THE FRAGMENTS

OF

ZENO AND CLEANTHES.
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ZENO AND CLEANTHES

WITH INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

AN ESSAY WHICH OBTAINED THE HARE PRIZE IN THE YEAR 1889.

BY

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PREFACE.

This dissertation is published in accordance with the conditions attached to the Hare Prize, and appears nearly in its original form. For many reasons, however, I should have desired to subject the work to a more searching revision than has been practicable under the circumstances. Indeed, error is especially difficult to avoid in dealing with a large body of scattered authorities, the majority of which can only be consulted in a public library.

The obligations, which require to be acknowledged for the present collection of the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, are both special and general. The former are soon disposed of. In the *Neue Jahrbücher für Philosophie* for 1873, p. 435 foll., Wellmann published an article on Zeno of Citium, which was the first serious attempt to discriminate the teaching of Zeno from that of the Stoa in general. The omissions of Wellmann were supplied and the first complete collection of the fragments of Cleanthes was made by Wachsmuth in two Gottingen programs published in 1874—1875 (*Commentationes I et II de Zenone Citiensi et Cleanthe Assio*). Mullach's collection of the fragments of Cleanthes in vol. I of the *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* is so inadequate as hardly to deserve mention.
Among the general aids the first place is claimed by Zeller’s *Philosophie der Griechen*, which has been constantly consulted. The edition referred to is the Second edition of the English Translation of the part dealing with the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, which appeared in 1880. In a few cases the fourth German edition has also been quoted. Reference is also made to the English Translations of the other parts of Zeller’s book, wherever available. Except incidentally, Zeller gives up the attempt to trace the development of the Stoa in the hands of its successive leaders, and this deficiency is to some extent supplied by the ingenious work of Hirzel, *die Entwicklung der Stoischen Philosophie*, forming the second volume of his *Untersuchungen zu Cicero’s Philosophischen Schriften*. To Hirzel belongs the credit of having vindicated the originality of Cleanthes against ancient and modern detractors, although in working out his views he often argues on somewhat shadowy foundations, and has unduly depreciated the importance of the contributions made by Zeno. Lastly, Stein’s two books *die Psychologie der Stoa* (1886), and *die Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa* (1888), have been of great service, and his views, where he disagrees with Hirzel, have been generally adopted. Many other books have of course been consulted and will be found cited from time to time, among which Krische’s *die theologischen Lehren der Griechischen Denker*, and Diels’ *Doxographi Graeci*, deserve special mention. Although the results arrived at have been checked by the aid of modern writers, the ancient authorities and especially Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Stobaeus (*Eclogae*), and Cicero have been throughout treated as the primary source of information. The references to Stobaeus are accommodated to Wachsmuth’s edition (Berlin, 1884). Sussemihl’s article on the birth-
year of Zeno in the Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie for 1889 appeared too late to be utilised for the introduction.

A word must be said with reference to the plan of the present collection. No attempt has been made to disentangle in every case the words of the writer from the body of the citation in which they appear. Although this is practicable in some cases, in others it is mere guess-work, and a uniform system has therefore been adopted. For similar reasons the fragments have been arranged as far as possible in natural sequence, without regard to the comparatively few cases in which we know the names of the books from which they were derived. However, the arrangement has been a matter of much perplexity, especially in those cases where the authorities overlap each other, and several modifications in the order would have been introduced as the result of a larger experience, were it not that each alteration throws all the references into confusion. The collection was made and put together practically in its present form before an opportunity offered of consulting Wachsmuth's pamphlets, and it was satisfactory to find that only a few of his passages had been missed. On the other hand, the additional matter which will be found here for the first time is not large. It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that we now possess the greater portion of the material, which is available for reconstructing the history of the earlier Stoa. For the sake of completeness I have included even those notices, whose authenticity is open to suspicion, as well as a collection of the so-called Apopthegmata, though it is often impossible to draw a strict line between written and oral tradition.

I desire to thank Mr R. D. Hicks, Fellow of Trinity College, for many valuable suggestions and criticisms.
CORRIGENDA.

p. 37, l. 13, for "he was only able" read "he alone was able".
p. 53, l. 23, add "see however on Cleanth. frag. 114."
INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. Life of Zeno.

The chronology of Zeno's life, formerly a subject of much dispute, has been almost entirely cleared up by an important passage discovered in one of the papyrus rolls found at Herculanenum, which contains a history of the Stoic philosophers and was first edited by Comparetti in 1875. From this we learn that Cleanthes was born in 331 B.C., and, as we know from other sources that he lived to the age of 99, he must have died in B.C. 232 in the archonship of Jason. But, according to the papyrus (col. 29), at the time of his death he had presided over the School for 32 years, which fixes the death of Zeno as having taken place in B.C. 264, thus confirming the authority of Jerome, who says under the year Ol. 129, 1 = B.C. 264, 3 "Zeno Stoicus moritur post quem Cleanthes philosophus agnoscitur." Now, in Diog. Laert. viii. 28 we have two distinct

2 Col. 28, 29. Comparetti believes this book to be the work of Philodemus.
3 Lucian Maerob. 19. Val. Max. viii. 7, Ext. 11.
4 So too the papyrus col. 28 (ἀ)πηλλάγι (η ἵππ' ἄρχοντος '1)άσονος.
5 Such at least is the restoration of Gomperz: Comparetti reads τριάκοντα καὶ ὅκτω, but admits that δύο is possible. The word after καὶ is illegible.
6 So Rohde states, but in Migne's ed. of Eusebius 1. p. 498 the statement appears to belong to Ol. 128.
accounts of his age at the time of his death, the one, that of Persaeus, in his \( \gamma \beta \iota \kappa \alpha i \, \sigma \chi o \lambda a i \), who makes him 72, and the other apparently derived from Apollonius Tyrius\(^1\), declaring that he lived to be 98 years old. Apart from internal considerations, the authority of Persaeus is unquestionably the higher, and reckoning backwards we are thus enabled to place the birth of Zeno in the year 336 B.C.\(^2\). Rohde suggests that the other computation may have been deduced by Apollonius Tyrius from the letter to Antigonus, now on other grounds shown to be spurious, but which Diogenes unquestionably extracted from Apollonius' book on Zeno\(^3\). In this Zeno is represented as speaking of himself as an octogenarian, so that on the assumption that the letter was written in B.C. 282, shortly after Antigonus first became king of Macedonia, and, calculating to the true date of Zeno's death (B.C. 264), he would have been 98 years of age in the latter year\(^4\).

Zeno, the son of Mnaseas\(^5\), was born at Citium, a Greek city in the south-east of Cyprus, whose population had been increased by Phoenician immigrants\(^6\). Whether he was of pure Greek blood or not we cannot tell\(^7\), but we can readily believe that his birthplace, while it in no degree influenced his philosophical genius, which was truly Hellenic, yet gave an

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\(^1\) A Stoic philosopher (floruit in the earlier half of the 1st century B.C.). For his work on Zeno's life see Diog. L. vii. 1. 2. 24. 28. Strabo xvi. 2. 24.

\(^2\) Gomperz l.c. undertook to prove that Zeno died in the month Scirophorion (Ol. 128, 4) = June 264 B.C., offering to produce the proofs in a later article, but this promise does not seem to have been fulfilled.

\(^3\) Diog. L. vii. 7. 8.

\(^4\) The weakness of this hypothesis lies in the fact that Antigonus Gonatas did not become King of Macedonia until 278—277 B.C., although no doubt he was struggling for the crown from the time of the death of his father Demetrius in B.C. 283. This is met to some extent by Rohde l. c. p. 624 n. 1.

\(^5\) Diog. L. vii. 1 mentions Demeas as another name given to his father but elsewhere he is always \( \zeta i m o s \, M u a r e o u \).

\(^6\) Cimon died while besieging this place (Thuc. 1. 112).

\(^7\) Stein, Psychologie der Stoa n. 3 sums up, without deciding, in favour of a Phoenician origin. So also Ogereau p. 4 whereas Heinze thinks that everything points the other way (Bursian's Jahresbericht vol. 50, p. 53).
Oriental complexion to his tone of mind, and affected the character of his literary style, so that the epithet "Phoenician," afterwards scornfully cast in his teeth by his opponents¹, is in any case not altogether unwarranted.

Again following the authority of Persaeus (Diog. L. i.e.)², we may conclude that he arrived at Athens at the age of 22, but as to the cause which brought him thither we are differently informed, and it is uncertain whether he came for the express purpose of studying philosophy³, or in furtherance of some mercantile enterprise⁴. There is however a consensus of testimony to the effect that he suffered shipwreck on his voyage to Athens, a misfortune which he afterwards learnt to bless as it had driven him to philosophy⁵. The story of his first meeting with Crates is characteristic⁶: Zeno, who had recently arrived at Athens, one day sat down by a bookseller's stall and became engrossed in listening to the perusal of the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia. Suddenly he enquired of the bookseller where such men as Socrates were to be found. At that moment Crates happened to pass down the street, and Zeno, acting on a hint from the bookseller, from that time attached himself to the Cynic teacher.

It is impossible to reconcile the dates, which we have taken as correct, with the remaining indications of time, which are scattered through the pages of Diogenes. Thus we are told that Zeno was a pupil of Stilpo and Xenocrates for ten years, that the whole time spent under the tuition of Crates, Stilpo, Xenocrates and Polemo was twenty years, and that Zeno presided over the School, which he himself founded, for fifty-eight years⁷. This last is the statement of Apollonius,

² Another account gives his age as thirty (Diog. L. vii. 2).
³ Diog. L. vii. 32.
⁴ Diog. L. vii. 3.
⁵ See Zeno apoph. 3, and the notes.
⁶ Diog. L. vii. 3.
⁷ Diog. L. vii. 2. 4. 28. The other tradition is traced by Rohde to Apollodorus known as ὁ τοὺς χρόνους ἀναγράψας. Evidence of his having dealt with Zeno's chronology will be found in Philod. περὶ φιλοσόφων
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and must be taken in connection with his opinion that Zeno lived till he was 98 years of age. Probably, Apollonius adopted the tradition that Zeno came to Athens at the age of thirty, and allowed ten years for the period of tuition. He must have assigned B.C. 322 as the date of the foundation of the Stoa, which is obviously far too early. According to the chronology adopted above, Zeno came to Athens about B.C. 314, and, if so, he cannot have been a pupil of Xenocrates, who died in that year. All that can be said with any approach to certainty is that after a somewhat extended period of study under Crates, Stilpo, and Polemo, Zeno at length, probably soon after 300 B.C., began to take pupils on his own account, without attaching himself to any of the then existing philosophical schools. These pupils were at first called Zenonians, but when their master held his lectures in the Stoa Poikile, they adopted the name of Stoics which they afterwards retained.

Though not yet rivalling the Peripatetic school in respect of the number of its followers, the Stoic philosophy steadily won its way into general esteem no less by the personal influence of its founder than through the fervour of its adherents. So great, indeed, was the respect which the character of Zeno inspired at Athens, that shortly before his death a decree

1 According to Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 321, Zeno was a πρεσβύτης when he προσεμαρτύρησεν ἐαυτῷ τὴν εὕρεσιν τῆς ἀληθείας. This refers to the publication of his writings, but this must have shortly followed the opening of the school. Jerome on Euseb. Chron. (i. p. 498 Migne) says opposite Ol. 126 “Zeno Stoicus philosophus agnoscitur.”

2 Diog. L. vii. 5.

3 Zeno apoph. 6.

4 The decree was carried in the archonship of Arrhenides, i.e. Nov. 265 B.C., if Arrhenides was archon 265—264 as seems to be Gomperz’s opinion, vid. supr. p. 2, n. 2.
was passed by the assembly awarding him a golden crown and entitling him to a public funeral in the Ceramicus on his decease. The grounds mentioned in the body of the decree, which is preserved by Diog. L. vii. 10, for conferring this special honour on Zeno were the high moral tone of his teaching and the example which he set to his pupils in the blamelessness of his private life. Greatly however as he was honoured by the Athenians, he steadily refused the offer of their citizenship\(^1\), and on one occasion, when holding an official position, insisted on being described as a citizen of Citium\(^2\). This devotion to his native town, whether a genuine sentiment of the heart or assumed in order to avow his conviction of the worthlessness of all civic distinctions, seems to have been appreciated by his countrymen, who erected his statue\(^3\) in their market-place, where it was afterwards seen by the elder Pliny\(^4\).

In the later years of his life, Zeno’s fame extended beyond the limits of Athenian territory; there is ample record of his intimacy with Antigonus Gonatas\(^5\), the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes and king of Macedon, and from one anecdote we learn that he had attracted the attention of Ptolemy Philadelphus\(^6\). Now that Athens had completely lost her freedom, she became a hotbed of political intrigue in the interests of the various successive pretenders to the Macedonian throne; some beguiled her with the promise of liberty\(^7\), but by far the most potent instrument to gain her favour was gold. Thus, while the internal politics of Athens had become of purely municipal interest, the greatest services to which Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, could lay claim as meriting the gratitude of the Athenians were the substantial money presents

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2 Diog. L. vii. 12.
3 Diog. L. vii. 6.
4 H. N. xxxiv. 19. 32.
6 See note on apoph. 25.
7 So Demetrius Poliorcetes: Grote vol. xii. p. 196.
which he had obtained for the treasury from Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Antipater. We cannot be surprised that, in such a period as this, Ptolemy and Antigonus, hoping to gain him over by personal condescension and munificent liberality, should have eagerly courted the adherence of one, whose influence like that of Zeno extended over a wide circle among the youth of Athens. It seems clear however that, in general, Zeno avoided politics altogether; and, although it may be doubtful whether his friendship for Antigonus may not have induced Zeno to espouse his political cause, we can at least be sure that the presents of the king were not accepted as bribes by the Stoic philosopher. If Zeno died in B.C. 264, he cannot have lived to see the conclusion of the so-called Chremonidean war, when Athens was besieged by Antigonus and defended by the joint efforts of Ptolemy and the Spartans, and it is impossible to say on which side his sympathies were enlisted, although he is said to have been a lover of Chremonides.

In voluntarily hastening his own end, Zeno only illustrated the teaching of his school. One day, on leaving the Stoa, he stumbled and fell, breaking one of his fingers in his fall. Regarding this as a warning of Providence, which it was folly to neglect, and convinced that the right course for a wise man is willingly to assist in carrying out the decrees of destiny, he returned home and at once committed suicide.

His personal appearance was evidently not attractive. Timotheus, in his work *περὶ βίων*, described him as wrynecked, while Apollonius called him lean, rather tall, and of a dark complexion, with thick calves, flabby flesh, and a weak

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1 See Grote vol. xii. p. 214.
2 Cf. Seneca de Tranq. An. i. 7 Zenonem Cleanthem Chrysippum, quorum nemo ad rempublicam accessit.
3 Zeno apoph. 44.
4 Zeno apoph. 56.
5 Nothing seems to be known of the date of this writer: see Dict. Biog. These authorities are quoted by Diog. L. vii. 1.
6 An uncomplimentary epithet, cf. Theocr. x. 26 Βομβικά χαρισσά *Σύραν καλέντι τι πάντες, ἵσχυν ἄλικανστον, ἐγώ δὲ μόνος μελιχλωρόν.* id. iii. 35 ἀ μελανόχρως.
digestion. The last-named defect is said to have been the cause of his frugal diet\(^1\), but this was no doubt also recommended to him by his philosophical views. In spite of his habitual abstinence, he enjoyed the company of his friends at a convivial banquet, where his severity relaxed with the wine he drank, just as (to use his own comparison) beans are improved by soaking\(^2\). For the rest, he seems to have been a man of few words, but quick at repartee, disliking all display and effeminacy, and generally of a somewhat stern and reserved cast of mind, though not without consideration for the wants of others.

§ 2. Stoicism as established by Zeno.

It will be convenient at this point to summarise those leading doctrines which the evidence here collected establishes as having been introduced by Zeno into the Stoic school, without paying regard to isolated expressions or to views of minor philosophical importance.

Zeno divided philosophy into three parts, logic, physics and ethics, and we may take them in the order named, as being that which he recommended.

To the formal side of logic Zeno paid but little attention, regarding it as useful only for the detection of error, rather than as a means towards the establishment of truth. The doctrine of the four categories, and the elaborate treatment of \(\alpha\xi\omega\mu\alpha\tau\alpha\) and syllogisms, belong almost entirely to Chrysippus, and, when we remember that out of 750 books which he is said to have written no fewer than 311 were devoted to logical studies, it is not improbable that he owed much of his reputation to his performances in this branch. In Zeno's eyes the most important division of logic was the question of the standard of knowledge, although strictly speaking this should rather be considered as belonging to psychology. He

\(^1\) εἰς ἀρτος, ὅψων ἵππας, ἵππινεῖν ὖδωρ. Philemon ap. Diog. L. vii. 27.

\(^2\) See Zeno apoph. 27.
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It is held that, though the senses themselves are unerring, the impressions they convey are often erroneous, and that only such impressions are to be trusted as are in themselves perspicuous. The ultimate test of truth resides in the strength of tension in the impression, as it strikes the sense-organ. If satisfied in this way that the impression is such that it must proceed from a real object, the mind in the exercise of its ever present activity grasps the impression, and assents to it. This is the meaning which Zeno expressed by saying that φαντασία καταληπτική is the criterion of truth. Diogenes Laertius, however, mentions certain ἀρχαίωτεροι τῶν Στωικῶν as teaching that ὁρθὸς λόγος is the standard of truth. This passage has been treated by Hirzel (in whose judgment other authorities have concurred) as proving that Zeno and Cleanthes were the philosophers indicated, and that Chrysippus was the first to introduce the definition of the φαντασία καταληπτική. The only other evidence, by which he connects Zeno with ὁρθὸς λόγος, is Philo quis virtuti studet p. 880 appearing in our collection as frag. 157. To this might have been added Arr. Epict. diss. iv. 8. 12 (frag. 4) and Philodem. περὶ εὐςεῖ. col. 8 (frag. 117). It is submitted, however, that these passages by no means prove the point in question, as against the positive testimony which attributes to Zeno the φαντασία καταληπτική. In Philo there is no question of a logical criterion at all, but Zeno is

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1 As the matter is one of considerable importance, in order to relieve the notes, it is desirable to quote Stein’s remarks (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 174):—"Mit Zeller muss man annehmen, dass das καταληπτικὸν ursprünglich einen aktiven Sinn halte, da der Tonus desselben Zweifels-ohe auf die διάνοια einwirkt. Andererseits muss man Hirzel wieder darin Recht geben, dass die διάνοια sich unmöglich rein leidend verhalten kann, dass vielmehr das καταληπτικὸν auch einen passiven Beigeschmack hat. Und doch lassen sich beide, sich scheinbar ausschliessende Stand-punkte vereinigen, wenn man in das καταληπτικὸν den von uns vermuteten Doppelsinn hineinlegt, den Zeno wohl absichtlich andeuten wollte. Danach wären die φαντασία und διάνοια bei der κατάληψις gleichlicherweise teils aktiv, teils passiv, woraus sich die schwankende Anwendung dieses Ausdrucks sehr wohl erklärt." For the connection of τῶν with κατα-ληψις, which is not however proved to be Zenonian, cf. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 408 ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὐτή μὲν ἡ ἀπαραλλαξία τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀκαταληπτῶν φαντασιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναργές καὶ ἐντονόν ἰδίωμα παριστάται.
speaking of the state of mind of the wise man, whose soul is in perfect conformity with the law of reason, and who has mastered all his impulses and passions. This is still more plain in the extract from Philodemus, where ὁρθὸς λόγος are coupled with σπονδαίως διαθέσεις. The weight of evidence the other way must remain to be stated hereafter, but it may be remarked that, even if Cicero's testimony is discredited, the fact of the controversy between Zeno and Arcesilas is not thereby disproved. Again, if Zeno defined φαντασία as a πίστις, and discriminated between the truth of various φαντασίαι, he must have pursued the subject still farther; and, if art and memory are defined with reference to κατάληψις and opinion is distinguished therefrom, it follows of necessity that he must have defined κατάληψις itself. Still, even admitting to the full the ethical significance of ὁρθὸς λόγος, the passage in Diogenes is not thereby disposed of, for if Zeno and Cleanthes are not indicated by the words οἱ ἀρχαῖότεροι τῶν Στωικῶν to whom does this expression refer? Must we, then, suppose that Zeno put forward two criteria of knowledge, rational thought (ὁρθὸς λόγος) as well as the experience of sense (κατάληψις)? Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the clearness and directness of Zeno's teaching. The only way out of the difficulty is to adopt the theory of Stein, who regards the doctrine of ὁρθὸς λόγος as a concession to rationalism. ὁρθὸς λόγος becomes, in this view, a subsidiary and secondary criterion, so that the results of thought must be confirmed by experience. In other words, the potential notions inspired in us by the divine λόγος require to be completed and corrected on the side

1 For Epict. 1. c. see note on Zeno frag. 4.
2 It is satisfactory to find that Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 341, claims for Zeno the φαντασία κατάληψική on precisely similar grounds to those stated in the notes to frag. 11.
3 For this see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 259—264.
4 It should be mentioned that Corssen de Posidonio Rhodio (1878) pp. 17—19 proposed to eliminate Στωικῶν as a blunder of Diogenes or his authority, assuming that Posidonius was speaking of Empedocles, the Pythagoreans, and Plato.
5 The meaning of the word ἀπολείπτωσιν should in this case be pressed. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 259.
of sensible experience before they can attain to objective actuality\(^1\).

From this point of view, then, it is not unreasonable to credit Zeno with the substance of the teaching recorded in Cic. Acad. i. 41, 42. If so much be admitted, it is most unlikely that he should have refrained from enquiring into the nature of knowledge and ignorance, which carry with them the doctrine of assent. On the other hand, it is most probable that he only touched lightly the doctrine of \(\varepsilon \nu \nu \omega \alpha \iota \) and not at all that of \(\pi \rho \sigma \lambda \gamma \psi \epsilon \iota \)\(^2\).

The remainder of the logical fragments are not of much importance as regards the positive teaching of the school. They include a nominalistic criticism of the Platonic theory of ideas, a curious statement of the nature of causation, a few scraps dealing with various rhetorical terms, a definition of geometry, some discussion as to the meaning of the word \(\sigma \delta \lambda \delta \iota \kappa \omega \), and a symbolical explanation, recorded by Cicero, of the different degrees of knowledge.

Zeno's contributions to Physics have been unduly depreciated by some authorities but, while it is true that the development of this branch is largely due to Cleanthes, still a fair estimate of the fragments here collected will lead us to the conclusion that the essential groundwork of the Stoic physical teaching was laid by the founder of the school\(^3\). Zeno started from the proposition that nothing exists but the material, inasmuch as body alone is capable of acting and being acted upon. All body is thus either active or passive and the material world is itself the result produced from the

\(^1\) Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 314, 315.

\(^2\) Stein holds that \(\pi \rho \sigma \lambda \gamma \psi \epsilon \iota \) was substituted by Chrysippus for Zeno's \(\delta \rho \theta \delta \iota \lambda \gamma \zeta \), in so far as the latter is concerned with epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie p. 269, 270).

\(^3\) See Stein, Psychologe p. 56 and n. 77, whose reference to the number of fragments in Wachsmuth's collection is however misleading. As regards Zeno, Wachsmuth's fragments are only intended to be supplementary to Wellmann's article in Fleckeisen's Jahrb. for 1873, so that no inference can be drawn from the fact that there are more physical than ethical fragments. It will be seen from the present collection that the numbers are very nearly equal.
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operation of these two principles. The active principle is God, and the passive is matter. God is more closely defined as the fiery aether\(^1\), which permeates the whole of the universe, even as honey passes through the honeycomb. He is at once the embodiment of reason and of law, and the power which binds in one the various portions of the universe, who, though his essence is constant, appears in different forms in everything that exists. Nature, forethought and fate are thus only different names for the same being; as nature he creates the world, and creates it in entire harmony with the law of fate. Matter, on the other hand, is formless and indeterminate, though limited in extent, and can exist only in conjunction with some active quality; although it is itself eternal, its parts are subject to change. The creation of the world is brought about by the action of God upon matter, whereby the creative fire through an intermediate watery stage passes into the four elements of fire, air, water and earth out of which everything else is formed. To explain the production of the individual thing by the intermingling of its elements, Zeno broached the celebrated theory of κρατις δι’ ὀλου, which is in effect a denial of the axiom that two bodies cannot occupy the same space.

The world, however, will not last for ever, nor are we left without indications of its destructibility. In the inequality of the earth's surface, in the retrocession of the sea, in the mortality of every substance with which we are acquainted, and lastly in the fact that the human race and all living creatures can be shown to have had a beginning in time Zeno saw clear proofs that the universe itself is destined to pass away. There will come a time when by the unceasing law of fate the world and all that it contains will again be merged in the primeval fire, only to be created anew, as the embryo is formed from the seed. For the process is unvarying no less than never-ending; a new Heracles will free a young world from its plagues, and a new Socrates will plead his cause against the same accusers.

\(^1\) Stein, Psychologie p. 58, remarks that there is no evidence of Zeno having used the term πρόθυμα in this connection.
The individual and the cosmos are thus partakers in the same decree of fate, but their likeness does not stop here. Not only is the world a unity, but also a living unity; it is moreover sentient, rational, intelligent, and wise.

Two characteristics are especially prominent in Zeno's system, first, his metaphysical contrast between God and matter, and, secondly, his materialism. He seems to have been animated by a desire to combine the results of later thought with the simplicity and directness of the early Ionian physicists. All is to be evolved out of fire: but fire is clothed with divine attributes, and sharply contrasted with the passive material on which it works. But Zeno did not observe that the combination is in reality self-destructive, and that with a materialistic system metaphysics are superseded. It remained for his successors to eradicate the dualism which is here involved, and, while thrusting into the background the points borrowed from Aristotle, to take their stand upon pantheism pure and simple.

Passing from the account of the cosmogony to the description of the different component parts of the universe, we find that the circumference of the sphere is occupied by a revolving belt of aether, in which are the sun, moon and stars, divine beings formed of creative fire. No void exists within the world, but outside it there is unlimited void; at the same time the world is kept together and preserved from dissolution into space by the attraction of its parts to the centre, in which the earth is placed. Zeno also explains certain natural phenomena such as eclipses, lightning, thunderbolts and comets, and defines time and colour.

We proceed to his anthropology, in which the account of the soul is most important. Although he apparently omitted to describe God, who is the soul of the universe, as fiery breath, yet the soul, which is the moving principle of the body, is defined as a warm breath, or (after Heraclitus) as a sentient exhalation. For the soul is fed by exhalation from the blood, just as the heavenly bodies are by particles from the lower
elements. Moreover, it is corporeal and grows up with the body, gradually expanding under the influence of external impressions, so that the perfect power of reason is only developed at the age of puberty. Though it is a simple essence, its faculties are diverse, and being extended from the ἕγεμονικῶν which is situated in the heart to the various organs of sense, it is said to have eight parts, namely, the ἕγεμονικῶν itself, the five senses, and the capacities of speech and generation. The soul entirely permeates the body, and at its departure the composite structure of soul and body is destroyed. The soul itself endures for a time after its separation from the body but is not immortal, and its condition after death is determined by the grade of purity to which it has attained. Such, at least, seems to be a fair inference from a passage of Lactantius in which Zeno speaks of the separation of the unholy from the holy and contrasts the misery of the former with the blessedness of the latter. On his discussion of the voice, sleep, vision, and the seed we need not dwell.

It remains to consider Zeno's attitude towards the popular religion. Although, in the strict sense, he teaches that there is but one God, yet he admits that there is a certain amount of truth in polytheism, as implying a recognition of the ubiquity of the divine presence. The manifestation of God in the powers of nature is symbolised by Zeus, Here and Poseidon, who represent the aether, the air, and the water respectively. In his interpretation of Hesiod's Theogony he gives the reins to his etymological fancy, so as to bring the cosmogony of the poet into accordance with Stoic views. Lastly the existence of divination is inferred from the forethought, which characterises the divine government.

Ethics, which are the crowning point of the Stoic system, come next in order. The aim and object of life is to live in agreement with nature, which is, in other words, to live according to virtue: for this is the goal to which nature conducts us. It would seem that Zeno did not accurately explain what he meant by nature, since Chrysippus and
Cleanthes took divergent views of its character, but, recognising the manner in which the different branches of the Stoic system are interlaced with one another\(^1\), we may reasonably conclude that by the prominence given to nature Zeno desired to connect his moral teaching with the divine creative æther, which permeates the universe\(^2\). Our first impulses, however, tend not to virtue but to self-preservation, and virtue is impossible in the child or the brute, since neither of them possesses the informing power of reason. These natural impulses require the guidance of reason, and in their proper subordination to it is to be found the condition of happiness, which may be described as the unruffled flow of life. For happiness nothing is required but virtue, and no external circumstances, nothing but what is morally evil, can diminish the satisfaction belonging to the virtuous. In this way we are led to discriminate between άγαθα and κακά: only virtue and vice or their accessories can be classed as good and evil; everything else, even life and death, is morally indifferent. But this classification does not exhaust the capacities of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν. The value of virtue is absolute and for all time: but, just as the supremacy of the monarch does not imply the absolute equality of his subjects, so the ἀδιάφορα are ranged between virtue and vice in a graduated scale of negative and positive value (ἀπαξία and ἀξία), the middle place being occupied by τὰ καθόπαξ ἀδιάφορα, i.e. such matters as having an even or odd number of hairs in one's head. Everything possessing ἀξία is κατὰ φύσιν, and everything possessing ἀπαξία is παρὰ φύσιν. At the same time ἀξία is not a permanent attribute of any ἀδιάφορον, for that which is at one time κατὰ

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2 Hirzel, Untersuchungen ii. p. 108, thinks otherwise and the point is certainly a doubtful one. If Zeno spoke only of human nature, Cleanthes may have here, as elsewhere, shown the connection of ethical with physical doctrine by explaining φύσις as κοινὴ φύσις. Then Chrysippus would have united both views. If this was the real development, there would be some pretext for Stobaeus' assertion that Cleanthes added τῇ φύσει to the definition, while the authority of Diogenes Laertius would remain unimpaired. See however Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 260.
Φύσιν might, under certain circumstances, become παρὰ φύσιν. Herein lies the vital distinction between ἀδιάφορα and ἀγαθά, for the latter are unaffected by any possible change of circumstances: a virtuous action can never be contrary to nature. Still, although there is not an absolute, there is yet a practical permanence in the value of certain things, which in the absence of some paramount objection (= κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον or ἀνευ περιστάσεως) we shall always choose in preference to their contraries. These then are the προηγμένα. Corresponding with this classification of objects, we have a scale of actions ranging from κατόρθωμα (virtuous action) to ἀμάρτημα (sinful action), wherein καθήκων answers to the class of ἀδιάφορα. Every καθήκων is thus directed to the choice of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν and the avoidance of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν. The doctrines of καθήκων and προηγμένον are not to be regarded as an excrescence foisted on to the Stoic system in consequence of the pressure of the arguments of opponents, but are an integral and necessary portion of the original structure as established by Zeno. The apparent inconsistency, which the application of these doctrines sometimes produces e.g. in the remarks on marriage, often disappears when we remember that the πολιτεία proposed to establish a socialistic constitution under which the importance of ἀδιάφορα would be reduced to a minimum.

