, and where he promises to return to the subject. τὸ γὰρ τέλεως ἄγαθον αὐτάρκεσις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὸ δ’ αὐτάρκεσις λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ἔστι βίων μονοτητὶ κ.τ.λ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαϊνθεὶς ἐπισκέπτεσθαι.

8 ἡ σοφία ἐποίησεν ἡ δαίμων] from the Orestes of Euripides, 665, sqq.: τοῦτοι φίλοι

ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρή τοὺς φίλουςν ωφελέως· ἄρκον δ’ ὁ δαίμων εἴδε δίδη, τί δει βίως; ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ωφελεῖ βίων.

2 ἀποφημισμάτων] ‘Us who allot;’ cf. Eth. i. vii. 8, where happiness is said to be τέλεως τι καὶ αὐτάρκεσις. The form of expression here used is similar to that in Eth. i. x. 2: “Ἡ τοῦτο γε παντελῶς ἄποικος, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐφεξῆς τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν;
4 ἐπεισάκτων ἡδονῆς] 'Adventitious pleasure,' 'pleasure introduced from without;' cf. Ἐθ. l viii. 12: οὐδὲν δὴ προσέγγισα τῆς ἡδονῆς ὃς βιος ἀυτῶν ὁστερ περιστο τινὸς, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονήν ἐν οὐσίᾳ. Cf. Ἐθ. x. vii. 3. The word ἐπεισάκτων occurs in Plato's Cratylus, p. 420 b, quoted above in the note on ix. v. 3.

5 ἐν ἀρχῇ... ἐκ τῆς ἡμέρας] 'For we said at the outset (Ἐθ. l vii. 14) that happiness is a kind of vital action, and it is plain that this arises in us, and does not exist in us like a possession. But if being happy consists in the play of life, and the actions of the good man are good and essentially pleasurable, as we said before (Ἐθ. l viii. 13), and also the sense of a thing being identified with oneself is one of the sources of pleasure, but we are able to contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves, and their actions better than our own, then the actions of good men being their friends are pleasurable to the good; for (such actions) contain both the two elements that are essentially pleasurable. The supremely happy man then will require friends of this character, if he wishes to contemplate actions which are good and also identified with himself; and such are the actions of the good man being his friend. Again, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasurally, whereas life is painful to the solitary man, for by oneself it is difficult to maintain long a vivid state of the mind, but with others and in relation to others this is easier.'

The first part of this sentence contains a complex protasis, to which the apodosis is αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὴ, κ.τ.λ.

τοῦ δ’ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια] In the passage referred to (Ἐθ. l viii. 13) the words are αἱ καὶ ἄρετες ἐνέργειαι, which may justify the above translation.

ἀμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῆς φύσει ἡδέα. δὴ...
his friend." But it would be irrelevant to speak of the feelings of the friend. The question is, what advantage does the happy man get out of having friends? ἄφιες here evidently applies to τὰ τῇ φύσει ἥδεα, as is further proved by the words ἐπιευκεία καὶ οἰκεία in the next sentence; it refers to what has gone before, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ —οἰκείων τῶν ἰδεῶν.

6-7 ο γὰρ σπουδαῖον—φησιν] The good man, feeling the same sort of pleasure in the moral acts reciprocated between himself and his friend which the musical man feels in good music, will prolong and enjoy that reciprocation, and, as Theognis says, 'will learn what is good by associating with the good.' The advantage here attributed to friendship is that, by adding the element of pleasure to the best functions of our nature, it assists and develops them. Cf. Eth. X. ν. 2: συναξεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἐπιευκείαν ἡ οἰκεία ἦδας—δηλοῦν δὲ καὶ οἱ ϕιλόμουσαι καὶ φιλοκοῦσικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστο ἐπιευκείας εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐργὸν θαυμάστως αὐτῇ.

καθάπερ ὁ μουσικός] On the 'moral sense' in its analogy to the 'musical ear,' cf. Eth. X. iii. 10.

7 τὸ δὲ [ἴσῃ—ροκέ] 'People define "living" in the case of animals by the power of sensation, in the case of men by the power of sensation or thought. But the word "power" has its whole meaning in reference to the exercise of that power, and the distinctive part of the conception lies in the "exercise." Thus the act of living appears distinctively to be an act of perceiving or thinking.' The train of reasoning in this latter part of the chapter is, that life consists in consciousness; life is good and sweet; consciousness is intensified, and life therefore is made better and sweeter, by intercourse with friends.

η δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ· έσκε δὴ τὸ ζήν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθών καὶ ἰδέων· ώρισμένον γὰρ, τὸ δ' ὁμολογεῖν τῆς τάγαθος φύσεως. τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπισκεψεῖ· διότι ἐσκε πάσιν ἢν
8 εἶναι. οὐ δεὶ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρῶν ζωῆς καὶ διευθαρ
μενήν, οὐδὲ ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ
tὰ υπάρχοντα αὐτῆ. † ἐν τοῖς ἔχομενοι δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης
9 ἐσται φανερῶτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἢν
(ἔσκε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὁρίσεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα
tοὺς ἐπισκεψεῖ καὶ μακαρίους· τούτως γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώ
τατος, καὶ τῷ τούτων μακαρωτάτης) ζωῆς), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ἵνα
ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ὁ ἀκούν ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζει ὅτι
βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἐστι τι τοῦ αἰσθανό-

† 'Εν τοῖς ἔχομενοι This must be, after all (see Vol. I. p. 49), undoubtedly an interpolation. The editor probably had in his mind a confused reference to x. iii. 2.

9 El δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν This is the beginning of a complex protasis, which goes on prolonging itself, ὁ δ' ὁρῶν—τὸ δ' ὁτι ἀλαθαμαθεῖ, &c., till at last it finds its apodosis in § 10; καθάπερ οἰν τοῦ αὐτῶν ἐειν αἰρετῶν ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῶν φιλῶν, ἡ παρα
πλησίον.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων—τοις] 'And with respect to all the other functions, in like manner there is something which perceives that we are exercising them, so then we can perceive that we perceive, and think that we think. But this (perceiving) that we perceive or think, is perceiving that we exist; for existing, as we said (§ 7), consists in perceiving or thinking.' ἐνέργεια is here used in a purely objective sense; the ἐνέργεια is here distinguished from the consciousness which necessarily accompanies it, and with
IX.—X.] ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ IX. 305

μενον ὃτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὡστε αἰσθανοῖμεθα ἣν ὃτι αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ νοοῦμεν ὃτι νοοῦμεν. τὸ δὲ ὃτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὃτι ἐσμεν. τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἢν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃτι ζυ, τῶν ἤδεων καθ’ αὐτὸν· φῦσει γὰρ ἁγαθὸν ὡς τὸ δ’ ἁγαθὸν ὑπάρχων εν ἐαντῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢδον. αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζυ καὶ μᾶλλον τοὺς ἁγαθοῖς, ὃτι τὸ εἶναι ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἢδον· συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἁγαθοῦ ἑδοναί. ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐχει ὁ οἴστουαίος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἔτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστιν, καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετὸν ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ, οὔτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἡ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ’ εἶναι ἢν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ὄντος. ἡ δὲ τουαίτη αἰσθήσει ἢδεια καθ’ ἐαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἀρα δει καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὃτι ἐστιν, τότε δὲ γίνοντ’ ἄν εν τῷ συζην καὶ κοινωνεὶ λόγον καὶ διανοια: οὕτω γὰρ ἄν δοξεῖ τὸ συζην επὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἄστερ επὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ εν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι, εἰ ὅτι τῷ μακρῷ τὸ εἶναι αἱρετὸν ἐστὶ καθ’ αὐτό, ἁγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὄν καὶ ἢδον, παραπλησίων δὲ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν ἀν εἰ. δ’ ἐστιν αὐτῷ αἱρετῶν, τότε δει ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἡ ταύτῃ ἐνδεχὴς ἔσται. δεῖςε ἀρα τῷ εὐδαιμονίους τοις φίλων στουδαίων.

Ἀρ’ οὖν ὡς πλείονοι φίλοι ποιητέων, ἡ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρήσθαι δοκεί

μὴν τολῆςιν μὴν ἄξιον,

which it is frequently identified. See Vol. I. Essay IV. The absolute unity of existence with thought here laid down anticipates the 'cogito ergo sum' of Descartes.

X. The question of the plurality of friends is brought under analysis in this chapter. The number of one's friends for use or for pleasure is shown to be limited by convenience. The number of one's friends, properly so called, is shown to be limited by one's...
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὐτὶ 2 πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρήσιν καὶ πάντων δόξειν ἂν ἀρμόσειν τὸ λέχθεν: πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπε- ρετείν ἐπιτόνον, καὶ οὐχ ἰκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πράτ- τειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἰκανὸς περιέργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλὸς ζῆν: οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἱδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὁλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν 3 τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἱδομα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους ποτέρον πλείσ- τους κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἣ ἐστὶ τι μέτρων καὶ φιλικοὶ πλήθους, ὥστε πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένωστ' ἄν πολις, οὔτε ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἢ τις πόλες ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἵσων ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πάν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὀρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δὴ ἐστὶ πλὴθος ὀρισμένον, καὶ ἵσως οἱ πλείστοι, μεθ' οὖν ἄν ἐν δύνατο τις συζήν· τούτῳ 4 γὰρ εἴδοκεν φιλικότατον εἶναι, ὅτι δ' οὕχ οὖν τὸ πολ- λοῖς συζήν καὶ διανέμειν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἀδηλον. ἐτὶ δὲ

incapacity to feel the highest kind of affection (ὑπερβολὴ τις φιλίας) for many individuals, and by the prac- tical difficulties which would attend a close intercourse (οὐχὶ) with many persons at once, who would also have to associate harmoniously with each other. On the whole the question is answered in the negative.

1 ἐμελεῖς εἰρήθαι] 'Neatly ex- pressed.'

μὴτε πολέξειον] From Hesiod, Works and Days, 713.

μηδὲ πολέξειον μὴθ' ἄξεισιν καλέοσθαι.

The line is untranslatable into English, as we have no word (like the German Gastfreund) to express both 'host' and guest,' as ἐξέειν does.

2 This section may be said to retract, upon further consideration, what was admitted, Eik. viii. vi. 3: ἐλευθερίαν ἐν τῇ κωπηλατικῇ πολλῇ γὰρ τοῦ τοι- στοῦ, καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

[κατὰ This reading, adopted by Bekker from a majority of MSS., is surprising; κατὰ περιέργα would not be a natural phrase, whereas the context really requires of πολείου δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ὀλείων βίων κατὰ.

3 οὔτε γὰρ—πόλεις ἐστὶν] 'For a state could not consist of ten men, nor again if consisting of a hundred thousand does it still continue to be a state.' This extremely limited idea of the size of a state is based on the Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the admin- istration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thou- sand citizens might easily appear unwieldy. Aristotle in the Politics, vii. iv. 9, represents the state as an organ- ism of limited size: ἐστὶ τι καὶ πάλαι μεγάθεια μέτρον, ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάσων, ζωῆς, φυτῶν, ὀργάνων καὶ γὰρ τούτους ἄκατον οὐτε λαός μερῶν οὐτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβαλλέεσθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, k.t.l.
κάκεινος δεὶ ἄλληλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἄλληλων συνημερεύειν. τότε δ' ἐργοῦσα εἰς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ 5 τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκεῖοι πολλοῖς· εἰκός γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἁμα τῷ μὲν συνήθεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἵςῳς οὖν εἴῃ ἐχεῖ μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλότατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτος ὁσοὶ εἰς τὸ σὺζην ἰκανοῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδεχόμεναι δόξειν ἃν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλου σφόδρα. δίστερ ὀ棰 ἐρῶν πλεῖνων· ὑπερθολῆ γὰρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τούτο δὲ πρὸς ἑνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἐχεὶν 6 ἐσκε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίγνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐταιρίκην φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμοῦνειν εἰς ὑπὸ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πάσιν οἰκεῖοι ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδεὶς δοκοῦσι εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὕς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἄρεσκοις. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν

5 δίστερ οὖν ἐρῶν πλεῖνων] This is almost a verbatim repetition of Eth. viii. vi. 2, which passage contains the germ of the present chapter.