Zeno held further that virtue is one and indivisible, springing from the ἡγεμονικόν, of which it is a fixed and permanent condition. Consistently with this, he maintains that all sinful actions are equally wrong, since all alike imply an aberration from a standard, which excludes increase or diminution. None the less, however, can we distinguish between different manifestations of virtue or separate virtues: virtue itself is identical with wisdom (φρόνησις), and justice, courage, and temperance are the particular applications of wisdom in diverse spheres. Whether Zeno also distinguished between two different kinds of φρόνησις, one as the groundwork, and the other as a particular species of virtue, must
remain doubtful. Hirzel (l.c. p. 99) infers that he did, but Plutarch’s words do not necessarily lead to such a conclusion, and we ought to hesitate to attribute such an inconsistency to Zeno without direct evidence. No doubt the Stoic school generally put forward four cardinal virtues φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, but inasmuch as Zeno’s position was admittedly modified by his successors we are left to judge of his views entirely from the two passages in Plutarch, in which he is mentioned by name.

The theory of the emotions, which was introduced by Zeno, constitutes one of the most distinctive features of Stoic ethics. Whereas Plato and Aristotle agreed in admitting the legitimacy of certain emotions, Zeno declared all alike to be sinful, as being due to an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or an excess of impulse. The four chief emotions are pleasure, grief, fear and desire, and Zeno in describing their nature dwelt, if we may trust Galen’s statements, rather on the psychological effects of the irrational impulse upon the soul than on the mental conditions which produce them. The special difficulties surrounding this subject will be discussed in the notes to the fragments themselves.

The whole of mankind was divided by Zeno into two classes, entirely distinct from one another, that of the wise and that of the foolish: Every action of the wise man is prompted by virtue and every action of the fool by vice. Hence it is generally true that the wise man performs every action well, and the fool fails in everything. Friendship, freedom, piety, riches, beauty, the arts of kingship and generalship, even success in culinary operations belong to the wise man alone: he is never mistaken, never regrets what he has done, feels no compassion, and is absolutely free from every form of emotion. At the same time, it is clear that Zeno contemplates a progress from the state of folly to that of wisdom as practicable; this advance is characterised by the purgation of the soul from emotional and delusive affections under the influence of reason. Even though he ultimately
emerges from the conflict with success, the wise man still feels the scars from the wounds he has received during its course, and is often reminded of his former evil impulses after he has completely suppressed them. Finally, since death belongs to the class ἀδιάφορα, suicide is justifiable in the wise man, if circumstances prescribe such a course.

It is obvious that a teacher, whose ethical views were of the nature, which we have just indicated, could not rest satisfied with the existing constitution of civic life in Greece. Equally unsatisfactory to him was the aristocratical community of Plato, with the sharply drawn dividing line between the guardians and the rest of the citizens. For this reason Eros, the god of friendship and concord, is taken as the presiding deity of Zeno's ideal state, a state which in no way corresponds to the Greek πόλις, but comprises the whole of mankind living together like a herd of cattle. In this state there will be no temples, law-courts, or gymnasia; no work of human craftsmen is worthy of divine acceptance; the state must be adorned not with costly offerings, but by the virtues of its inhabitants. Zeno likewise advocates an abolition of coinage, a community of wives, and a thorough revolution of the current system of education.

The remaining fragments, dealing mainly with particular καθήκοντα, do not require to be summarised here.

§ 3. Zeno's relation to previous philosophers.

The opponents of the Stoic school were fond of accusing its members of plagiarism and want of originality. Zeno is the keen Phoenician trader, pilfering other men's wares, and passing them off as his own: if all that belongs to others were withdrawn from the voluminous writings of Chrysippus, we should have a blank page. Antiochus, in Cicero, represents

2 Cf. Diog. L. vii. 25.
3 Diog. L. vii. 181.
4 Acad. i. 43. The same argument is put forward by Cicero himself against Cato in the 4th book of the de Finibus.
the views of Zeno as merely immaterial changes in minor points of the genuine Academic doctrine, while Juvenal only repeats current opinion in speaking of the Stoic dogmas as “a Cynicis tunica distantia”¹. Even a slight acquaintance with the Stoic system is sufficient to refute these gross charges: indeed, its originality is abundantly vindicated when we point to the influence it exercised for several centuries on the intellectual life of Greece and Rome². At the same time it must be admitted that Zeno was largely indebted to his predecessors—especially to Antisthenes and Heraclitus—for the bricks and mortar with which he constructed so splendid an edifice. Of Cynicism in particular he appropriated the kernel, while discarding the husk. It is, however, when we look at Stoicism as a whole that we are able to appreciate the skill with which its incongruous elements were fused, and the unity of thought which pervades a variety of detail. The Stoic wise man is as far removed from Diogenes in his tub, as is the all permeating aether from the fiery element of Heraclitus. We proceed to discuss in detail the various points in which Zeno’s obligation to previous thinkers is most strongly marked.

A. To Antisthenes and the Cynics.

The resemblances between Zeno and the Cynics are naturally to be found chiefly in their ethical doctrines. Physics were almost entirely neglected by the Cynics, and their nominalistic logic was not of great importance for Stoicism, although we may observe in passing that both schools maintained in similar terms³ that Plato’s ideas were a mere fiction of the brain and had no objective existence. The Stoic doctrine of life in accordance with nature finds its historical origin in the

¹ xiii. 121.
teaching as well as in the life of Diogenes. Like Zeno, Antisthenes teaches that virtue is in itself sufficient to secure happiness; that nothing is a Good but virtue, nothing an Evil but vice, and that everything else is indifferent. Accordingly Diogenes held that death, since it involves no disgrace, cannot be an Evil. Hence it is not surprising to learn that many of the Cynics put an end to their lives by suicide, though we have sayings both of Antisthenes and Diogenes on record denying the legitimacy of such a course. Virtue itself is described, after Socrates, as consisting in wisdom and prudence: “prudence,” says Antisthenes, “is the safest wall; it cannot be undermined or betrayed.” At the same time the futility of the ordinary course of Greek education is strongly insisted on. The distinction between virtue and vice draws with it that between the wise and the foolish; the philosopher's wallet preserves a chosen few from a condition bordering on madness.

We are told, on the authority of Diogenes Laertius, that Zeno adopted the Cynic form of life. This is probably to be taken with some limitation, as the incidents recorded of his life only partially agree with it. It is certain, however, that his life was one of abstinence and simplicity, and for this reason he became the butt of the comic poets, who thus unconsciously testified to his merit. Apollodorus Ephillus, a later Stoic writer, declared that the wise man would cynicise, and that Cynicism was a short cut to virtue. It should, however, always be borne in mind that the Stoic ideal was

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1 Diog. L. vi. 71 δέων ὁν ἄντι τῶν ἀξιότατων πόλων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν ἔλυμένους ἔγερε εὐδαιμόνες. Zeno frag. 120.
2 Diog. L. vi. 11. Zeno frag. 125.
7 Diog. L. vi. 103. Zeno frag. 167.
9 Diog. L. vi. 104.
10 Diog. L. vii. 26, 27.
11 Diog. vi. 104. vii. 121.
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humanised and elevated to an extent entirely incompatible with Cynicism, mainly owing to the attention which was bestowed on mental culture.

Turning to the views of the two schools in applied moral science, we find a curious agreement as to the relations of the sexes: Zeno and Diogenes both held that, in the ideal state, there should be a community of wives, and neither saw anything revolting in marriage between the nearest relations. At the same time marriage and the begetting of children are recommended for the wise man both by Zeno and Antisthenes, and apparently we must regard this as intended to apply to the existing condition of life, in which marriage was a civil institution. Both teachers allow to the wise man the passion of love, as he alone will be able to select a suitable object: both maintain that the virtuous alone are capable of genuine friendship.

Lastly, Zeno copied Antisthenes in his treatment of the Homeric poems, and particularly in explaining certain apparent contradictions as due to the fact that the poet speaks at one time κατὰ δόξαν and at another κατ' ἀληθείαν. The allegorising method of interpretation is common to both, and was afterwards developed to an excessive degree by Cleanthes and Chrysippus.

Though we have thus seen that Zeno's ethical teaching is largely founded on Cynicism, we must not forget the many points of divergence. Thus, for example, we find the Cynics treating honour and wealth as absolute evils; these things,

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1 The difference of spirit in the two schools is well put by Sir A. Grant (Ar. Eth. vol. i. p. 317 ed. 3).
2 Diog. L. vi. 72. Dio. Chrys. x. 29. Cf. Zeno frags. 176 and 179. These passages are from the πολεμία of Zeno, which is supposed to have been written while he was still an exponent of orthodox Cynicism. Chrysippus, however, is reported to have also held this repulsive doctrine.
3 Diog. L. vi. 11. Zeno frag. 171.
4 Diog. L. vi. 11. Zeno frag. 172.
7 See Cic. N. D. ii. 63 foll.
8 See the passages collected by Zeller Socrates, etc. E. T. p. 304.
according to Zeno, belonged to the class of \( \pi\rho\omega\eta\mu\epsilon\alpha \). Again, to take their attitude towards the popular religion, we know that Zeno expressly countenanced divination, while the existence of prophets made Diogenes think man the most foolish of animals\(^1\).

B. To Heraclitus.

There can be no doubt that Zeno borrowed some important principles in his physical teaching from the writings of Heraclitus, and particularly from his account of the cosmogony. There is, however, a difficulty in comparing the doctrines of the two schools minutely, owing to the obscurity in which our knowledge of the Heraclitean theories is involved, and which is often increased by the doubt as to whether some particular doctrine belonged equally to the Stoics and the philosopher of Ephesus, or whether some later development, introduced by the former, has not been wrongly ascribed to the latter by our authorities. For instance, it was at one time stoutly maintained that the conflagration of the world was not taught by Heraclitus but that it was first propounded by Zeno, although the contrary opinion seems now to prevail\(^2\). Again, it is not entirely clear whether we are to class Heraclitus, as Aristotle does\(^3\), with the early Ionian physicists, starting from his dogma that all things are fire, or whether we are to regard this principle as a metaphysical abstraction, metaphorically shadowing forth the eternal flux of all things, a view which is more in accordance with Plato's criticism in the Theaetetus\(^4\). However this may be, Heraclitus is essentially a hylozoist, who, following Anaximenes, chooses fire as being the rarest element, and insists on the continuity of change in order to escape from the mechanical theories of Anaxagoras and Em-  

\(^1\) Diog. vi. 24 and contrast Zeno frag. 118.  
\(^2\) See the elaborate discussion in Zeller, Pre-Socr. Phil. Eng. Tr. ii. pp. 62—77. See however Bywater, Journ. Phil. i. 42.  
\(^3\) Met. i. 3. 8. This is the view of Ueberweg p. 40 and is also held by Dr Jackson.  
\(^4\) Zeller's position (p. 20 foll.) combines the two views.
pedocles on the one hand, and the Parmenidean immobility on
the other. The λόγος εινῶς is with him the expression of the
truth that nothing can be known but the law of mutability,
the harmony in difference, which he likens to the stretching of
a bowstring. This law he calls γνώμη, δίκη, εἰμαρμένη, τὸ
περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικὸν τε ὑν καὶ φρενῆς, and ὁ Ζεὺς, but these
terms are mere metaphors and we should be wrong in straining
their philosophic import: they represent, in fact, the law of
change and nothing more. Still, there can be no doubt that
the use which Heraclitus made of his formula λόγος was one
of the chief points in his system which attracted the attention
of Zeno. As a disciple of Cynicism he was familiar with
λόγος as a dialectical and an ethical principle: neither of these
aspects of λόγος was discarded by him in broaching his own
system. Yet, through the help of the Heraclitean λόγος, he
was enabled to take one step further. Just as Plato gave to
the Socratic ὑπόθεσις or general conception a metaphysical
existence in the form of the idea, so did Zeno elevate the λόγος
of Antisthenes from its position as a criterion for thought and
duty to that of the physical cause of being and movement. The
Stoic deity is, like the Heraclitean λόγος, provided with
many names, such as God, Mind, the all pervading Aether,
Fate, Forethought, and Zeus, but on the other hand it belongs
to an essentially later period of thought. We have here set
forth the teleological view of Nature, which is regarded as
creating all things out of itself for a good purpose. The
Stoics, at least after Cleanthes, are also pantheists in so far as
they acknowledge that God and the world are identical. Even
where Zeno followed Heraclitus most closely there are essential
differences in treatment. The fire of Heraclitus becomes

1 Heraclitus frag. 56 ed. Bywater. Hirzel finds here the origin of the
Stoic τάνως, but this is very questionable.
2 For a detailed statement see Krische, Forschungen p. 368 foll.
3 The comparison is suggested by Hirzel ii. p. 42. But Hirzel very
much underestimates the influence of Heraclitus on Zeno, as Heinze has
pointed out. It is quite contrary to the evidence to attribute the Hera-
clitean tendencies of the Stoa solely, or even mainly, to Cleanthes.
4 Cic. N. D. ii. 58.
aether or πῦρ τέχνικόν— for this distinction is unknown to the Ephesian—and is thereby spiritualised and rarefied. Instead of three elements the Stoics have four, according to the universal practice of post-Aristotelian writers. Cleanthes, at least, regarded these four elements merely as graduations of τόνος, a notion entirely alien to Heraclitus. The doctrine of πάντα ἰεί is replaced by that of μεταβολή, and ἄλλωσις gives way to the characteristic theory of the mixture of substances, known as κράσις δι’ ὅλων. In stating the differences between the two schools we have indicated how the Stoic physics were built upon Heraclitus. The remaining resemblances are comparatively unimportant. It was a natural corollary to both systems to maintain the unity of the cosmos. Zeno seems to have adopted Heraclitus' definition of the soul as an ἀναθερμαίας, but, instead of regarding this exhalation as imbied from the outer air (τὸ περιέχον), he taught that the soul was fed by emanation from the warm blood. Where Heraclitus regarded dryness as an essential characteristic of the wise soul, the Stoics rather looked for warmth or εὖκρασία. Lastly, we may observe that Heraclitus attributed immortality to the soul, and that in Ethics he counselled submission to the common law and the regulation of speech and thought in accordance with the demands of nature.

C. To Plato and Aristotle.

It has often been observed as a remarkable fact that the influence exercised both by Plato and Aristotle on their immediate successors was comparatively small. Zeno and Epicurus sought the groundwork of their ethics in the systems of Antisthenes and Aristippus, and followed in their physics, with surprising closeness, the pre-Socratic philosophers Heraclitus and Democritus. Indeed, the Peripatetic school itself showed no great vitality after Theophrastus, the new Academy

1 Stob. Ecl. i. 22. 3 b p. 199, 10.
2 Heracl. frag. 74, Bywater.
3 Stob. Floril. iii. 84.
of Arcesilas and Carneades bore no resemblance to that founded by Plato, and Antiochus owed more to the Stoa than to the old Academy which he professed to resuscitate. In the post-Aristotelian philosophy, taken as a whole, we find a universal tendency to materialistic views, a striking decline of interest in purely intellectual research, as an end in itself, and a general agreement in confining the area of speculation to the two questions of the standard of ethics and the logical criterion. However we are to explain this phenomenon, and even if we consider inadequate the explanation of Zeller, who attributes this result to the loss of political freedom and the consequent concentration of thought on the needs of the individual, we are more concerned with the fact itself than with its possible causes. It is enough to say that the system founded by Zeno was in no sense the offspring of those of Plato and Aristotle, although in many points it presupposes their existence.

In the case of Chrysippus we may go further, for there is no doubt that his logic was largely a development, and that not a very happy one, of the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism. Zeno, however, although the titles of several of his logical treatises have come down to us, was not considered to have paid great attention to this branch of philosophy. The principal contribution made by Zeno to the theory of knowledge is the establishment of the φαντασία καταληπτική as the criterion: in this, the essential point, whereby the convincing power of the impression is made the test of its reality, is due entirely to Zeno, but he was obviously influenced by the Aristotelian treatment of φαντασία, in which it appears as "decaying sense," and is more accurately defined as "the movement resulting from the actual operation of the sense faculty." Again, in the Zenonian definitions of memory and art there will be found a familiarity with the progressive stages in the growth of knowledge, as enunciated by

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1 This question is discussed in Benn's Greek Philosophers (Preface).
2 Rhet. i. 11. 1370 a 28.
3 de An. iii. 3. 429 a 1.
Aristotle\(^1\), and his terminology, at any rate, is recognisable in a logical fragment preserved by Stobaeus\(^2\).

Diogenes Laertius introduces his discussion of the Stoic physics by stating that the two \(\delta \rho \chi \alpha\)' posited by the school were God and Indeterminate Matter: here we have not only the well-known Aristotelian distinction between the formal and the material cause, but also his description of matter as that which is entirely formless and contingent\(^3\). The aether, the so called quinta essentia of Aristotle, of which the heavenly bodies were composed, has its representative under the system of Zeno, who held that the circumference of the world was surrounded by a moving belt of aether.

Cicero puts into the mouth of professed Antiocheans, and, when speaking in the character of Antiochus, himself makes the charge that Zeno's Ethics are identical with those of the Academy, and that the only change is one of terminology. This is developed at length in the fourth book of the de Finibus, where Cicero points out the inconsistency of denying that external goods contribute to happiness, while admitting that they have a certain positive value. There is considerable force in the objection in so far as it lays bare a weak point in the Stoic stronghold, but, if it is meant for a charge of plagiarism, it is grossly unfair. In fact, as has been remarked, Antiochus, who himself stole the clothes of Zeno, was always anxious to prove that they never belonged to Zeno at all. As we know, however, that Zeno was a pupil of Polemo, it is not unnatural to find that he was to some extent influenced by his teaching. Thus, life according to nature was one of Polemo's leading tenets, and Clement of Alexandria has preserved the title of one of his books which deals with this subject\(^4\). Zeller well

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1 Met. i. 1. Anal. Post. ii. 19.
2 Zeno frag. 24.
3 Metaph. vi. 3, 1029 a 20 Λέγω δ' ἔλθην ἢ καθ' αἵην μήτε τι μήτε ποσών μήτε ἀλλο μηδὲν Μέγεται οἷς ὑποσταί τὸ ὅν.
4 Cic. Fin. iv. 6. 14. Clem. Alex. Strom. viii. p. 304 Sylb. Polemo himself is represented as saying to Zeno:—οὐ λαβόναις, ὃ Ζήρων, ταῖς κηπαίαις παρεισφέρων θάρασι, καὶ τὰ δόγματα κλέπτων φιλοσοφικῶς μεταφερεναι (Diog. L. vii. 25). One of the doctrines, which were in this way appro-
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sums up the extent of Academic influence when he says¹ that “such points in Platonism as the Socratic building of virtue on knowledge, the comparative depreciation of external goods, the retreat from sensuality, the elevation and the purity of moral idealism, and, in the older Academy, the demand for life according to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of virtue and the growing tendency to confine philosophy to practical issues—all these were questions for a Stoic full of interest.” Amongst the particular points, in which Zeno seems to have felt the influence of Plato, may be mentioned the doctrines of the cardinal virtues (frag. 134) and the πάθη (frag. 142) and the explanation of the world as ζωόν ἐμψυχον (frag. 62).

We have endeavoured briefly to indicate certain leading points of doctrine in which Zeno was influenced by his predecessors, leaving minor resemblances to be pointed out in the notes.

§ 4. The writings of Zeno.

A list of the titles of Zeno’s works is preserved in Diog. L. vii. 4, but is admittedly incomplete, as the same writer himself makes additions to it in his exposition of the philosophical views of the Stoic school. This list was probably derived by Diogenes from two distinct sources, as it is divisible into two separate portions. The first or main division gives the names of 13 (or 14) works, of which 6 deal with ethical, 4 with physical, and 3 (or 4) with logical and miscellaneous subjects; then follows a kind of appendix giving 4 (or 3) additional titles. Apollonius Tyrius has been with much probability suggested as the authority to whom the main division is due².

priated by the Stoa, appears to be the third definition of ἔρως preserved by Andronicus περὶ παθῶν c. 4 as υπηρεσία θεῶν εἰς νέων κατακόσμησιν καὶ καλῶν: cf. Plut. ad prin. iner. 780 ὦ Πολέμων ἔλεγε τὸν ἔρωτα εἶναι θεῶν υπηρεσίαν εἰς νέων ἐπιμέλειαν (Kreuttner, Andronicus p. 49).

¹ Stoics etc. p. 399.

² See Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Antigonos p. 107: Zeller and Wachsmuth adopt Nietzsche’s hypothesis (Rhein. Mus. xxiv. 185) that all the lists in Diog. are, with certain exceptions, derived from Demetrius of
for not only does Diogenes in several places cite him by name (e.g. § 2) but also Strabo (xvi. 2. 24, p. 757) expressly mentions a work of his with the title πίναξ τῶν ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν βιβλίων; who supplied Diogenes with the appendix has not been determined.

The works, of which any record has survived to us, may be divided into four classes:—

I. Logical.

(1) περὶ λόγον. From this work, not mentioned in the general catalogue, Diog. L. (vii. 39. 40) cites the triple division of philosophy and the order of arrangement for its study, which Zeno recommended. According to Susemihl, this book contained Zeno’s epistemology, but, being superseded by the writings of Chrysippus, lost its place in the canon.

(2) καθολικά. Nothing is known of this work but the title (Diog. 4): Wachsmuth thinks that καθολικὰ περὶ λέξεων is the title of a single work.

(3) περὶ λέξεων (Diog. 4). In Stoic terminology λέξις is defined as φωνή ἐγγράμματος as opposed to λόγος which is φωνῇ σημαντικῇ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεριπομένη (Diog. vii. 56). It is probable, therefore, that this work dealt specially with the definition of terms, and to it may perhaps belong the fragments in which Zeno explains the proper meaning of σολοκίζεων (frags. 30 and 31). Wellmann (Neue Jahrb. für Philol. 107, p. 478) suggests that this treatise gave rise to the oft-repeated accusation made by Cicero that Zeno’s innovations in philosophy were solely of a verbal character, and that Chrysippus had defended his master from a similar charge in the work περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρησθαί Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.

(4) τέχνη (Diog. 4). This is identified by Zeller and Magnesia, who is specified by name with reference to Xenophon’s works (Diog. L. ii. 57). Susemihl (Jahrbücher für Philol. 123, p. 741) thinks that the Diogenes catalogue comprises only those writings of Zeno which were included in the Stoic canon, and that the πολιτεία, the τέχνη ἐρωτική, and the διατριβαί were treated as apocryphal while their genuineness was admitted.

1 See however on frag. 23.
Wellmann with the ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη of § 34, while Wachsmuth writes τέχνη καὶ λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι Β' as one title. The third course, which at first sight seems the most natural inasmuch as τέχνη bears this special meaning from Corax and Tisias downwards, is to regard it as an art of rhetoric. The objection to this view is that it is inferred from Cicero de Fin. iv. 7 that no work of Zeno bearing this title was known to Cicero or his authority, but too much reliance need not be placed on this, as it is clear that Zeno's logical treatises had been cast into the shade by the more elaborate performances of Chrysippus. On the other hand, there is a fair amount of evidence to show that Zeno did to some extent busy himself with rhetoric (frags. 25, 26, 27, 32), and though Zeller suggests that the definitions of διήγησις and παράδειγμα may belong to some other Zeno, this does not apply to the passages in Sextus and Quintilian.

(5) λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι Β' (Diog. 4). Possibly owing to the influence of Stilpo the Megarian, Zeno may have devoted some attention to this branch of logic, which in general he regards as of less importance¹: see frag. 6.

II. Physical.

(6) περὶ τοῦ ὀλον (Diog. 4) seems to have been the most important of Zeno's physical writings. Diogenes refers to it as containing Zeno's views about the elements (vii. 136) and the creation and destruction of the world (ib. 142), and quotes from it the statement that there is only one world (ib. 143). It also contained an account of the eclipses of the sun and moon (ib. 145), and explanations of the phenomena of thunder and lightning (ib. 153).

(7) περὶ φύσεως cited by Stobaeus Ecl. 1. 5. 15. p. 78, 18. for Zeno's views on the subject of εἰμαρμένη: Krische (p. 367) would identify it with the last named treatise.

¹ This is the only work which deals with the formal side of logic, so that Stein's argument in Erkenntnistheorie n. 689 might have been put more strongly. He follows the old reading and speaks of two treatises, τεχνικὴ λύσεις and ἔλεγχοι Β'.

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(8) περὶ οὐσίας unnecessarily identified by Wellmann (l.c. p. 442) and Susemihl with περὶ ὀλον and περὶ φύσεως is quoted by Diog. (134) for Zeno’s definition of the two first principles, God and Matter.

(9) περὶ σημείων: a treatise on divination (Diog. 4). Thus μαντική is defined in Stob. Ecl. ii. 122, 238 as ἐπιστήμη θεωρητική σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων. This is no doubt the work referred to by Cic. de Div. i. 3, 6 sed cum Stoici omnia fere illa diffunderent quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset. Its position in the catalogue makes against Prantl’s hypothesis, who classes it as a logical work.

(10) περὶ ὄψεως only known by its title (Diog. 4) is regarded as logical by Stein.

(11) Πυθαγορικά (Diog. 4) classed by Wachsmuth as a physical book owing to its position in the catalogue, but nothing else is known concerning it.

III. Ethical.

(12) περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος (Diog. 4). Here must belong Zeno’s definition of duty (frag. 145), from the terms of which Wellmann conjectures without much probability that we should identify this treatise with the following.

(13) περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου (Diog. 4).

(14) περὶ ὀρμής ἢ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως (Diog. 4). Diogenes quotes the Zenonian definition of the summum bonum from this book (vii. 87); Fabricius (Bibl. Gr. iii. 580) proposed to separate this title reading η = octo, and Weygoldt adopting this further identified περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως with περὶ φύσεως, but the latter is not an anthropological work.

(15) περὶ παθῶν (Diog. 4) containing the general definition of emotion and the discussion of its several subdivisions, pain, fear, desire and pleasure (ib. 110).

(16) πολιτεία. This seems to have been the most generally known, as it is certainly the most often quoted, of Zeno’s writings; it was also one of the earliest in point of

1 r. p. 458. So also Stein, Erkenntnistheorien n. 689.
time, having been written while its author was still under the influence of Cynicism (Diog. 4). Plutarch informs us that it was written as a controversial answer to Plato's Republic. The allusions to it are too numerous to be specified here in detail 1.

(17) *περὶ νόμου* (Diog. 4). From its position in the catalogue this work must have belonged to the political side of ethics, and Krische's supposition (p. 368) that it treated of the divine law of nature is therefore rebutted. Themist. Or. xxiii. p. 287 A speaks of the νόμοι of Zeno but appears to be referring generally to his philosophical precepts.

(18) *περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας* (Diog. 4): cf. frag. 167, which however is stated to belong to the πολιτεία.

(19) ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (Diog. 34). To this book probably belongs the interesting fragment (174) preserved by Clem. Alex. relating to the behaviour suitable to young men.

(20) *διατριβαί* (Diog. 34): a similar work, as we are told by Diog. whose statement is confirmed by the passages (frags. 179, 180) quoted from it by Sextus. As we are told by Plutarch that something of the same kind was contained in the πολιτεία, we may believe that this and the last three works were written in close connection with it, as shorter appendages dealing with special topics, and before Zeno had worked out the distinctive features of Stoicism. From the general meaning of "lectures, discussions" (for which cf. Plat. Apol. 37 ὅτα ἐμὸς διατριβὰς καὶ τοῖς λόγοις) διατριβὴ seems to have assumed the special sense of a short ethical treatise, if we may trust the definition of Hermogenes (Rhett. Gr. ed. Waltz, t. III. p. 406) διατριβὴ ἐστὶ βραχέως διανοήματος ἡβίκοι ἔκτασις. Zeller's identification with the χρεία is improbable, and Susemihl

1 A summary will be found in Wellmann I. c. p. 437 foll. As regards its Cynic tendencies Susemihl observes:—Wer den Witz machte, er sei bei ihrer Abfassung wohl schon über den Hund gekommen, aber noch nicht über den Schwanz, schrieb eben damit dies Werk einer etwas späteren Zeit, zu frühesten etwa als er von Krates zu Stilpon übergegangen war.
believes that the δεοτριβαι was excluded from the πράξις as being an earlier Cynic work.

(21) ήθικά (Diog. 4). The title is somewhat doubtful, as Wachsmuth reads ἀπομημονεύματα Κράτητος ήθικά as a single title, and Wellmann would emend ἡ χρεῖαι for ήθικά: more probably however it was a collection of short ethical προβλήματα.

IV. Miscellaneous.

(22) προβλημάτων Ὀμηρικῶν ε' (Diog. 4): we learn from Dio. Chrys. 53, 4 that Zeno wrote on the Iliad, Odyssey and Margites, and that his object was to show the general consistency of Homer by explaining that a literal meaning was not to be applied throughout the poems, which ought in many instances to be interpreted allegorically. That he in some cases proposed emendations may be seen from Strabo vii. 3, 6, cf. ib. i. p. 41, xvi. p. 1131. Krische p. 392 shows that there is no foundation for the suggestion that Zeno attributed the Iliad and the Odyssey to different authors.

(23) περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀκρώσεως (Diog. 4). Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 689, speaks of this work, the προβλ. Ὀμηρ. and the περὶ Ἐλλην. παποῖ, as an educational series, and regards them as an appendix to the πολιτεία.

(24) ἀπομημονεύματα Κράτητος (Diog. 4) also mentioned by Athen. iv. 162 b as Ζήμωνος ἀπομημονεύματα, from which Persaeus is said to have made extracts. There seems little doubt that this was identical with the χρεῖαι mentioned in Diog. vi. 91 in connection with Crates, or that Wachsmuth is right in referring to this book the story of Crates and the cobbler (frag. 199). Aphthonius' definition of χρεῖαι runs thus:—ἀπομημονεύμα αὑτομον εὐπτόχως ἐπὶ τι πρόσωπον ἀναφέρομεν.