6 οὕτω δ'—τοιοῦτοι] 'And this seems to be practically the case; for we do not find that people have many friends (together) on the footing of companionship. And the classical friendships of story are recorded to have been between pairs. But they who have many friends, and who associate familiarly with all, seem to be friends to none, except in a civil way, and men call them "over-complaisant."' In a civil way indeed it is possible to be a friend to many without being over-complaisant, but being really kind; but on a moral and personal footing this is not possible in relation to many; one must be content to find even a few worthy of this.'


ἐταιρικὴ] Cf. Eth. viii. xii. 6, and viii. v. 3. 'Companionship,' which Aristotle compares to the feeling between brothers, is much more akin to the perfect and ideal friendship than it is to either of the lower forms of friendship (for gain or for pleasure). It is essentially based on personal considerations (δ' αὑροῖς), though not necessarily on moral considerations (δ' ἀρετής).


οἵ δὲ πολύφιλοι—οὐδεὶς δοκοῦσι εἶναι φίλοι] Cf. Eudemian Ethics, vii. xii. 17: τὸ γιγνεῖν ἑνὸς καὶ συγκαθαίρειν πολλοῖς φίλους, ἀμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς φίλοι μη τολμάλοι φίλου, ἀμω λέγεται ὑπὸ, which sentence reconciles the above passage with Eth. viii. i. 5. In an external way (τοιούτως) a man should have many friends, personally (δ' αὑροῖς) a few.

centre πολλοίς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὅτα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄλθος ἐπίευξη. δι' ἄρετὴν δὲ καὶ δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτως.

11 Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλον δεῖ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπίζητονται: οἱ τε γὰρ ἄτυχοιτες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἱ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβιοῦν καὶ οἷς εὖ ποιοῦσιν. Βούλονται γὰρ εὖ θάν. ἀναγκαίοτερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἄτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦν. τοῦτον γὰρ αἱρετῶτερον ἐνεργεῖτειν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ παροσιαία αὐτῇ τῶν φιλῶν ἡδεία καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυποῦμενοι συναλγοῦντος τῶν φιλῶν. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειν τις πότερον ὡσπέρ βάρος μεταλαμβάνοντο, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν οὖ, ἡ παροσιαία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεία οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἐννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δ' ἀλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω.

3 συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεγέν. ἐσκε δ' ἡ παροσιαία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅρμων τοὺς φίλους ἰδοὺ, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ἄτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι; παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὤσι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ἢ ἐπιδεξιος. οἰδὲ γὰρ τὸ θὸς καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ήδεται καὶ λυτεῖται, τὸ δὲ λυποῦμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἄτυχίαις λυπηρόν· τὰς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διότεροι οἱ μὲν

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2 διὸπερ βάρος μεταλαμβάνουσιν] 'Whether they take part of the burden, as it were.' This is the ordinary metaphor. Cf. Xenophon, Memor. ii. vii. 1. (Σωκράτης)' Αρισταρχῶν ποτὲ δρῶν εὐκριπτῶν ἐχοῦσα· ένοικα, ἐφ' οὖ, ὁ 'Αρισταρχῆς, βαρεῖος φέρει δι' ἁρὶ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταλαμβάνον τοῖς φίλοις. ἐνα τῇ δὲ τί σε καὶ ἡμεῖς κουφίσαμεν. Aristotle hints at, without fully giving, a more psychological account of the operation of friendship in adversity.

3 μικτή τις] Cf. Eth. iii. i. 6, iv. ix. 8.
άνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν ευλαβούνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ ὑπερτεῖν τῇ ἄλπειᾳ, τὴν ἑκείνοις γινομένην λύπην ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνδρήνουσι οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδὲ αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικὸς· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιούτοι ἄνδρες τοὺς συστένουσι χάρισυ, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν ἀπασὶ δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίων. ἦ δὲ ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἤδειαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἐνοικαν ὅτι ἦδονται ἕπι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄγαθοις. διὸ δόξειν ἄν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως· εὐρηγετικῶν γὰρ εἶναι καλὸν· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὁκουντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἤκιστα δεὶ τῶν κακῶν, ὁθεν τὸ

Διὸς ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.

μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητεῖον, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθεῖν μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὀφελήσειν. ἦναι δὲ ἀνάπαυσιν ἴσως 6 ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχόντας ἀκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλων γὰρ εὐ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἱδίον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργόντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίος· οὐ

4 κἂν μὴ ὑπερτεῖν τῇ ἄλπειᾳ—θρηνητικὸς] 'And (such a one), unless he be excessively impassive, cannot endure the pain which is brought upon them; and altogether he does not like sympathetic wailers, not being given to wailing himself.' The words κἂν μὴ κ.π.λ. have troubled the commentators. The Paraphrast explains them as if meaning:—And unless (the sympathetic presence of friends) be excessively painless to them.' But evidently the clause is brought in in reference to οἱ ἄνδρῶδες. 'Manly natures' are not at all unlikely to be somewhat blunt and callous, and deficient in sensibility for the feelings of others. One might almost fancy that Aristotle was thinking of the Ajax of Sophocles, v.v. 319, 320:

πρὸς γὰρ κακοῦ τε καὶ βαρύφθην γόου τουοόδ' ἀεὶ ποι' ἀνδρός ἥμηνετ' ἔχειν.

5 Διὸς ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν] These words are not to be found in any extant play or fragment. The nearest approach to them is in Sophocles, Ἐδ. Τύρ. 1061: οἷς νοσοῦσιν ἐγώ.

6 φίλων γὰρ· ἰδίοι] 'For it behoves a friend to benefit (his friends), and especially those who are in need, and to (benefit) them when they have not asked. For this is nobler and sweeter for both parties.' With καὶ τό, εἴτε ποῖειν isto be repeated. Some editions, against the MSS., read καὶ τὸν.
γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὑφελείσθαι. δέξαν δὲ ἀνδίας ἐν τῷ διωθείσθαι ἵσως εὐλαβητέων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει, ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἀπασιν αἰρετῇ φαίνεται.

12 Ἄρ’ οὖν, ἄσπερ τοὺς ἐρωτῖ τὸ ὄρον ἀγαπητότατον ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἰσθησιν ἡ τὰς λοιπὰς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἐρωτὸς ὅντος καὶ γινομένου, οὗτοι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἰρετῶτατον ἐστὶ τὸ συζήν; κοινονία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὗτοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. περὶ αὐτὸν δὲ ἡ αἰσθησις ὅτι ἐστιν αἰρετῇ καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δὴ. ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζήν, ὡςτ’ ἐκὸτοι τοῖς ἐφείσεται.

2 καὶ δ’ τ’ ὅτ’ ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι ἡ σάρξ καὶ αἰροῦνται τὸ ἦν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φίλων βουλοῦνται διάγειν· διότι οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγκυμονούσιν καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἡ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἐκάστοι ἐν τούτῳ συμμερεύοντες δ’ τ’ περὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ συζήν γὰρ βουλομένους μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταύτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινονοῦσιν οἷς οὖνται 3 συζήν. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαίλων φιλία μοχθηρὰ· κοινονοῦσι γὰρ φαίλων ἄβέβαιοι ὅτε, καὶ μοχθηροί δὲ

δέξαν δὲ—συμβαίνει] 'But one should beware perhaps of getting the reputation of churlishness in rejecting (benefits); for this sometimes happens.' ἀνδία answers to the 'insuavis, acerbus,' of Horace, Sat. 1. iii. 85.

XII. In conclusion, the best thing in friendship is—intercourse. This gives vividness to the pursuits of life; and when good men have intercourse with each other, they mutually strengthen and increase the good that is in them.

1 ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζήν] 'But it is by living together that they attain the fulness of life.' The word ἐνέργεια here has evident reference to ἡ αἰσθησις δει ἐστιν in the preceding sentence. Zell and Cardwell follow some of the MSS. in reading αὐτῆ, i.e. τῆς αἰσθησιος. But ἡ ἐνέργεια stands naturally alone (cf. Eth. ix. ix. 6), meaning 'the vivid sense of life.' And a similar collocation occurs Eth. viii. iii. 5: γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φίλλαν ὀφθώς.

3 κοινονοῦσι γὰρ—ἀλλήλαι] 'For, being of an unstable nature, they have fellowship in evil, and become bad by assimilation to each other.' Cf. Eth. ix. i. 7: τῶν φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσαν. The word ἄβεβαιοι here is not connected with the use of βέβαιον in Eth. viii. viii. 5: οἱ δὲ μοχθηροί τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν. Aristotle is not talking here of the instability of the friendship between bad men, but of its evil results mutually. Throughout the treatise on Friendship
he speaks of the weakness of vice (cf. note on ix. iv. 9), and here he says that bad men, from the weakness and instability of their natures, imbibe evil example.

ἀπομάστωται — ἄρεσκονται] 'For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like.' Cf. Aristophanes, Ran., v. 1040:

ὅτι ἡ μὴ φήν ἀπομαζομένη πολλαὶ ἄρετας ἐποίησεν.

ἔσθλων μὲν γὰρ] On this passage of Theognis, which is referred to above, Eth. ix. ix. 7, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 93. It is after Aristotle's manner to end a treatise with a line of poetry; cf. Metaphysics, xi. 14, where the book ends with the verse

Οὐκ ἄγαθὸν πολυκοιμαῖνη εἰς κοιρανὸς ἔστω.

Accordingly the unnecessary paragraph περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας κ.τ.λ. is probably the interpolation of an editor.
PLAN OF BOOK X.

This book,—beginning with a treatise on Pleasure (which subject is introduced (1) because of its connection with Morals; (2) because of the controversies about it), and rising from the critical examination of extreme views to Aristotle's own theory of Pleasure, namely, that it is the sense of the vital functions, or, in other words, of the harmonious action of some one faculty—proceeds, almost without transition, to declare that Happiness in the truest sense of the term must consist in the action of the highest faculty, and that, this highest faculty being Reason, Philosophy must, beyond all comparison with anything else, whether idle amusement, or even the exercise of the moral virtues, constitute Happiness, or that Practical Chief Good which is the end of Man, and the province of the ethical branch of Politics.

Thus far this branch of Science, having obtained a definite conception, might be thought to be complete. But it still remains, says Aristotle, to ask whether something cannot be added towards its practical realisation, and, as habits of life are clearly necessary for the attainment of human excellence, on which the Chief Good depends, it follows that we shall require such domestic institutions as may be favourable to the cultivation of human excellence. These institutions, whether of public or private ordinance, can only be rightly conceived after a scientific study of the principles of Legislation, i.e. of Politics in its highest form. To this, then, Aristotle proposes to address himself, considering it to be a branch of science which has hitherto been neglected. He roughly sketches out the plan of his works on Politics, with a transition to which the ethical treatise concludes.

This tenth book then shows us the Ethics as a rounded whole. It is written in close connection with Book I. (cf. X. vi. 1), and it
sums up referentially the contents of Books I. II. III. IV. VIII. IX. But while the Ethics are thus rounded off in their beginning and end, and as to part of their contents, it is clear on the other hand that they contain a lacuna which has been artificially filled up.

It is very significant that the present book makes no reference to the contents of Books V. VI. VII.; and it seems impossible to avoid thinking that Aristotle wrote the conclusion to his ethical treatise at a time when he had not as yet composed certain parts which were meant to be introduced into it. Whether he afterwards ever composed those parts in literary form, or whether he merely gave materials for them in his oral discourses, we have now no means of knowing. That Books V. VI. and VII. were not actually composed by Aristotle we have seen many reasons for believing.
META ἔτη ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἵσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· μὲν· λιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνοφρευσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν· διὸ πανδεύοντι τοὺς νέους οἰκείοντες ἡδονῆ καὶ λύπη. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἱδέως ἁρέτην μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δὲ καὶ μισεῖν ἄ δε. διατείνῃ γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἁρέτην τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαιμονίαν βίον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἠδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἄν δοξεῖ παρετέον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅσ τε καὶ πολλὰ ἐχόντων ἀμφισβητῆσιν. οἵ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθόν ἡδονῆ λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' εὐ ἐν αὔτιας κομιδὴ φαίλουν, οἱ μὲν ἵσως πεπεισμένοι ὀντο καὶ ἔχειν, οἵ δὲ ὁμοίως βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαιλον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτήν καὶ δούλευειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖ εἰς τοιαύταν ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἄν οὖτως

I. The treatise on Pleasure opens analogously to that on the Voluntary (Eth. iii. 1), and that on Friendship (viii. i. 6), justifying the introduction of the subject, (1) as connected with Ethics, (2) as having been made matter of controversy.

1 μαλωτα γὰρ—ἡμῶς] 'For it seems to be most intimately connected with the human race.' Omni sed non soli, see below v. 8.

διὸ πανδεύοντι κ.τ.λ.] This is all taken from Plato's Laws, ii. p. 653. See note on Eth. ii. iii. 2, where the passage is quoted.

πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἱδέως ἁρέτην] Some MSS. read ἄρχη, which it is strange that the commentators should have thought a natural reading, supported by at μὲν τὴν φρονήσεως ἄρχη (below, viii. 3). Because φρονήσεως is regarded by Aristotle as a syllogism, or set of syllogisms, having ἄρχη or major premisses,—it does not follow that the phrase ἥ τοῦ ἱδέως ἄρχη is admissible.

2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ—μέσων] 'For some call pleasure the chief good, others on the contrary call it exceedingly evil, (of these latter) some perhaps believing it to be so, but others thinking it for the interests of morality to declare pleasure to be an evil, even if it be not so, because most men incline
towards it, and are enslaved to pleasures, and so one ought to lead men in the opposite direction, for thus they will arrive at the mean.'

In all probability Aristotle here alludes immediately to two sections of the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Eudoxus, whose arguments are quoted; (2) that headed by Speusippos, whose anti-hedonistic arguments were contained in two books mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, under the titles Περὶ ἡδονῆς α'· 'Ἀριστιππος', and which are now passed under review. Under the class of those who 'call pleasure the chief good,' Aristotle less directly refers to Aristippus, who, though he belonged to a bygone era, still lived in the pages of Plato's Philebus, and in the book of Speusippus bearing his name.

μὴ ποτε became very common in the later Greek.

ο̣ γαρ ψέγων—πολλῶν] 'For he who blames pleasure (unreservedly), and yet is seen occasionally desiring it, is thought to incline towards it as being altogether good; for ordinary persons cannot discriminate.' 

τοιοῦτοι here, as τοιοῦτο does frequently in Aristotle, takes its sense from the context. Cf. Eth. viii. vi. 6, x. ii. 4, &c.

From what is above stated we learn that, the decline of philosophy having commenced, some of the Platonists enunciated theories which were meant to be practically useful, rather than true. Thus they overstated what they believed to be the truth about pleasure, in order to counteract men's universal tendency towards it. Aristotle doubts whether this is good policy.' Their whole theory is likely to be upset by their occasionally indulging in the higher kinds of pleasure.

μ. τούτων [ευνυμεν] 'Those who comprehend them,' i.e. appreciating the truth of the theories, as shown by their agreement with men's actions. Cf. Eth. vi. x. 1, note. On τοῖς ἔργοις cf. ix. viii. 2.
II. This chapter contains the grounds on which Eudoxus 'used to think that pleasure is the chief good;' and an examination of three objections, which had been started to those reasons. The arguments of Eudoxus are: (1) that all things seek pleasure; (2) that pain is essentially καθ' αὑρίαν an object of aversion, and therefore pleasure, its contrary, must be essentially an object of desire; (3) that pleasure is always desired as an end-in-itself, and not as a means to anything; (4) that pleasure when added to any other good makes it more desirable. The objections to these arguments are: (1) the opinion of Plato (which serves as an objection to argument 4th), that the chief good must be incapable of being added to any other good, and so made better. This objection Aristotle allows as valid. (2) An objection to the 1st argument, probably suggested by Plato's Philebus, p. 67, and repeated by Speusippus,—that the testimony of irrational creatures is of no value. This objection is disallowed. (3) The counter-argument of Speusippus to the 2nd argument of Eudoxus,—that not pleasure, but the neutral state, is the true contrary to pain. This is refuted.

1 τὸ ἀπερθὴν ἀπεικόνισαμεν ἡ τοῦ ἡθονίου ἡμῶν θὰνατὸν ἐγένετο, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ πάντα ὅρμων ἐφιμενα αὐτής, καὶ ἡ ἔλλογα καὶ ἁλογα. ἐν πάσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρέτων ἐπεικές, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον κράτιστον τὸ δὴ πάντα ἐπὶ ταύτῳ φέρεσθαι μηνεύειν ὡς πάσι τούτῳ ἁρατῶν ἐκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἁγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὡσπερ καὶ τροφῆν τὸ δὴ πάσιν ἁγαθὸν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφιεσαι, τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθονίου ἁρετήν μᾶλλον θαὶ δι' αὐτοὺς διαφερόντως γὰρ

more right than his opponents, but wrong in not discriminating between the different kinds of pleasure, and in going so far as to say that pleasure is the chief good. The term τὸ ἀπερθῆν, in opposition to τὸ φιλάθλην, seems to have played a great part in the reasons of Eudoxus. It is admitted by Plato, Philebus, p. 20, as a necessary attribute of the chief good, and so also by Aristotle, Eth. i. vii. 8; x. ii. 4. Here it is implied in the word ἐφιμενα. It appears simply to mean 'that which is a reasonable object of desire,' cf. Eth. viii. viii. 2: ἣ φιλία καθ' αὑρίαν ἀπερθῆ, and x. iii. 13, ἡδωρη ὡς πάνα απερθῆ. As implying will and choice, it is applicable in a relative, as well as an absolute sense, to means as well as to ends. Book 111. of the Topics contains hints on the method of dealing with this term, and throws light on its use, which fluctuates between a reference to the good, the useful, and the pleasant (cf. Top. iii. iii. 7).

ἐνυπερηφανοί δ' οἱ λόγοι] This is a pleasing allusion to the personal character of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who lived about 366 B.C., and who enjoyed great fame as an astronomer. He appears to have introduced the sphere from Egypt into Greece. The poem of Aratus is a versification of his Παυμήνα. Certain stories in Diogenes would leave the impression that, being Plato's pupil, he quarrelled with his
II.

HΩΙΚΟΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ Χ.

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edókei σώφρων εἶναι: οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἱδονῆς ἐδόκει
taúta λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἤπτον 2
δὲ φετ' ἐναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ'
auto πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὦμοιος δὴ τοῦναντίον αἰρέτων,
máλιστα δὲ ἐναι αἰρέτων δὲ μὴ δὲ ἔτερον μηδ' ἐτέρου χάριν
αιρούμεθα. τοιούτων δὲ ὁμολογομένων εἶναι τὴν ἱδονήν:
οὐδενα γὰρ ἐπεροστῶν τίνος ἔνεκα ἥδεται, ὦς καθ' αὐτὴν
οὕσαν αἰρέτην τὴν ἱδονήν. προστιθεμένην τε ὁτέρων τῶν
ἀγαθῶν αἰρετότερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαίοπραγεῖν καὶ
σωφροσύνῃ καὶ αὐξεῖσθαι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ.
ἔσκε δὴ οὕτως γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, 3
καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐτέρου. πάν γὰρ μεθ' ἐτέρου ἀγαθόν
αἰρετότερον ὃ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων
ἁναιρεῖ δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἱδονή τάγαθον: αἰρετότερον γὰρ
εἶναι τῶν ὧν βιόν μετά φρονήσεως ἡ χώρις, εἰ δὲ τὸ
μικτὸν κρείττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἱδονήν τάγαθον: οὐδὲνος
γὰρ προστιθέντος αὐτὸ τάγαθον αἰρετότερον γίνεσθαι.
δῆλον δὲ ὡς οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τάγαθον ἄν εἰη, δὲ μετὰ τίνος
master. Aristotle (or, as Diogenes
says, 'Nicomachus') is the only
authority for his ethical opinions.

2 δὲ δὴ ἐτέρου] The end is better
than the means, but this does not
prove anything as to the comparative
superiority of pleasure to the rest of
the whole class of ends. Thus the
argument of Eudoxus oversteps the
mark. A similar argument of his is
mentioned with careless approbation,
Bk. i. xii. 5: Δοκεῖ καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι,
says Aristotle, 'Eudoxus is thought
to have pleaded well' in favour of
pleasure being the chief good, because
it is never praised. This argument
would only prove that it belongs to
the class of τὰ τίμα.

προστιθεμένη] It is suggested as a
commonplace of reasoning. Topics,
iii. ii. 2, that you may say 'Justice
and courage are better with pleasure
than without.'

3 τὰν γὰρ—χωρὶς] 'For that "every
good is better in combination with
another good than alone." This is
indeed the very argument by which
Plato proves pleasure not to be the
highest good. For the pleasant life
is more desirable with wisdom than
without.' Cf. Philebus, pp. 21-22,
where however the proposition οὗτος
προστιθέντος—γίνεσθαι is not to be
found. Plato only argued that, as the
highest conception of human good im-
plied a combination of both pleasure
and knowledge, pleasure separately
could not be the chief good. It is
a deduction of Aristotle's from the
terms λαοῦ καί ἐλεός, used by Plato,
that the chief good is incapable of
addition or improvement. Cf. Topics,
iii. ii. 2, where it is said that the
end plus the means cannot be called
more desirable than the end by itself;
cf. Eth. i. vii. 8, where the same
4 τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετῶτερον γίνεται. τί ὡν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπίθεται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίσται, μη οὐδὲν λέγοις. ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τούτ' εἶναι φαμεν. ὁ δὲ ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάντα πιστότερα ἐρεῖ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἁνότα ὀφέγετο αὐτῶν, ἢν ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοις ἂν τι; ἵνας δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαιλοῦσι ἐστιν τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ

5 καθ' αὐτά, δ' ἐφίσται τοῦ οἰκεῖου ἀγαθοῦ, οὐκ ἔσκε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἔναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικείσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἀμφοτέρως, λέγοντες ταύτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλήθειοντες. ἀμφότεροι μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευγότα ἐδει ἀμφοτέρος εἶναι, τῶν μητέρων δὲ μητέρου πη ὑμωὸς. νὰν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγουσθε ὡς κακὸν, τὴν δ' αἴροιμενοι ὡς ἀγαθὸν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀντικείσθαι.

3 ὦ μὴν οὖν εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτῶν ἐστίν ἢ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτον οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι

opinion seems to be conveyed, though that interpretation of the passage has been disputed.

4 τί ὡν—ἐπιθεται] 'What is there then which has these characteristics (i.e. supreme goodness without the capability of addition) which we men can partake of? For such is the very object of our inquiries.' That is, not a transcendental good, but something to be practically realised. Cf. Eth. l. vi. 13.

δ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ] This acceptance of the testimony of instinct occurs also in the Eudemian book, Eth. vii. xiii. 5.

ὁ δ' ἀναφέρων] Probably Speusippus, taking up a suggestion from Plato, Philebus, p. 67.

τοὺς φαιλοῖς] In the neuter gender, 'the lower creatures;'—alluding to the θηλα mentioned by Plato, Philebus, l.c.

5 οὐ γὰρ φασιν] As we learn from the Eudemian book, Eth. vii. xiii. 1, Speusippus was the author of this objection.

III. Aristotle investigates remaining arguments used by the Platonists to prove that pleasure is not a good:

(1) that it is 'not a quality.' This argument would prove too much, as it would be equally decisive against happiness, or the actions of virtue;

(2) that it is 'unlimited.' But (a) in one sense this will apply to virtue also, (b) in another sense it is only applicable to the 'mixed pleasures,' which are analogous to health, i.e. a proportion variable according to circumstances; (3) that it is 'not final.'
or perfect, but in some sort 'a transition.' Against which Aristotle argues, (a) that it cannot be a motion, because not admitting the idea of speed, (b) that it cannot be a creation, because not capable of being resolved into its component parts, (c) that it cannot be a filling up, for this is merely corporeal, and even in the case of bodily pleasure it is not the body that feels; (d) that there are many disgraceful pleasures. To which it may be answered, that pleasures differ in kind, and even if some be bad, others may be absolutely good.

1 εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιητῶν] This seems to be the only record of an argument, probably occurring in the works of Speusippus, that 'pleasure is not a good, because it is not a quality.' It points to the moralising tendency, above noticed, of this school of Platonists, as if they said that nothing could be called 'good' which did not form part of man's moral character.

2 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἁσθενοῦ] Pleasure may be said to admit of degrees, first, in reference to men's different capacities of feeling it; but in this respect it will stand on the same footing as courage and justice.

εἰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις—μεταλ] 'In the second place, if (they predicate this attribute of "unlimited" as existing, not in the recipients of pleasure, but) in the pleasures themselves, perhaps they omit to state the reason of the fact, namely, that while some pleasures are unmixed, others are mixed.' Plato in the Philebus divides pleasures into mixed and unmixed. Of each he makes three classes. Mixed pleasures are: (1) bodily pleasures, the restoration of harmony in the animal frame, where the bodily pain of want or desire is mixed up with the bodily pleasure of gratification; (2) the pleasure of expecting this restoration, where the bodily pain of want is mixed up with the mental pleasure of the idea of relief; (3) the pleasure which we feel in the ludicrous, where the mental pain of seeing the un-beautiful is mixed with the mental pleasure of laughing at it. The unmixed pleasures, i.e. in which no pain is implied, are (1) those of smell; (2) those of sight and hearing; (3) those that belong to the intellect. Of these two classes Plato confines the attribute of áμετρα, 'want of measure,' to the first class. The unmixed or pure pleasures necessarily possess áμετρα, cf. Phileb. p. 52 c. The same doctrine is given Euk. vii. xiv. 6: αἱ δὲ ἄνευ λυπῶν (θυσίαι) ὅσον ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. Speusippus, forgetful of this distinction, appears to have made áμετρα (ἀδριστὸν εἶναι) a universal predicate of pleasure.
3 τί γὰρ κωλύει κ.τ.λ.] Even the mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit the idea of proportion (συμμετρία), just as health is a proportion, though a relative and variable one, of the elements in the human body. In the Topics, vi. ii. 1, the words ἡ γύλεια συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν are given as an instance of an ambiguous definition, συμμετρία being used in more senses than one.

οὐ γὰρ—ὁτειν] ‘Health is not the same proportion of elements in all men, nor even in the same man always, but with a certain laxity of variation it still remains health, though admitting of difference in the degrees (according to which the elements are compounded).’

4 τέλειον τε τάγαθον τιθέντες κ.τ.λ.] Plato, in the Philebus, p. 53 c, accepted the doctrine of the Cyrenaics, ὃς ἐδει γένεσις ἔστω (ἡ ἠθοπ.), and then, by the contrast of means and end, γένεσις and οὐσία, he proved that pleasure could not be the chief good. As said above, Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 249, Plato seems to have recognised a class of pleasures above those which were mere states of transition, but to have had no formula to express them. Speusippus probably applied the argument drawn from the Cyrenaic definition not merely ad homines, as Plato had done, but as if absolutely valid.

οὐδὲ τῇ τοῦ κόσμου i.e. οὐκ ἐστιν τάχος καὶ βραδύτης καθ’ αὐτὴν. ‘All motion has speed and slowness properly belonging to it, if not relatively to itself—as, for instance, the motion of the universe has no speed or slowness in itself (because it moves equably),—at all events in relation to other things.’ Aristotle argues that though it is possible ‘to be pleased’ (ἡθοπ. — μεταβάλλει εἰς ἠθοπ.) more or less quickly, it is not possible to ‘feel pleasure’ (ἡθεσθαι) either quickly or slowly. This argument seems a verbal one, like some of those in Eth. i. vi. against Plato’s doctrine of ideas. If pleasure be identified with κίνησις, the argument holds good. But if it only be held to have the same relation to κίνησις as Aristotle himself makes it to have to ἔννοια, Eth. x. viii. 4, the argument falls to the ground. This argument and the one in § 6 really only apply to the want of a sufficiently subjective formula to express pleasure. If pleasure were defined as ‘the consciousness of a transition,’ there might then be degrees of speed in the transition, though not in the consciousness of it.
Aristotle's real objection to the term κύρις lies deeper than these mere dialectical skirmishings, and has been explained, Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 247-50.

5 γένεσις τε—φθορά] 'And how can it be a creation? For it does not seem to be the case that anything can be created out of anything; a thing is resolved into that out of which it is created. And (as the Platonists say) pain is the destruction of that of which pleasure is the creation.' This elliptical argument seems to require for its conclusion, 'Where then are the elements out of which our perfect nature (οὐσία) is created by the process called pleasure, and into which it is resolved by the destructive process called pain?' We find pain called a destruction in the Philebus, p. 31 Ε: δύσος δ' α' φθορά καὶ λόγος καὶ λόγος, η δ' τού ὄργου πάλιν τὸ ἐξερήσθεν πληρώσα δόμοις ἡδονή. Aristotle, arguing polemically, says, 'Where then are the elements with which the creative and the destructive process must begin and end?'

He afterwards reasonably substitutes εἰρήμεια for γένεσις as a better formula, but the above polemic seems not to have much value.

6 οὖν εἶστι ἄρα—λυπώτατο] 'Neither is pleasure therefore a replenishment, though one may feel pleasure while replenishment is taking place, just as one may feel pain while one is being cut.' Pleasure, says Aristotle, may be synchronous with replenishment, but cannot be identical with it, for pleasure is a state of the mind, and not of the body, cf. Eth. i. viii. 10: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑσθαν τῶν ψυχῶν. All that is proved here is that a more subjective formula than ἀναπληρώσις is required to express the nature of pleasure. Plato had used the formula πληρώσις, Philebus, p. 31 Ε, and Speusippos probably repeated it.

tεμώμονασι] The words τομαὶ καὶ καθέσεις were commonly used by Plato, as instances of bodily pain. Cf. Timæus, p. 65 Β: ταῦτα δ' α' περὶ τὰς καθέσεις καὶ τομὰς τοῦ σώματος γνώριμα ἐστὶ κατάθεια.
δοκεῖ γεγενηθαῖ εκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἧδων· εἴδεις γὰρ γνωμένους καὶ προλυτηθέντας ἰδεῖσθαι
7 τῷ ἀναπληρώσει. τούτῳ δ' οὐ περὶ τάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἧδων ἄλοιποι γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀρφήσεως, καὶ ἣκρα-ματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὐτὰ γενέσαι ἦσονται; οὐδὲνς γὰρ ἔνδεια
8 γεγένησαι, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπληρώσει. πρὸς δὲ τοῦ τροφήρντας τὰς ἐποιειδίστους τῶν ἦδων λέγω τις ἂν ὅτι οὖν ἔστι ταῦτ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακοῖς διακει-μένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰστέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτως, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ύγιεῖνα ἡ γυλικεὰ ἡ πικρά, οὐδὲ αὐτὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς
9 ὀφθαλμῶν. ὡς οὖτω λέγω τις ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἦδων αἱρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὀσκερ καὶ τὸ πλούτειν, προδότι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ύγιαν, οὐ μὴν ὀτιῶν
10 φαγόντι. τῷ εἰδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἦδων· ἐπεραὶ γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἱσθήναι τὴν του δικαίου μὴ ὅτα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μονικοῦ μὴ ὅτα μονικοῦ, ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
11 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεί καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἐπεραὶ δὲν τοῦ κόλακος, οὐκ οὔσαι ἀγαθον τὴν ἦδων ἡ διαφόρους εἰδε. οὐ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τάγαθαι ομιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὃ δὲ πρὸς ἦδων, καὶ τῷ μὲν

capable of feeling certain pleasures; (b) that the flatterer is different from the friend; (c) that the pleasures of childhood differ from those of maturity. The whole reasoning is repeated in better form in chap. v.
11 ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεί καὶ ὁ φίλος] The term 'friend' is used here in a distinctive sense to denote 'the true friend,' just as it is in Eth. viii. xiii.
9 : ἐκεῖν ὁπλον οὐ ποιήσειν. Common language, which contrasts the flatterer who ministers pleasure, from the friend who ministers good, testifies to the non-identity of pleasure (in all forms) with good.
If pleasure, according to Eudoxus, were the chief good, all pursuits would be prized in proportion to their affording pleasure, but this Aristotle shows not to be the case.

IV. Having finished his critical remarks on existing theories (τὰ λεγόμενα) about pleasure, Aristotle proceeds synthetically to state his own views, as follows: (1) Pleasure is, like sight, something whole and entire, not gradually arrived at, but a moment of consciousness, at once perfect, independent of the conditions of time, §§ 1–4. (2) It arises from any faculty obtaining its proper object, but is better in proportion to the excellence of the faculty exercised, §§ 5–7. (3) It is thus the perfection of our functions, but is distinct from the functions themselves, § 8. (4) It cannot be continuously maintained, owing to the weakness of our powers, our functions being soon blunted by fatigue, § 9. (5) Pleasure, in short, results from the sense of life, and is inseparably connected with the idea of life, §§ 10–11.

I τι δ' ἐστιν ἡ ποιόν τι [Cf. Eth. II. v. i.: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τι ἔστω ὁ ἀριθμὸς σκεπτέων. Ibd. vi.: δει δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον οὕτως εἰσέχω, ὅτι τοιαύτα ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις. The genus (τι ἐστι) of pleasure here given is that it is εἶσον τι, one of those moments of consciousness which are complete in themselves; the differentia (ποιόν τι) is that it results from the exercise of any faculty upon its proper object. It may be said that this definition would leave pleasure undefined; but in fact it is a simple sensation, not admitting of entire explication. ἡ μὲν ὅρασις] Modern researches in optics would tend to modify this view of the entirely simple nature of an act of sight. But it may be conceded that any ‘process’ which takes place in sight is too swift to be noticed by the mind. Cf. Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Book II. ch. xiv. § 10. ‘Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an instant, and is that which takes up
the time of only one idea in our minds without the succession of another, wherein therefore we perceive no succession at all.'

2 διὰκε—ἀπαντη 'Therefore it is not a process; for every process is under conditions of time and aims at some end; as, for instance, the (process of) architecture is perfect when it has effected what it aims at. May we not say (4) then that it is perfect in the particular (τοῦτος) time viewed as a whole? But in the separate parts of the time occupied all processes are imperfect, and are different in species, both from the whole process, and from each other. For the collection of the stones is different from the fluting of the pillars, and both from the making of the temple. And the making the temple is a perfect process, for it wants nothing towards its proposed object; but that of the basement and the triglyph are imperfect, for they are each the making of a part. Therefore they differ in species, and it is not possible to find a process perfect in species in any time whatsoever, unless it be in the time occupied viewed as a whole.' With Michelet, who follows two MSS., ἂς has been omitted above before τοῦτο. The reading ἂς τοῦτο makes no sense, unless one which would be opposed to what is said afterwards (οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὕσων κ.τ.λ.) ἂς ἐν ἀπαντη The form ἂς with a question, used for conveying Aristotle's opinion on any subject, occurs again in § 9 of this chapter, ἂς καμιάν; In the illustration given, two of the processes mentioned are merely preparatory, the collection of the stones for building, and the fluting of the pillars before they are set up; two others are substantive parts of the building, the laying of the foundation (the first act), and the adding the triglyph, which was a
fluted tablet added as an ornament to the frieze (perhaps the last act in the creation of the temple). The creation of the temple as a whole, regarded in the whole time which it occupies, is alone to be regarded as a perfect process.

3-4 ὅμολος δὲ—ὁμοίος] 'So too in the case of walking, and all other processes. For if passage be a process from place to place, even of this there are different species, flying, walking, jumping, and the like. And not only this, but even in walking itself (there are different species), for the whence and the whither are not the same in the whole course and in the part of the course, and in one part and the other part; nor is it the same thing to cross this line and that. For a person not only passes a line, but a line in space, and this line is in different space from that line. We shall treat exactly of process elsewhere, but it seems not to be perfect in every time, but the majority of processes seem imperfect and differing in species, if the whence and the whither con-
stitute a differentia. But pleasure seems perfect in kind in any time (of its existence) whatsoever.' Every process is under conditions of time, and its parts being under a law of succession are essentially different from each other: the ἔστερος from the πρῶτος, the beginning, middle, and end, from one another. In pleasure nothing of the kind is to be found. One moment of pleasure does not lead up, as a preparative, to another more advanced moment. Pleasure, when felt, is, ἵππος facta, complete.

ἐν ἄλλως καὶ ἐρυθραὶ] Cf. Physics, IV. and V. But as the Physics were probably a later work, ἐρυθραὶ may be here a mis-reading for ἐρυθραὶ, as in the instance given, Vol. I. Essay I. p. 69, note.

ὅκ ἐν ἄναν] 'Non in quolibet tempore: this is of course different from ἐν ἄναν τῷ χρόνῳ τότην, and ἐν τῷ ἄναν, in the preceding section.

ἐν ὑμῶν] 'In quolibet,' but above, ὅκ ἐστιν ἐν ὑμῶν means 'in nullo potest.'