(25) ἐπιστολαί (Maxim. Floril. ed. Mai, c. 6). This reference was first pointed out by Wachsmuth, see frag. 190.

The passage in Cic. N. D. i. 36 (cum vero Hesiodi Theogoniam interpretatur) led Fabricius to insert among his list of Zeno's writings (iii. p. 580) ἀπομημονέμετρα εἰς τὴν Ἑσιόδου
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Oeoyoi, and there can be no doubt from the statements in Proclus and the other Scholiasts that Zeno's labours extended to Hesiod as well as to Homer. It is, however, impossible to say in what work these fragments appeared, and we do not feel much inclined to accept Krische's view (p. 367) that the allegorical explanations of Hesiod were worked into the περὶ δόλων. May they not belong to the περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀκροάσεως?

It remains to call attention to Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 9, 58 p. 245, S. p. 681, P. ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωικοὶ λέγουσι Ζήνωνι τῷ πρώτῳ γεγράθαι τινα ἀ μὴ ραδίως ἐπιτρέπουσι τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἀναγεγρωσκεν μὴ οὐκεί πείραν δεδωκόσι πρῶτερος εἰ γνησίως φιλοσοφόετε, but similar suggestions of esotericism are made against all the post-Aristotelian schools, and especially against the New Academy. (Mayor on Cic. N. D. i. 11.)

§ 5. Zeno's style.

The fragments which survive of Zeno's writings are not sufficient to enable us to form any satisfactory opinion of his style, and it would be unsafe to generalise from such scanty data. We shall therefore only attempt to point out those characteristics about which there can be no doubt.

The later Greek philosophers troubled themselves but little with the graces of literary ornament. Philosophy had now become scientific in its treatment and ceased to be artistic in form. Zeno was no exception to this rule, and was satisfied if he presented his arguments to his readers with directness and perspicacity. In this respect, he has been successful in avoiding obscurity⁴, though he lays himself open to the charge of

1 See Flach, Glossen und Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theognie, p. 29 foll.
2 Cf. also Diog. L. viii. 48, Minuc. Felix Octav. xix. 10 Chrysippus Zenonem interpretatione physiologiae in Hesiodi Homeri Orpheique carminibus imitatur.
3 Zeller who formerly supported this view (Stoics p. 40) now thinks otherwise (Ph. d. Gr. iii. 1. 32).
4 Fronto ad Verum Imperat. i. p. 114 ad docendum planissimus Zenon. Cf. Diog. L. vii. 38 ἔστι μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ προσγεγραμμένα βιβλία
abruptness and want of finish. To this tendency was due his custom of couching his arguments in syllogistic formulae, which often served to cloak a somewhat obvious fallacy. This formally logical style subsequently grew so habitual with the Stoics that they earned for themselves the title of διαλεκτικοί. Cicero (N. D. iii. 22) especially observes on Zeno's fondness for certain "breues et acutulas conclusiones," and several examples of these are to be found in his remaining fragments. "That which is reasonable is better than that which is unreasonable: but nothing is better than the world: therefore the world is reasonable." "That thing at whose departure the living organism dies is corporeal: but the living organism dies when the breath that has been united with it departs: therefore this breath is corporeal: but this breath is the soul; therefore the soul is corporeal." "That is altogether destructible all whose parts are destructible: but all the parts of the world are destructible; therefore the world is itself destructible," cf. also frags. 59, 60, 61, 129, 130.

Passing to quite a different characteristic, we remark in Zeno's style a certain picturesqueness and love of simile, which perhaps may be regarded as traceable to the Oriental influence of his birth-place. Particularly striking is his observation that those who are in a state of πρόκοπη may from their dreams discover whether they are making progress, if then the imaginative and emotional part of the soul is clearly seen dispersed and ordered by the power of reason, as in the transparent depth of a waveless calm (frag. 160). Zeno, says Cicero (N. D. ii. 22), "similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem concludit hoc modo." "If tuneful flutes were produced from an olive should not we regard some knowledge of

\[\text{πολλά, ἐν οίς ἐλάχιστον ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν Στοιχείων} \]

in which passage Stein, Psychologie n. 2, finds evidence of "die Klarheit und Gediegenheit der Schriften Zenos."

1 In Cic. N. D. ii. 20 the Stoic claims that such arguments "apertiora sunt ad reprehendendum." Elsewhere Cicero calls them "contortulis quibusdam et minutis conclusiunculis nec ad sensum permanentibus." Tusc. ii. 42.


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flute-playing as inherent in the olive?” (frag. 63). In like manner he uses the simile of the minister in a royal court to explain his doctrine of the προηγμένον (frag. 131), and likens his ideal commonwealth to a herd grazing on a common pasture (frag. 162).

Not only in elaborate comparisons but also in single expressions may the same picturesque touch be seen. Thus character is said to be the fountain of life (frag. 146), emotion a fluttering of the soul (frag. 137), and happiness the unruffled flow of life (frag. 124).

It will be remembered that Cicero, or his authority, constantly taunts Zeno with being the inventor of new words, and new words only\(^1\). When scrutinised, this appears to mean not so much that he was a coiner of new expressions, as that for the purposes of his system he appropriated words already in existence as part of his special terminology. Putting aside προηγμένον and ἀποπροηγμένον, which stand on rather a different footing, we may instance προκοπή, ἐνάργεια, συγκατάθεσις, κατόρθωμα, κατάληψις, καθήκον, ἐννοιά(?) and τύπωσις: πρόληψις is certainly not due to Zeno. Yet, although none of these words are new coinages, κατάληψις and καθήκον are instances specially selected by Cicero in support of his statement.

Diog. Laert. x. 27 speaking of Chrysippus observes:—καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια τοσαίτα ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκείνων μόνων γέμειν τὰ βιβλία, καθάπερ καὶ παρὰ Ζήνων ἐστίν εὔρειν καὶ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει. The existing fragments however do not justify this assertion.

Finally, although doubtless the circumstances under which the fragments have been preserved render this tendency more noticeable than it otherwise would be, we shall not be wrong in attributing to Zeno a love of precise definition. The school afterwards became famous for their definitions (cf. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 205—212), and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the habit originated with the founder. Instances of this

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\(^1\) Cic. Fin. iii. 5. 15. Tusc. v. 32. 34. Legg. i. 38, etc. Cf. Galen de diff. puls. viii. 642 ed Kühn Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κίπτεως ἐτὶ πρότερον ἐτόλμησε κανονομεῖν τε καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν τὸ τῶν Ἐλλήνων θεὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.
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will occur passim. In fact, his writings in their general character were dogmatic and terse rather than discursive and polemical. The longest extract in the following pages is of dubious authenticity, and therefore for a specimen of the style of our author we would refer to the description of youthful modesty in frag. 174.

§ 6. Cleanthes.

In discussing the dates of Zeno's life we have seen that there is good reason to believe that Cleanthes was born in the year B.C. 331, and if so he was only five years younger than Zeno. We also saw that he lived to the age of 99 and presided over the Stoa for 32 years from B.C. 264 till his death in B.C. 232. Against this computation there is to be taken into account the fact that Diogenes (vii. 176) states that he lived to the age of 80 and was a pupil of Zeno for nineteen years. Unless we are prepared to reject the authority of the papyrus altogether, we have in Diogenes' account either a different tradition or a stupid blunder. In any case, Cleanthes was well advanced in life when he became head of the Stoic School.

He was born at Assos, a town in the Troad, but at what age he came to Athens or under what circumstances he became a pupil of Zeno we have no information. His circumstances were those of extreme poverty: he is said to have been a boxer before he embraced philosophy, and the story is well known how he earned his living by drawing water at night, in order to devote his daytime to study. Hence the nickname of Φρεώτλης was given to him by his opponents, while his friends in admiration of his laborious activity called him a "second Heracles." The man's mind is shadowed forth in these anecdotes: the same earnestness and thoroughness which

1 Rohde l. c. p. 622 n. 1 suggests that Diogenes subtracted the 19 years passed under Zeno's tuition from the years of his life, but this is hardly credible.

2 Diog. L. vii. 168.
characterised his life are no less apparent in his teaching. Whatever he did was marked by energy and completeness and was grounded on deeply-rooted conviction. Philosophy with him was not merely an intellectual exercise, but far more a religious enthusiasm. This religious fervour led him to regard the theological side of philosophy as of the highest importance, and, feeling that the praise of the divine majesty should be set forth in something higher than sober prose, his genius expressed itself in poetical compositions of the greatest merit. It is easy to believe that a man of this character may have proved an unsuccessful teacher, and there is some evidence that under his presidency the Stoic school was in danger of losing ground, cf. Diog. L. vii. 182 οὖτος (Chrysippus) οὐκεἰσθεῖς ἱπτο τινος ὅτι οὐχὶ παρὰ Ἀρίστων μετὰ πολλῶν σχολαζοῦ, εἰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, εἶπε, προσεῖχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφιλοσόφησα. His apparent want of success possibly stimulated the unfavourable estimate with which his written works were received by antiquity. The Stoa was now fiercely assailed by various opponents—its ethics by the Epicureans, and its logical theories by Arcesilas. Skill in controversy was more than ever needed, if the position won by Zeno’s efforts was to be maintained. Herein lay the special strength of Chrysippus, who was very probably employed in defending Stoicism during his predecessor’s life, and who surpassed Cleanthes in fineness and subtlety, even if he was inferior to him in depth. Most suggestive, in this view, becomes the passage in Diog. L. vii. 179 διηνέχθη (Chrysippus)...πρὸς Κλεάνθην ὑ καὶ πολλάκις ἐλέγε μόνης τῆς τῶν δογμάτων διδασκαλίας χρήζειν, τὰς

1 There is no direct evidence for this, but the whole of Diogenes’ account implies it.

2 Cf. Diog. L. vii. 182 πρὸς δὲ τῶν κατεξαιστάμενων Κλεάνθους διαλεκτικῶν, καὶ προτεινόντα αὐτῷ σοφίσματα, πέπαινο, εἶπε, παρέλκων τόν πρεσβυτέρον ἀπὸ τῶν πραγματικωτέρων, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς νεοῖς ταῦτα προτίθει.

3 So Hirzel π. 180 “Kleanthes war keine die Begriffe zergliedernde, sondern eine anschauende Natur, er war wohl minder rührig aber vielleicht tiefer angelegt als sein Schüler,” and Stein, Psychologie p. 171 “Kleanthes erscheint als der rauhschaalige, mihsam stammelnde, aber tiefe Denker, Chrysipp dagegen als der feinere, leichtbewegliche, elegant vermittelnde Schönredner.”
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δὲ ἀποδεῖξεις αὐτῶν εὑρήσειν. The anecdote leads us to infer that Chrysippus was conscious of a want of originality in himself, and a want of combative force in his master.

The position of Cleanthes among the early leaders of the Stoic school has quite recently been subject to a considerable modification in current opinion. He has been generally regarded as merely the exponent of his master's teaching, and as having contributed no new views of his own to the development of the system. This opinion is not without justification in the ancient authorities. Diogenes Laertius expressly asserts that Cleanthes adhered to the same tenets as his predecessor (vii. 168), and that he did not object to be called an ass, declaring that he was only able to bear Zeno's burden (ib. 170). This estimate of his powers was for some time acquiesced in by modern investigators, so that even Zeller says of him (p. 41):—"Cleanthes was in every way adapted to uphold his master's teaching, and to recommend it by the moral weight of his own character, but he was incapable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis" (see also Krische, Forschungen, pp. 417 and 418). Now however a reaction in his favour has set in, and from a closer scrutiny of the notices concerning him the opinion has been formed that "his contributions were more distinctive and original than those of any other Stoic" (Encycl. Brit. Art. Stoics). In a question of such importance it is singularly unfortunate that the hand of time has dealt so hardly with him, not only in the actual amount of the fragments which have been preserved to us, but also in their relative importance for his philosophic system. For one fragment of supreme value such as frag. 24 we have six or seven trifling etymologies of the names of the gods,

1 Hirzel has carried this view to an extreme, which the facts do not warrant. At p. 137 he curiously says:—"Da wir aber nichts unversucht lassen dürfen, um eine eigentümliche Lehre des Kleanthes herauszubringen." On the other hand, Windelband, writing as late as 1888, says of Cleanthes:—"als Philosoph ist er unbedeutend gewesen" (Müller's Handbuch, v. 292).
of so extravagant a character that it is hard to credit their seriousness. The happy chance that has preserved to us the Hymn to Zeus is counterbalanced by the consideration that we only know of his theory of tension through two or three passages.

Cleanthes divides philosophy into six branches, but in reality this is only the triple division of Zeno, logic being subdivided into dialectic and rhetoric, physics into physics and theology, and ethics into ethics and politics.

In his estimate of logic he resembles Zeno: at least it seems to have played only a subsidiary part in his system, judging both from the number of his recorded works on this subject (about 10 out of a total of 56) and from the insignificance of the fragments which remain. Four only are of any importance, and one of these, his criticism of the Platonic idea, is involved in such obscurity that it will be convenient to defer its consideration for the notes. As it is clear throughout all his teaching that Cleanthes was the most advanced materialist in the Stoic school, so we find that his epistemology rests on a still stronger empirical basis than that of his predecessor Zeno or his successor Chrysippus. Zeno had not defined φαντασία further than by describing it as an impression on the soul. Cleanthes explained this as an actual material concavity impressed by the object, an explanation which found no favour with Chrysippus. There is also high probability in the view which ascribes to Cleanthes the authorship of the "tabula rasa" theory, a theory made celebrated in modern philosophy owing to its adoption by Locke, namely, that when a man is born his mind is like a blank sheet of parchment ready to receive a copy. At least we know of no other Stoic philosopher to whom the introduction of this extreme result of sensualistic views so properly belongs. Since Chrysippus, in express opposition to Cleanthes, defined φαντασία as ἑτεροίωσις ἡγεμονικοῦ, it is less likely that he should have propounded a theory which in its very terms carries out the more materialistic doctrine of his opponent.
We have therefore, in accordance with Stein's view, included the passage of Plutarch, which attributes the doctrine to the Stoics in general, among the fragments of Cleanthes. Stein, however, goes further. Zeno had conceded this much to rationalism, that we derive directly from God the capacity for abstract thought, and that certain notions are the product of this potentiality when actualised by experience. In an ingenious and closely-reasoned argument, whose force it is difficult to reproduce within short limits, Stein contends that this position was thrown over by Cleanthes. According to the latter, the capacity given us by nature is solely that for moral and not for intellectual activity. The belief in God himself does not, as with Zeno, arise from a "cærta animi ratio" but rather from induction founded on empirical observation. The conclusion is that Cleanthes is a thorough-going advocate of empiricism. But a divergence from the rest of the school in a matter of such importance ought not to be assumed on mere inference resting on ambiguous statements, although were this doctrine explicitly ascribed to Cleanthes in a single passage we should not hesitate to accept it, as being in entire consonance with his general bent of mind. What then is the evidence which Stein produces apart from the passage of Cicero just referred to, which is by no means conclusive? In the first place he appeals to two passages which prove that moral impulses are transmitted to us from our parents and implanted in us by nature, and lays stress on the fact that intellectual powers are not included. This, however, is only negative evidence, and for positive proof we are referred to frags. 106 and 100; in the first of these we read that the uneducated differ from the brutes only in shape, and in the second that the undiscerning opinion of the many should be totally discarded. Surely these grounds are insufficient to support the conclusion:

1 Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 322-328.
2 Cleanth. frags. 82 and 36.
3 Cleanth. frag. 52. (Cic. N. D. ii. 13.)
Plato himself might have greeted these sentiments with approbation. But a more serious stumbling-block remains in the oft quoted passage from Diog. L. vii. 54. If, as Stein himself admits, Chrysippus substituted προληψις for the Zenonian ὀρθὸς λόγος, Cleanthes must of necessity be included in the term ἀρχαίστεροι τῶν Στωικῶν, for there is no one else to whom the words could apply. Were further positive evidence of Cleanthes' "concession to rationalism" required, it would surely be as reasonable to supply it from frag. 21 ψυχήν...ἡς μέρος μετέχοντας ήμᾶς ἐμφυχιόσθαι as to deduce the contrary from frags. 100 and 106. For these reasons we feel bound to withhold assent to Stein's hypothesis, until some weightier proof is put forward to support it.

Cleanthes was also involved in a controversy with reference to the sophism known as ὁ κυριεύων and first propounded by the Megarian Diodorus. This sophism was concerned with the nature of the possible; and Cleanthes tries to escape from the dilemma in which Diodorus would have involved him by denying that every past truth is necessary, or, in other words, by asserting that since that which is possible can never become impossible, it is possible for the past to have been otherwise, in the same way that it is possible for a future event to occur even though that event will never take place. Besides this we learn that he introduced the term λέκτον in the sense of κατηγόρημα, that he left definitions of art and rhetoric, and that he explained the names given to a certain kind of slippers and a drinking-cup.

The first five of the physical fragments need not detain us here, containing, as they do, with one exception, merely a restatement of positions already taken up by Zeno. The exception referred to is the introduction of πνεῦμα as the

1 Stein himself supplies the materials for his own refutation. At p. 267 in dealing with a similar question he says:—"Ohne Not sollte Niemand unter ἀρχαίστεροι andere Stoiker als Zeno Kleanthes und Chrysipp verstehen." Chrysippus is here excluded by the nature of the case: the inference need not be stated.

2 See Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 327.
truest description of the divine permeating essence, which Zeno had characterised as aether. With frag. 17 however we are on a different footing. Cleanthes teaches, according to Cicero’s account, that the world is God, and it is significant that, although the same doctrine is attributed by him to Chrysippus (N. D. i. 39), no such statement is found with regard to Zeno (ib. 36). Zeno had indeed declared that God permeates every part of the universe: would he have gone so far as to identify the universe with God? It is true that we find among his fragments (frag. 66) οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, but this is not conclusive. Not only the general cast of the expression, but also the addition of the words καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν, make us hesitate to ascribe to these words their full pantheistic sense. However, even if Cleanthes was not following in his master’s footsteps, he was only carrying Zeno’s teaching to its logical conclusion. The dualism of God and Matter was inconsistent in a materialistic system. But Cleanthes went further. Teaching that God creates the world through the medium of the four elements\(^1\), and teaching that these elements themselves do not remain stable but are in a restless and continual mutation, he was led to search for the cause of this ceaseless movement. The question may be put in another form, why did God create the world? The answer was found in a comparison of the structure of individual things. Every creature is produced at the proper time by means of certain proportions of the soul’s parts, which are found in the seed. The soul, however, is material and is braced up by that tension which is elsewhere described as “a stroke of fire.” This tension is ever varying and is the cause of movement in the human frame. Now, since the individual is a pattern of the universe\(^2\), the cause of movement in the cosmos must be the tension which permeates all its parts.

\(^1\) Not three in spite of Hirzel’s Excursus ii. 737—755. See Stein, Psychologie p. 113.

\(^2\) This is probably the meaning of 1. 4 in the Hymn to Zeus, where see note. For the doctrine of the macrocosm and the microcosm in general see Stein’s Appendix to Psych. pp. 205—214.
Thus the phenomenal world is created and again destroyed by the successive phases in the ever varying tension of the fiery breath, which is at once identified with God and with the universe.  

As the ἤγεμονικόν of the human soul is placed in the breast, so did Cleanthes teach that the ruling part of the world is in the sun, to which is due day and night and the seasons of the year. He was led to this opinion by his investigations in natural science. Observing that nothing can exist without warmth, he inferred that warmth constitutes the essence of things. Since however warmth is given to the whole world and to each individual thing from the sun, the sun must be the ἤγεμονικόν of the world. In the sun is the fiery breath found in its purest form, and at the conflagration, when the world is destroyed, the sun will assimilate to itself moon and stars and all the heavenly bodies. If Aristarchus therefore taught that the earth revolves round the sun, he was guilty of impiety for displacing the earth, which is the hearth of the world. The sun is fed by exhalations from the sea, and moves in an oblique course through the zodiac. The stars are formed of the same fiery substance as the sun, and, as the sun is the cause of life to everything, its essence must be akin not to the earthly fire, which is destructive, but to the creative. As the sun strikes the world with his rays, he is called a plectrum. Sun, moon, and stars are alike conical in shape.

Cleanthes proved that the soul is material by two syllogistic arguments, founded on the mental resemblance between parents and children and the sympathy of the soul with the body. So far indeed did his materialism extend that he even maintained that the act of walking was the extension of πνεῖμα from the ἤγεμονικόν to the feet. In other respects he seems to have concurred in Zeno's psychology, teaching that the
reasoning powers are developed by external impressions, and
that all souls exist after death till the time of the general con-
flagration. His views on zoology comprise a statement that
the pig was provided with a soul to keep him fresh for sacrifice
and a curious anecdote proving the intelligence of ants.

To the theological branch of physics Cleanthes devoted
considerable attention, but in practice no sharp dividing line
can be drawn between physics and religion, since in the Stoic
system they necessarily overlap. It is hardly necessary to
analyse the Hymn to Zeus, but it may be observed that
Cleanthes refuses to admit that evil is due to the divine
agency, a remark which must be taken in connection with the
statement of Chalcidius that, while Chrysippus identified fate
with forethought, Cleanthes distinguished them. Five dis-
tinct reasons are given for the existence of God:—(1) the
ascending series of organisms from plants to man, which
shows that there must be some being who is best of all, and
this cannot be man with all his imperfections and frailties,
(2) the foreknowledge of coming events, (3) the fruitfulness
of the earth and other natural blessings, (4) the occurrence of
portents outside the ordinary course of nature, and (5) the
regular movements of the heavenly bodies. Zeus i.e. ν' ἀειων
is the only eternal god; the rest are perishable and
will be destroyed at the κτισματεύρωσις. The popular religion is a
representation of truth, but requires interpretation if we
would understand its real significance. Thus, the Eleusinian
mysteries are an allegory; Homer, if properly understood, is a
witness to truth; the very names given to Zeus, Persephone,
Dionysus, Apollo, and Aphrodite are indications of the hidden
meaning which is veiled but not perverted by the current
belief, and the same is true of the myths of Heracles and
Atlas. It is difficult now-a-days to enter into the spirit with
which the Stoic school pursued these etymological fancies.
At times it is hard not to acquiesce in Plutarch's opinion (see

1 Cic. N. D. ii. 63, iii. 63.
frag. 55), who attributes them to παιδία and εἰρωνεία. But, if this is so; it is impossible to account for the extreme diligence, which was expended upon them. Rather, having once taken up the position that the popular belief can only be explained by Stoic methods, they were often driven to defend it by arguments which they must themselves have perceived to be of questionable validity. For example, Cleanthes may not have been satisfied with the derivation of Dionysus from διανύσαι, but his explanation could not be disproved, and he was bound to explain the name somehow, since, so long as it remained unexplained, it was a standing objection to his method.¹

The number of ethical works attributed to Cleanthes, 32 out of a total of 56, shows that he paid considerable attention to this branch of philosophy. Yet, in the main, he seems to have accepted the principles laid down by Zeno, except in those cases where his physical innovations demanded a separate treatment, and many of the fragments which have come down to us deal rather with the practical than with the theoretical side of morals. This agrees with what we are told as to the titles of his books (see infra, p. 52). Defining the aim of life and happiness in the same manner as Zeno, Cleanthes laid special stress on the agreement with the general law of nature, while Chrysippus is said to have emphasised the necessity for agreement with human nature no less than with nature in general. This view is thoroughly in consonance with the general bias of Cleanthes' teaching. One of the most striking and important of his doctrines is the parallelism between the macrocosm of the world and the microcosm of the individual. The more, therefore, that man brings himself into harmony with the spirit which breathes throughout the universe, the more does he fulfil the rôle to which he is destined. The same spirit may be traced in the

¹ The etymologies of Plato in the Cratylus are quite as bad as any of these, but they are professedly in part at least playful. The most recent exposition of this dialogue is by Mr Heath in the Journal of Philology xvii. 192.
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lines in which the subordination of the individual to the decrees of Zeus and of destiny is so forcibly advocated. Cleanthes is perhaps the author of a distinction which subsequently became of some importance whereby happiness is described as σκόπος, and the attainment of happiness as τέλος.

The doctrine of τόνος was applied by Cleanthes, with important results, to two branches of his master’s ethical system, namely, the nature of virtue and the emotions. Zeno had identified virtue with φρόνησις, but Cleanthes, while retaining the intellectual basis which Zeno made the groundwork of virtue, sought to explain its character more precisely. Again he had recourse to his physical theories. Every body contains within it a material air-current with ever-varying tension. When this tension is strong enough to perform its fitting duties it is regarded as strength and power, and this strength and power as applied to different spheres of activity gives rise to the four virtues ἐγκράτεια, ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, and σωφροσύνη. It will be observed that ἐγκράτεια here occupies the position which by Chrysippus and his followers is assigned to φρόνησις. Thus Cleanthes fortifies his main position, that strength of tension is the necessary starting-point of virtue, by a tacit appeal to the authority of Socrates, who had pointed to ἐγκράτεια as κρητὶς ἀρετῆς. A recurrence to the same teacher may also be recognised in the approbation with which his identification of τὸ συμφέρον with τὸ δίκαιον is cited. To return to τόνος; when the tension is relaxed, a weakness of soul follows, and in this weakness is to be found the explanation of the πάθη. Thus the essence of virtue and emotion, which Zeno had left unexplained on the physical side, is traced to a single source, and this source is the same power which is the origin of all movement and life.

The application of τόνος to the πάθη leads us to the consideration of another question, not indeed directly raised by the fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, but having an important

1 See however Hirzel ii. p. 557.
bearing on our general view of their ethical doctrines. What position do the πάθη occupy in the classification of goods? Zeno classified ἱδονή and therefore presumably the other πάθη among the αἵδιάφορα, and the reason is not far to seek. He regarded πάθη as distinct from vice, because they have nothing to do with ignorance (Plut. Virt. Mor. 10 τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὐ φασί γέννεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀμαρτητικόν). Only κακία or τὸ μέτεχον κακίας is κακὸν, according to Zeno, and πάθος is neither, but rather an ἐπιγέννημα. (Cf. τὰ ἐπιγεγνόμενα κρίσεων Zeno frag. 139 and for the distinction between ἐπιγεγνήμουτα and μετέχοντα cf. Diog. L. v. 95.) That this applies to all the πάθη and not merely to ἱδονή is made clear by the following considerations. In frag. 169 Zeno recommends the rational use of wealth ὅπως ἄδεις καὶ ἀθαύμαστον πρὸς τὰλλα τὴν διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοντες ὅσα μῆτε καλὰ ἐστὶ μῆτε αἰσχρὰ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν όσ ἐπὶ πολὺ χρῶνται τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων μηδέν δεδοκότες λίγω καὶ μὴ φόβῳ τούτων ἀπέχωνται. This shows that the ἀδίάφορα are the field of φόβος, and for λίπη we may refer to Cic. Tusc. iii. 77 nihil enim esse malum quod turpe non sit si hujenti persuaseris...et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur. It is noteworthy, moreover, that Cleanthes, who is allowed to have been the severest opponent of pleasure¹, declares ἱδονήν μῆτε κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι μῆτε αξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ (frag. 88) but does not venture to class it as κακὸν. The result of this discussion is that Zeno and Cleanthes did not class λίπη and φόβος with κακά, and therefore Wachsmuth cannot be right in attributing to Zeno a passage in Stobaeus² where this classification is implied.

¹ Zeller, Stoics p. 237. The remarks in the text are intended to obviate the difficulty as to the classification of ἱδονή suggested by Heinze, de Stoicorum affectibus p. 37.
² See Wachsmuth’s Stobaeus vol. ii. p. 58. That this question was much debated appears from Cic. Tusc. iv. 29. Some appear to have held that πάθος was κακὸν but not κακία (Stob. 1. c.), because πάθος is κίνησις but κακία is διάθεσις (Cic. 1. c. 30).
That this view did not continue to be the orthodox view of the school after their time is possible, but to pursue the subject further would be foreign to our purpose.

The uncorrupted impulses given by nature tend towards virtue, and, when they are suitably developed, wisdom founded on firm apprehension, so that it can never be lost, follows in due course. Secure in the possession of virtue, the wise man partakes of the same excellence as God.

In the treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς Cleanthes seems to have engaged in a spirited controversy with the Epicureans, and to have attacked their moral teaching, just as he perhaps assailed their physics in the work περὶ ἀτόμων. Pleasure is a mere useless ornament: it possesses no value whatever, nay, it is absolutely contrary to nature. If, as we are told, pleasure is the ultimate goal of life, it was an evil spirit which gave to mankind the faculty of wisdom. He sarcastically likened his opponents' position to an imaginary picture in which Pleasure, seated on a throne in gaudy apparel, is ministered to by the virtues, who form her willing slaves, declaring that this service is the sole reason of their existence.

Passing to those fragments, which seem more strictly to belong to the παραπετεικὸς or υποθετικὸς τόπος (i.e. the region of applied morals), we notice that Cleanthes frequently refers his precepts to the general principle, which is a leading characteristic of Stoic morals, namely, that virtuous conduct depends not on the nature of the deed but on the disposition of the agent. The same action may be either vicious or virtuous, according to the motive which prompts its performance. To many of the subjects which fall under this branch separate treatises were devoted, among which are the books περὶ εὐβουλίας, περὶ χάριτος, περὶ φθονερίας, περὶ τιμῆς, περὶ δόξης, περὶ φιλίας, περὶ συμποσίων κ.τ.λ. To the book περὶ χάριτος we may assign three of the extant fragments (frags. 97, 98, 99) all of which are preserved by Seneca in the de Beneficiis. The theory of consolation (frags. 93 and 94) may belong either to the περὶ ἀρωγῆς or the περὶ φιλίας. Frags. 100 - 103 all in
verse and one in hexameter metre ought to be referred to the περὶ δόξης.

One solitary fragment attests the political studies of Cleanthes, to which at least four of the works in the catalogue must be referred.