ἐν δῆλον ὅσον—ἡδονή] 'It is clear
όλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀράσεως ἐστὶ γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τοῦτων οὐδὲν κινήσις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ 5 ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γὰρ τι· αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἑνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ καλοστὸν τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἰσθησίαν· τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἑνεργεία· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἑνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν φ' ἐστὶ· μηθὲν διαφερέτω· καθ' ἐκαστὸν δὲ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἑνεργεία τοῦ ἀριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ύφ' αὐτῆν. αὐτὴ δ' ἐν τελειοτάτῃ εἴη καὶ ἑδίστη· κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἰσθησίαν ἐστὶν ἡδονῆ, ὦμοιος δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἑδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη τελειοτάτῃ δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἑκοιτο πρὸς τὸ σπουδαίοτατον τῶν 6 ύφ' αὐτῆν. τελειοὶ δὲ τῆς ἑνεργείαν ἡ ἡδονῆ. οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων ἢ τε ἡδονῆ τελειοὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἡ αἰσθησίας, σπουδαία ὄντα, ὅσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ύγίεια καὶ 7 ὁ ἱατρὸς ὦμοιος αὐτικὰ ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνει. καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἰσθησίαν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονῆ, δηλον· φαμέν γὰρ ὀράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἴδεα. δηλον δὲ καὶ ὃτι μάλιστα, ἑπειδ' ἢ τε αἰσθησίας ἢ κρατίστῃ καὶ πρὸς τοιούτων ὑπερφιγί· τοιοῦτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἐσται ἡδονῆ ὑπάρχοντος γε τοῦ 8 ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. τελειοὶ δὲ τῆς ἑνεργείαν ἡ ἡδονῆ οὖχ ὡς ἡ ἔξις ἑνντάρχοσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγνώμονον τι τέλος, οἶον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὀρα· ἔως ἄν οὖν τό τε νοητόν ἡ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἶον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον

then that (process and pleasure) must be different from one another, and that pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and perfect.'

6 τελειοὶ δὲ—ὑγιαίνειν] 'Pleasure renders the exercise of a faculty perfect, but not in the same way in which the goodness of the faculty itself and of its object does so, just as health and the physician are in different ways the cause of one's being well; i.e. pleasure is the formal, and not the efficient, cause of a perfect function. 'Cause' in this Aristotelian usage becomes equivalent to 'result.' The

illustration used here is given also, with a slight confusion of terms, in the Eudemian book, Eth. vi. xii. 5, 'Ἐνεικτα καὶ ποιοῦντι μὲν, οἷς ὡς ἱατρικῇ δὲ ἴδεα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ἴδεα.

7 τοιοῦτων δ' ὄντων—πεισομένου] 'But if the object and the percepient be in this (highest) condition, there always will be pleasure, as long as subject and object remain.' The relative terms τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πείσετον take their meaning from the way in which they are applied. Thus, Eth. v. v. 9, they are used for 'producer and consumer.' Here τὸ ποιοῦν is used
for the perciuient, to πάθωσι for the object perceived.

8 ομοιων γαρ δητων—γνωσθα] 'For from similar pairs of relatives, bearing the same relation to one another, i.e. the active and passive, the same result is naturally produced.' This appears to be an abstract and a priori way of stating the universality of pleasure attendant on the harmony between a faculty and its proper object.

9 πως ου—αμαυρωται] 'How is it then that no one is continuously in a state of pleasure? The reason must be that one grows weary. For all human things are incapable of continuous activity. Pleasure, therefore, ceases to be produced, for it depends on the activity of the faculties. It is on this same account that some things please us while they are new, but afterwards not in the same way. For at first the intellect is excited and acts strenuously on the objects in question (as in the case of sight, when one first fixes one's glance), but afterwards the action is not equally vivid, but relaxed, and so one's pleasure also fades.' On this doctrine, cf. Vol. I. Essay IV., and Ar. Metaph. viii. viii. 18, there quoted, p. 251.

10 It is natural to say that all desire pleasure, from its inseparable connection with the sense of life, and with each of the vital functions. Thus far Eudorus was right, but he was wrong in not recognising a difference in kind between different pleasures, and this point is demonstrated in the ensuing chapter.
V. Pleasures may be thought to differ in kind: (1) Because our several functions (mental and others) differ from each other in kind, and things different in kind are perfected by things different in kind, §§ 1–2. (2) Because while its own pleasure promotes any particular exercise of the faculties, an alien pleasure impedes it, §§ 3–5. (3) Because the human functions differ from each other in a moral point of view, and the pleasures therefore which are so closely connected with them as almost to be identical must differ in the same way from each other, §§ 6–7. (4) Creatures different in kind must have, and by common consent do have, different pleasures, § 8. (5) The pleasures of man when in a morbid state must differ from the pleasures of man when in a healthy state. As a corollary to the last argument it may be added, that reasonings against pleasure from a reference to the morbid pleasures have no weight. The answer to them would be, that such are not pleasures at all.

The ἐνεργεία mentioned in this section must be those of the rational faculty. Thus we have the classification of things capable of being made perfect, into nature, art, and the moral and intellectual life of man. Cf. Eik. iii. iii. 7: ἄλλα γὰρ δοκοῦντι εἰμι φόβος καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἐτὶ δὲ νοῦ καὶ πῶς τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων.

2 φανεῖ δ᾽—τελειά] ‘This would also seem to be shown by the intimate connection existing between each pleasure and the function which it perfects.’ Cf. Eik. x. i. 1: μάλλον γὰρ δοκεῖ συνεργείας τῷ γένει ἡμῶν. Pleasure, generally speaking, is proper to the human race; from another point of view, each function has its own proper pleasure, and the pleasure ‘proper’ to one function is ‘alien’ to other functions. This distinction of oikêia and ἄλλοτρα ἡδονὴ was perhaps suggested by a passage in the Republic of Plato, ix. 587 a, where those terms are used, though not with quite the same application. It is there said that in the philosopher each part of his soul does its proper work and attains its proper pleasure; but when some lower passion has the predominance, that passion, causing
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐκαστὰ κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οὖν γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἐκαστὰ μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσι καὶ φιλοκοιδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὸ ἐκπίθευεν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. συνανεύοντι δὲ αἰ ἡδοναῖ, τὰ δὲ συνανεύοντα οἰκεῖα. τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδε καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἑτέρα τῷ εἶδε. ἐτὶ δὲ 3 μᾶλλον τούτῳ ἐν φανεί ἐκ τοῦ τῶν ἁφ’ ἐτέρον ἡδονῆς ἐμποδίσεις τὰς ἐνεργείας εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀνυναιτοῦσι τοὺς λόγους προσέχειν, οὐν κατακύκλωσιν αὐλόκαινος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσῃ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἤ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικῇ ὅπως ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τῶν λόγων ἐνεργείαν φθάιει. οἷοί οὖν δὲ τούτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 4 συμβαίνει, ὅταν αἱ περὶ δύο ἐνεργῆ. οἱ γὰρ ἡδονῶν τὴν ἐτέραν ἐκποιοῦν, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὡστε μηδ’ ἐνεργείαν κατὰ τὴν ἐτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁτιοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάντα δρόμων ἐτέρον, κἂν ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡμεῖς ἀρεσκόμενοι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ πραγματικότεροι, ὅταν φαίλου οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὃσι, τότε μᾶλιτζ’ αὐτὸ δρόσων. ὅπει δ’ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία 5 ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χροιωστέρας καὶ βελτίων ποιεῖ, αἱ δ’ ἄλλοτριαι λυμαίνουσα, δὴλον ὡς πολὺ διεστάζον. σχεδόν γὰρ αἱ ἄλλοτριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσαν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκείαι λύται, φθέροντες γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκείαι λύται, οἷον εἰ τῷ τὸ γράφειν ἀνδρός καὶ ἐπιλυτον ἢ τὸ λογιζομαι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ’ οὐ λογιζομαι, λυπηρᾶς οὖσας τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τὰς

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disturbance, does not itself attain its own pleasure, and compels the other faculties to pursue a pleasure which is alien to them: ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἐτέρων τοι καταθῆ, ὑπάρχη αὐτῷ μητὶ τὴν ἐναυτῷ ἡδονήν ἐξουσίας τα τε ἄλλα ἀναγεινέναι ἄλλοτρίαν καὶ μη ἀληθῆ ἡδονῆ διώκειν.

ἐξακριβοῦσιν] 'They work out.' Cf. note on Eth. i. vii. 18. The word ἐξακριβοῦν is used transitively Eth. i. xii. 7, and below, x. v. 5, where from the analogy of the arts it means to 'give the last finish to.' It is used intransitively Eth. i. vi. 13: ἐξακριβοῦν ἐπὶ τοῦτων, 'to refine.'

4 καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροι — δρῶσιν] 'And those who munch sweetmeats in the theatres do so especially when the actors are bad.' This is one of those illustrations from common life which are richly strewed about the writings of Aristotle.

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ένεργείας τούναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἱδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ’ αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δὲ ἅλλοτρια ἱδοναὶ εἴρηται ὁτι παραπληκτῶν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γὰρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοιῶς.

6 διαφέρουσαν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία καὶ φαιλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν τῶν δ’ οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἤχουσι καὶ αἱ ἱδοναί· καθ’ ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνεργείαν οἰκεία ἱδονή ἐστιν. ἤ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκείᾳ ἐπιεικείᾳ, ἢ δὲ τῇ φαιλή μοχθηρὰ· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεται, τῶν δ’ αἰσχρῶν ψεκται. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἱδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιάρροιοι οὕτως ὡστ’ ἔχειν 7 ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταύτων ἐστιν ἡ ἐνεργεία τῇ ἱδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἑκατέρας ἡ ἱδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ’ αἰσθησις· ἀτοπον γὰρ ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζοταί φαινεται τοῖς ταῦταῖς. ὡσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνεργείαι ἐστεραί, καὶ αἱ ἱδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὅλης ἀφής καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκόα καὶ ὀσφρησις γενέσεως· ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἱδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ 8 τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἐκάτερα ἄλληλων. δοκεῖ δ’ εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ζῷω καὶ ἱδονή οἰκεία, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν, καὶ ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦται τούτ’ ἄν φανεῖν· ἐτέρα γὰρ ἵπτον ἱδονὴ καὶ κύνος καὶ ἀνθρώ- που, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος φησιν ὅνος σύμματι· ἣν ἐλέοθαι μῖλλον ἡ χρυσῶν· ἱδονῶν γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὅνοις, αἱ μὲν

6-7 καὶ ἄδοροι—ταύτων] 'And they are so indivisible as to raise a doubt whether the function is not identical with the pleasure attached to it. And yet pleasure can hardly be thought or perception—this would be absurd; but through their not being separated, some persons fancy them to be identical.' To 'divide' and to 'distinguish' are, as Coleridge tells us, two different things. Pleasure, though not divided, should be distinguished, from the vital functions. The author of the Eudemian books, however, Eth. vii. xii. 3, identified them, and we might well ask Aristotle why happiness, any more than pleasure, should be identified with ἐνεργεία.


8 ὡστε καὶ ἐργον] Cf. Plato, Republic, p. 352 B· 'Ἀρα οὖν τούτῳ ἰ πέλφις καὶ ἴπτον καὶ ἄλλω ὄγκοιν ἔργον, δ’ αἱ η μῆλον ἐκεῖνον τιν τίνι ἢ δραμάτα; καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος—χρυσῶν] 'As
οὖν τῶν ἐτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, τάς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἁδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι δ’ οὐγ μικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἄνθρωπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἕστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκεῖν δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πρεποντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὔδε γερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεί καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ’ ἐτέρων συμβαίνει· δοκεῖ δ’ ἐν ἁπαται τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δ’ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ὁ ἁγαθός, ἡ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναί ἐξεν ἄν αἱ τοιοῦτα φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἰς ὀνει χαίρει. τὰ δ’ τοῦτῳ δυνατῆ ἐὰν τῷ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν όμορρατόν* πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λύμαί ἄνθρωπον γίνονται· ἡδέα δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτος καὶ οὕτως διακει-μένος. τὰς μὲν οὐν ὁμολογομένους αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ 11 φατέον ἡδοναί εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ’ ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσον ποιαν ἡ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι; ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δήλου· ταῦται γὰρ ἐπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἰτ’ οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἶτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταῦτα τελειοῦσα ἡδοναί κυρίως

Heraclitus says that "an ass would prefer hay to gold," — the reason being that he is an ass. This saying of Heraclitus, which reminds us of the Epic fable of the Cock and the Jewel, was probably meant to satirise the low desires of the human race. It forms the pendant to that other saying, 'Zeus looks on the wisest man as we look on an ape.'

10 εἰτεν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ὁ ἁγαθός] That there is a definite standard of pleasure and of taste, as of other apparently variable things, is most clearly laid down in Aristotle's discussion upon the saying of Protagoras, that 'man is the measure of all things.' Cf. Metaphysics, x. vi. 6: φανερῶν δὲ τοιῷ ἐκ τῶν γεγομένων κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν· οδηγεῖτο γὰρ τὸ οὗτο φαινότα τοῖς μὲν γλυκῷ, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις, μη διεφθαρμένων καὶ λευκο-θεμένων τῶν ἐτέρων τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χρυσί. τοιοῦτο δ’ διὸ τοιοῦτο τοῦτο ἐτέρως μὴ ὑπολητέτων μέτρων εἶναι, τοὺς δ’ ἐτέρως οὐκ ὑπολητέτων, ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο λέγω καὶ ἐτι ἁγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰθροῦ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. Those who are vicious and corrupt are to be pronounced not to be right judges of what is good or pleasant. Their pleasures are to be pronounced not pleasures at all. Cf. Plato, Philebus, p. 40 C: μειώσω ἐρα ἡδοναί τά πολλά οἱ τοσιρῳ χαρουσα, οι δ’ ἁγαθεί τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἀληθεύω.
VI. Aristotle having concluded his treatise upon the nature of pleasure, reverts now to the general question of the nature of happiness, or the chief good for man. He takes up from the first book the following fundamental propositions: (1) that happiness must be an action (ἐργεία) and not a state (ἐίσι) of the faculties; (2) that it must be final and satisfying; (3) that it must consist in some development of the faculties sought for its own sake. The remainder of the chapter is occupied with excluding games and amusements from the above definition. Though exercises of the faculties sought for their own sake, these are (a) patronised by unworthy judges,—tyrants, children, and the like; (b) after all, they are rather the means to working, than ends in themselves; (c) they do not represent the higher faculties in man.

1 ἐργείαν δε τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἱδρυμάς, λοιπῶν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθείν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὕτην τίθεμεν τῶν ἄνθρωπων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ ἐπειρημένα συντομώτερος ἐν εἰς ὁ λόγος. ἐξομεν δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστων ἐξεις καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθένοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίων, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦτι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὲ ταύτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μάλλον εἰς ἐνέργειαν τινα θετέων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ἐρηματα, τῶν δὲ ἐνέργειαν αἰ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαία καὶ δὲ ἐπεραι αἰρεται, αἰ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δὴλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δὲ ἀλλον συνεχος γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' εἰσάρκης. καθ' αὐτᾶς δ' εἰσίν αἰρεται, ἀφ' ὅν μὴν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαύται δ' εἰσίν δοκοῦσιν αἰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεως. τὰ 3 γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πραττέν τῶν δι' αὐτω ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν παιδίων δὲ αἱ ἱδρυμα. οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἐπεραι αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται. βλάπτονται γὰρ ἂν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἡ ὀφελούν τας, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτίσεως. καταφεύγοντι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγάς τῶν εὐδαιμονίων.
θομέων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐπράτελοι· ὃν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς· δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαμόνικα ταῖτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείας ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἰσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιούτοι εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἄρετὴ οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς, ἄφι ὅν οἱ σπουδαῖοι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδὲ ἐγενστοὶ οὕτων ὄντες ἡδονής εἰλεκρινοὶ καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφένουσιν, διὰ τούτο ταῦτα οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμῶμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. εὐλογοῖ δὴ, ὡσπερ παις καὶ ἀνδράς ἐτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεκέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις ἔρημα, 5 καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τοῦ τῷ σπουδαῖο τοιαύτα ὄντα. ἐκαστὸ τῇ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἐξίναι αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ καὶ τῇ ἁπάτῃ τῇ ἁρετῇ. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἁρὰ ἡ εὐδαμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἀτοπὸν τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδίαν, καὶ πραγματεύονται καὶ κυκοπαθεῖν τῶν βίων ἀπαντά τοῦ παιδίαν χάριν. ἀπαντὰ γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτέρου ἔνεκα αἰροῦμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαμονίας· τέλος γὰρ ἡμέρα. σπουδαῖεν δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν παιδίας χάριν ἠλθον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικοῦ· παιζεῖν δὲ ὧν σπουδαῖξη κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὅρθως ἐχεῖν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαυῶσι γὰρ ἐοίκεν ἡ παιδία, ἀνανεώσεις δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαυσεῖς δέονται. οὐ

who are called happy,' cf. Eth. 1. ix. 11: τελευτήσωστα ἄθλιοι οὔδεις εὐδαιμονίζει.

3-4 δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐνέργειαι
'These things are fancied to be constitutives of happiness because monarchs spend their leisure in them. But perhaps after all monarchs are no evidence, for neither virtue nor reason, on which the higher functions of man depend, are involved in kingly power.' Cf. Eth. 1. v. 3, where it is said that brutish pleasures 'obtain consideration' owing to potentates, who have everything at their command, devoting themselves to such.

4 ἄγενστοι] This reminds one of the saying about greedy and corrupt kings in Hesiod, Works and Days, vv. 40, 81: ἡπίοι· σοῦδε ἰσασιν διὸ πλέον ἡμοῦ παντὸς, σοῦδον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μὲν δοξαρ.

6 οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ ἀρα ἡ εὐδαμονία]
With the whole of the present chapter we may compare the interesting discussion in Ar. Politics, VIII. v. 12-14. On the relation of amusements to happiness, see Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 226.
HÖIKÔN NIKOMÁXEİΩΝ X.

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[Chap.

dh têlos h anâpâswsi: ginetai yâr eneka tis energeias. dôkei ð h evdaimonios bôs kat' arêtên eînai ðnitos dê metâ 7 spoudê, ãll' ouk en pайдâ. bêlтîn te lêgomeim tâ spoudaia twn yeloiwv kai twn metà pайдiâ, kai twn bêlтionos aiei kai morion kai anãdrôton spoudaioteiran tân enêргeiav, ãî dê twn bêlтionos krei'tîn kai evdaimonikov 8 têra ëthi. ãpatolaiosie t' ãn twn smamatikow ëdônwn twn yelion kai anãdrôton oux ëttôn twn ariotov. evdai-
mônias s' oudeis anãdrôpôdph metaboliston, ei ëmy kai bìon: ou yâr en tais toiaútais diajwgyais ã evdaimonía, ãll' en taís kat' arêtên enêргeiav, katháper kai próteron èhrtai.

7 Ei ð' estin ã evdaimonia kat' arêtên enêргeiav, eîlogon kat' òn kratisth: autê ð' ãn eîh twn ariotov. eîte dh nôs toûto eîte ãlllo ti ð dh kat' fôvwn dôkei arxhein kai ëgeisêthai kai ênnoian ëxhein perî kalôn kai theîwv, eîte theôn ãn kai autó eîte tòn ën ëmîn tò theûtaton, ã tóto enêргeiav kat' tân oikeian arêtên eîh ãn ã telêia evdai-
2 monia. òti ð' esti theôrtikh, èhrtai. ómologou'menon dê

8 evdaimonias s' oudeis—blow] 'For
noone allows a slave to share in hap-
iness, any more than in the social life
of a citizen.' In Politics, i. xiii. 13, it
is said that the slave, as distinguished
from the artisan, is kouros ëwthi, i.e.
he 'lives with the family,' but he is
not kouros blow, he does not share in
the career of his master.

VII. Aristotle's argument now cul-
minates in the declaration that hap-
iness, in the highest sense, consists in
philosophy: (1) because this is the
function of the most excellent part of
our nature; (2) because it most admits
of continuance; (3) because it affords
most pure and solid pleasure; (4) be-
cause it has pre-eminently the charac-
ter of being self-sufficient; (5) because
it is above all things an end-in-itself,
and not a means to ulterior results;
(6) because it is a sort of repose, and

as it were the fruit of our exertions.
It is indeed something higher than
man regarded as a composite being,
and is only attainable by him through
virtue of a divine element which is in
him. But we must not listen to those
who would preach down our divine as-
pirations. On the contrary, we should
encourage them, and endeavour to live
in harmony with our noblest part,
which is in fact our proper self.

1 etre theîw—beòstataw] 'Whether it
be, itself too, absolutely divine, or re-
latively speaking the divinest thing in
our nature.' Philosophy is said in the
Metaphysics, i. ii. 14, to be most divine
in two ways, first, as being kindred to
the thought of God; second, as being
knowledge of things divine. touasth
de diçhos ãn elî mouon: ãh te yâr mûlart
ân ò theîw ëxos, theîa twn ëpisthmonw ëti,
kav elî twn theîw elî. Cf. the note
on Eth. i. ii. 8.
It is difficult to point out a precise passage corresponding to this reference (cf. Eth. ix. iii. 1, where a similar vague reference occurs); but perhaps it partly is meant to recall Eth. i. xiii. 20: διαρέσται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἁρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγουμεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἡθικὰς, partly Eth. i. v. 7: τρίτος δὲ ἄστιν ὁ δεινοτέρως, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐν τοῖς ἐπιμένους ποιημέθεα. There is nothing in Book VI which corresponds.

3 ἔλογον δὲ—εἰσα [And it is reasonable to suppose that those who know pass their time more pleasantly than those who are inquiring.] This is opposed to the often-repeated saying that 'the search for truth is more precious than truth itself.' Thus Bishop Butler says, 'Knowledge is not our proper happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having of it, which is the entertainment of the mind. Indeed, if the proper happiness of man consisted in knowledge considered as a possession or treasure, men who are possessed of the largest share would have a very ill time of it; as they would be infinitely more sensible than others of their poverty in this respect. Thus he who increases knowledge would eminently increase sorrow' (Sermon XV.). In one respect these two views are reconcilable; for Aristotle never meant to say that the ἔλογα or ἐπιστήμη τὴν σοφίαν constitutes happiness, but the ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν, 'the play of the mind under the guidance of philosophy.' He contrasts the peace and repose of conviction with the restlessness of doubt. In the same spirit Bacon said (Essay I.): 'Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth.' But in another respect the views of Aristotle are irreconcilable with those above quoted from Butler. The one over-states, nearly as much as the other under-states, the blessings of knowledge. And Aristotle strangely leaves out of account that sense of ignorance which the wisest man will always retain. His statement is chargeable with philosophic pride, from which Socrates and Plato were free. (See Vol. I. Essay III. p. 216.)
But moreover the (function) of the politician also is restless, and beyond mere administration it aims at power and distinctions, or, if happiness for the man himself and his citizens, at all events a happiness which is something distinct from the exercise of the political art; nay, we are in search of this happiness—plainly as something distinct. Sōphia, while producing happiness, is identical with it: but politeia is to happiness as means to end. Cf. Ἁλ. vi. xii. 5: οὐχ ὁ γάρ ὑπὲρ τῆς σκληροῦ, ἀλλ' ὁ γάρ ἡ ὑγεία, οὕτως ἡ σοφία (τοιῇ) εὐδαιμονίᾳ. The
words ἦν καὶ ἤτοιμον may be referred to Eth. l. ii. 9: ἥ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἔφεσα, τοιοῦτος τις οὖσα.