The result of our investigation has been to show conclusively that all those doctrines which are most characteristic of the true essence of Stoicism were contributed by Zeno and Cleanthes. To Zeno belong the establishment of the logical criterion, the adaptation of Heraclitean physics, and the introduction of all the leading ethical tenets. Cleanthes revolutionised the study of physics by the theory of tension, and the development of pantheism, and by applying his materialistic views to logic and ethics brought into strong light the mutual interdependence of the three branches. The task of Chrysippus was to preserve rather than to originate, to reconcile inconsistencies, to remove superfluous outgrowths, and to maintain an unbroken line of defence against his adversaries. Although it might seem to many that this less ambitious rôle requires less brilliant capacities in its performer, yet Chrysippus was commonly regarded as the second founder of the Stoa, and the general opinion of his contemporaries is aptly summed up in the line εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἢν Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἄν ἢν Στοά (Diog. L. vii. 183). The reason of this has been already indicated. The extraordinary fertility of the writer commanded admiration even where it failed to win assent, nor was his dialectical skill (Diog. L. vii. 180) a matter of small moment. Though logic was only the propaedeutic of philosophy, it was the battleground of the fiercest controversy. Vitally opposed in other respects, Epicureans and Stoics here at least were allied in maintaining the possibility of knowledge against the universal scepticism of the New Academy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the foremost champion of dogmatism should have taken the highest place in the Stoic triad.
§ 7. The writings of Cleanthes.

The relation of the poetical to the prose writings of Cleanthes has not been accurately determined, and the evidence does not enable us to decide whether the former were published separately from, or in conjunction with the latter. The only indication we possess is in frag. 49, in which Cleanthes describes poetry as being peculiarly adapted to theological subjects. Yet the only book in the catalogue with a distinctively theological title is the work περὶ θεῶν, and there is direct evidence that this contained etymological explanations of the names of the gods, and that part of it, at any rate, was written in prose. Kríshe p. 422 supposes that the Hymn to Zeus was a poetical supplement incorporated with this treatise, but such treatment would surely have produced highly incongruous results. It is possible that we ought to separate Cleanthes the philosopher from Cleanthes the poet, and to infer that works published by him in the latter capacity were not included in the list of his philosophical treatises. At the same time we should remember that Chrysippus (Galen. plac. Hipp. et Plat. p. 315) and Posidonius (ib. p. 399 ῥήσεις τε ποιητικάς παραπληθεὶς καὶ ἱστορίας παλαῖων πραξεων μαρτυροῦσας ὁς λέγει) were accustomed to freely interpolate poetical quotations in their prose writings, and Cleanthes may have composed his ʿown florilegia, just as Cicero translated from the Greek where the Latin poets failed him (Tusc. D. ii. 26). A catalogue of the titles known to us is subjoined; where not otherwise indicated, the source of reference is Diog. L. vii. 174, 175.

I. Logical.

(1) περὶ ἰδίων. For ἰδια cf. Ar. Top. i. 5, p. 102 a 17: the essential attributes of a thing are its ἰδια: thus γραμματικῆς δεκτικός is an ἰδιον of man.
(2) περὶ τῶν ἀπορῶν.
(3) περὶ διαλεκτικῆς.

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(4) περὶ τρόπων. Probably this is logical rather than rhetorical.

(5) περὶ κατηγορημάτων. To this book may be referred frag. 7.

(6) περὶ μεταλήψεως (Athen. xi. 467 d, 471 b).

(7) περὶ τοῦ κυριεύοντος (Arr. Epict. II. 19. 9). Krische p. 427 n. gives to this work the title περὶ δυνατῶν, but Epict. distinctly contrasts Chrysippus' work bearing the general title with a treatise by Cleanthes on the particular fallacy (Κλεάνθης δ' ἵδια γέγραφε περὶ τούτου), Wachsmuth, Comm. i. p. 18.

(8) περὶ τέχνης may be the same work as the ars rhetorica mentioned in Cic. Fin. iv. 3, but if so it is out of its place in the catalogue, where it appears between nos. 4 and 5 of the physical books.

(9) περὶ τοῦ λόγου γ'. This and the following book appear in the catalogue among the ethical works.

(10) περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 722, counts among the logical works the books περὶ χρόνου περὶ αἰσθήσεως and περὶ δόξης, but omits, probably by an oversight, the book περὶ τρόπων. He also observes that from the number of books treating of the theory of knowledge Cleanthes must have displayed more activity in treating of the subject than the remaining fragments would lead us to suppose.

II. Physical.

(1) περὶ χρόνου.

(2) περὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας β'.

(3) τῶν Ἦρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεων δ'. Cf. Diog. L. ix. 15 πλείστοι τε εἰσίν ὅσοι ἐξήγησαν αὐτοῦ τὸ σύγγραμμα. καὶ γὰρ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Ἦρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς Κλεάνθης τε καὶ Σφαῖρος ὁ Στωκός. The influence of Heraclitus on Cleanthes has been variously estimated. Hirzel is the chief advocate in favour of it, holding e.g. that Cleanthes agreed with him in his hypo-
thesis of three elements, and that τὸνος is traceable to παλίν-
τονος (or παλιντροπος) ἄρμονις. Stein's more moderate estimate
appears to us truer.

(4) περὶ αἰσθήσεως.
(5) πρὸς Δημόκριτον, perhaps the same as περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων
(Diog. L. vii. 134) so Krische p. 430.
(6) πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον, see on frag. 27. Some have erro-
neously supposed that the Aristarchus here referred to was
the Homeric critic, whose date is a century later than
Cleanthes; cf. Krische p. 394 and Wilamowitz-Moellendorf in
Hermes xx. 631.
(7) ὑπομνήματα φυσικά (Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 8).
The books next in order treat of θεολογικόν.
(8) ἄρχαιολογία has been identified with μυθικά (Athen.
xiii. 572 e, Porphyry. vit. Pyth. c. 1), but the genuineness of the
latter work is seriously questioned. Müller frag. hist. Gr. ii.
p. 5. 9. 11 thinks that the τὰ κατὰ πόλιν μυθικά of Neanthes
of Cyzicus (cf. Plut. quaest. syrup. i. 10) is referred to in both
passages and Zeller Pre-Socr. i. p. 308 says:—The Cleanthes
of Porphyry is certainly not the Stoic but most likely a mis-
spelling for Neanthes of Cyzicus.
(9) περὶ θεῶν, cf. Plut. de vit. aer. alien. c. 7. To this
work Wachsmuth refers frags. 47. 54. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.
62. 63. Krische (p. 418, 422) also the statements in Cic.
N. D. i. 37 (frags. 14—17) and the hymn to Zeus (frag. 48).
See also Osann Praef. Cornut. p. ix.
(10) περὶ γυγάντων.
(11) περὶ Ὑμεταιῶν. This is a curious title. Perhaps it
should rather be classed as ethical. Cf. Persaeus' book περὶ
γάμου (Diog. L. vii. 36).
(12) περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ. This book treated of the inter-
pretation of Homer, and Wachsmuth accordingly refers to it
frags. 55. 65. 66. 67. To these should be added frag. 63 and
perhaps frag. 54.
(13) θεομαχία (ps.-Plut. de Fluv. v. 3. 4) was identified
by Krische with the book περὶ γυγάντων supra (p. 434) but this
and the next book are rightly described by Wachsmuth as “ficta ab impostore ps.-Plutarcho,” see note on frag. 69.

(14) περὶ ὑπότων, ib. v. 17. 4.

Fabricius Bibl. Gr. iii. p. 552 infers from Simplic. in Epict. Man. c. 78 that one of Cleanthes’ works bore the title Ἰαμβεῖα, but the words simply mean “in his well known Iambic lines.”

III. Ethical.

(1) πρὸς Ἡριλλον. For Herillus see Zeller p. 42.
(2) περὶ ὀρμῆς β’.
(3) περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος γ’.
(4) περὶ εὐβουλίας.
(5) περὶ χάριτος.
(7) περὶ ἀρετῶν.
(8) περὶ εὐφυίας.
(9) περὶ Γοργιπποῦ “num πρὸς Γοργιπποῦ qui idem fuerit atque Γοργιππίδης ad quem complura scripta Chrysippus misit?” Wachsm. Mohnike p. 100 wishes to read Γοργιππίδου.
(10) περὶ φθονερίας.
(11) περὶ ἐρωτῶς. Here belongs perhaps frag. 108.
(12) περὶ ἐλευθερίας.
(13) ἐρωτική τέχνη.
(14) περὶ τιμῆς.
(15) περὶ δόξης.
(17) περὶ βουλῆς.
(18) περὶ νόμων.
(19) περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν.
(20) περὶ ἀρωγῆς.
(21) περὶ τέλους.
(22) περὶ καλῶν.
(23) περὶ πράξεων.
(24) περὶ βασιλείας.
(25) περὶ φιλίας.
(26) περὶ συμποσίων. Persaeus wrote συμποσικά ύπομνήματα or διάλογοι (Athen. iv. 162 b, xiii. 607 a).
(28) περὶ τοῦ τῶν σοφῶν σοφιστεύειν.
(29) περὶ χρειῶν.
(30) διατριβῶν β’.
(31) περὶ ἔδονῆς. For this book see Krische p. 430 foll.
(32) περὶ χαλκοῦ (Diog. L. vii. 14). The title of this book has been much discussed. It was altered to περὶ χάριτος by Casaubon, to περὶ χρόνον by Menagius, Fabricius and Mohrines, and to περὶ χρειῶν by Wachsmuth. It is possible that χαλκοῦ is due to the scribe’s eye catching the word χαλκόν which closely precedes in the citation, and, if so, we have no clue to the true title.
(33) περὶ στοάς. This book is supposed to have existed from a mutilated passage of Philodemus περὶ φιλοσόφων in vol. Here. viii. col. 13 v. 18 ως αἱ τ’ ἀναγραφαὶ τῶν π(ερί)νάκων (αἱ)τε βιβλιοθήκαι σημαίνουσιν, (παρὰ Κλ)εύνθη ἐν τῷ περὶ στοάς εἰ στὸν Διογένους αὐτὴ ἡ μνήμη.
1. Diog. L. vii. 39, τριμερή φασίν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ
φιλοσοφίαν λόγον. εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τί φυσικὸν· τὸ
dὲ ἡθικὸν· τὸ δὲ λογικὸν. οὐτω δὲ πρῶτος διείλε Ζήνων ὁ
Κατεύχει ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου.

The triple division of philosophy was first brought into
prominence by Zeno and the Stoics, though it seems to
have been adopted before them by Xenocrates and the
de...οί εἰσποτες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τί εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ
dὲ ἡθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικὸν δὲν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτωνν ἐστὶν
ἀρχηγὸς, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἡθικῶν οὐκ
ὁλιγον δὲ λογικῶν διαλεκτικῶν· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν
Ἐνοκράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἐτί δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς
στοᾶς ἔχουτε τῆς ἐν τῆς διαιρέσεως. Ar. Top. i. p. 105 b 19
ἐστὶ δ' ὡς τύπῳ περιλάβειν τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προ-
βλημάτων μέρη τρία· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν, αἱ
dὲ φυσικαὶ, αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ must not be taken as indicating
that Aristotle had in view the triple division (see Waitz in
loc.). Cicero speaking of Speusippus, Aristotle, Xenocrates,
Polemo, and Theophrastus says (de Fin. iv. 4):—totam
philosophiam tres in partes disserunt, quam partitionem
a Zenone esse retentam videmus. In Acad. i. 19 he wrongly
attributes the division to Plato (fuit ergo jam accepta a
Platone philosophandi ratio triplex): Diog. L. iii. 56 only
says that Plato introduced the διαλεκτικὸς τόπος, not that
he recognised the triple division. With the Stoics it became so fundamental that they did not hesitate to refer to it the three heads of Cerberus and Athene’s name Τριτογένεια (Zeller, pp. 363, 364). Hirzel (de logica Stoicorum in Sauppe’s Satura Philologa, p. 71) thinks that Zeno was the inventor of the term λογική in place of Xenocrates’ διαλεκτική.

2. Diog. L. vii. 40, ἄλλοι δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τὸ λογικὸν τάττοσαί; δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν; καὶ τρίτον τὸ θεωρικὸν. ὃν ἐστὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου.

As logic is obviously the least important to the Stoics of the three divisions, Zeno regarded Ethics, not Physics, as the kernel of his system. The authorities are however very confusing on this point, for of Chrysippus, who is coupled with Zeno in Diog., Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, 1 says:—τούτων (μερών) δειν τάττεσθαι πρῶτον μὲν τὰ λογικά, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ θεωρικά, τρίτα δὲ τὰ φυσικά—and yet in the same passage we find attributed to Chrysippus the statement οὔδ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἐνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὕσης ἡ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἡ κακῶν διάστασιν, which shows that he must have regarded ethics as containing the consummation of philosophy. Again, the Stoics compared the three parts of philosophy to a fruit garden surrounded by a wall and also to an egg, but whereas according to Diog. (vii. 40) physics are likened to the fruit of the garden and the yolk of the egg, in Sextus (adv. Math. vii. 17—19) they are compared to the trees in the garden and the white of the egg, having changed places with ethics. But both alike in recording the comparison, which Posidonius thought more apt, yield the place of honour to ethics, which are compared to the soul of man. It is not improbable, as Wellmann and Stein (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 302) think, that the two former of
these similes may be due to Zeno, on whose fondness for such similes we have remarked in the Introd. p. 33, but there is no evidence to decide. The confusion about the whole matter seems to have arisen from the distinction made by the Stoics between the order of relative importance and the order of teaching (cf. Sext. l. c. 22, 23). At any rate, as regards Zeno, it is most natural to suppose that the pupil of Crates and the admirer of Socrates placed ethics in the forefront of his system. [Ritter and Preller, § 390 n. and Ueberweg, p. 192 apparently regard as the earlier view that which gave physics the most important position, but see Stein, Psychologie n. 7.]

LOGICA.

3. Arr. Epict. diss. iv. 8, 12, θεωρήματα τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ...ἐπὶ Ζήνου λέγει γνώναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ποιῶν τι ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς ἀρμόττεται πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ ὅσα τούτως ἄκολουθά ἐστὶ.

It is difficult, in the absence of Zeno’s context, to decide the exact meaning of τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα. There is no doubt that the Stoics used this phrase in the sense of “parts of speech” (Diog. vii. 58 ῥήμα δὲ ἐστὶ...στοιχεῖον λόγου ἀπτωτον), but this meaning is not general enough and is certainly excluded by the words immediately preceding in Epictetus τί τέλος; μὴ τι φορεῖν τρίβωνα; οὐ, ἄλλα τὸ ὀρθὸν ἐχεῖν τὸν λόγον. It is suggested, therefore, that Zeno is here expressing, possibly in an earlier work, the nominalism of Antisthenes and that λόγον στοιχεῖα = the (indefinable) elements of definition. It is now generally admitted (see e.g. Dr Jackson in Journ. Phil. xiii. 262) that the opinion stated at some length by Socrates in Theaet. p. 201 E—202 c is that of Antisthenes, and the words στοιχεῖον and λόγος in this sense must have belonged to his terminology (see the
whole passage and especially τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἰονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα...λόγον οὐκ ἔχει 201 ἔ, οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἀλογα καὶ ἄγνωτα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δὲ, cf. 206 ἔ τὸ ἔρωτηθέντα τί ἐκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ: with this should be compared the passages in Ar. Metaph. viii. 3. 1043 b 23, xiv. 3. 1091 ἁ 7 ὡστ’ οὐσίας ἔστι μεν ἤς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὠρον καὶ λόγον οἶον τῆς συνθέτου εἰών τε αἰσθητή ἐάν τε νοητή ἕξ ὑν δ’ αὕτη πρῶτων οὐκ ἔστιν. It is not a necessary inference from this passage that Zeno treated ὀρθὸς λόγος as κριτήριον ἀληθείας, or that he and Cleanthes are the ἀλλοι τίνες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν whom Diogenes (vii. 54) mentions as holding this opinion, although Hirzel thinks this established, comparing frag. 157 (Untersuchungen, π. pp. 14 f. 23). Indeed it is difficult to understand how, except on the hypothesis of a change of opinion, this is reconcilable with the fact that Zeno introduced the φαντασία καταληπτική, as will appear hereafter. Hirzel further remarks:—"Unter den τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τίνες des Alexand. Aphrod. zur Topik (schol. Arist. p. 256 b 14) welche den λόγος durch τί ἤν definirten könnte Zenon gemeint sein." The latter part of this note requires some modification if Stein's view referred to in the Introd. p. 9 be accepted. The same writer (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 90, 91) explains γνώναι τὰ τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα as "die Erkenntnis der Elemente des Denkens d. h. wie das Denken beschaffen sei und worin die gegenseitige Verbindung der Gedanken bestehe und welche Konsequenzen sich aus dieser Gedankenverbindung ergeben."

4. Arr. Epict. diss. i. 17. 10, 11, καὶ τὰ λογικὰ ἀκαρπὰ ἐστὶ...καὶ περὶ τούτου μὲν ὡφόμεθα, εἰ δ’ οὖν καὶ τούτο δοίῃ τις, ἐκείνα ἀπαρκεῖ, ὅτι τῶν ἀλλων ἐστὶ
diakritikà kai épiskopeutikà kai ós ēn tis eîpoi metrē-
tikà kai stathkà: tis légei taûta; mûnous Xrûsîppos
kai Zήnou kai Klaîavthòs;

This and the two following fragments show us the
view which Zeno took of the value of logical studies,
which were recommended not so much on account of the
value of the results obtained, as because they enable us to
test the theories and expose the fallacies of others and to
clear the ground for further enquiries, cf. Ar. Top. i. 104
b 1 τούτο δ' ἔδιων ἡ μάλιστα οἰκείων τῆς διαλεκτικῆς
ἐστίν: ἐξεταστικῆ γὰρ οὕσα πρὸς τὰς ἀπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων
ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει, cf. also the title ὀργανὸν given to
Aristotle's logical treatises (Waitz Π. 294) and the name
κανονική) adopted by the Epicureans. For the distinction
between the Peripatetic and Stoic views of logic see
Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 207. Hirzel's remarks about
Zeno (de log. Stoic. p. 72) do not take into account this
evidence.

στατικά, "weighing." The word is used by Plato, cf.
Phileb. 55 E οἰνον πασῶν ποιο τεχνῶν ἀν τις ἀριθμητικῆν
χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικῆν καὶ στατικῆν, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν.
Charmid. 166 B.

LXXXII. 5], Ζήνων τὰς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν τέχνας εἰκαζε τοῖς
dikaiow métrois ou πυρῶν οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν σπουδαίων
μετροῦσιν ἄλλ' ἄχυρα καὶ κόπρια.

At first sight this and the next fragm. appear con-
tradictory, but probably this is directed against some
particular opponents. The Megarians, the Eristics of this
period, are most likely to be meant, and we know that
they were often called διαλεκτικοί, as the Stoics them-
selves are by Sextus (Zeller, Socrates etc. p. 250 n. 3).
Moreover Aleximus was a determined opponent of Zeno
(Diog. II. 109 διεφέρετο δὲ μάλιστα πρὸς Ζήνωνα) and Sextus tells us how he controverted Zeno's proof that the world is λογικός (Math. ix. 107). Stein thinks that the inconsistency is to be explained by the importance attributed by Zeno to the question of the criterion (Erkenntnistheorie, p. 303), but surely διαλεκτικῶν in frag. 5 and διαλεκτικῆν in frag. 6 must refer to the same branch of logic. The explanation is however perfectly valid to explain the difference of statement between Cic. Fin. iv. 9 and id. Acad. i. 40. τέχνας = treatises.

δικαίως: so the three best mss AM and S: εἰκαίως adopted by Mein. from ms B (late and untrustworthy) is virtually a conjecture. Wachsm. suggests χιδαίως but, on the interpretation given above, δικαίως is more forcible: the methods are good enough (cf. μετρητικά frag. 4) but they are put to base uses, i.e. to mere quibbling. After μέτροις Gaisf. add. οἰς.

If the fragment be interpreted quite generally as a depreciation of logical studies, we have here an approximation to the position of Aristo (Stob. Ecl. ii. 2. 14, 18, 22 = Floril. lxxxii. 7, 11, 18) in one of the points on which he severed himself from the Stoic school.


σοφίσματα, cf. the anecdote related by Diog. vii. 25.
A logician showed Zeno seven διαλεκτικαὶ ἰδέαι in the Reaper fallacy, and received 200 drachmas, although his fee was only half that amount, ib. vii. 47 οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ

For the use of τύπωσις see Introd. p. 34. That Zeno did not define his meaning further than by the bare statement is evident from the controversy which afterwards arose between Cleanthes and Chrysippus as to the exact meaning of τύπωσις: for which see on Cleanth. frag. 3. It would seem however from the expressions “efficitum” and “impressum” in Zeno’s definition of fantasia καταληπτική (frag. 11) that Cleanthes is a truer exponent of his master’s teaching in this matter than Chrysippus. Zeno must have been influenced by Aristotle’s treatment of fantasia (de An. iii. 3): see Introd. p. 24. See further Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 157.

8. *τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ἀλήθεις τῶν ἐν τῇ ὑμνήματι τὰς μὲν ἀλήθεις τὰς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. *This is attributed to the Stoics generally by Stob. Ecl. i. 50. 21, Plut. plac. iv. 8. 9, but must belong to Zeno having regard to Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 355. Δημόκριτος μὲν πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ὑπαρξίν κεκινήκεν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ἔλεξε βέβαιον εἶναι ὁ δὲ Στωικὸς Ζήνων διαιρέσει ἔχρητο; Cic.
N. D. i. 70 urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret quae sensibus viderentur; Zeno autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia; Cic. Acad. i. 41 visis non omnibus adjungebat fidem.

Zeno is not entirely a sensualist: Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 307. For the general doctrine see ib. p. 142—151. Zeno is here again following the lead of Aristotle, cf. de An. iii. 3. 7 είτα αἱ μὲν (scil. αἰσθήσεις) ἀληθεῖς εἰ, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ἡγεῖσ. On the other hand Epicurus held πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι (Sext. Math. vii. 204).

9. Cic. Acad. i. 41, (Zeno) adjungebat fidem...iis (visis) solum, quae proprium quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quae viderentur.

Cicero is here speaking of the Greek ἐνάργεια, for which he elsewhere suggests as translations perspicuitas or evidentia (ib. ii. 17). Every sense impression is ἑνάργεια according to the Epicureans (Zeller, p. 428), but with Zeno ἐνάργεια is simply introduced as an attribute of καταληπτικὴ φαντασία: cf. Sext. Math. vii. 257 speaking of the κ. φ. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἑνάργης οὐσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν λαμβάνεται καταστῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτειν ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράν ύποβάλλειν. Hirzel (Untersuchungen, ii. pp. 3, 6) attributes ἑνάργεια to the Cynics but his authorities merely show that Diogenes proved the possibility of motion by walking about (Diog. vi. 39), which Sextus (Math. x. 68) calls a proof δι’ αὐτῆς τής ἑνάργειας.

10. Sext. Math. vii. 253, ἄλλα γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιοτεροί τῶν Στωικῶν κριτήριον φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τῆν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ib. 227 κριτήριον ἀληθείας εἶναι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. This is to be at-
tributed to Zeno partly as an inference from the word ἀρχαιότεροι, partly as a necessary corollary from the next fragment, and partly in accordance with the testimony of Cic. Acad. I. 42 sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam (κατάληψις) quam dixi collocabat eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat sed soli credendum esse dicebat. Diog. L. vii. 46 refers the citation to the school generally and in 54 quotes it from Chrysippus ἐν τῇ δυσδεκάτῃ τῶν φύσικῶν.

For the doctrine of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία see Zeller, pp. 87—89. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 167 foll. Four different explanations of the meaning of the term have been given (1) καταλ. active. The irresistible character of the impression compels assent, Zeller. (2) καταλ. passive: the perception is grasped by the mind, Hirzel. (3) The object of representation (τὸ υπάρχον) and not the perception is grasped by the mind, Ueberweg, p. 192 (now given up by Heinze). (4) καταλ. both active and passive, Stein, thus reconciling the apparent contradiction between Cic. Acad. I. 41, and Sext. Math. vii. 257. For the exact meaning of κατάληψις(καταληπτικὴ φαντασία cf. Sext. Emp. Math. xi. 182 κατάληψις ἐστὶ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις: a distinction, possibly due to Zeno, which tends to disappear in practice. See also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 182. κατάληψις καταληπτικὴ, etc. were new terminology invented by Zeno, according to Cic. Acad. I. 41 comprehensionem appellabat similem iis rebus, quae manuprehendentur: ex quo etiam nomen hoc dixerat cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re usus est, ib. ii. 145, but the verb καταλαμβάνειν had been used by Plato in the sense “to grasp with the mind,” Phaedr. 250 D peri δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ ἐπομεν, μετ’ ἐκεῖνων τε ἐλαμπεν ὃν, δεύρῳ τε ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν
11. Sext. Math. vii. 248, fantasia καταληπτική ἕστιν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχουν καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη ὀποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχουν, ib. 426, Pyrrh. ii. 4. Diogenes gives the definition in substantially the same words in § 50 adding however καὶ ἐναποτετυπωμένη after ἐναπομεμαγμένη: in § 46 he omits ὀποία—ὑπάρχουν but adds:—ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχουν, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχουν μὲν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον τὴν μὴ τρανὴ μηδὲ ἐκτυποῦν, which very possibly belongs also to Zeno. The evidence attaching the definition to Zeno is as follows:—Cic. Acad. ii. 18 si illud esset, sicut Zeno definiret, tale visum impressum effictumque ex eo unde esset quale esse non posset ex eo unde non esset, id nos a Zenone definitum rectissime dicimus; ib. 113, ib. i. 41 id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur comprehendibile (of Zeno) ib. ii. 77. Speaking of the controversy between Arcesilas and Zeno, Cic. states that the last words of the definition were added by Zeno because of the pressure put upon him by Arcesilas. Numenius ap. Euseb. P. E. xiv. 6, p. 733 τὸ δὲ δόγμα τοῦτο αὐτὸ (scil. Ζῆνωνος) πρώτου εὐρομένου καυτὸ τὸ ὄνομα βλέπων εὐδοκιμοῦν ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις τὴν καταληπτικὴν fantasiaν πάση μηχανὴ ἐχρήτο ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆν (of Arcesilas). August. c. Acad. iii. 9, 18 sed videamus quid ait Zeno. Tale scilicet visum comprehendi et percipi posse, quale cum falso non haberet signa communia.

The controversy between Arcesilas and Zeno is a historical fact about which there can be no doubt, and, apart from direct evidence, the chronology proves that our defi-
nition can hardly be due to Chrysippus, who only succeeded to the headship of the Stoa eight years after the death of Arcesilas (cf. Plut. Com. Not. c. 1). This question of the criterion was the chief battle-ground of the Stoics and the New Academy, and in later times Carneades maintained ἀκατάληπτα πάντα εἶναι οὐ πάντα δὲ ἀδήλα (Zeller, p. 555). In the second book of Cicero’s Academica the question is discussed at length. Sext. Math. vii. 248—252 shows in detail the reason for the insertion of each member of the definition: the impression must be from the object to exclude the visions of madmen, and with reference to the object to exclude a case like that of Orestes, who mistook his sister for a Fury. It must be imprinted and stamped on the mind to ensure that the peripient shall have noticed all the characteristics of the object. Lastly, the addition ὑποία οὐκ ἄν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος was inserted to meet the Academic objection that two impressions, one true and the other false, might be so entirely alike (ἀπαράλλακτον) as to be incapable of distinction, which of course the Stoics did not admit. For ἐναπομεμφαγμένη cf. Ar. Ran. 1040 ὅθεν ἡ μὴ φρὴν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐποίησεν.


H. P.
tēchnē sūstēmā ἐστὶν ἐκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λαμβανόντων τὴν ἀναφορὰν. The same definition partially in id. Pyrrh. iii. 188, 241, 251, Math. i. 75, vii. 109, 373, 182. Wachsm. also quotes (Comm. i. p. 12), Schol. Dionys. Thrac. p. 649, 31, ib. p. 721, 25 οἱ Στωικοὶ οὐτως ὀρίζονται τὴν τέχνην τέχνη ἐστι σύστημα περί ψυχην γενόμενον ἐγκαταληψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων κ.τ.λ. Cf. also Quintil. ii. 17, 41 Nam sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas via, id est, ordine efficiens: esse certe viam atque ordinem in benedicendo nemo dubitaverit; sive ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis observatur artem constare ex praeceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem vitae utilem. Cic. frag. ap. Diomed 414 ed. Putsch ars est perceptionum exercitarum constructio ad unum exitum utilem vitae pertinentium. Cic. Acad. ii. 22 ars vero quae potest esse nisi quae non ex una aut duabus sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat. Fin. iii. 18 artes...constent ex cognitionibus et continet quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via (illustrating also the next frag.). N. D. ii. 148 ex quibus (perceptis) collatis inter se et comparatis artes quoque efficimus partim ad usum vitae...necessarias.

It is worth while to compare with Zeno's definition of art those to be found in Aristotle: both philosophers alike recognise its practical character (cf. Eth. vi. 4. 6 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἄληθος ποιητικὴ ἐστὶν) and that it proceeds by means of regulated principles (cf. Met. i. 1. 5 γίνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὀμοίων ὑπόληψις). Aristotle's distinction that τέχνη is concerned with γένεσις while ἐπιστήμη deals with ὅν (Anal. Post. ii. 19. 4) is of course foreign to Zeno's system. Zeller's note on p. 266, 2 (Eng. Tr.) is inaccurate but appears correctly in the 4th German ed. (iii. 1. 247).

The authenticity of this fragment is rendered doubtful (1) by the fact that Zeno had defined τέχνη differently, as we have seen, (2) because Cleanthes defined τέχνη as ἔξις ὀδὸ πάντα ἀνύονσα (frag. 5). It is of course possible that Zeno left two alternative definitions as in the case of πάθος (frags. 136 and 137), and that Cleanthes adopted one of these with verbal alterations, but it seems most probable that the Schol. has made a mistake, and certainly ὀδοποιητική has a suspicious look. Stein however, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 312, accepts the definition.

14. μνήμη θεσαυρισμός ἐστι φαντασιῶν.

These words are shown to belong to Zeno by the following considerations. Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 372 foll. is describing the controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus as to the meaning of Zeno's τὐπωσις and introduces one of Chrysippus' arguments εἰ γὰρ κηροῦ τρόπου τυποῦται ἡ ψυχῇ φανταστικῶς πάσχουσα ἀεὶ τὸ ἐσχατον κίμημα ἐπισκοτήσει τῇ προτέρᾳ φαντασίᾳ, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ τῆς δευτέρας σφραγίδος τύπος ἐξαλειπτικὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ προτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ τούτο, ἀναρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θεσαυρισμὸς οὕσα φαντασιῶν, ἀναρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη σύστημα γὰρ ἵναι καὶ ἀθροίσμα καταλήψεων κ.τ.λ. Now one might suspect from internal evidence alone that Chrysippus is appealing to the school definitions of Memory and Art as established by Zeno in support of his argument against Zeno's pupil, but the inference becomes irresistible when we find that the definition of Art is certainly Zeno's, as has already been shown. Cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 22 quid quisquam meminit quod non animo comprehendit et tenet? ib. 106 memoria perceptarum comprehensarumque
rerum est. Plut. plac. iv. 11. 2. Aristotle discusses the relation between \( \mu \varepsilon \mu \eta \) and \( \phi a n t a s i a \) in the tract \( d e \) Memoria (see Grote’s Aristotle, pp. 475, 476). \( \mu \varepsilon \mu \eta = \mu \nu \eta \) \( t o \)\( v \ a i \sigma \theta \eta \mu a t o s \), An. Post. ii. 19. 99 b 36.

15. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 151, \( \delta \bar{\omega} \bar{\alpha} \) \( e \nu \iota \iota ) \( \alpha \theta \theta \varepsilon \eta \) \( k a \) \( \psi \varepsilon \nu \delta \iota \) \( s u g k a t \acute{a} \theta e s i n \) attributed to Zeno by Cic. Acad. i. 41 ex qua (inscientia) existeret etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla et cum falso incognitoque communis, cf. ib. Tusc. iv. 15 opinationem autem...volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. Stobaeus speaks of two Stoic definitions of \( \delta \bar{\omega} \bar{\alpha} \) Ecl. ii. 7. 11m, p. 112, 2 [= ii. 231] \( \delta i t t a \acute{a} \) \( \gamma \acute{a} r \) \( e \nu \iota \iota \) \( \tau \iota \nu \mu e \nu \) \( \acute{a} k a t a l \acute{a} \eta \pi t \tau o s \) \( s u g k a t \acute{a} \theta e s i n \), \( \tau \iota \nu \) \( \delta \acute{e} \) \( \upsilon \p\acute{o} \acute{l} \eta \psi i \iota \) \( \alpha \theta \theta \varepsilon \eta \), cf. ib. ii. 7. 10. p. 89, 1 [= ii. 169] \( p a r a \) \( \lambda \acute{a} \mu \beta \acute{a} \) \( \alpha \acute{e} \nu s \theta a i \) \( \tau \iota \nu \) \( \delta \bar{\omega} \bar{\alpha} \) \( \acute{a} n t i \) \( \tau \iota \)\( s \) \( \acute{a} \theta \theta \varepsilon \eta \)\( v i s \) \( \upsilon \p\acute{o} \acute{l} \eta \psi e s \). It is possible from a consideration of the next frag. that Zeno’s word was \( \omicron \eta \psi i \sigma i s \). Thus, as with Plato, \( \delta \bar{\omega} \bar{\alpha} \) and \( \acute{a} g n o i a \) are ultimately identical. See further Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 204, 205.

16. Diog. L. vii. 23, \( \acute{e} \lambda \gamma e \) \( d \acute{e} \) \( \mu \eta \delta \bar{\alpha} \) \( e \nu \iota \iota \) \( t \iota \nu \)\( s \) \( \omicron \eta \)\( \sigma e \)\( w o s \) \( \alpha \lambda l \) \( \lambda \delta \) \( \omega t \iota \iota \) \( \pi r o s \) \( k a t \acute{a} \lambda \eta \psi i \iota \) \( t \iota \nu \) \( \acute{e} p \) \( i \sigma t \eta \mu \acute{a} \)\( w \)\( w \). \( t \iota \nu \)\( \acute{e} p \) \( i \sigma t \eta \mu \)\( w \)\( n \). The plural is used because \( \acute{e} p \) \( i \sigma t \eta \mu \)\( h \)\( i \) in the narrower sense in which Zeno used the word is a single \( k a t \acute{a} \lambda \eta \psi i \iota \). The Stoics also defined \( \acute{e} p \) \( i \sigma t \eta \mu \)\( h \)\( i \) as a \( \sigma \)\( \ups i \sigma t \mu \)\( a \) (cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 51 p. 73, 21 = ii. 129) of such perceptions. At the same time we must beware of supposing that \( \acute{e} p \) \( i \sigma t \eta \mu \)\( h \)\( i \) is according to Zeno identical with \( k a t \acute{a} \lambda \eta \psi i \iota \). \( \acute{e} p \) \( i \sigma t \eta \mu \)\( h \)\( i \) is the conscious knowledge of the wise man, whereas \( k a t \acute{a} \lambda \eta \psi i \iota \) may be possessed by the \( \phi a \)\( \nu \lambda o s \). The latter may occasionally and accidentally assent to the \( k a t \acute{a} \lambda \eta \psi t \)\( i \kappa \) \( \phi a n t a s i a \), but the former’s assent is regular and unerring. Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 152 \( \delta \nu \) \( \tau \iota \nu \) \( \mu e \nu \) \( \acute{e} p \) \( i \sigma t \eta \mu \)\( h \)\( \acute{e} \nu \)\( m \)\( \nu \)\( o i o s \) \( \acute{u} \)\( f i \)\( s t a s \)\( t h a i \) \( \lambda \)\( \acute{e} \nu o u s i \) \( t o i s \) \( \sigma \)\( \phi \)\( o i s \), \( \tau \iota \nu \) \( d \acute{e} \) \( \delta \bar{\omega} \bar{\alpha} \) \( \acute{e} \nu \)\( m \)\( \nu \)\( o i o s \) \( t o i s \) \( \phi a \)\( \nu \lambda o s \).
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τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινὴν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι. We have here, in fact, the Platonic distinction between δόξα ἀληθῆς and ἐπιστήμη in another form.

17. Cic. Acad. i. 41, si ita erat comprehensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam sin aliter inscientiam nominabat (Zeno).

The Greek sources for this will be found in Stob. Ecl. π. 7, 51 p. 73, 19 = π. 129 εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ύπὸ λόγου, ib. 111 p. 111, 20 = π. 231, τὴν ἀγνοιαν μεταπτωτικὴν εἶναι συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἀσθενή, cf. Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 151, ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαιαν καὶ ἀμεταθέτον ύπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν, see also Stein, p. 311 and n. 711, who concludes that these definitions are Zenonian. Diog. L. vii. 47, αὐτὴν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασίν ἡ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ, ἢ ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει, ἀμεταπτωτόν ύπὸ λόγου. The definition of ἐπιστήμη as ἕξις κ.τ.λ. is due to Herillus, cf. ib. vii. 165, but I am unable to see why on that ground Zeller, p. 82, n. 1, and Wellmann, p. 480, should also infer that it was introduced by Zeno. It is far more natural to suppose that the simplest form of the definition was first put forward by the founder of the school, and that it was subsequently modified by his successors in accordance with their different positions: thus Herillus’ definition is undoubtedly modelled on Zeno’s, but is adapted to his conception of ἐπιστήμη as the ethical τέλος.

18. Cic. Acad. i. 42, inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem collocabat, camque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat.

Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 151, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθορίᾳ τοῦτον τεταγμένην κατάληψιν...κατάληψιν δὲ
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τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων: ib. 153, ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος...δεικνύσ ὦτι οὐδὲν ἐστι μεταξὺ ἐπιστήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριων ἢ κατάληψις. (It will be observed that where Cicero speaks of inscientia Sextus mentions δόξα, but, as has been shown, they are practically identical.) Wellmann, p. 484, thinks that either there is some mistake in the text or that Cicero has misunderstood his authorities, but the passage in Sextus l.c. 151—153 makes the meaning perfectly clear: see the note on frag. 16. The latter part of Cicero's statement may be either an inference by his authority ex silentio, or a record of an express statement by Zeno. In any case, it derives its force here simply from the antithesis to scientia and inscientia: thus the Stoics classed certain virtues (goods) as ἐπιστήμαι and certain vices (evils) as ἄγνοιαι, cf. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5, p. 58, 5—59, 3 = π. 92—94.


In this case it is impossible to recover Zeno's actual words, nor can we tell how much of the Stoic doctrine handed down by Sext. Math. viii. 397, belonged to Zeno; cf. especially ἑνεκατάθεσις ἢτις διπλοῦν ἐςκεν εἶναι πρώτῳ καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἅκούσιον τὸ δὲ ἅκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἣμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. A full list of authorities is given by Zeller, Stoics, p. 88, n. 1. The free power of assent must be understood only in the limited sense in which free will is possible in consequence of the Stoic doctrine of εἰμαρμένη: see Wellmann, I. c. pp. 482, 483. It is moreover only the wise man who can distinguish accurately the relative strength of divers impressions, and he alone will consistently refuse assent to mere φαντάσματα.
20. Cic. Acad. i. 41, Quod autem erat sensu comprehensum, id ipsum sensum appellabat.

For the different meanings of αἰσθησις in the Stoic school, see Diog. L. vii. 52 αἰσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τὸ τε ἀφ’ ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεύμα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διήκον, καὶ ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν κατάληψις, καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή, καθ’ ἣν τινες πηροὶ γίνονται: the second of these definitions is thus attributed by Cicero to Zeno. So Dr Reid: it is however possible that sensum is past part, pass, of sentio and is a translation of αἰσθητῶν or αἰσθητικῶν rather than of αἰσθησις, in which case cf. Diog. L. vii. 51 τῶν δὲ φαντασίων κατ’ αὐτοὺς αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν αἰσθητικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὐ. αἰσθητικαὶ μὲν αἱ δὲ αἰσθητήριον ἡ αἰσθητηρίων λαμβανόμεναι κ.τ.λ.

21. Cic. Acad. i. 42, Zeno sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat quod comprehensio facta sensibus et vera illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinquueret quoque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimenteretur, e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendum viae reperimur.

For the general sense see Zeller, p. 80, n. 1.

non quod omnia: Dr Reid cites Sext. Pyrrh. i. 92 ἐκαστὸν τῶν φαινόμενων ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ποικίλον ὑποπίπτειν δοκεῖ οἷον τὸ μῆλον λείον εὐώδες γλυκὸν ξανθόν. ἀδηλον οὖν πότερον ποτε ταύτα μόνας οὕτως ἔχει τὰς ποιότητας ἡ μονοποιῶν μὲν ἐστὶ παρὰ δὲ τὴν διάφορον κατασκευὴν τῶν αἰσθητήριων διάφορον φαίνεται ἢ καὶ πλείονας μὲν τῶν φαινόμενων ἔχει ποιότητας, ἡμῖν δὲ οὖ υποπίπτουσί τινες αὐτῶν, ib. 97. These passages however do not refer to Stoic teaching but are used in furtherance of the Sceptical argument.
notiones: a translation of ἐννοιαὶ. It seems certain that the distinction between προλήψεις and ἐννοιαὶ (for which see R. and P. § 393 and note c. and Stein, Erkenntnis-theorie, p. 237) is not at least in terms Zenonian, though he may have spoken of κοιναὶ ἐννοιαὶ. Reid (on Acad. II. 30) suggests that the word πρόληψις was introduced by Zeno, but cf. Cic. N. D. 1. 44 ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψις appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat, so that it is more probable that Chrysippus borrowed it from the rival school; but see Stein, l. c. p. 248—250. ἐννοια, on the other hand, used by Plato (Phaed. 73 c) in quite a general sense, and defined by the Peripatetics as δὲ ἄθροισμὸς τῶν τοῦ νου φαντασμάτων καὶ ἡ συγκεφαλαίωσις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἰς τὸ καθόλου (Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 224) must have received its special Stoic sense from Zeno.

principia: it is difficult to determine whether this is a translation of a Stoic technical term, cf. Acad. II. 21.

22. Cic. Acad. i. 42, Errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinationem et suspicacionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis adsensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat.

With this may be compared the Stoic definitions of ἀπροπτωσία, ἀνεικαίοτης, ἀνελεγξία, and ἀματαιότης quoted by Diog. L. vii. 46, 47. Temeritas is probably a translation of προπέτεια, a favourite word with Sextus when speaking of the dogmatists (e.g. Pyrrh. i. 20) but also used by the Stoics (Diog. vii. 48). Reid also quotes (on Ac. II. 66) Epict. d. iii. 22. 104 προπετής συγκατάθεσις.

taûta de ùpo tôn ârkhâiôn ideâs prosgoropneûthai. tòn gar kata tâ evnoiâma ùpotopiptontôn einai tâs ideâs, oíon ântiropwv, ùppwv, koivóteron eîsteîn pàntwv tôn xîwv kai tôn allwv õpòswv leîgousin ideâs einai. [taûta de oî òtwv filósofoí fàswv ãnuptàrkitous einai kai tôn meû evnoiâmatôn metècheîn ëmâs, tûn de ùtvoswv, ùs ùs ù prosgorîas kalôsî, tûvchûneiv].

Cf. Euseb. P. E. xv. 45, oî ùpò Zêwnos òtwv ìnuôî-

"mata ãmêtera tâs ideâs. Plut. Plac. i. 10, 4, oî ùpò

Zêwnos òtwv ìnuôîmata ãmêtera tâs ideâs ëfassan.

Wellmann, p. 484, (followed by Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 689) suggests that this may have come from the book entitled katólokà. Possibly this criticism of the ideas formed part of the attack upon Plato mentioned by Numenius, ap. Euseb. P. E. xiv. 6, p. 733, ò ð (Zêwn) èn tê âsthvenestérph ón ësychiàn ãgwn ùn dvnàmevnes ãdi-

keiûn 'Arkeśilàwv meû âfîeto, pollâ ãn eîsteîn ëxhos, ãll' ouk ëxeîle, tâxa de mèllvnon allwos, pròs de tôn oûkèti èn xûswv õnta Plátowv èskiamâchéi, kai tîn ùpò ãmâzxh ùmpwpeiàn pàsas katebhorîbei, lègos ùs ouî' ãn tûn Plátowv ãmûnômewn, ùtherdikeîn te autouv ãllwv òudènî melôv' eîte melîseivn 'Arkeśilàwv, autvôs ùe ker-

daneîn òfeto ùpôterphmewn âf' èautov tûn 'Arkeśilàvov.

tûnto de ãdh kai 'Agathoklêa tûn ëvrrâkôsvon poîsantâ-

to sôfisma èpti tòv ëvrrâ Kûrûghonîous. At any rate, both

the circumstances and the chronology indicate that the

reference is not to the Politêià (Introd. p. 29).

ëvnoîmata. For the definition cf. Plut. Plac. iv. 11

èstî de ùnômâmâ fàntasmâ diavòs ëgikous ëxwv, i.e., as he

goes on to explain, ëvnoîma stands to fàntasmâ in the

relation of eldos to ãnôs: fàntâsmata are shared with us

by all other animals whereas ëvnoîmata belong to the

gods and mankind alone. Diog. vii. 61, ëvnoîmâmâ de èstî

fàntasmâ diavòs, ouîte tî ãn ouîte poîwv, òswanê de tî
οὐ καὶ ὡσανεὶ ποιῶν, οἶον γίνεται ἀνατύπωμα ἵππου καὶ μὴ παρόντος.

τινα...ποιά, i.e. they have no existence or definiteness. For the Stoic conception of τι and ποιῶν, see Zeller, pp. 98 f. and 102 f. It has been inferred from this passage that the doctrine of the four categories does not belong entirely to Chrysippus (Petersen, Chrys. phil. fundam. p. 18).

Ἰδέας. The meaning is that the Platonic ideas are identical with ἐννοήματα, inasmuch as they possess no objective existence, but are mere figments of the mind. Plato himself deals with this very point, Parm. 132 β ἀλλα...μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐκαστον ἥ τοῦτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἥ ἐν ψυχαῖς. Antitheues had already criticised the theory of ideas from this point of view: see Introd. p. 18.

ὑποπιπτόντων: the regular word for the presentation of external impressions to the organs of sense (e.g. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 40 οὐχ αἱ αὐταί...ὑποπιπτοῦσι φαντασίαι).

ὁπόσων, κ.τ.λ. So far as it goes this passage is in agreement with Aristotle’s statement that Plato recognised ideas of ὀπόσα φύσει only (Metaph. Α. 3. 1070 a 18): see Dr Jackson in Journ. Phil. x. 255, etc.

ταύτας—τυγχάνειν. These words are not expressly attributed to Zeno: hence Diels followed by Wachsm. adds to the lemma Ζήνωνος the words καὶ τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ.

τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, κ.τ.λ. This passage is extremely difficult and is supposed to be corrupt by Zeller, ΠΠ'. 2. 79 and Wachsmuth. The latter suggests τὰς δὲ ποιότητας ἐπωνυμῶν, κ.τ.λ. or if πτώσεων is corrupt for ἐπωνυμῶν “in fine talia fere interciderint τὰς κοινὰς ποιότητας, cf. Diog. vii. 58,” the former (coll. Sext. Math. vii. 11) would read τὰ τυγχάνοντα in place of τυγχάνειν (die Gedanken
The text, as it stands, has been interpreted in three ways:

1. notitiae rerum rationi nostrae insitae sunt, nomina fortuito obveniunt, Diels.

2. πτῶσεις = omnes singulae res cuinseunque qualitatis) (γενικὰ ποιά, i.e. ἰδέαι. These impress themselves on the mind of man (τυγχάνειν), Petersen, l.c. p. 82, foll.: but this interpretation of πτῶσεις is unwarranted and is founded on a misconception of Diog. L. vii. 58.

3. Prantl's interpretation (i. p. 421, n. 63) is a combination of these two views. That the text is sound in the main is, I think, proved by Simplic. Cat. p. 54 (quoted by Petersen) οἴ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Άκαδημίας ἐκάλουν τὰ μεθεκτὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ μετέχεσθαι καὶ τὰς πτῶσεις τευκτάς ἀπὸ τοῦ τυγχάνεσθαι, and Clem. Alex. viii. 9. 26: after saying that the πτῶσεις for the κατηγόρημα “τέμνεται” is “τὸ τέμνεσθαι,” and for ναῦς γίγνεται “τὸ ναῦν γίνεσθαι” and explaining that Aristotle called the πτῶσις προσηγορία he proceeds ἡ πτῶσις δὲ ἀσώματος εἶναι ὠμολογεῖται: διὸ καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ἐκεῖνο λύεται, ὁ λέγεις διέρχεται σοῦ διὰ τοῦ στόματος, ὑπερ ἄληθές, οἰκίαι δὲ λέγεις, οἰκία ἀρα διὰ τοῦ στόματος σοῦ διέρχεται ὑπερ ψευδός: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν οἰκίαν λέγομεν σῶμα οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πτῶσιν ἀσώματον οὖσαν, ἢς οἰκία τυγχάνει. A consideration of the latter passage, which it is surprising that no one has cited, warrants the suggestion that τὰ υπάρχοντα or some such words have fallen out after τυγχάνειν. All would then be plain: πτῶσις = name (ἐννόημα = thought. πτῶσις was also) (κατηγόρημα as noun to verb (Plut. qu. Plat. x. 1, 2). For the present use of πτῶσις, cf. also Sext. Math. xi. 29, vi. 42, for πτῶσις in Aristotle see Waitz, Organon, vol. i. p. 328, 329. προσηγορία is a common noun, such as “man” “horse” (Diog. vii. 58, Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14) tending in practice to become identical with πτῶσις, though theoretically narrower.
24. Stob. Eel. i. 13, 1°, p. 138, 14 (Ar. Did. 457, Diels), αἰτιον δ' ὁ Ζήνων φηαίν εἶναι δι' ὅ' οὐ δὲ αἰτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰτιον σῶμα, οὐ δὲ αἰτιον κατηγόρημα· ἀδύνατον δ' εἶναι τὸ μὲν αἰτιον παρεῖναι οὐ δὲ ἐστιν αἰτιον μὴ ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον τοιαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν· αἰτιον ἔστι δι' ὅ γίγνεται τι, οἷον διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν γίνεται τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται τὸ ζῆν καὶ διὰ τὴν σωφροσύνην γίνεται τὸ σωφρονεῖν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι σωφροσύνης περὶ τινα οὕσης μὴ σωφρονεῖν ἢ ψυχῆς μὴ ζῆν ἢ φρονήσεως μὴ φρονεῖν.

It is difficult to understand why Zeller, Stoics, p. 95, n. 2, regards the main point of this fragment as a grammatical distinction between noun and verb; it appears rather that Zeno is discussing the nature of αἰτιον from a logical standpoint, and that κατηγόρημα is introduced to explain αἰτιον and not vice versa. The fragments of Chrysippus and Posidonius which follow our passage in Stobaeus should be compared with it. Zeno did not adopt the four Aristotelian causes because his materialistic views led him to regard the efficient as the only true cause.

συμβεβηκός = "result" or "inseparable consequence," cf. Stob. Eel. i. 13 ad init. αἰτιον ἔστι δι' ὅ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα ἢ δι' ὅ συμβαίνει τι. This meaning of συμβεβηκός is also to be found in Aristotle, who uses the word in two distinct senses: see an elaborate note of Trendelenburg on de An. i. 1 p. 402 a 8 who quotes amongst other passages Metaph. Δ 30 1025 a 30 λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβεβηκός οἷον ὁσα ὑπάρχει ἐκάστῳ καθ' αὐτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὀντα οἷον τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν. That συμβεβηκός must be used in this sense here and not in its more common Aristotelian sense of "accident" seems indubitable, when we read infra that the αἰτιον can never be present unless accompanied by the οὐ αἰτιον.
σῶμα: the materialism of the Stoics is well known: to what lengths it was pushed may be seen from Zeller, Stoics pp. 127—132, with the examples given in the notes.

κατηγόρημα: the οὗ αἵτιον was therefore something incorporeal, and Chrys. and Posid. accordingly speak of it as non-existent. Probably this inference did not present itself to Zeno’s mind, as the question of the ὑπαρχῆς of λεκτὰ only arose later: see further on Cleanth. frag. 7. The present passage is illustrated by Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 14 οἱ μὲν οὖν σῶμα, οἱ δ’ ἀσώματον τὸ αἵτιον εἶναι φασιν. δόξαι δ’ ἂν αἵτιον εἶναι κοινότερον κατ’ αυτούς δι’ ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, οἶον ὡς ο ἢλιος ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότης τοῦ χείσθαι τὸν κηρὸν ἢ τῆς χύσεως τοῦ κηροῦ. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διαπεφωνήκασιν, οἱ μὲν προσηγοριῶν αἵτιον εἶναι τὸ αἵτιον φάσκοντες, οἶον τῆς χύσεως, οἱ δὲ κατηγορημάτων, οἶον τοῦ χείσθαι. ib. Math. ix. 211 Στωικοὶ μὲν πάν αἵτιον σῶμα φασι σώματι ἀσωμάτου τινὸς αἵτιον γενέσθαι, οἶον σῶμα μὲν τὸ σμίλιον, σώματι δὲ τῇ σαρκί, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ τέμνεσθαι κατηγορήματος, καὶ πάλιν σῶμα μὲν τὸ πῦρ, σώματι δὲ τῷ ξύλῳ, ἀσωμάτου δὲ τοῦ καλέσθαι κατηγορήματος.

φρόνησιν κ.π.λ. A parallel to this will be found at Stob. Ecl. ii. 7 114 p. 98, 3 τὴν γὰρ φρόνησιν αἰρούμεθα ἐχειν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, οὐ μὰ Δία τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἀσώματα ὄντα καὶ κατηγορήματα. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 307, infers from this passage that, according to Zeno, not a single moment in life passes without thought, but that the ἡγεμονικὸν always thinks.

Perhaps this frag. comes from the τέχνη of Zeno: see Introd. p. 27. Zeller is inclined to doubt whether the words do not belong to some other Zeno, but inasmuch as this anonymous writer also quotes Chrysippus (p. 454, 4), the presumption is that he refers to Zeno of Citium, and there is no a priori reason to discredit his authorship.


eis τὸ κ.τ.λ. “adapted to the character maintained on behalf of the speaker.” πρόσωπον is technical ](πράγμα. τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον τοῦ προοίμιον δόξα προσώπων τε καὶ πραγμάτων Dion. H. Ant. Rhet. x. 13, cf. the Latin persona. Cic. pro Mil. § 32 itaque illud Cassianum cui bono fuerit in his personis valeat, pro Cluent. § 78 huius Staleni persona ab nulla turpi suspicione abhorrebat. For ρέονσα cf. Plat. Rep. 485 ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἐν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ρέουσιν...ὡ δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πάν τὸ τοιούτον ἐρρυήκασιν.

26. Anonymi τέχνη ap. Spengel Rhet. Gr. i. 447, 11 ὡς δὲ Ζήνων παράδειγμα ἐστὶ γενομένου πράγματος ἀπομνημόνευσις εἰς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ υἱὸν ζητουμένου. Maxi-
mus Planudes ap. Walz. Rhet. Gr v. 396 παράδειγμα
de ἐστιν, ὡς Ζήνων φησιν, γενομένου πράγματος ἀπομνη-
μόνευσις εἰς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένον.

This frag. must stand or fall with frag. 25.

παράδειγμα: a technical term in rhetoric. Aristotle
regards the example of the orator as an imperfect repre-
Post. i. 1, 71 a 9 ὡς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπει-
θοῦσιν ἢ γὰρ διὰ παράδειγμάτων, ὃ ἐστιν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ δι'
ἐνθυμημάτων, ὁπερ ἐστι συλλογισμός.

27. Quintil. Inst. Or. iv. 2. 117 hic expressa (verba)
et ut vult Zeno sensu tineta esse debebunt.

It has been supposed by some that these words are a
reference to apoph. 13, but inasmuch as sensu is a very
inappropriate translation of εἰς νόν, and Quintilian is
speaking of the narrative portion of a speech, the meaning
is rather "coloured by the actual impressions of sense"
i.e. giving a vivid and clear representation of the actual
facts.

28. Anonymi variae collectiones mathematicae in
Hultschiana Heronis geometricorum et stereometricorum
editione p. 275, Ταύρου Σιδονίου ἐστιν ὑπόμνημα εἰς
Πολιτείαν Πλάτωνος ἐν ὃ ἐστι ταῦτα: ὡρίσατο ὁ Πλάτων
τὴν γεωμετρίαν...Ἀριστοτέλης δ...Ζήνων δὲ ἔξιν ἐν
προσδέξει φαντασίων ἀμεταπτωτοῦ ὑπὸ λόγου.

This frag. is due to Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 12)
who emends as above for the meaningless ἔξιν πρὸς δεῖξιν
It is barely credible that Zeno can have defined geometry
in the same words by which Herillus certainly and he
himself possibly defined knowledge. There is doubtless
some mistake in the tradition: possibly μαθηματικῶν has
dropped out. I cannot find any evidence to illustrate Stoic views on mathematics.

29. Plut. Sto. Rep. 8, 1, πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα μηδὲ δίκην δικάσεις πρὶν (qu. add ἂν) ἀμφοῖν μὺθον ἀκούσῃς ἀντέλεγεν ὁ Ζήνων, τοιοῦτο τινὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος· εἰτ' ἀπέδειξεν ὁ πρότερος εἰπὼν οὐκ ἀκουστέον τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος· πέρας γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰτ' οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν ὁμοιον γὰρ ὅσ εἰ μηδὲ υπήκουσε κληθεὶς ἢ υπακούσας ἑτέρτισεν· ἣτοι δ' ἀπέδειξεν ὃ οὐκ ἀπέδειξεν· οὐκ ἀκουστέον ἄρα τοῦ δευτέρου λέγοντος. The same is preserved by Schol. ad Lucian. Cal. 8 with unimportant variations.


λόγῳ. The argument is couched in the syllogistic form which Zeno especially affected: see Introd. p. 33. Whether the first speaker proves his case or not, the argument of the second speaker is immaterial; but he must have either proved his case or failed to do so: therefore the second speaker should not be heard.

ὑπήκουσε: appeared in court when the case was called on—answered to his name: cf. Dem. F. L. p. 423 § 257 ἡτίμωσεν υπακούσαντα τιν' αὐτοῦ κατήγορον "procured the disfranchisement of a man who had actually appeared as his accuser." The word was used indifferently of plaintiff and defendant, ib. p. 434 § 290 οὐδ' υπακούσαι

κληθεῖς: either (1) by the presiding magistrate, cf. Dem. Olymp. p. 1174 ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐκάλει ὁ ἄρχων εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπαντᾷ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας κατὰ τὸν νόμον. Ar. Vesp. 1441 ὑβρις’ ἔως ἀν τὴν δίκην ἄρχων καλῇ, or (2) by the officer of the court solemnly calling him by name. We know that this procedure (κλήτευσις) was adopted in the case of a defaulting witness, and it may also have been applied if one of the parties failed to put in an appearance.


λόγους. For the comparison of words to coins cf. Hor. A. P. 59 licuit semperque lieebit signatum praesente nota producere nomen. Juv. vii. 54 qui communi feriit carmen triviale Moneta and Prof. Mayor’s note. Possibly this and the following frag. came from the work peri λέξεων.

Ἀλεξανδρείῳ: in this phrase which recurs at viii. 85 I have followed Köhler (Rhein. Mus. xxxix. 297) in reading Ἀλεξανδρείῳ for Ἀλεξανδρίῳ. It appears that Alexandria had struck no coinage in the reign of the Ptolemies (Head, Historia Numorum p. 718); on the other hand the tetradrachm of Alexander was part of the
current coinage all over Greece (ib. p. 198 foll. and see Hultsch, Gr. and Rom. Metrologie pp. 243—245).

κεκομμένοις...σολοίκοις. MSS. κεκομμένοις. Bywater (Journ. Phil. xvn. 76) reads κεκομμένοις καὶ σολοίκοις and the former certainly seems necessary to restore the balance of the sentence.

καθέλκειν: this meaning of καθέλκω is omitted by L. and S. s. v.

λέξεις bracketed by v. Wilamowitz and Köhler is rightly retained by Bywater.


σολοικίζειν. Zeno is not alone in using the word in this extended sense, cf. Xen. Cyr. viii. 3. 21 Δαίφέρνης ὅ τις ἡν σολοικότερος ἀνθρωπος τῷ τρόπῳ.

ἐπὶ ἑνδυμάτων. The Athenians attached great importance to κοσμιότητι in dress as in other matters of personal behaviour. The cloak was required to be of a certain length, cf. Theophr. Char. 24 (Jebb) of the Penurious Man:—φορούντας ἐλάπτω τῶν μηρῶν τὰ ἰμάτια; and to wear it in the fashionable style (ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀναβάλλεσθαι) was a mark of sobriety. Cf. Ar. Av. 1567 οὗτος τί δρᾶς; ἐπὶ αἱστέρ' οὗτως ἀμπέχει; οὐ μεταβαλεῖς θοιμάτιον ὡδ' ἐπὶ δεξιῶν;

ἀτάκτως ἐσθίῃ. How carefully children were trained
in this respect may be seen from three passages of Plutarch cited by Becker, Charicles, E. T. pp. 236, 237. Cf. e.g. de Edue. Puer. 7 τῇ μὲν δεξιᾷ συνεθίζειν τὰ παιδία δέχεσθαι τὰς τροφάς, κἂν προτείνειε τὴν ἀριστεράν, ἐπιτιμάν.