8 κατὰ τούτοις [parauνότας] The moralists, says Aristotle, take a shallow view in bidding us tame down our aspirations to our mortal condition. Cf. Rhet. ii. xxi. 6, where the gnome, ὅταν ἡ ὁμολογία τῶν ὑπωνόμων φρονείν, is quoted from Epicharmus. Isocrates (Ad Dem. p. 9 b) gives a sort of reconciliation of the views: ἀθάνατα μὲν φρονεῖ τῷ μεγάλῳ ψυχος εἰμι: θητεὶ δὲ τῷ συμμέτρῳ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀνθρώπων, which reminds one of George Herbert's quaint lines:

'Pitch thy behaviour low, thy projects high:
So shalt thou humble and magnanimous be:
Sink not in spirit: who aimeth at
Shoots higher much than he that
means a tree.
A grain of glory mixt with humbleness
Cures both a fever and lethargickness.'

ei γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὧν ὑπερέχει] 'For

though (this noblest part) be small in proportionate bulk, yet in power and dignity it far surpasses all the other parts of our nature.' Aristotle here signifies that the divine particle (νόος) bears a small proportion to the whole of our composite nature. And in accordance with this he elsewhere intimates that only at short and rare intervals can man enjoy the fruition of his diviner nature. Cf. Metaph. xi. vii. 9: ei οὖν οὕτως ἐθέλει, ὥς ἢ διὰ τῶν ὑπωνόμων ἄνθρωπων, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ οὕτως. Pol. viii. v. 12: ἐν μὲν τῷ τελείῳ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἀληθικῶς γίγνεσθαι. With which we may compare the saying of Spinoza (De I intellectus Emendatione, II.), that at first he found himself only able to rest in the idea of 'the truly good' for short intervals, yet that these intervals became longer and more frequent as he went on. 'Et quamvis in initió hec intervallà essent rara et per admodum exiguum tempórum durarent, postquam tamen Verum Bonum magis ac magis mihi innotuit, intervalla ista frequentiora et longiora fuerunt.' Aristotle: idealises these moments of the philosopher, suppos-
tò λεχθὲν τε πρὸτερον ἀρμόσει καὶ ὃν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοοῦ βίον, εἴπερ τούτῳ μᾶλιστα ἄνθρωπος. ὁτόσον ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖται.

8 Δευτέρως δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἄρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἄνθρωπικα· διόκειν γὰρ καὶ ἄνδρεια καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράπτομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοῦ τῷ τῶν πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ. τάτα δὲ εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἄνθρωπικά· ἐναὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνοικισμένα· πολλά πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἥδους ἄρετη· συνεξεύται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρονήσεις τῆς τοῦ ἥδους ἄρετῆ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἥκικας εἰσὶν ἀρετάς, τὸ δὲ ἀρθὸν τῶν ἥκικων κατὰ τὴν φρονήσιν. συνεχείται δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἄρετῆς, καὶ εἰ αὐτὴν ἑαυτὸν ἄρετα, ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἥκικας εἰσὶν ἀρετάς, τὸ δὲ ἀρθὸν τῶν ἥκικων κατὰ τὴν φρονήσιν. συνεχείται δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἄρετῆς, καὶ εἰ αὐτὴν ἑαυτὸν ἄρετα, ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἥκικας εἰσὶν ἀρετάς, τὸ δὲ ἀρθὸν τῶν ἥκικων κατὰ τὴν φρονήσιν.

VIII. Aristotle, pursuing this theme, declares further the paramount excellence of the philosophic life, by showing that the life of practical morality holds a merely secondary place, (1) because it is bound up with man's composite nature, that is, with the passions; (2) because it is more dependent on external circumstances; (3) because such a life cannot possibly be attributed to the gods. He adds that though the philosopher will certainly require a degree of external prosperity, this will only be a very moderate degree, as the sayings of ancient sages testify. And if there be any providence of the gods watching over men, it may be presumed that this will especially watch over the philosopher, who loves and honours that which is divine.

3 συνεχείται δὲ — ἀνθρωπικα] 'Thought, moreover, seems inseparably connected with excellence of the moral nature, and this with thought, since the major premises of thought are in accordance with the moral virtues, and the "right" in morals is that which is in accordance with thought. But as thought and moral virtue are bound up with the passions, they must be concerned with our composite nature; and the virtues of the composite nature must be purely human.' And therefore secondary to philosophy, which is more than human. This passage appears to contain the germ of much that is expanded in the Eudemian books; cf. Ἐθ. vi. xii. 9-10, xiii. 4. But we may observe, first, that thought (φρονήσεις) is here as if for the first time coming forward in opposition to philosophy (σοφία), and not in that recognised opposition which would have been the case had Book VI. been previously written; and, that there is no reference to any previous discussions on the moral syllogism.

συνεχείται 'Thought' and moral virtue are here said to be reciprocally connected, just as it is said of pleasure
and life, chap. iv. 11: συμβιβάζων μὲν γὰρ ταύτα φανερά καὶ χωροφανῶν οὐ δέχεσθαι.


4 τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων—διότι—

For though on the one hand both (the philosopher and the practical man) will have an equal need of the ordinary means of life, even if the practical man takes more trouble about the concerns of the body and such like—for there will be but little difference in this respect—on the other hand there will be a wide difference with regard to the discharge of their respective functions. The term ὁ πολιτικὸς here appears to be used in opposition to ὁ σοφὸς (§ 13), not as distinctively indicating ‘the politician,’ but as representing the whole class of the active virtues, which are subsequently analysed. Thus, Eth. i. v. 4, we find ὁ χαρίστει καὶ πρακτικὸς given as equivalents for ὁ πολιτικὸς.

τὸ ἀνδρεῖο δὲ δινάμως] δύναμις here seems used in a sense exactly corresponding to ‘physical power.’ In modern warfare, a weak body may often be accompanied by the highest personal courage, but in the ancient mode of fighting this would have been impossible or useless.

τὸ σωφρον ἐξουσίας] ‘The temperate man will require full liberty of gratification. Cf. Eth. i. v. 3: διὰ τὸ πολλῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιασάντων Σαρδανάπαλος, viii. vi. 5: οἷς δ’ ἐν
tais e'cnowian. The use of the article and of the plural number makes a slight difference in signification.

7 dieioioi de—theoi. 'And if we went through all the virtues, we should see that whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of the gods.' Aristotle argues here that we cannot attribute morality to the Deity without falling into mere anthropomorphism; but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought. Aristotle himself felt this difficulty, and elsewhere defined the thought of God as 'the thinking upon thought' (Metaph. xi. ix. 4), which would not only deprive the Deity of all those fatherly and tender functions which the human race is prone to attribute to Him, but would also remove Him from the conditions of all human thinking. If it be conceded that the life of God is only analogous to that of the philosopher; we might then ask, why not also analogous to the life of the good man? Plato, by placing the 'idea of justice' in the suprasensible world, allowed a more mortal interest to morality.
And he speaks of the just man, by the practice of virtue, being 'made like to God.' Rep. 613 a, quoted below.

10 Aristotle seems to lose no opportunity of expressing his contempt for great potentates. 'Reason is not implied in kingly power,' Eth. x. vi. 4. 'One may do noble deeds without ruling over land and sea,' &c. We may again refer to George Herbert, who in his verses on Church Music, says,—

'Now I in you without a bodie move, Rising and falling with your wings; We both together sweetly live and love,' Yet say sometimes, God help poore kings.'
of aught beside.' Anaxagoras, being asked to define 'the happy man,' said that his opinion, if he declared it, would be thought paradoxical.

12 συμφωνεῖν δὴ—ὑποληπτέων] 'The opinions of the philosophers appear then to coincide with our arguments. Authority of this kind affords a certain ground of belief. But truth in practical matters is settled by an appeal to facts and human life, for in them rests the decision. We ought then to consider previous sayings with a reference to facts and life; if those sayings agree with facts, we should accept them; if they differ, we must account them mere theories.' Cf. Eth. i. viii. 1.

13 θεοφιλέστατος έοικεν εϊναι] The term θεοφιλής occurs repeatedly in Plato; cf. especially the interesting passage in Republic, p. 613a: where it is said that 'all things work together for the good of those whom the gods love. οὕτως ἔρα ὑποληπτέων περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνθρώπου, ἐὰν τε ἐν πενήνθη γένηται εἰς τοῦ ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινί ἄλλῳ τῶν δοκῶν τῶν κακῶν, ἡτατερία ταιτρά εἰς ἀγάθῳ τι τελευτήσῃ ζωῆι ἢ καὶ ἀφανίζοντι· οὔ γάρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται δός ὁ προβουλεῖται ἐθέλη δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς, τὸν θεόν καὶ τὸν πέπτον, ὑποληπτέων ἢ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνέργην καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύνον καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστος καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἐοικεν εϊναι· εἰ γάρ τις εἰσάγει τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὅσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἰ τὸν ἀνθρωπόν θαρεῖν

'If powers divine Behold our human actions, as they do.' Aristotle expresses here no opinion, one way or the other, as to the reality of a Divine Providence. δοκεῖ merely indicates that an opinion is held; the word is frequently used to indicate a false opinion or fancy. Cf. Eth. vii. xii. 3: δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίος ἀγάθων. x. vi. 3: δοκεῖ μὲν ὁ πλείον εὑρήσκειν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Plato had said that moral virtue (see the last note) placed men peculiarly under the care of the gods. Aristotle, differing from Plato in his conception of the Deity, says, if there be any care of men by the gods, it must surely be extended in an especial degree not to the just man, but to the philosopher, since philosophy is most akin to the life of the Deity Himself.
Even on this supposition. It seems probable that Aristotle had in his mind the very words of Plato, above quoted.

IX. The theory of human life now being complete, Aristotle asks if anything more is wanting? The answer is Yes, since theory is not by itself enough to make men good. For virtue three things are required, nature, teaching, and custom. The first is beyond man's control; the second may be identified with theory, which we have now supplied; the third requires institutions for the regulation of life, which may either be (1) of public, or (2) of private ordinance. As a fact, the state too much neglects (§ 14) the arrangement of daily life, and therefore private individuals must address themselves to the task in a scientific spirit, and must first learn the principles of legislation. Whence are these principles to be learnt? On the one hand we find that practical politicians neither write nor speak on the principles of their art. On the other hand the Sophists, who profess to teach politics, are far from understanding even what they are, and their mode of teaching is merely empirical. So far from imparting principles, they go to work in an eclectic way, collecting laws, which are mere results, lying, as it were, on the surface. Legislation, as a science, has in short been neglected hitherto, and must now be essayed. We must enter at once upon the whole theory of the state, examining former speculations and existing constitutions, and developing a conception of the best form of government.

According to the sequence of ideas in this chapter, it would appear that the connecting link between ethics and politics is to be found in the word ἔθος, custom, or mode of life. As custom has great influence upon men's power of attaining virtue and the chief good, and on the other hand as the institutions of individual life have a close connection with those of the state, it follows that politics are the complement of ethics.

Under the head of ‘doing’ are of course included the functions of thought, which, as we have just been told, are the highest forms of action in man. Cf. Pol. vii. iii, 8: ἄλλα τῶν πρακτικῶν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν πρὸ
ḤΘIKΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ X. [CHAP.

ἀρετῆς ἴκανον τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πει-
3 ρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. εἰ μὲν οὖν
ᾷπαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ πούσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολ-
λοιοί ἂν μισθοί καὶ μεγάλους δυκαίος ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν
Θέον, καὶ ἐδει ἃν τούτους πορίσασθαι. νῦν δὲ φαίνο-
ναι προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς
ἐλευθερίαν ἵσχυειν, ἢδος τ' εὐγενεῖς καὶ ὡς ἄληθῶς φιλό-
καλον πούσαι ἂν κατοκόχωμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ
4 πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι: οὐ
gὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοὶ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀνέχεσ-
θαι τῶν φαίλων διὰ τὸ αἰχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας.
πάθει γὰρ ζύντες τὰς οἰκείας ἰδονὰς διάσκοιν καὶ δὲ
The last line is quoted in the Meno

of Plato, p. 95 ε, to indicate that Theognis held teaching insufficacious to produce virtue. Aristotle borrows the application. On Theognis see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 92 sqq.

κατακόχωμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς] 'Under the influence of virtue.' This word, which is also written κατακόχωμοι, seems derived from κατέχει, with a reduplication. In Ar. Pol. ii. ix. 8, we find κατακόχωμοι πρὸς, and id. viii. vii. 4, κατακόχωμοι ὑπά. 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἥθεις κατεληψι-

ména] 'What has long been fastened in the character.'

6 τοὺς ὡς ἄληθῶς εὐτυχίων] 'To those who are in the most ideal sense of the term to be called fortunate.'

Cf. Eth. III. v. 17: καὶ τὸ ἐδ' καὶ τὸ
καλῶς τούτῳ περιφέρεσθαι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθεύς ἐν εἰς ἐσώφρῳ.

9 οὐχ ἰκανὸν δ’ ἰσος νέους ὄντας προφήτης καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ἀρηθῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας ἀπὸ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἐπηρεαθήσατο, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεομεθ’ ἄν νόμων, καὶ ὀλος δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολειοι ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ᾧ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ξιμίας ἡ τῷ καλῷ. διότερον ὁμοίως τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν τοῖς μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοὺς καλῶν χάριν, ὡς ὀπακοσμομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἄθετοι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσί δὲ καὶ ἀφειστέρως οὐσὶ κολάσεις

πρὸς τῆν τελεόν· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μὴ ποτ’ οὐκ ἐν ἀπασίν ἴσχυς, ἀλλὰ δεῦροι προδιεργάσθαι τοῖς ἐθεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ὑγιῆ πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μοιὲν, ὁσπερ γὰρ τὴν ὑπεραυξαν τὸ σπέρμα, οὐ γὰρ ἰν ἀκούσειε λόγον ἀποστρέφοντος οὐδ’ αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ἵππων· τὸν δ’ ὀντος ἔχοντα πῶς οὖν τε μεταπεῖτα; ὡς τ’ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἄλλα βία. δεὶ δὴ τὸ ἰθὸς προὐ-πάρχειν τοις ὀκειόν τής ἀρετῆς, στέργων τὸ καλὸν καὶ δισχεραίνω τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ’ ἀγωγῆς ὁρῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπῶς μὴ ὑπὸ τοιοῦτοι τραφέντα νόμως· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρπερικῶς ἵππον οὐχ ἰδοὺ τοῖς πολεσίς, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ νεοὶ. διὸ νόμως δεῖ τεταχθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γνώμονα. οὐχ ἰκανὸν δ’ ἰσος νέους ὄντας προφήτης καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ἀρηθῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύσειν αὐτὰ καὶ εὐθείᾳ, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεομέθ’ ἄν νόμων, καὶ ὀλος δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολειοι ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ᾧ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ξιμίας ἡ τῷ καλῷ. διότερον ὁμοίως τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν τοῖς μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοὺς καλῶν χάριν, ὡς ὀπακοσμομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἄθετοι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσί δὲ καὶ ἀφειστέρως οὐσὶ κολάσεις
te kai timoeria epitetvenai, tous δ' anastes olois efoi-zev. Tov men gar epieik Kai prois to kalon kwneta th
loigor peitharchei, tov th de faivon elon oreyomenov
luph kolaizeboi wsper upopoigin. Dio kai kai faiv dein
toiastai ginesthai tais lupas aij malist' enanstoynai
11 tais agapeomeneis idounaiv. Ei δ' odoi, kataster eirynai,
tov esymenov agadon trafihein kalow de kai ediothiinai,
ei'd othos en epistheminin epieikesi izon kai mi't akonta
mu'th ekonta pratttein to fayla, tauta de gignoin' ai
bionomeois kat' tina noin kai tazin orhyn, ekoynan ischou.
12 H men oov patrignon prostaizis oiv exai to isxurhno odoi to
anagkaion, odoi th olow izon anidoro, poi basilews ointos
h tinos toioutou. O de nivos anagakstikin exei dynamin,
lugos oiv apo tinos fronihsou kai noin. Kai twn men
anthetaipon echatyron tais enantioymenous tais ormais,
kai orhios aut' drowewn. O de nivos oiv estin entaphis
13 tattnov to epieikes. En monh de TR Dakebavonov polei
meta oligna o nymothen epimelias dokei petoynthai
trophi te kai eptihdemantov. Ei de tais plieitais twn
poléon exemelhtai peri twn toiouton, kai izon ekastos
as boyleta, kulkontidión thesmateon paideon izon alócon.
14 kraitonov men oov to gignesthai koinh epimelias kai
orhyn kai drav aut' dynastai. Koinh izon ekmelounemnon
ekastou doxeian an prosokein tois sferaiois tekois kai
philos eis izon arithm beballesin, h proaireistai ge.
maliota izon to auton dynastai doxeian ek twn ehrmenon
nymothenikos genomeneis. Ai men gar koinh epimelias

13 kulkontidión] Referring to Homer,
Odys. IX. 114:

θεμιστείς δὲ ἐκαστὸς
παιδών ἢ δ' ἁλόχων, οὖν ἄλληλων
ἀλέγουσιν.

Aristotle considers that any people
among whom the state does not settle
by law the customs of daily life is
unworthy to be called a society at all.
He ignores that element called 'public
opinion,' which in so many respects,
and more naturally, supplies the place
of legislation.

14 καὶ δραίν αὐτῷ δύνασθαι] 'And
that it should have power to effect
the object in question.' This apparently
refers to § 12: ἡ μὲν οὖθεν πατρίη
προστάσις οἷς ἔχει τὰ ἱσχύουν κ.π.λ.
μάλιστα δ'—γενόμενοι] 'But from
what we have said it would appear
that a person would best be able to
do this (i.e. to help his children and friends towards virtue) after learning the principles of legislation.' As we find from Eth. vi. viii. 2, legislation was considered by the Peripatetics to be the superior (διάδοσει) form of political thought. A person possessing the general principles of scientific legislation (see below, § 16) would be best able to deduce rules for the guidance of his family, and at the same time to allow of such exceptions as individual peculiarities might call for. That the family is a deduction from the state, which is prior in point of idea, we know to have been Aristotel's opinion, Pol. i. ii. 12.

16 οὐ μὴν ἄλλα ἐμπειρίαν] 'And yet perhaps nothing hinders a man even without scientific knowledge treating well some particular case, from an accurate observation, empirically, of what results on each thing being tried.' Cf. Metaph. 1. i. 7: 

πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἄλλα καὶ
βουλομένη δ' ἐπιμελείας βελτίως ποιεῖν, ἔτει πολλοὺς ἐκτιθέντες, δολώσω, νομοθέτου λατρεύειν, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοῦ γενομένῳ ἂν. δεδυναμενά διὰ τοῦ προτεθετοῦ διαδειναί καλῶς οὐκ ἔστιν τούτων εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ἐπετελεῖν τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ ιατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἄν ἑστὶν ἐπιμελείας τις καὶ φρόνησις. ὃ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτότεν πόθεν ἡ ποῖς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἡ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γάρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἡ οὖς ὑμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεως; ἐν μὲν γάρ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδίδοντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ὦν ιατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς τὰ δὲ πολιτικά ἐπαγγελλοῦνται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτεύμονοι, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἐν δυνάμει τινὶ τούτῳ πράττειν καὶ ἐμπεψία καλόν ἡ διανοία. οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (κατοι καλλιον ἡ Ἰούς ἡ λόγος δικαίως τε καὶ δημηγορικός), οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς πεποικότες τοὺς σφετέρους, ἦν η τινα 19 ἄλλοι τῶν φίλων. εὐλογοῦν δ' ἢν, εἴπερ εὖναιτο. οὔτε γάρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδέν κατέληπτον ἃν, οὔθε αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλθειν ἃν καλόν τῆς τοιούτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλότοις. οὐ μὴν μικρὸν γε ἐοικε ἡ ἐμπεψία συμβαλλοῦσα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνετο οὕτω διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συμβεβηκάντας πολιτικοῦ διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοισιν 20 περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἐοικε ἐμπεψίας. τῶν δὲ

μᾶλλον ἐπιγυνχάνονται ὁμοίως τούς ἐμπεψίας τῶν ἄνω τῆς ἐμπεψίας λόγον ἐχόντων.

17 διὸ καὶ τοῦ προτεθέτοι[ ]
'Any one you like to propose.' Cf. Ἐνν. ι. ιϊ. 8: τί προτεθέμεθα, 'what we propose to ourselves.'

18 μόριον τοῦ γάρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι 'For, as we said, legislation is generally considered to be a branch of politics.' This probably refers to Ἐνν. ι. ιϊ. 7: χρονικὴ δὲ τοῦτος ταῖς λοιπαὶς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἐν δὲ νομοθέτοντας τί δὲ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀνέχεσθαι. In vi. viii. 2–3, the point of view is different, πολιτική not being there treated as a science.

ἐπαγγελλοῦνται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ. Cf. Plato, Μένων, p. 95 β.: οἱ σοφισταὶ σοι οὕτω, οὔφερ μόνον ἐπαγγελλοῦσα, δοκοῦσι διδασκαλοὶ εἶναι δρέπθη.'

The whole of the present discussion on the teaching of political science is evidently suggested by that on the teaching of virtue in the Μένων, where it was shown that the great statesmen do not attempt to teach their sons virtue, and that the Sophists, who
profess to teach it, are doubtful instructors.

20 ὁ δὲ νόμος—δικαίωσι 'But laws are as it were the results of political science.' Aristotle's account of the Sophists' method of teaching politics is precisely analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. He here speaks of their taking a shallow view of politics, and making it an inferior branch of rhetoric; and he adds that they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touching upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are un instructed in principles are wholly useless. In the same way (Soph. Bleon. xxxiii. 16) he says they gave various specimens of argument to be learnt by heart, and that this was no more use than if a person who undertook to teach shoemaking were to provide his pupils with an assortment of shoes. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὶ οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὶ ἐβίβαζαν ἑκατέρους τοὺς ἀλλήλους λόγους. Διότερ ταχεία μὲν ἔτεχον δ' ἔστω ἡ διδασκαλία ταύτων μαθάσασθαι παραὶ τῶν οἷον ἄριστων: οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἅλλα τὰ ἀπό τὴν τέχνην διδύμων παθεῖν τις φάθαι, ὡσπερ ἂν ἐπὶ τεκνηφορίαν φάκον παραδώσοι τι κτ οἷον ἄριστον παθάναι, διότερ δὲ πολλὰ γένος χαρτοδιατηρών ὑποδημάτων.

21 οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται—ἐξεις 'For men do not appear to learn the physician's art from treatises, though (they who write such treatises) aim at stating not only modes of treatment, but how people can be cured, and how each person is to be treated, according to a classification of habes (of body).' συγγραμμάτων here is frequently translated 'prescriptions,' but from what Aristotle says about them clearly something more is meant. In the Minos
which bears Plato’s name we find συγγράμματα used as a generic word, of which several species, λατρικά, γεωργικά, μαγειρικά, &c., are mentioned, and are compared (as here) with ‘laws.’ Cf. Minos, p. 316 c sqq.: ἓν ποτὲ ἐντύχεις ἐνεγράμματι περὶ ὅγειας τῶν καμπῦτων; Ἔγνως.—Ταυτικά ἄρα καὶ λατρικοὶ νόμοι ταῦτά τὰ συγγράμματα ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν λατρειῶν; Ταυτικά μὲντοι.—Ἄρι ὅπως καὶ τὰ γεωργικὰ συγγράμματα γεωργικὸν νόμον εἶσιν; κ.π.λ. The συγγράμματα here mentioned were perhaps ‘reports of cases,’ or monographs on particular diseases.

τοῖς δ’ ἄνευ—γένουσιν ‘But those who without proper training study such things would not be able to judge of them correctly (except by mere accident), though they might gain an appreciative faculty with regard to the subject.’ ἔδει here denotes the state of mind formed by scientific training. Such a training especially produces ‘judgment’ (τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς). Cf. Pol. iii. xi. 14: ἐσται γὰρ ἐκαστὸς μὲν χείρων κριτής τῶν ἐλέεων. Eth. i. iii. 5, and note. This kind of judgment, as being deep and original, is distinguished above from σύνεσις, the power of appreciation, but in Eth. vi. x. 2, σύνεσις is called πρακτική, in a lower sense, and as contrasted with ‘thought,’ which is πρακτική.

22 παραλιπόντων ὅτι πρῶτον ἀνερέιπτον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέπτεσθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἔσω, καὶ ὅλως ὑπ’ ἑπερὶ πολιτείας, ὥσπερ εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῆ πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ τι κατὰ μέρος ἔρθαι καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων περιθαύμας ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτεῖων θεω-

23 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι A rough outline of the Politics is here given, as Aristotle conceived it before writing it. The sketch is so very general that it omits the subject of Book I, and yet critics have thought that this passage may be taken as evidence of what the order of books in Aristotle’s Politics should be.

ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτείων ‘From my collection of constitutions.’ Cf. Cicero, De Finibus, v. iv.: ‘Omnium fere civitatum, non Grecis morem, sed etiam barbariae, ab Aristotele mores,
Instituta, disciplinæ; a Neophrasto leges etiam cognovinæ. Diogenes Laertius, in his list of the works of Aristotle, mentions (v. 1.12): politeiam polisyn dynasion exēkouna kai ekaton, kai idia demokratikai, oligarchi-kai, aristokratikai, kalutarcheî. The fragments of this work have been collected by C. F. Neumann, and may be found in the Oxford reprint of Bekker's edition of Aristotle.
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ταῦτ

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ἀδίκα τι ἐκ τοῖς ἀνὶ ἀνὴρ.
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