άκοσμος περιπατή. Fast walking in the streets was so severely criticised that it was a circumstance which might be used to damage an opponent before a jury; cf. Dem. Pantaen. p. 981 § 52 Νικόβουλος δ’ ἐπίφθονός ἐστι, καὶ ταχέως βαδίζει καὶ μέγα φθέγγεται, καὶ βακτηρίαν φορεῖ and see Sandys on id. Steph. i. §§ 68, 77. Lysias protests against such matters being considered of any importance in a law court, Or. xvi. § 19 πολλοί μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν διαλεγόμενοι καὶ κοσμίως ἀμπεχόμενοι μεγάλως κακῶν αἰτίων γεγόνασιν, ἔτεροι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελοῦντες πολλὰ κῶγαθα ὑμᾶς εἰσίν εἰργασμένοι.

32. Sext. Emp. Math. ii. 7, ἐνθέν γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὅτῳ διαφέρει διαλεκτικὴ ῥητορικὴ συστρέψας τὴν χείρα καὶ πάλιν ἐξαπλώσας ἔφη “τούτῳ” κατὰ μὲν τὴν συστροφὴν τὸ στρογγύλον καὶ βραχὺ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς τάττων ἱδίωμα διὰ δὲ τῆς ἐξαπλώσεως καὶ ἐκτάσεως τῶν δακτύλων τὸ πλατὺ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δυνάμεως αἰνιττόμενος. Cic. Fin. ii. 17 Zenonis est inquam hoc Stoici omnem vim loquendi, ut jam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoricae palmam, dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. Orat. 32, 113 Zeno quidem ille, a quo disciplina Stoicorum est, manu demonstrare solet quid inter has artes interesser, nam cum compesserat digitos pugnumque fecerat, dialecticam aiebat eiusmodi esse; cum autem diduxerat et manum dilataverat, palmæ illius similem eloquentiam esse dicebat. Quint. Inst. Or. ii. 20 Itaque cum duo sint genera orationis, altera perpetua, quae rhetorice dicitur, altera

6—2
THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.

Although this extract and the next purport to be merely spoken remarks of Zeno, it has been thought better to insert them at this place, as distinctly belonging to λογική. Very probably in their original form they came from some written work.

τὸ στρογγύλον is used of a terse and compact as opposed to a florid and elaborate style: thus Dion. Halic.
in contrasting the styles of Lysias and Isocrates says:—


Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 181, 313, finds in this passage an indication of the tension theory, but surely this is somewhat far-fetched, for although it is no doubt true that the Stoic theory of knowledge is often made to depend on τόνος, yet probably the introduction of τόνος is later than Zeno. He suggests with more reason p. 126 that the activity of the ἥγεμονικὸν in the process of
reasoning may be inferred from this, i.e. the ἡγεμονικὸν is not merely receptive (κατὰ πείσων) but also productive (κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν).

scire: we have already seen that ἐπιστήμη is peculiar to the wise man, while κατάληψις is also shared by the φαύλος: see note on frag. 16. Sextus speaking of the inconsistency of the Stoics, who would not admit that even Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus had attained to perfect wisdom, cites as a Stoic dogma πάντα ἥγνοεῖ φαύλος (Math. vii. 434). Reid quotes Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 83 διόπερ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἐν μόνῳ σπουδαίῳ φαύλων εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλήθες καὶ ἐν φαύλων ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸν φαύλον ἀλήθεις τι εἶπεῖν.

visum = φαντασία frag. 7. adsensus = συγκατάθεσις frag. 19. comprehensio = κατάληψις, see on frag. 10. scientiam, frag. 17.

PHYSICA.

34. Cic. Acad. i. 39, (Zeno) nullo modo arbitrabatur quicquam effici posse ab ea (scil. natura) quae express esset corporis nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus.

Zeno adopted the Platonic dogma that everything which exists is capable either of acting or being acted upon, cf. Soph. 247 | λέγον δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανὸν κεκτημένον δύναμι, εἰτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκός, εἰτ᾽ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ συμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φανλοτάτου, καὶ εἰ μόνον εἰσάπαξ, πάν τοῦτο ὁντός εἶναι: he differed, however, widely from Plato in limiting these things to material objects. For Stoic materialism cf. Plut. plac. iv. 20 πάν γὰρ τὸ δρόμενον ἡ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα (quoted by Zeller, Stoics p. 126) and further references ap. Stein, Psychologie n. 21. For the application of this doctrine
to theories of sensation and thought see the authorities collected in Dr Reid’s note.

35. Diog. L. vii. 134, δοκεῖ δ’ αυτοίς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὦλων δύο τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἀποικομόν οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τούτοις γὰρ οὔτα αἵδιον διὰ πάσης ὕλης δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. τίθεισι δὲ τὸ δόγμα τούτο Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς ἐν τῷ περὶ οὔσιας. Plut. plac. i. 3. 39 Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεύς ἀρχὰς μὲν τὸν θεόν καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὅν ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν τοῦ ποιεῖν αἰτίος ἢ δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν. στοιχεῖα δὲ τέτταρα. Stob. Ecl. i. 10. 14 f. 126, 17 Ζήνων Μνασέου Κιτιεύς ἀρχὰς τὸν θεόν καὶ τὴν ὕλην στοιχεία δὲ τέτταρα. Diels, p. 289, adds the following passages:—Achill. Tat. p. 124. E Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς ἀρχὰς εἶναι λέγει τῶν ὦλων θεῶν καὶ ὕλην, θεόν μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὕλην δὲ τὸ ποιοῦμενον, ὅφ’ ὧν τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεία γεγονέναι. Philo, de Provid. i. 22 Zeno Mnaseae filius aerem deum materiam et elementa quantior [aerem is a blunder arising from ἀρχὰς (Diels), which seems better than Stein’s suggestion (Psych. n. 31) to substitute aethera]. Theodoret, Gr. cur. aff. iv. 12 Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁ Μνασέου, ὁ Κράτητος φοιτητής ὁ τῆς Στοιχείας ἀρξας αἰρέσεως τὸν θεόν καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχὰς ἐφησεν εἶναι.

Cf. Sext. Math. ix. 11: further authorities for the Stoic school in general are given by Zeller, p. 141.

In distinguishing between God as the active efficient cause of the universe and formless indeterminate matter as its underlying substratum Zeno is following on the lines laid down by Plato in the Timaeus and by Aristotle, cf. Theophr. frag. 48 Wimmer (speaking of Plato) δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς βούλεται ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλην, ὁ προσαγορεύει πανδεχές, τὸ δ’ ὡς αἰτίον καὶ κινοῦν, ὁ περιάπτει τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τάγαθοῦ δυνάμει: see Introd. p. 25. When we remember that God is by the
Stoics identified with fiery breath, the purest and rarest of all substances, while on the other hand the world itself is merely a temporal manifestation of the primary fire, it becomes apparent that the Stoic dualism is ultimately reducible to a monism and that the system is essentially hylozoistic, like those of the early Ionians (Zeller, Stoics, p. 155, 6. Stein, Psychologie n. 25, collects the passages which prove this). How far this was worked out by Zeno may be doubted: indeed there is no evidence to show that he ever passed beyond the stage of regarding the dual origin of the world as fundamental, and the opinion is now prevalent that Cleanthes by his principle of τόνος was the first to consciously teach the pantheistic doctrines, which subsequently became characteristic of Stoicism.

δημιουργεῖν: a favourite Platonic word, recalling the δημιουργός of the Timaeus. For the distinction between ἄρχαι and στοιχεία cf. Diog. Λ. vii. 134 διαφέρειν δὲ φασίν ἄρχας καὶ στοιχεία· τάς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἁγεννητοὺς καὶ ἀφθάρτους· τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν φθείρεσθαι.

36. Hippolyt. Philosoph. 21, 1. p. 571 Diels Χρύσιττος καὶ Ζήνων οἱ ὑπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄρχην μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων σῶμα ὅντα τὸ καθαρώτατον διὰ πάντων δὲ διήκειν τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ. Galen. Hist. Philos. 16. p. 241. Diels p. 608 Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Στωικὸς περὶ τῆς οὔσιας τοῦ θεοῦ διελθηλυθότες οὐχ ὀμοίως περὶ ταύτης διενοθήσαν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Πλάτων θεὸν ἀσώματον, Ζήνων δὲ σῶμα περὶ τῆς μορφῆς μηδὲν εἰρηκότες [if we may rely on Diels’ text here, some modification will be required in Stein, Psychologie n. 88, where Kühn’s reading οὐ κόσμον ἀλλὰ παρὰ τάυτα...τι ἄλλο is adopted].

Cf. generally Tatian ad Graec. c. 25 p. 162 c (speaking of the Stoics) σῶμα τις εἶναι λέγει θεὸν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀσώματον. August. adv. Acad. π. 17. 38 (quoted below).
τὸ καθαρωτάτων. “God is spoken of as being Fire, Aether, Air, most commonly as being πνεῦμα or Atmospheric Current, pervading everything without exception, what is most base and ugly as well as what is most beautiful,” Zeller, Stoics p. 148, who gives the authorities in the notes. καθαρωτάτων is used with special reference to διήκειν, cf. Sext. Emp. vii. 375 οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τούτο [τῦποσιν] ἐπιτίθειν, λεπτομερέστατων καὶ εὑροῦν παρὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρχον. Ar. Metaph. i. 8. 3, 4 (speaking of those of his predecessors who had explained generation by σύγκρισις and διάκρισις) τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀν δόξει στοιχεωδέστατον εἶναι πάντων ἐξ οὐ γένονται συγκρίσει πρώτου, τοιούτων δὲ τὸ μικρομερέστατον καὶ λεπτότατον ἀν εἰ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων. διόπερ ὅσοι πῦρ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι μίλιστα ὁμολογομένως ἀν τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ λέγοιεν. Krische, Forschungen p. 382.

πρόνοιαν like rationem in the next frag. brings into prominence the spiritual side of the Stoic conception of God, which is everywhere strangely blended with the material.


38. Tertullian, ad Nat. ii. 4, ecce enim Zeno quoque materiam mundiæalem a deo separat et eum per illam tamquam mel per favos transisse dicit. Cf. id. adv. Hermog. 44 Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse quomodo mel per favos (quoted by Stein, Psychologie, p. 35, n. 43).

favos: κηρία. Zeno’s fondness for simile has been
observed upon in the Introd. p. 33. Virgil's lines are well known, Georg. iv. 219 sqq. His quidam signis atque haec exempla securi Esse apibus partem divinae mentis et haustus Aetherios dixere; deum namque ire per omnes Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum. It is curious that bees should have suggested themselves to both writers, though in a different way, in connection with the same thought, cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 120 cuius (divinae sollertiae) vos majestatem deducitis usque ad apium formicarumque perfectionem ut etiam inter deos Myrmecides aliquis minutorum opuscilorum fabricatoruisse videatur.

separat: if this is pressed, we must conclude that Zeno never identified God with matter: see n. on frag. 35.


Cf. Diog. L. vii. 88, ὃς ἀπαγορεύειν εἰώθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς ὥν τῷ Διὶ καθηγοῦν τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι. Schol. on Lucan ii. 9 hoc secundum Stoicos dicit, qui adfirmant mundum prudentia ac lege firmatum, ipsunque deum esse sibi legem. Law regarded in its moral rather than its physical aspect is defined in similar terms in Stob. Eel. ii. 7. 114 p. 96, 10 = Floril. 46, 12 τῶν τε νόμων σπουδαίων εἰναι φασὶ λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα προστατικοῖν μὲν ὁν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικοῖν δὲ ὃν ὦν ὑπὸ ποιητέων repeated at ii. 7. 114, p. 102, 4.

Gods and men are influenced by the same law "quae est recti praeceptio pravique depulsio" Cic. N.D. ii. 78.
Law is the human counterpart of the "ratio summa insita in natura" id. Leg. i. 18. The origin of law is simultaneous with that of the divine mind: quamobrem lex vera atque princeps apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum ratio est recta summi Iovis, id. ib. II. 10. For Zeno Right exists φύσει and not merely θέσει, cf. Krische p. 371. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 708.

40. Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβ. c. 8, δεῖ τὴν <δ>ύναμιν οὕσαν συνα<π>τικὴν οἶκε<ἰ>ως τῶν μερῶν πρὸ<ς αὐ>ληλα καὶ ἐκ...ων τὴν δ' ἀνα<τολὴ>ν ἡ<λί>ου καὶ κύ<κλησιν> ἡ περίοδον.

The position of these words with reference to their context corresponding to Cic. N.D. I. 36 points to Zeno's authorship. “Stoica frustula dubitanter ad Zenonem refero” Diels p. 542.

τὴν δύναμιν. This is evidently a Stoic description of God as the power which binds the parts of the world together and keeps them in union.

συναπτικὴν. We should expect συνεκτικὴν, which is the more natural word in this connection. Sext. Math. IX. 84 ἀνάγκη ἀρα ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτῶν (τῶν κόσμων) φύσεως συνέχεσθαι ἐπεὶ καὶ περιέχει τὰς πάντων φύσεις ...τοιαύτη δὲ τυγχάνουσα θεὸς ἐστὶν. On the other hand συνάπτω συναφὴ and the like are technically applied to the structure of manufactured articles, which are said to be ἐκ συναπτομένων (ἣνομένα: ib. 78 ἐκ συναπτομένων δὲ τὰ ἐκ τε παρακείμενων καὶ πρὸς εὖ τι κεφάλαιον νευόντων συνεστῶτα ὡς ἀλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι καὶ νῆες.

is pressed here, it points to the exception of Cleanthes, but see on Cleanth. fr. 15].

* aetheru not to be confounded with ἀηρ, which is one of the four elements and subject to destruction; aerem in Tertull. is probably a blunder, unless with Stein, Psych. n. 80, aut should be read for et. The aether here in question is an equivalent of πνεύμα or of πῦρ τεχνικόν, i.e. it is merely one of the labels convenient to express the material essence of God. Neither πῦρ nor αἰθήρ is regarded in itself as a complete description. For the distinction between the Stoic αἰθήρ and the Heraclitean πῦρ see Stein, Psychologic p. 26 and n. 31. The Stoic deity is at once corporeal and rational: but how far it may be said to have been personified cannot be determined: in fact, as has been remarked, the ancients seem to have grasped the notion of personification with much less distinctness than modern thinkers.


Cf. Stob. Eel. 1. 1. 29b p. 38, 2 ἀνωτάτω πάντων νοῦν ἐναθέρειν εἶναι θεόν.

For the Stoic conception of the World-Soul see Stein, Psychologie p. 41, who distinguishes the world soul from the Aether God, the former being an offshoot from the latter. “Die Weltseele ist nur ein Absenker jenes Urpneumarestes der als Gott Aether unser Weltganzes umspannt; sie ist als Ausfluss der Gottheit jenes künstlerische göttliche Feuer (πῦρ τεχνικόν) das die Keimkräfte (σπερματικούς λόγους) der Weltbildung im allgemeinen und der Einzelbildungen insbesondere in sich enthält.” In regarding νοῦς as an indwelling material essence Zeno revived the position formerly taken up by Diogenes of
Apollonia in opposition to Anaxagoras: see the fragment quoted by Zeller, Pre-Socraties, E. T. i. p. 287 n. 7.

The MSS κόσμου was corrected to κόσμον by Krische p. 378, who supplies θεον ἀπεφήματο. Hirzel ii. p. 220, 2 prefers to put a comma after κόσμον: otherwise καὶ πῦρινον is necessary.

43. Themist. de An. 72 b [ed. Speng. ii. p. 64, 25] τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος σύμφωνος ἡ δόξα διὰ πάσης οὐσίας πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεόν τιθεμένοις καὶ ποὺ μὲν εἶναι νοῦν ποὺ δὲ ψυχὴν ποὺ δὲ φύσιν ποὺ δὲ ἔξων.

This same force, appearing in different substances, is called ἔξως as the bond of union for inorganic matter, φύσις in the case of plants, ψυχὴ in the case of animals, and νοῦς as belonging to rational beings. Diog. L. vii. 139 δι' οὖν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔξωσ κεχώρηκεν ὡς διὰ τῶν ὅστών καὶ τῶν νευρῶν δι' οὖν δὲ ὡς νοῦς ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, cf. Cleanth. Frag. 51. Some Stoics seem however to have denied this distinction between ψυχὴ and νοῦς. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 1 (quoted by Stein, Psych. pp. 92, 3) τινὲς δὲ οὖ διεστειλαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν νοῦν ἀλλὰ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς ἡγεμονικὸν εἶναι τὸ νοερὸν ἡγοῦνται. Stein however is not justified in holding that the living principle of animals occupies a position midway between φύσις and ψυχὴ, as will be shown on Cleanth. frag. 44. That the passage is good evidence that the distinction between ἔξως, φύσις and ψυχὴ is Zenonian may be inferred from the words σύμφωνος ἡ δόξα.

44. Lactant. de Vera Sap. c. 9, Zeno rerum naturae dispositorem atque artificem universitatis λόγον praedicat quem et fatum et necessitatem rerum et deum et animum Iovis nuncupat. Tertull. Apol. 21 Apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον id est sermonem atque rationem constat artificem videri universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat


μὴ διαφέρειν. God receives different names, while his essence is constant, owing to the various phases of his union with matter (τὰς προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνειν δι' ὅλης τῆς ὕλης δι' ἥς κεχώρηκε παραλλάξειν Stob. Ecl. i. 1. 29 b p. 37, 23, according to Diels and Wachsmuth a mistake for διὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης δι' ἥς κεχώρηκε παραλλάξεις). Thus he is Fate as acting in accordance with a constant law, Forethought as working to an end, and Nature as creator of the word. Cf. Athenag. Supplie. e. 6. p. 7 B οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοιχήματι κἂν τὰς προσηγορίας κατὰ τὰς παραλλάξεις τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἥς φασὶ τὸ πνεῦμα χωρεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ, πληθύνωσι τὸ θείον τοὺς ὄνομασι, τῷ γοῦν ἐργῳ ἑνα νομίζουσι τὸν θεόν· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδὸν βαδίζουν ἐπὶ γενέσεις κόσμου ἐμπεριεληφός ἀπαντᾷ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ' ὑστ' ἐκαστά καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ διηκεῖ δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, ὁ θεὸς εἰς κατ' αὐτοὺς Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ ζέον τῆς ὕλης ὀνομαζόμενος "Ἡρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ'
This connection it may be observed that Gercke (Chrysippea, p. 697) is mistaken in speaking of a fragment of Zeno as preserved by Aristocles ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 14. The reference there is to the Stoics generally and not to Zeno in particular.

45 A. Diog. L. vii. 149, καθ’ εἰμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γένεσθαι Χρύσιππος...καὶ Ποσειδώνιος...καὶ Ζήνων Βοηθὸς δέ.

Since εἰμαρμένη is identical with πρόνοια, it follows that everything is produced κατὰ πρόνοιαν. Cleanthes, however, demurred to this (frag. 18).


The Greek of the definition is ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδὸ βάδιζον εἰς γένεσιν, Diog. L. vii. 156. Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 597. φύσις is only another name for God viewed in his creative capacity. Hence Stob. Eel. i. 1. 29β p. 37, 20 οἱ Στωικοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδὸ βάδιζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου, ἐμπερειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους καθ’ οὓς ἀπαντά καθ’ εἰμαρμένην γίνεται: Athenag. i. c. Wellmann, p. 472 and Weygoldt p. 35 think that λόγος σπερματικὸς is a Zenonian expression. So Stein, Psych. p. 49 and n. 87.
47. Tatian ad Graec. c. 3, p. 143c, καὶ ὁ θέος ἀποδειχθήσεται κακῶν κατ' αὐτῶν (scil. Ζήνωνα) ποιητής, ἐν ἀμάραις τε καὶ σκώληξι καὶ ἀρρητουργοῖς καταγινόμενος.

Cf. Clem. Alex. Protrept. 5 § 66 οὐδὲ μὴν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοίχειες παρελευσομαί διὰ πάσης ὕλης καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτυμοτάτης τὸ θέου διήκειν λέγοντας: οὗ κατασκόνουσιν ἀτεχνών τήν φιλοσοφίαν: Sext. Pyrrh. III. 218 Στωικοὶ δὲ πνεύμα διήκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν: Cic. Acad. II. 120 cur deus omnia nostra causa cum faceret—sic enim voltis—tantam vim naticium viperarumque fecerit? cur mortifera tam multa et perniciosae terra marique disperserit? We have no information as to what answer Zeno made to this objection, but the later Stoics said that physical evils ultimately served a good purpose: so Chrysippus ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 21, 4 quoted by Zeller, p. 189. As to the existence of moral evil see on Cleanth. fr. 48, l. 17 and Wellmann's discussion at p. 472.

48. Cic. N. D. II. 58, Ipsius vero mundi qui omnia complexu suo coercet et continet natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium.

An ingenious explanation of this difficult passage is given by Stein, Psychologie, pp. 42, 43 in accordance with his view of the distinction between World-Soul and Aether-God. "Die natura artificiosa ist unseres Erachtens die Weltseele, während die natura plane artifex sich auf den Gott Aether oder das ἥγεμονικὸν der Welt bezieht." The πνεύμα which permeates the universe is ignis artificiosus and only secondarily represents God, since it is an efflux from him. It cannot be described as plane artifex, a term which is applied to God (σῶμα τὸ καθαρώτατον), whereas the world-soul is less καθαρόν from its combination with matter.

49. Chalecid. in Tim. c. 290, Plerique tamen silvam separat ab essentia, ut Zeno et Chrysippus. Silvam quippe dicunt esse id quod subest his omnibus quae habent qualitates, essentiam vero primam rerum omnium silvam vel antiquissimum fundamentum earum, suapte natura sine vultu et informe: ut puta aes, aurum, ferrum, et cactera huius modi silva est eorum, quae ex iisdem fabrefunt, non tamen essentia. At vero quod tam his quam ceteris ut sint causa est, ipsum esse substantiam.

This passage shows that Zeno distinguished between οὐσία and ἥλη—the former the indeterminate and formless matter underlying the universe, and the latter the stuff out of which a particular thing is made. ἥλη is thus from one point of view the more general term, since οὐσία = πρῶτη ἥλη (frag. 51). Cf. Dexipp. ad Cat. Schol. Arist. Brandis 45 a 21 ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διττὸν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοάς καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβύτερους ἐν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ὡς ἡ ἀποίου ἥλη ἢν δυνάμει σῶμα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιὸν ὅ κοινῶς ἡ ἱδίως υφίστατο ἱ.τ.λ. Similarly Arist. Metaph. vii. 4. 1044 a 15 distinguishes πρῶτη καὶ οἰκεία ἥλη καὶ ib. iv. 24. 1023 a 27 says that material origin may be specified in two ways ἢ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον γένος ἢ κατὰ τὸ υστατον εἰδος οἶνον ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ἀπαντὰ τὰ τηκτὰ ἢ δ’ ὡς ἐκ χάλκου ὁ ἄνθρωπος. The point of view of Posisdonius is different: he holds διαφέρειν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ἥλης τὴν <αὐτὴν> οὐσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον. Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5 ε, p. 133, 22. Wellmann (Neue Jahrb. vol. 115, p. 808) denies that it is a necessary inference
from this passage that Zeno taught the doctrine of the four Stoic categories. Stein, Psych. n. 73, explaining the passage generally as above, apparently identifies οὐσία with κοινῶς ποιόν, and ὑλή with ἰδίως ποιόν, but this distinction is a subordinate one, for οὐσία is entirely distinct from ποιόν, whether κοινῶς or ἰδίως, as Dexipp. l.c. shows.

50. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 292. Deinde Zeno hanc ipsam essentiam finitam esse dicit unamque eam communem omnium quae sunt esse substantiam, dividuam quoque et usque quaque mutabilem: partes quippe eius verti, sed non interire, ita ut de existentibus consumantur in nihilum. Sed ut innumerabilium diversarum, etiam cerearum figurarum, sic neque formam neque figuram nec ulla omnis qualitatem propriam fore censet fundamenti rerum omnium silvae, coniunctam tamen esse semper et inseparabiliter cohaerere aliqui qualitati. Cumque tam sine ortu sit quam sine interitu, quia neque de non existente subsistit neque consumetur in nihilum, non deesse ei spiritum ac vigorem ex aeternitate, qui moveat cnam rationabiliter totam interdum, nonnamquam pro portione, quae causa sit tam cerebrae tamque vehementis universae rei conversionis; spiritum porro motivum illum fore non naturam, sed animam et quidem rationabilem, quae vivificans sensilem mundum exornaverit eum ad hane, qua nune illustratur, venustatem. Quem quidem beatum animal et deum adpellant.

finitam. This is in strong contrast with Epicurean teaching: it follows from the Stoic doctrine of the unity of the world, and is connected with that of the infinity of space, cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Eel. 1. 18. 4th p. 161, 19 τόν δὲ τόπον (i.e. full space) πεπερασμένον διὰ τὸ μηδὲν σῶμα ἀπειρὸν εἶναι. καθάπερ δὲ τὸ σωματικὸν πεπε-
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ρασμένον εἶναι οὕτως τὸ ἁσώματον ἀπειρον, Diog. vii. 150 σῶμα δὲ ἔστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία καὶ πεπερασμένη. The Stoic view is refuted by Lucr. i. 1008—1051, who concludes thus:—infinita opus est vis undique material. Similarly Diog. L. x. 41 εἶτε γὰρ ἦν τὸ κενὸν ἀπειρον τὰ δὲ σώματα ὁρισμένα, οὐδαμοῦ ἀν ἔμενε τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ’ ἐφέρετο κατὰ τὸ ἀπειρον κενὸν διεσπαρμένα, οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰ ύπερεῖδοντα καὶ στέλλοντα κατὰ τὰς ἀντικοπάς.

unamque eam etc. See on frag. 51.

cerearum: wax is chosen as being one of the most pliable substances. Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 375 ὁ μαλακώ- τατος κηρός...τυποῦται μὲν ὑπὸ τινος ἁμα νοήματι διὰ τὴν ύγρότητα οὐ συνέχει δὲ τὸν τύπον. A very close parallel will be found in Ov. Met. xv. 169: (of Pythagoras)

utque novis facilis signatur cera figuris,
	nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas servat easdem,
	sed tamen ipsa eadem est; animam sic semper eandem

esse, sed in varias doceo migrare figuras.

neque formam etc. Cf. Posid. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5c p. 133, 18 τὴν τῶν ὄλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὑλὴν ἀποικόν καὶ ἀμορφόν εἶναι καθ’ ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτελαγμένον ἵδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ’ αὐτὴν ἄδιʼ ἐν τινι σχῆματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι. In this respect the Stoics simply adopted Aristotle’s conception of ὑλή, cf. Metaph. Z. 3. 1029 a 20 λέγον δ’ ὑλὴν ἢ καθ’ αὐτῆν μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἀλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὁρισταὶ τὸ ὄν. Arist. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 4, p. 132 foll. concluding thus:—δείν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν (i.e. ὑλῆς καὶ εἰδοὺς) τῆς συνόδου πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν. The distinction between the two schools is that, whereas the Stoics defined ὑλή as σῶμα (Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5b p. 133, 16), Aristotle declared it to be σωματική merely, but this distinction is more apparent than real.
sine ortu: αἰδιος, σύγχρονος τῷ θεῷ, infra frag. 51.
neque de non existente: the denial of ἀπλῶς γένεσις ἐκ μη ὄντος is common to all ancient philosophy. See Tyndall, fragments of Science p. 91 (quoted by Munro on Lucr. i. 150), “One fundamental thought pervades all these statements, there is one taproot from which they all spring: this is the ancient notion that out of nothing nothing comes, that neither in the organic world, nor in the inorganic, is power produced without the expenditure of other power.” Cf. Posidonius ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 20. 7, p. 178, 2, τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐκ ὄντα (φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν)...ἀπέγνωσαν ἀνύπαρκτον οὐσιαν. M. Aurel. iv. 4.
moveat, κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης, frag. 45.
non naturam: in apparent contradiction to frag. 46, but we shall probably explain: the πνεῦμα is not merely φύσις, it is also ψυχή, nay more it is ψυχὴ λόγον ἔχουσα, i.e. νοῦς.
animal, frag. 62. deum: observe that this is attributed to the school in general and not to Zeno in particular, cf. frag. 66.

51. Stob. Ecl. i. 11. 5a, p. 132, 26. Ζήνωνος: οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὑλήν, ταύτην δὲ πάσαν αἰδιον καὶ οὕτε πλεῖο γιγνομένην οὔτε ἑλάττω- τα δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ ἀεὶ ταῦτα διαμένειν ἀλλὰ δια- ρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχείσθαι. διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τὸν παντός λόγον, ὃν ἑνοὶ εἰμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἶνοπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα. Epiphan. Haeres. i. 5, Diels, p. 558, φάσκει οὖν καὶ οὕτος (Ζήνων) τὴν ὑλήν σύγχρονον καλὸν τῷ θεῷ ἵσα ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰρέσεισιν, εἰμαρμένην τε εἶναι καὶ γένεσιν εἴ ς ἢς τὰ πάντα διοικεῖται καὶ πάσχει. Diog. L. vii. 150, οὐσίαν δὲ φασὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὑλήν ώς...Ζήνων...καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ
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\( \text{οὔτε} \) πλείων. The \( \text{ἄποιος} \) \( \text{ύλη} \) is, as we have seen, \( \text{ωρισμένη} \) and \( \text{πεπερασμένη} \): being also \( \text{ἄδιδως} \) it is incapable of increase or diminution. Its parts however (i.e. matter as seen in the \( \text{ἰδίως} \) \( \text{ποιόν} \) or individually determined thing) are subject to destruction and change. See the further authorities cited by Zeller, Stoics, p. 101, n. 2.

\( \text{διαίρεσθαι} \) καὶ \( \text{συγχέισθαι} \). Strictly speaking both these terms are to be distinguished from the theory of intermingling which was characteristic of Stoicism (\( \text{κράσις} \) \( \text{δί} \) \( \text{όλων} \), and see infra). Thus \( \text{διαίρεσις} \) is the separation of substances which have been combined by \( \text{παράθεσις} \), e.g. a heap of barley, wheat or beans, while \( \text{σύγχυσις} \) is the chemical fusion of two distinct substances which lose their essential properties in consequence of the process (Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 17. 4, p. 154, 10—155, 14). The Stoic \( \text{κράσις} \) or \( \text{μίξις} \) is distinguished from the former by its implication of entire permeation, and from the latter owing to the retention of their properties by the ingredients.

\( \text{52.} \) Stob. Ecl. i. 17. 3, p. 152, 19. \( \text{Ζήνωνα} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{οὔτως} \) \( \text{ἀποφαίνεσθαι} \) \( \text{διαρρήηδην} \) \( \text{τουαύην} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{δεήσει} \) \( \text{εἶναι} \) \( \text{ἐν} \) \( \text{περιόδῳ} \) \( \text{τὴν} \) \( \text{τοῦ} \) \( \text{όλου} \) \( \text{διακόσμησιν} \) \( \text{ἐκ} \) \( \text{τῆς} \) \( \text{οὐσίας} \), \( \text{ὅταν} \) \( \text{ἐκ} \) \( \text{πυρὸς} \) \( \text{τροπὴ} \) \( \text{εἰς} \) \( \text{ὕδωρ} \) \( \text{δὲ} \) \( \text{ἄερος} \) \( \text{γένηται} \), \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{μὲν} \) \( \text{τὸ} \) \( \text{ὕφιστασθαι} \) \( \text{kαὶ} \) \( \text{γῆν} \) \( \text{συνίστασθαι} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{καὶ} \) \( \text{κ}
μὲν διαμένειν ὑδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου ἀέρα γίνεσθαι λεπτυνομένου δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτεσθαι, τὴν δὲ μίξιν ἐκ τῆς ἀλληλα τῶν στοιχείων μεταβολῆ σώματος ὅλου δι' ὅλου τινὸς ἐτέρου διερχομένου.

Diog. L. vii. 135, 136, ἐν τε εἶναι θέον καὶ νόην καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία πολλαῖς τε ἐτέραις ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι. κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸν ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται οὕτω καὶ τούτων σπερματικῶν λόγον ὅταν τοῦ κόσμου, τοιόνδε ὑπολείπεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ εὐεργόν αὐτῷ πιούντα την ὑλὴν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐξής γένεσιν εἶτα ἀπογεννᾶν πρῶτον τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν. Ἰέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου. Diog. L. vii. 142, γίνεσθαι δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ὑσία τραπῇ δ' ἀέρος εἰς ὑγρότητα, εἶτα τὸ παχυμέρες αὐτοῦ συστάν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῇ τὸ δὲ λεπτομέρες ἐξαιρέσθη, καὶ τούτ' ἐπὶ πλέον λεπτυνθέν πῦρ ἀπογεννῆσθῃ εἶτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτὰ τε καὶ ξώα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα γένη. περὶ δὴ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων μὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου, κ.π.λ. Probus ad Verg. p. 10, 33 K. ex his (quatuor elementis) omnia esse postea effigiata Stoici tradunt Zenon Citieus et Chrysippus Solaeus et Cleanthes Assius.

ἐν περιόδῳ: these words seem to refer to the periodic renewal of the world after each ἐκπύρωσις and to a constantly recurring cycle in the course of the universe, rather than to the mutual interchange of the four elements which goes on during the actual existence of the world, cf. Marc. Aurel. x. 7, ώστε καὶ ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι εἰς τὸν τοῦ ὅλου λόγον, εἶτε κατὰ περίοδον ἐκπυρομένου εἶτε κ.π.λ. Numenius ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 18. 1, ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἵρεσεως ταύτης ἐξυγροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περίοδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας εἰς πῦρ αἴθερὸδες ἀναλυμένων πάντων.
The evolution of ὑδωρ from the πῦρ τεχνικῶν is first described and then the subsequent generation of the four elements from τὸ ὕγρων. This appears more clearly in the first extract from Diogenes than in the actual words of Zeno as reported by Stobaeus. Zeno is here following very closely in the footsteps of Heraclitus (πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα· θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἡμισὺ γῆ τὸ δὲ ἡμισὺ πρηστήρ, R. and P. § 30) but differs from him in adopting the theory of the four elements, and to this fact is due the introduction of the words δὲ ἄερος. Cf. also the account of Anaximenes, ap. Simpl. Phys. p. 6 α, Ἄναξιμένης ἀραιούμενον μὲν τὸν ἄερα πῦρ γίγνεσθαι φησὶ, πυκνούμενον δὲ ἀνέμου, εἰτα νέφος, εἰτα ἕτοι μᾶλλον ὕδωρ, εἰτα γῆν, εἰτα λίθους τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκ τοῦτων. The ἄνω κάτω ὀδὸς appears clearly in the passage in Stobaeus, cf. Cleanth. frag. 21. There are certain difficulties in this account of the διακόσμησις, which, although not discussed in the authorities, it is right to state even if no satisfactory solution of them can be given. (1) Is the ἐξύγρωσις entirely distinct from and anterior to the formation of the four elements? If Diog.'s account is based upon Zeno, this question must be answered in the affirmative, but in Stobaeus it appears rather as an ordinary stage in the κάτω ὀδὸς. That an entire resolution of the πῦρ τεχνικῶν into ὕγρων (except as regards τὸ ἐσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς) was taught by the Stoæ is also clear from Cornut. c. 17, p. 85, Osann. ἔστι δὲ Χάος μὲν τὸ πρὸ τῆς διακοσμησεως γενόμενον ὕγρων, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως οὐτως ὀνομασμένου, ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ὡς ἔστων οἶνοι κάος... ἢν δὲ ποτε, ὁ παῖ, πῦρ τὸ πάν καὶ γεννησαι πάλιν ἐν περιόδῳ σβησθεῖτο δ' εἰς ἄερα αὐτοῦ μεταβολὴ ἀθρόα γίνεται εἰς ὕδωρ. ὁ δ' ξαμβαίνει τοῦ μὲν υφισταμένου μέρους τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ πῦκνωσιν τοῦ δὲ λεπτυνομένου κατὰ ἀραίωσιν.
(2) Is the ἐξύγρωσις merely a step in the creative process or is it to be regarded, as it apparently was by Cleanthes, as the antithesis of the ἐκπύρωσις? Perhaps it is safest to regard Zeno as an exponent of the simple ὀδὸς ἀνω κάτω and to treat the complications in connection with the τόνος theory of Cleanthes (frag. 24).


λεπτυνομένου, κ.τ.λ. is the corr. of Wachsm. for the mss. ἐκ τινός δὲ τοῦ ἀέρος, coll. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 41, 3. μίξιν. The mixture of dry substances )κράσων the fusion of moist. For a full discussion of the peculiar Stoic doctrine, see Zeller, Stoics, p. 136 foll. It carries with it practically a negation of the physical truth that two bodies cannot occupy the same space. Chrysippus, who devoted much attention both to the positive exposition and controversial defence of this doctrine, illustrated it by several practical examples, one of which, from its obscurity, deserves consideration: καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον ἀντιπαρεκταθῆσεται συμφαρήσεται (Diog. L. vii. 151), i.e. the disappearance of the wine particles can only be explained on the hypothesis of their equable distribution. Stein observes (Psych. nn. 29, 35) that the Ionian ἀλλοϊωσις is not found in the Stoa before Marcus Aurelius, but this is inaccurate. Thus Posidonius, ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 25, p. 178, 7, after explaining that there are four kinds of μεταβολή, (1) κατὰ διαῖρεσιν, (2) κατ᾽ ἀλλοϊωσιν, (3) κατὰ σύγχυσιν, (4) ἐξ ὁλων οὗ κατ᾽ ἀνάλυσιν, proceeds:—τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ᾽ ἀλλοϊωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίνεσθαι τὰς δ’ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γινομένους.

53. Galen, eis to Ἰπποκράτου ὑπόμνημα περὶ χυμῶν i. (xvi. 32 K.) Ζήνων τε ὁ Κιτιέδος [ὁς] τὰς ποιότητας ὀὕτω
καὶ τὰς ὀυσίας δι’ ὅλου κεράνυσθαι ἐνόμιζεν, id. de nat. facult. i. 2, εἰ δ’ ὄσπερ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὰς ὀυσίας δι’ ὅλων κεράνυσθαι χρῆ νομίζειν, ὡς ὑστερον ἀπεφήματο Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς. (Galen says that this theory was ultimately due to Hippocrates, from whom Aristotle took it.)

The best commentary on this frag. is to be found in Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 57—62, which contains a statement and refutation of the doctrine here referred to. The following short summary will make the meaning clear:—Things which are subject to the influence of κράσις are themselves a combination of ὀυσία and ποιότητες: when mixture takes place, we must either say that the ὀυσίαι are mixed or that the ποιότητες are mixed, or that both or neither are mixed. The last alternative is obviously absurd, and the same may be shown to be the case with either of the two first, λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι καὶ αἱ ποιότητες τῶν κερναμένων καὶ αἱ ὀυσίαι χωροῦσι δι’ ἀλλήλων καὶ μιγνύμεναι τὴν κράσιν ἀποτελοῦσιν (§ 59). But this is still more absurd. Mix one spoonful of hemlock juice with ten of water: if both entirely permeate each other, they must occupy the same space and be equal to each other. The result of the mixture ought therefore to give us either 20 spoonfuls or 2. The whole discussion is one which strikes a modern reader as particularly barren and pedantic, but it should never be forgotten that to the Stoics ποιότης was material no less than ὀυσία. “Aristotle’s εἶδος becomes a current of air or gas (πνεῦμα), the essential reason of the thing is itself material, standing to it in the relation of a gaseous to a solid body.” (Encycl. Brit. Art. Stoics.)

54. Stob. Ecl. i. 20. 1*, p. 171, 2. Ζήνων καὶ Κλειάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν ὀυσίαν μεταβάλλειν ὅπων εἰς ὁπερμα τὸ πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτε-
The Stoic authorities for the doctrine of ἐκπύρωσις will be found collected in Zeller, p. 164 n. 2. On this point they were opposed to the Peripatetics who held the ἀφθαρσία of the κόσμος, and even some of the later Stoics, notably Panaetius and Boethus, diverged from the teaching of their predecessors. It is doubtful whether Zeno derived the ἐκπύρωσις from Heraclitus (see Introd. p. 21): it may however be observed that it was far more in accordance with his historical position to maintain the destructibility of the world, at any rate, so long as we concede any materiality to his primal fire; if fire is a mere metaphor to express πάντα ῥεῖ, the case is of course very different. Cf. Marc. Aurel. iii. 3. The Christian writers often allude to the ἐκπύρωσις, which serves at once as a parallel and a contrast to their own doctrine, e.g. Tatian, adv. Graec. c. 25, p. 162 c, ἐκπύρωσις (λέγει τις) ἀποβαίνειν κατὰ χρόνους ἐγὼ δὲ εἰσάπαξ. Justin Martyr, Apol. i. 20. 20, p. 66 D.

τὸ πῦρ, add. εἰς Heeren whom Heinze, Logos, p. 111, follows, but the alteration is needless. For σπέρμα cf. M. Aurel. iv. 36.

55. Tatian, adv. Graec. c. 5, τὸν Ζήνωνα διὰ τῆς ἐκπύρωσις ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνίστασθαι πάλιν τοὺς αὐτούς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, λέγω δὲ "Ἀνυτον καὶ Μέλητον ἐπὶ τῷ κατη-
γορεῖν Βούσιριν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ἔνοκτονείν καὶ Ἦρακλέα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἄθλεῖν παραιτητέον.

Cf. Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 38, ἔσεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν Σωκράτη καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντεύξεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεταχειριέσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ κόμην καὶ ἄγρον ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι. The exact repetition in some future cycle of the world’s course of the events that have already happened was maintained also by the Pythagoreans, cf. Simpl. Phys. 173 a, εἰ δὲ τις πιστεύσει τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὡς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμοῖ, κἀγὼ μυθολογεύσω τὸ βασίλειον ἡχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἔξει καὶ τῶν χρόνων εὐλογὸν ἐστὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι (quoted by Zeller, Pre-Socratics i. p. 474, n. 2). The Stoics were the more inclined to adopt such a view in consequence of their belief in the unswerving operation of the decrees of destiny. Somewhat analogous are the consequences which flowed from the Epicurean theory of an infinite number of worlds: cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 125, et ut nos nunc simus ad Baulos Putecolosque videamus, sic innumerabilis paribus in locis isdem esse nominibus, honoribus, rebus gestis, ingeniis, formis, aetatibus isdem de rebus disputantis?

The subject is well treated by Ogereau, Essai, p. 70.

παραίτητον : Tatian’s objection to the Stoic theory is based on the ground that there is no progress towards perfection, the bad will be again more numerous than the just: Socrates and Heracles belong to a very small minority.

άνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἐκάστου τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν διαλύσεως, χερσαίων φθοράς κατὰ γέννη ζώων. κατα- 5 σκευασίων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀύτως: 'εἰ μὴ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔλαβεν ἡ γῆ, μέρος ὡπανεστὸς οὐδὲν ἄν ἔτι αὐτῆς ἑωράτο, χθαμαλὰ δ' ἦδη τὰ ὀρχ πάντ᾽ ἐγεγένητο, καὶ οἱ γεώλοφοι πάντες ὑσόπεδοι τῇ πεδιάδε τοσούτων γὰρ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ὡμβρων ἐξ αἰδίου φερομένων εἰκὸς ἢν τῶν διημένων 10 πρὸς ύψος τὰ μὲν χειμάρροις ἀπερρήθαι, τὰ δ’ ὑπονοστή- σαντα κεχαλάσθαι, πάντα δὲ διὰ πάντων ἦδη λελειάνθαι· νυνὶ δὲ συνεχῶς ἀνωμαλίαι καὶ παμπόλλων ὅρων αἱ πρὸς αἰθέριον ύψος ὑπερβολαὶ μηνύματ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ τῆς γῆς μὴ ἀἰδίων εἶναι· πάλαι γὰρ, ὡς ἐφη, ἐν ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ ταῖς 15 ἐπομβρίαις ἀπὸ περάτων ἐπὶ πέρατα πᾶσ’ ἀν λεωφόρος ἐγεγένητο. πέφυκε γὰρ ἡ ὑδατος φύσις καὶ μάλιστα ἀφ’ ύψηλοτάτων καταράττουσα τὰ μὲν ἐξωθεν τῇ βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ τῷ συνεχεῖ τῶν ψεκάδων κολάττουσα κοιλαίνειν ὑπερ- γάζεσθαι τε τῆς σκληρογέων καὶ λιθωδεστάτην ὅρυκτήρων 20 οὐκ ἔλαττον. 'καὶ μὴν ἡ γε θάλασσα,' φασίν, ἡ θεία μεμείωταί μάρτυρες δ’ αἱ νῆσων εὑροκιμώταται Ἦδην ὑπὸ τέκνων καὶ Δήλος: αὕτη γὰρ τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἡφαινομένα κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ἐδεδύκεσαν ἐπικλυζόμεναι, χρόνῳ δ’ ύστερον ἐλαττομένης ἠρέμα κατ’ ὅλων ἀνίσχουσα, ὡς 25 αἱ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναγραφεῖσαι μηνύσσων ἰστορίαι: [τὴν δὲ Δήλον καὶ Ἀναφήν οὐνόμασαν δ’ ἀμφοτέρων ὅνομάτων πιστούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δὴ ἴδη ἀναφανεῖσα ἐγένετο ἢδηλομενή καὶ ἀφαινὴς οὔσα τὸ πάλαι] πρὸς δὲ τούτους μεγάλους πελαγῶν μεγάλους κόλπους καὶ βαθέις 30 ἀναξηραθέντας ἰπειρώσθαι καὶ γεγεννῆσθαι τῆς παρακει- μένης χώρας μοίραν οὐ λυπρῶν σπειρομένουν καὶ φυτευο- μένους, οὶς σημεῖ’ ἀττα τῆς παλαιᾶς ἑισαπολελείθαι θαλαττώσεως ψηφίδας τε καὶ κόγχας καὶ ὅσα ὁμοιότροπα πρὸς αἰγαλους εἴωθεν ἀποβράττεσθαι. [διὸ καὶ Πίνδαρος 35 ἐπὶ τῆς Δήλου φησὶ: Χαῖρ’, ὁ θεοδόματα, λιπαροπλοκάμου}
παίδεσσι Λατούς ἰμεροέστατον ἔρνος
Πόντου θύγατερ, χθονὸς εὐρείας ἀκίνητον τέρας· ἂν τε βροτοὶ
40 Δάλον κικλῆσκουσιν, μάκαρες δ' ἐν 'Ολύμπῳ τηλέ-
φαντον κυανέας χθονὸς ἀστρον.
θύγατέρα γὰρ Πόντου τὴν Δήλον ἐιρήκε τὸ λεχθὲν αἰνι-
τόμενος]. εἰ δὲ μειοῦται ἢ θάλαττα, μειωθῆσεται μὲν ἢ
γῆ, μακραῖς δ' ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδοις καὶ εἰς ἅπαν ἐκάτερον
στοιχεῖον ἀναλωθῆσεται, δαπανωθῆσεται <δὲ> καὶ ὁ
45 σύμμπας ἀὴρ ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ὁλίγον ἐλαττούμενος, ἀποκρι-
θῆσεται δὲ πάντ' εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν τὴν πυρός.'
πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ τρίτου κεφαλαίου κατασκευήν χρώνται
λόγῳ τωρῇς: 'φθείρεται πάντως ἐκεῖνο, οὐ πάντα τὰ μέρη
φθαρτά ἐστι, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου πάντα τὰ μέρη φθαρτὰ ἐστι,
50 φθαρτὸς ἁρὰ ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν.' δ' ὑπερεθέμεθα νῦν ἐπι-
σκεπτέουν. ποιον μέρος τῆς γῆς, ἰν' ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρξόμεθα,
μεῖζον ἢ ἐλαττον, οὐ χρόνῳ διαλυθῆσεται; λίθων οἱ
κραταίοτατοι ἀρ' οὐ μυδώσι καὶ σήποται κατὰ τὴν ἐξεως
ἀσθένειαν—[ἡ δ' ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόνως, δεσμὸς οὐκ
55 ἄρρηκτος, ἀλλὰ μόνον δυσδιάλυτος]—θρυπτόμενοι καὶ
ῥέουτες εἰς λεπτὴν τὸ πρῶτον ἀναλύονται κόνιν; [εἰθ' ὑπέρ
ὑστερον δαπανηθέουτες ἐξαναλύονται] τί δὲ; εἰ μὴ πρὸς
ἀνέμων ῥιπτεῖοτο τὸ ύδωρ, ἀκίνητον ἑαθὲν οὐχ ύφ' ἕσυχιας
νεκροῖται; μεταβάλλει γούν καὶ δυσωδέστατον γίγνεται
60 οἷα ψυχῇ ἀφηρημένον ξῶ̂ν. αἰ γε μὴν ἄρος φθοραὶ
παντὶ τῷ δῆλαι νοσεῖν γὰρ καὶ φθίνειν καὶ τρόπον τῶν'
ἀποθνήσκειν πέρικεου. ἐπεὶ τί ἄν ταῖς, μὴ στοχαζόμενος
ὁνομάτων εὐπρεπείας ἀλλὰ τάληθοὺς, εἰποὶ λοιμὸν εἶναι
πλὴν ἄρος θάνατον τὸ οἰκείον πάθος ἀναχέοντος ἐτὶ
65 φθορᾶ πάντων ὅσα ψυχῆς μεμοίραται; τί χρὴ μακρη-
γορεῖν περὶ πυρῶς; ἀτροφῆσαι γὰρ αὐτίκα σβέννυται
χωλόν, ἢ φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ, γεγονός ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ. διὸ σκηριτ-
τόμενον ὀρθοῦται κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀναφθείσης ύλῆς νομὴν,
ἐξαναλωθείσης δ' ἀφαιρεῖται. [τὸ παραπλήσιον μέντοι
καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰνδικὴν δράκοντας φασὶ πᾶσχειν. 70 ἀνέρποντας γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ξών ἐλέφαντας περὶ νότα καὶ νηδύν ἀπασαν εἶλεύθαι, φλέβα δ’ ἦν ἣν τοῦ χρί διελόντας ἐμπόνειν τοῦ αἵματος, ἀπλήστως ἐπιστομοφένος βιαῖρο πνεύματι καὶ συντόνῳ ροΐξῳ. μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινος ἐξαναλομένους ἐκείνους ἀντέχειν ὑπ’ ἀμηχανίας 75 ἀνασκιρτῶντας καὶ τῇ προνομαίᾳ τὴν πλευρᾶν τύπτοντας ὡς καθιερόμενος τῶν δράκοντων, εἶτ’ ὑεὶ κενομενέον τοῦ ξωτικοῦ πηδῶν μὲν μηκέτι δύνασθαι, κραδαινομένους δ’ ἐστάναι, μικρὸν δ’ ὠστερον καὶ τῶν σκελῶν ἐξασθενησάτων κατασειθέντας ὑπὸ λιφαμίας ἀποψύχειν πεσόντας 80 δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους τοῦ θανάτου συναπολλύναι τρόπῳ τοῦδε: μηκέτ’ ἔχοντες τροφὴν οἱ δράκοντες, ὃν περιέθεσαν δεσμὸν ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐκλύειν ἀπαλλαγὴν ἤδη ποθοῦντες, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ βάρους τῶν ἐλεφάντων θλιβόμενοι πιεζοῦνται καὶ πολύ μᾶλλον ἐπειδὰν τύχῃ στέριφον <ὁν> καὶ λιθῶδες 85 τὸ ἐδαφὸς ἐλυστομένοι γὰρ καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντες εἰς διάλυσιν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πέσαντος βίας πεδηθέντες εἰσευτοὺς πολυτρόπως ἐν ἀμηχάνοις καὶ ἀπόροις γυμνάσαντες ἐξασθενοῦσιν <καὶ> καθάπερ οἱ καταλευσθέντες ἢ τείχους αἰφνίδιον ἐπενεχθέντες προκαταληφθέντες, οὐδ’ ὅσον ἄνα- 90 κύψαι δυνάμενοι πυγὴ τελευτῶσιν.] εἰ δὴ τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον τοῦ κόσμου φθορὰν ὑπομένει, δηλοῦντι καὶ ὃ ἔξ αὐτῶν παγεὶς κόσμος ἀφθαρτος οὐκ ἔσται,’ τὸν δὲ τέταρτον καὶ λοιπὸν λόγον ἀκριβωτέων ὀδὲ φασίν. ‘εἰ δ’ ὁ κόσμος ἀίδιος ἦν, ἦν ἃν καὶ τὰ ξῶα αἴδια καὶ πολὺ γε μᾶλλον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὅσοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁμεινόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ψυγονος φανήσαι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἔρευναν τὰ φύσεως. εἰκὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον δ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρώπως συνυπάρξαι τὸς τέχνας ὡς ἄν ἰσηλίκας οὐ μόνον ὅτι λογικὴ τὸ ἐμμε-θοδοῦν οἰκεῖον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ξῆν ἄνευ τοῦτων οὐκ ἐστὶν.’ 100 ἰδομεν τοὺς ἐκάστων χρόνον αὐλογήσαντες τῶν ἐπιτραγω- δομένων θεοῦς μύθων * * * εἰ μὴ ἀίδιος ἀνθρωπος, οὐδ’ ἀλλῳ τὶ ξῆν, ὡστ’ οὐδ’ αἱ δεδεγμέναι ταῦτα χωραὶ γῇ
καὶ ὑδωρ καὶ ἀέρ. ἐξ ὧν τὸ φθαρτὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δῆλον ἔστων.'

It will be seen that the writer attributes to Theophrastus the statement and criticism of certain views as to the creation and destruction of the world, which were opposed to the Peripatetic doctrine of its eternity. After the above extract this hostile view is refuted by arguments obviously derived, in part at least, from Peripatetic sources¹, although the name of Theophrastus is not again introduced. The question arises, assuming the good faith of the extract, to whom do these criticised views belong? This point was first raised by Zeller in Hermes XI. 422—429 and by an ingenious process of reasoning he concluded that Zeno is the philosopher who is here attacked. First, the four arguments, by which the proposition that the world is mortal is supported, belong to the Stoic school. They cannot belong to a pre-Aristotelian philosopher, for the doctrine of the eternity of the world and of mankind, against which they are directed, had not been broached before Aristotle (see de Caelo i. 10. 279b12); of the post-Aristotelians they obviously alone suit the Stoics, who were alone in holding the periodical destruction of the world. The second argument, built on the retrocession of the sea, finds a parallel in the views of a world-flood attributed to the Stoa by Alexander Aphrod. Meteor. 90a m.; and the dialectical form in which the third and fourth arguments are couched suggests the same origin. Again, the authority of Diog. L. vii. 141 is conclusive as to the third argument, and the terminology of ἐξις, τόνος, πνεύμα, and πνευματικὴ δύναμις, to which may be added οὐσία, ἀναφθείσης ὑλῆς, and φύσει οἰκεῖον, is undoubtedly Stoic. Next, it being proved that these arguments belong to the Stoic school, Zeno is the only Stoic whom Theo-

¹ This point is proved in detail by Zeller, l. c. p. 424, 5.
phrastus could have criticised, for the latter died in OL. 123, that is between 288 and 284 B.C., at a time when Zeno’s school had been founded for about 15 years. For the avoidance of a direct mention of Zeno, if such was really the case in the Theophrastean original, Zeller quotes the parallel cases in which Aristotle combats the views of Xenocrates and Speusippus without referring to them by name. As an additional circumstance pointing to Zeno’s authorship, we may refer to the form in which the syllogism introducing the third argument is cast. This is undoubtedly one of those breves et acutulae conclusiones, so often mentioned by Cicero as characteristic of the style of the founder of Stoicism and of which examples (in addition to those in Cicero) have been preserved by Sextus Empiricus and Seneca: see the collection in Introd. p. 33. This is perhaps the right place to observe that a supposed frag. of Zeno, extracted by Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 8) from Philo de Provid. i. 12, and to the same effect as the third argument here, can no longer be regarded as belonging to Zeno on the authority of that passage after the explanation of Diels, Doxogr. Gr. proleg. p. 3.

These views of Zeller have however been vigorously criticised by Diels (Doxogr. Gr. pp. 106—108). His main contention is that the authority of the compiler of the pseudo-Philonian treatise is too weak to support so important a discovery as the alleged controversy between Theophrastus and Zeno, of which no trace has come down to us from other sources. He does not believe that this “nebulo” had ever read Theophrastus, and suggests that, finding the name of Theophrastus attached to the first two arguments in some work of Critolaus, he left his readers to assume that the elder Peripatetic was really responsible for those passages in which Critolaus himself
attacks what is undoubtedly Stoic doctrine. The result is that Diels, though he prints cc. 23—27 in the body of his work, does not believe that they contain (even after allowing for later accretions) a genuine excerpt from the φυσικαὶ δόξαι of the Eresian philosopher. Now it is obvious that we are only concerned with the question of the fontes of the Philonian treatise and its general credibility, in so far as its solution enables us to authenticate these fragments as belonging to Zeno. Thus, altogether apart from its appearance in this passage, the Zenonian authorship of the syllogism in ll. 48—50 is extremely probable not only from internal indications, but also because of the evidence of Diogenes Laertius vii. 141, 142 (observe especially the words περὶ δὲ οὐν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου). But, as to the general body of the fragment, the case is different: if we cannot trust the good faith of the writer, as giving us a genuine statement of the refutation by Theophrastus of his opponents' doctrine, it may well be that the two earlier arguments represent early Ionian, possibly Heraclitean, views (with Stoic additions), and that in the later portions we have the work of one of Zeno's successors as set out by a later Peripatetic. On the other hand, if Theophrastus is responsible for the exposition of all four arguments, they certainly belong to a single teacher or a single school, and that teacher, as has been shown above, must be Zeno. It is therefore necessary for us to consider the tenor of Zeller's rejoinder in Hermes xv. 137—146, which, briefly stated, resolves itself into a theory as to the origin of the pseudo-Philonian treatise. He fully admits the many absurdities with which the text is strewn, but argues that they can all be eliminated without interfering with the nexus of the arguments; nay more, that the original writing, though
not of great value, was at least a clear and trustworthy exposition of the views of the Peripatetic school, to which the writer belonged, but that the sequence of its thought has been distorted and its whole character changed by the blundering additions of a later hand. We are able to recognise in this treatise the work of two distinct authors, the first probably an Alexandrian philosopher of the latter half of the first century before Christ, and a contemporary of Arius Didymus and Boethus, and the second an Alexandrian Jew of the first or second century of the Christian era. The references of the original writer to Greek philosophy are found to be correct in all cases where his statements can be scrutinised by the light of other evidence: why then should we mistrust his citation of Theophrastus? To test this theory in detail would require a thorough examination of the treatise in question with reference to the suggested additions, an examination which would be out of place here. But we can gauge the character of the proposed explanation by the three passages which Zeller expels from our extract, and which may be fairly said to be typical of the accretions in the general body of the work. All three are certainly futile and purposeless, but that which is especially remarkable is the manner in which the course of the argument is improved by their removal. In particular, the long digression about the serpents and the Indian elephants prevents the conclusion founded on the destructibility of the several elements from following in natural sequence the last of the arguments by which this destructibility is proved of each element in detail. The latest treatment of this question is to be found in von Arnim’s Quellen Studien zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin 1888) p. 41 foll. He believes that the compilator of the treatise only had later Peripatetic writings—especially those of Critolaus—before
him, and that the main portion of our passage was derived from one of them. All that belongs really to Theophrastus is the statement of the headings of the four arguments (ll. 1—5) and these headings, if taken alone, might refer to pre-Aristotelians. Yet, holding in agreement with Zeller and against Diels that the arguments by which the headings are supported are undeniably Stoic, he concludes that a younger Peripatetic adopted the Theophrastean scheme, originally a doxographical statement of pre-Aristotelian doctrines, as a groundwork for his polemic against the Stoics, who on their side had adopted these four arguments, perhaps from Heraclitus and Empedocles. Finally he suggests, on very inadequate grounds (p. 47), that Antipater of Tarsus was the particular Stoic whose views are summarised. If this theory is correct, it is certainly an extraordinary coincidence that Theophrastus should have selected from the older philosophy four particular statements, which go to prove the destructibility of the world, and that the Stoics should have unconsciously taken up identically the same ground in support of their own theory. Zeller’s opinion still appears to me more reasonable: see also Stein, Psych. n. 86, who has anticipated the argument used above from the syllogism in ll. 33—35.


ἐγενέτο(ἐγένετο) indicates that the process would have been already complete at the time specified i.e. long ago. In the case of verbs denoting an action the distinction between plup. and aor. with ἀν is less apparent, though always present: cf. e.g. Dem. Timocr. p. 746 § 146, if imprisonment were contrary to the Ath. constitution
THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.

ovdu ̓ oswv ̓ endeixi̇s ̓ estin ̓ h ̓ apagwgh, prosegrappto ̓ an ̓ en tois ̓ nómois k.t.l. "There would not have been found a clause enacted in the laws" etc.

16. ἀπὸ περάτων κ.τ.λ. "The whole earth would have become a highway from end to end." πᾶσ’ ἀν: so Bücheler and Diels for πᾶσα.

19. τῇ συνεχεί, MS. Med. whence Bücheler reads τῇ συνεχεία, recalling the line κοιλαῖνει πέτρην βανὶς ὑδατὸς ἐνδελεχεία.


28. γὰρ: the sentence would run more smoothly if this word were omitted.

33. ὃς σημεῖ’ ἀπα κ.τ.λ. The observation of similar facts induced in Xenophanes the belief that the earth was originally in a fluid state: cf. Hippolyt. i. 14 (quoted by Zeller, pre-Socrat. i. p. 570), ὁ δὲ Σενοφάνης μίξων τῆς γῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν γενέσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ λύεσθαι φάσκων τοιαύτας ἔχεων ἄποδείξεις, ὅτι ἐν μέσῃ γῆ καὶ ὄρεσιν εὐρίσκοντο κόγχαι καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις δὲ ἐν ταῖς λατομίαις λέγει εὐρήσθαι τύπον ἄθυος καὶ φοκάων, ἐν δὲ Πάρῳ τύπον ἀφύς ἐν τῷ βαθεὶ τοῦ λίθου, ἐν δὲ Μελίτῃ πλάκας συμπάντων θαλασσίων.

35. ἦν—αινιττόμενος expelled by Zeller l. c. and also by Bücheler.

37. Pindar, frag. 64[87] Bergk.

43. περίδοις: see on frag. 52.

45. ἀποκριθήσεται "will be merged," cf. Thuc. i. 3, Ἐλλήνας...eos ἐν ὄνομα ἀποκεκρίσθηα, Diog. L. vii. 148, φύσις...τοιαύτα δρωσα ἀφ’ οἰων ἀπεκρίθη.


ix. 81, τῶν ἰσομέσων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως 
συνέχεται...καὶ ἔξεως μὲν, ὥς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα (Zeller, p. 
208).

54. πνευματικὸς τόνος: the favourite doctrine of Clean-
thes: if this passage belongs to Zeno, we have an indica-
tion here that the master prepared the way for the pupil, 

cf. Cleanth. frag. 24. The words however may in any case be 
a later addition, and under the circumstances they have 
been bracketed.

56. ρέοντες “passing away” in the Heraclitean sense; 
yet even Plato has ei γὰρ ρέοι τὸ σῶμα...(Phaed. 87 D) 

32. 442.

58. ἀνέμων: the illustration is suggestive in connection 
with the doctrine of πνεῦμα. For ῥυπίζωτο cf. frag. 106 
κινούμενον καὶ ἀναριτιζόμενον ὅπ’ ἐκείνου.

60. ψυχῆν appears to be attributed to animals in 
general and not exclusively to man, see on frag. 43.

63. εὐπρεπεῖας. Cf. Plat. Euthyd. 305 ε, καὶ γὰρ ἔχει 
ὀντως ὧ Κρίτων εὐπρεπείαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλῆθειαν. It is 
possible that there is a reference to some contemporary 
school here, which had explained λοιμὸς after the manner 
of Prodicus. For the definition cf. M. Aurel. ix. 2.

69—91 ejected by Zeller, l. c.

85. ὁν add. Diels. 89. καὶ add. Bernays.

99. ὡς ὁν not merely equivalent to ὡσπερ but elliptical. The full phrase would be ὡς εἰκός ἢν ἂν ἐi ἱση-

λικεσ ἡσαν. Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 38, ἢ ἐi σοι πείσαιμι κοινὴ 
τὴν πόλιν ψευδόμενον ὡς ἂν στρατηγικοὶ καὶ πολιτικοὶ 
ἐαυτὴν ἐπιτρέψαι, where see Kühner. In this way is to 
be explained Thuc. i. 33. 1.

102. “Deesse quibus εὐρήματον tempor a explica-

verant vidit Mangey,” Usener.
57. Philargyrius ad Verg. Georg. ii. 336, Zenon ex hoc mundo quamvis aliquae interea tamen ipsum perpetuo manere quia inhaerent ei elementa e quibus generantur materiae: ut dixit crescere quidem, sed ad interitum non pervenire manentibus elementis a quibus revalescat.

If taken literally, the doctrine here referred to would be inconsistent with the destructibility of the κόσμος, which, as we have seen, was held by Zeno: again, elementa can hardly be a translation of στοιχεῖα, which undoubtedly perished. We must suppose therefore that Zeno is speaking not of the visible world, but of the universe, and that elementa = ἄρχαι. According to Diog. L. vii. 137 κόσμος is used by the Stoics in three senses: the first of these is αὐτόν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιοῦν ὅς δὴ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, and this is the sense which mundus must bear here. If this explanation be thought impossible, we can only suppose that there is a confusion with Zeno of Tarsus who is said to have withheld assent to the doctrine of the ἐκπύρωσις, Zeller, p. 168 n. 1. Stein, Psych. p. 64 and n. 92, thinks that Zeno held that at the ἐκπύρωσις the various manifestations of God—world-soul, λόγος σπερματικὸς etc.—lose themselves in the divine unity, but that the indefinite matter (ἀποιος ὕλη) remains, cf. ib. p. 34, n. 42.


This was one of the points which distinguished the Stoics from the Epicureans, who held that there are an infinite number of worlds. See further Zeller, p. 183 and the notes: the characteristic and important view of συμπάθεια μερῶν or συντονία is one of the developments introduced by Cleanthes.

We need not infer from this passage that Zeno expressed himself to be adopting Socrates' argument, for in the preceding paragraphs in Sext. l. c. 92 f. the passage referred to (Xen. Mem. i. 4 §§ 2—5. 8) is set out and discussed. The parallel passage is § 8 καὶ ταῦτα εἶδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρόν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὐσίας ἔχει κ.τ.λ. ...νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἁρά οὐδαμὸν ὅντα σε εὐτυχῶς πῶς δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, καὶ τάδε τὰ ὑπερμεγέθη καὶ πλήθος ἀπειρα δι’ ἀφροσύνην τινὰ, ὡς οἶει, εὐτάκτως ἔχειν; cf. Sext. Math. ix. 77, M. Aurel. iv. 4 and see Stein, Psych. n. 53.

τούτῳ. Bekker with some plausibility suggests τοῦ θεοῦ. The Stoics argued from the existence of God that the world must be reasonable and vice versa. For the relation of God to the world see infra, frag. 66.

60. Cic. N. D. ii. 22, Idemque (Zeno) hoc modo: "Nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt: non igitur caret sensu mundus."


Alexinus the Megarian attacked Zeno's position with the remark that in the same way the world might be proved to be poetical and possessed of grammatical knowledge. The Stoics retorted that it is not true that in the abstract τὸ ποιητικὸν is better than τὸ μὴ ποιητικὸν or τὸ γραμματικὸν than τὸ μὴ γραμματικὸν: otherwise Archilochoi would be better than Socrates, Aristarchus than Plato (Sext. l. c. 108—110). For the fact cf. Diog. vii. 139, οὗτῳ δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ξύον ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν κ.τ.λ. Stein adds Philo, de incorr. m. p. 506 Μ, ὁ κόσμος καὶ φύσις λογική, ὦ μόνον ἐμψυχὸς ὄν, ἄλλα καὶ νοερὸς πρὸς δὲ καὶ φρόνιμος. Siebeck refers to Arist. de Gen. An. ππ. 1. 731β 25, τὸ ἐμψυχὸν τοῦ ἀψύχου βέλτιον.


Hirzel's theory, ππ. p. 217, 218, that Zeno called the world ἐμψυχον and λογικὸν only but not ξύον is controverted by Stein, Psych. n. 82 from this passage. The passage in Plato, part of which is quoted by Sextus, is
Timaeus, p. 29 foll.; and see esp. 30 A, B which illustrates this and the last frag., cf. M. Aurel. iv. 40.

63. Cic. N. D. ii. 22, Idemque similitudine, ut saepe solet, rationem conclusit hoc modo: 'si ex oliva modulate canentes tibiae nascerentur, num dubitares quin inesset in oliva tibicinii quaedam scientia? quid? si platani fidiculas ferrent numerose sonantes, idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque judicetur, quum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes?'

This recalls the anecdote about Amoebeus: apoph. 19.

64. Stob. Ecl. i. 23. 1, p. 200, 21, Ζήνων πύρινων εἶναι τὸν οὐρανόν.

Stobaeus couples Zeno with Parmenides, Heraclitus and Strato. For the Stoic authorities see Zeller, p. 201.

65. Achill. Tat., Isag. in Arat. 5. p. 129 e, Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς οὖτως αὐτὸν ὀρίσατο: 'οὐρανός ἐστὶν αἰθέρος τὸ ἐσχατὸν. ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ὧ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐμφάνως: περιέχει γὰρ πάντα πλῆθος ἀντοῦ. οὔδὲν γὰρ ἐαυτὸ περιέχει: ἀλλ' ἑτέρου ἐστὶ περίεκτικόν. αἰθέρος τὸ ἐσχατὸν: cf. Diog. L. vii. 138 quoted below. The genitive is partitive: "the extreme part of the aether." This becomes clear when we remember that Zeno is closely following Aristotle here, cf. Phys. iv. 5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ μὲν γῆ ἐν τῷ ὑδατί, τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ αέρι, οὕτως δ' ἐν τῷ αἰθήρι, ὁ δ' αἰθήρ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, δ' οὐρανὸς οὐκέτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. Just before he had said: ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ πάντα: ὁ γὰρ οὐρανὸς τὸ πᾶν ἑσως.

περιέχει. A direct parallel to this may be found in the teaching of the Pythagoreans (Zeller, pre-Socratics, i. p. 465), but there is possibly also a reminiscence of Plato, Timaeus 31 A, where οὐρανὸς is spoken of as τὸ περιέχον

Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 1. 29, p. 38, 1. The Stoics held θεοῦ... τὸν κόσμον καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν γῆν. In so far as God is manifested in the world, the world is God. Many more references are given in Zeller, p. 157. The words καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν are added because in it the material essence of divinity exists in its purest form. Diog. L. vii. 138, οὐρανός δὲ ἐστιν ἢ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ἢ πᾶν ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον. Hence Chrysippus and Posidonius spoke of the οὐρανός as τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου (ib. 139). Certainly, if these words are pressed, pantheism, involving the identification of God and matter, is distinctly attributed to Zeno. Wellmann, p. 469, suggests that Zeno may really only have said that the world is formed out of the divine essence (ὁ κόσμος οὐσία θεοῦ) and that Diog. through a confusion of subject and predicate interpreted this as a definition of the essence of God. Another possibility is that κόσμος is used in the same sense as in frag. 71. See also Stein, Psychologie n. 88.

67. Stob. Ecl. i. 19. 4, p. 166, 4, Ζήνωνος. τῶν δ’ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πάντων τῶν κατ’ ἱδίαν ἔξιν συνεστῶτων τὰ μέρη τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου μέσον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόσμου. διότερ ορθῶς λέγεσθαι πάντα τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τοῦ κόσμου τὴν φορὰν ἔχειν, ὃ μάλιστα δὲ τὰ βάρος ἔχοντα. ταῦταν δ’ αἰτίον εἶναι καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μονῆς ἐν ἀπείρῳ κενῷ, καὶ τῆς γῆς παραπλησίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ περὶ τοῦ τούτου κέντρου καθισμενής ἰσοκρατῶς. οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀβαρῇ εἶναι ἄερα καὶ πῦρ τεῖνεσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πὼς 10
ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς ὀλης σφαίρας τοῦ κόσμου μέσου, τὴν δὲ σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν περιφέρειαν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι. φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ μυθενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδ' αὐτῶν φασι τὸν κόσμον

15 βάρος ἔχειν διὰ τὸ τὴν ὀλην αὐτοῦ σύστασιν ἐκ τε τῶν βάρων ἐχόντων στοιχείων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀβαρῶν. τὴν δ' ὀλην γῆν καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν ἐχειν ἀρέσκει βάρος παρὰ δὲ τὴν θέσιν διὰ τὸ τὴν μέσην ἔχειν χώραν (πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῖς τοιούτοις σώμασιν) ἐπὶ τοῦ τόπου 20 τούτου μένειν.

2. συνεστάτων. This is the most general term, elsewhere opposed to συνάπτεσθαι, συνέχεσθαι etc.

4. πάντα τὰ μέρη κ.τ.λ. This centralising tendency is called by Diogenes (VII. 140) τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπυοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. In the Stoic doctrine of the microcosm and the macrocosm there is one discrepancy, in that while the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world is at its extreme periphery the ἡγεμονικὸν of man is in the breast. Stein, Psych. p. 211, finds in this passage an attempt to remove this inconsistency by making the earth the central point from which all motion originates and to which it returns.

9. οὐ πάντως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 14. 1 f. p. 142, 9, οἵ Στωικοὶ δύο μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων κούφα πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα· δύο δὲ βαρέα ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν. κούφον γὰρ ὑπάρχει φύσει, ὁ νεῖε τοῦ τοῦ ἰδίου μέσου, βαρὺ δὲ τὸ εἰς μέσον, i.e. light is opposed to heavy not relatively, as in our use of the words, but absolutely, implying motion in an outward or upward direction. Cic. Tusc. i. 40, persuadent mathematici...eam naturam esse quattuor omnia gignentum corporum, ut, quasi partita habeant inter se ac divisa momenta, terrena et umida suopte nutu et suo pondere ad paris angulos in terram et in mare ferantur, reliquae duae partes, una ignea, una animalis,...rectis
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lineis in caelestem locum subvolent, sive ipsa natura superiora adpetente, sive quod a gravioribus leviora natura repellantur. N. D. II. 116, 117. The Stoics were following Aristotle (ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 19. 1, p. 163, 9, τῆς δὲ κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τὴν δὲ περὶ τὸ μέσον: πυρὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου, γῆς καὶ ύδατος ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον, τοῦ πέμπτου περὶ τὸ μέσον.).

10. τείνεσθαι δὲ: So Diels for MSS. γίνεσθαι, a correction more probable for palaeographical reasons and in itself more attractive than Meineke’s κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Nemes. 2. p. 29, τοικήν εἰναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σῶματα εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἕμα καὶ τὸ ἕξω κινουμένην. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 44. 7. 1054 ε, οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ κινουμένου κ.τ.λ. The explanation is as follows:—the natural motion of the elements is restrained and modified by the continual process of change (μεταβολῆ) by whose action the world is formed and exists. Fire and Air are perpetually being transformed into Water and Earth and thus, before their upward tendency has time to assert itself, they themselves becoming possessed of βάρος start again in the opposite direction. Thus each of the four elements is apparently stationary and remains constant: in reality its component parts are in continual motion. Cf. Chrysippus ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 44. 6, a passage too long to quote. This explanation is supported by the statement which is attributed to the Stoics by Stobæus, that at the ἐκπύρωσις the world is resolved into the void (Ecl. i. 18. 4 b. p. 160, 11 and Euseb. P. E. xv. 40): cf. ib. i. 21. 3 b, μὴτε αὐξέσθαι δὲ μὴτε μειοῦσθαι τὸν κόσμον τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὅτε μὲν παρεκτείνεσθαι πρὸς πλείωνα τόπου ὅτε δὲ συστέλλεσθαι. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Prof. Mayor’s explanation (on N. D. II. 116) that “the all-pervading aether, while it has a naturally ex-
pansive and interpenetrative force, has also a strong cohesive force and thus holds all things together round the centre.” See also M. Aurel. xi. 20.


17. παρὰ δὲ τὴν θέσιν: in itself earth βάρος ἔχει and so tends to move πρὸς τὸ μέσον, but owing to the accident of its position in the centre of the κόσμος its natural motion has no opportunity of becoming apparent.

18. μέσην. For the position of the earth cf. Diog. L. vii. 137, 155, Cic. N. D. i. 103.

Stob. Ecl. i. 15. 6 a p. 146, 21, Ζῆνων ἐφασκε τὸ πῦρ κατ’ εὐθείαν κινεῖσθαι.

Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 14. 1. f. p. 142, 12, τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ’ εὐθείαν...κινεῖται. This is only true of πῦρ ἀπεχθύνων, for the aether or πῦρ τεχνικὸν has a circular motion in the same manner as the πέμπτον σῶμα of Aristotle. So Ar. de Caelo, i. 2. 9, τὸ τε γὰρ πῦρ ἐπ’ εὐθείας ἀνω φέρεται.

Stob. Ecl. i. 18. 1 d p. 156, 27, Ζῆνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἑντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν, ἔξω δ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπειροῦν. διαφέρειν δὲ κενὸν, τόπον, χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον.

Cf. Diog. vii. 140, ἔξωθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ περικεχυμένου εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ἀπειροῦν ὅπερ ἀσώματον εἶναι ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἶνον τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων οὐ κατεχόμενον· ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν. Plut. plac. i. 18, οἱ Στωικοὶ ἑντὸς μὲν τοῦ κόσμου οὐδὲν εἶναι κενὸν, ἔξωθεν δ’ αὐτοῦ ἀπειροῦν. M. Aurel. x. 1. Diels adds Theodoret iv. 14, ἑντὸς
μὲν τοῦ παντὸς μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἕκτος δὲ αὐτοῦ πάμπολυ τε καὶ ἀπειρον. The Epicureans held that without the existence of void within the world motion was impossible (Lucr. i. 329 foll., Reid on Acad. i. 27, n. 125). The Stoics were unaffected by this argument in consequence of their doctrine of κράσις δι᾽ ὀλων, see further on frag. 50, supra. Aristotle denied the existence of void altogether either within or without the universe.

κενόν, τόπον, χώραν. The Stoics and the Epicureans were in virtual agreement in their definitions of these terms: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 2, 3. For a fuller exposition cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 18. 4th p. 161, 8, who compares κενόν to an empty, τόπος to a full, and χώρα to a partially filled vessel, cf. the similar views of Aristotle quoted by R. and P. § 327.


τῶν ἄρχαιων τινές are probably the Pythagoreans who believed in an ἀπειρον πνεῦμα outside the universe, called κενὸν by some of the authorities (Zeller, pre-Socratics i. pp. 467, 8).

71. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 5, p. 213, 15, Ζήνων τὸν ἥλιον φησι καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρων ἐκαστὸν εἶναι νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον πύρινον πυρὸς τεχνικὸν. δύο γὰρ γένη πυρὸς, τὸ μὲν ἀτεχνὸν καὶ μετάβαλλον εἰς ἑαυτὸ τὴν τροφήν, τὸ δὲ τεχνικὸν, αὐξητικὸν τε καὶ τηρητικὸν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἔστι καὶ ζῴοις, ὁ δὲ φύσις ἔστι καὶ
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ψυχή: toioùtou δὴ πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἀστρων οὐσίαν τῶν δ᾽ ἥλιων καὶ τὴν σελήνην δυὸ φορᾶς φέρεσθαι, τὴν μὲν ὕπὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἀπ᾽ ἀνατολῆς εἰς ἀνατολήν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐναντίαν τῷ κόσμῳ ξέδιον ἐκ ξώδιον μεταβαίνοντας. τὰς δ᾽ ἐκλείψεις τούτων γίγνεσθαι διαφόρως, ἥλιον μὲν περὶ τὰς συνόδους, σελήνης δὲ περὶ τὰς πανσελήνους· γίγνεσθαι δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων τὰς ἐκλείψεις καὶ μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους. Stob. Ecl. i. 26. 1, p. 219, 12, Ζήμων τὴν σελήνην ἐφησεν ἀστρον νοερὸν καὶ φρόνιμον πῦρινον δὲ πυρὸς τεχνικοῦ.

πύρινον: they are situated in the external periphery of aether, and are themselves composed of the same substance. The later Stoics, at any rate, held that the heavenly bodies are fed by exhalations of grosser matter, and hence their differentiation from their environment. Cf. Cleanth. frags. 29 and 30.


φύσις refers to φυτοῖς and ψυχὴ to ζώοις: cf. frag. 43.

φοράς. The first movement is the diurnal revolution from east to west (from one rising to another); the second is the orbit described κατὰ τῶν ξωδιακῶν κύκλων, occupying either a year or a month, as the case may be. For the Zodiac cf. Diog. L. viii. 155, 156.

ὑπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, i.e. they move with the aether which revolves round the three lower strata of the world. These latter are themselves stationary, so that κόσμου is used as in Cleanth. frag. 48, l. 7, where see note. The whole structure of the cosmos is very clearly expounded by Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 21. f. p. 184, 185; and cf. especially τοῦ...κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον περὶ τὸ μέσον τὸ δ᾽ ὑπόμενον' περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα ὑπόμενον δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἑπὶ αὐτῆς ύγρὰ καὶ τὸν ἀέρα...τὸ δὲ περιφερόμενον αὐτῷ ἑγκυκλίως αἰθέρα εἶναι, ἐν ὦ τὰ ἀστρα καθίδρυται τὰ τ' ἀπλανῆ καὶ τὰ πλανώμενα, θεία
τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχὰ καὶ διοικοῦμενα κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν.

ξώδιον: according to Diels, the acc. is "insolenter dictum" and requires the addition of εἰς, but it has been pointed out to me that the true explanation of the acc. is to be found in the fact that ξώδιον is a measure of space = 30 μοίραι, Hippol. Haer. v. 13: we should not therefore compare μεταβας βίοτον Eur. Hipp. 1292, which is in any case different. For the fact cf. Diog. vii. 144.

tὰς δὲ ἐκλείψεις: see infra frag. 73.
μείζους καὶ ἐλάττους: "entire and partial."

72. Cic. N. D. i. 36, idem (Zeno) astris hoc idem (i.e. vim divinam) tribuit tum annis, mensibus, annorum-que mutationibus.

astris. On the other hand the Epicureans taught that the stars could not possess happiness or move in consequence of design. Diog. L. x. 77, μήτε αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς συνεστραμμένα τὴν μακριότητα κεκτημένα κατὰ βούλησιν τὰς κινήσεις ταύτας λαμβάνειν.

annis: probably Zeno did not stop to enquire whether the seasons etc. were corporeal or not: he regarded them as divine "als regelmässig erfolgende Umläufe der Sonne und des Mondes" (Krische, p. 389). Chrysippus must have been hard pressed when he delivered the extraordinary opinion quoted by Plut. Comm. Not. 45, 5 (see Zeller, Stoics p. 131). Krische appositely quotes Plat. Leg. x. p. 899 β, ἀστρων δὲ δὴ περὶ πάντων καὶ σελήνης ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὀρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἀλλον λόγον ἑρῶμεν ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὥσ ἐπειδή θυγατρικὸν μὲν ἢ θυγατρικῆς πάντων τούτων αἵτις ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ πᾶσαν ἁρετὴν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, εἴτε ἐν σώμασιν ἐνοῦσαι, ξῦνα ὄντα, κοσμοῦσι πάντα οὐρανόν, εἴτε ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως: In Sext. Math. ix. 184 an argument of Carneades is
quoted of the Sorites type, disproving the existence of God. If the sun is a god, so are days, months and years. This the Stoics might have admitted, but he concludes thus:—σὺν τῷ ἀτοπον εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν θεόν εἶναι λέγειν, τὴν δὲ ἐω καί τὴν μεσημβρίαν καί τὴν δείλην μηκέτι.

73. Diog. L. vii. 145, 6, ἐκλείπειν δὲ τὸν μὲν ἦλιον ἐπιπροσθούσης αὐτῷ σελήνης κατὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μέρος, ὡς Ζήνων ἀναγράφει ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου. φαίνεται γὰρ ὑπερχομένη ταῖς συνόδοις καὶ ἀποκρύπτουσα αὐτὸν καὶ πάλιν παραλλάττουσα. γνωρίζεται δὲ τοῦτο διὰ λεκάνης ὕδωρ ἔχουσης. τὴν δὲ σελήνην ἐμπίπτουσαν εἰς τὸ τῆς γῆς σκίασμα. οἴθεν καὶ ταῖς παυσελήνοις ἐκλείπειν μόναις, καίτερ κατὰ διάμετρον ἰσταμένην κατὰ μῆνα τῷ ἦλιῳ ὅτι κατὰ λοξοῦ ὅς πρὸς τὸν ἦλιον κινουμένην παραλλάττει τῷ πλάτει ἑ βορειοτέρα ἡ νοτιωτέρα γινομένη. ὅταν μὲντοι τὸ πλάτος αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸν ἥλιακὸν καὶ τὸν διὰ μέσων γένηται εἶτα διαμετρήσῃ τὸν ἦλιον τότε ἐκλείπει.

ἐκλείπειν. The eclipse of the sun owing to the interposition of the moon between it and the earth is a doctrine attributed by Stobaeus to Thales, the Pythagoreans, and Empedocles (Ecl. i. 25. 1 3 b 3 e): the same explanation was also given by Anaxagoras (Zeller, pre-Socrates p. 361). The same account is given by the Stoic in Cic. N. D. ii. 103, luna...subiecta atque opposita soli radios eius et lumen obscurat, tum ipsa incident in umbram terrae, cum est e regione solis, interpositu interiectuque terrae repente deficit.

taῖς συνόδοις “at the period of conjunction.” Cf. Cic. Rep. i. 25, Pericles...docuisset eives suos dicitur, id quod ipse ab Anaxagora, cuius auditor fuerat, exeeperat, certo illud (eclipse of sun) tempore fieri et necessario,
cum tota se luna sub orbem solis subiecisset: itaque, etsi non omni intermenstruo, tamen id fieri non posse nisi certo intermenstruo tempore. Thuc. ii. 28.


πανσελήνωις: the fact was a matter of common observation: cf. Thuc. vii. 50, ἣ μήνῃ ἐκλείπειν ἐφύγχον γὰρ πανσελήνως οὐσα.

κατὰ λοξοῦ: hence ἐλικοειδὴ in Diog. L. vii. 144, see Krische p. 389.

dιά μέσων scil. ἔφοδων. There is nothing distinctively Stoic in these explanations. Zeno was simply repeating the ordinary scientific theories of his age. Epicurus gave alternative explanations, of which this is one (Diog. L. x. 96).

74. Diog. L. vii. 153, 154, ἀστρατήν ἐκ ἐξαφνι ὑφὸν παρατριβομένων ἡ ῥηγυμένων ὑπὸ πνεύματος, ὥσ πάρον ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου βροντῆν ἐκ τῶν τούτων ψόφων ἐκ παρατρίψεως ἡ ῥήξεως κεραυνών ἐκ ἐξαφνι σφόδραν μετὰ πολλῆς βίας πίπτουσαν ἐπὶ γῆς νεφῶν παρατριβομένων ἡ ῥηγυμένων.

Cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 29. 1, p. 233, 9, ἀστρατήν ἐξαφνι νεφῶν ἐκτριβομένων ῥηγυμένων ὑπὸ πνεύματος, βροντῆν δὲ εἶναι τῶν τούτων ψόφων...όταν δὲ ἡ τῶν πνεύματος φορὰ σφοδρώτερα γένηται καὶ πυρῶδης, κεραυνών ἀποστελεῖσθαι. ib. p. 234, 1 where the same views are attributed to οἱ Στοικοὶ. Here again there is nothing specially characteristic of the Stoa: Epicurus, as was his wont, gave a number of possible explanations and amongst them these: see Diog. L. x. 100—103, cf. Lucr. vi. 96 f. (thunder), 162 f. (lightning), 246 f. (thunderbolts). Lucan i. 151, qualiter expressum ventis per nubila fulmen aetheris impulsi sonitu etc. Aristoph. Nub. 404 foll.

On this point the majority of the Stoic school seem to have deviated from the teaching of Zeno, considering his view unsatisfactory: thus Diog. vii. 152, κομήτας δὲ καὶ πωγονίας καὶ λαμπαδίας πυρὶ εἶναι ύφεστώτα, πάχος ἄρος εἰς τὸν αἰθέρῳ τόπον ἀνενεχθέντος, cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 28. 1* p. 228, 6, Βοσθὸς ἄρος ἀνημμένον φαντασίαν. Sen. N. Q. vii. 21, placet ergo nostris cometas...denso aere creari.

76. Stob. Ecl. i. 8. 40* p. 104, 7, Ζήνων ἐφησε χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ κρυτήριον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος ὅπως ἔχει ἐκαστα>. κατὰ τοὺτον δὲ γίγνεσθαι τὰ γυνόμενα καὶ τὰ περαινόμενα ἀπαντα καὶ τὰ οὔτα εἶναι. Simplic. ad Cat. 80 a 4, τῶν δὲ Στωικῶν Ζήνων μὲν πάσης ἀπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶναι, who goes on to say that Chrysippus limited the definition by adding the words τοῦ κόσμου. Cf. Diog. vii. 141, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἀσώματον, διάστημα οὔτα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Varro L. L. vi. 3 (quoted by Prof. Mayor on Cic. N. D. i. 21.), tempus esse dicunt intervallum mundi motus. See also Zeller p. 198 and add Plotin. Ennead. III. 7. 6, Sext. Pyrrh. III. 136 f. Math. x. 170 f. Zeno held as against Chrysippus that time existed from eternity, and that it is not merely coeval with the phenomenal world. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 223—225.

ἐκαστα is added by Wachsm. and some word is clearly wanted: Posidonius however in reproducing the clause has ὅπως ἔχει τὸ ἐπινοούμενον (Stob. Ecl. i. 8. 42, p. 105, 21). It seems better to remove the comma usually placed
after βραδύτητος, as the genitives depend at least as much on ὀπως ἔχει as on μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον, cf. e.g. Thuc. ii. 90. 4, ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἐκαστος.

ἀπαντά must be corrupt, as some verb is required to balance γίνεσθαι and εἶναι. Usener suggests ἀπαρτιζεσθαι, which gives the required sense, cf. ἀπαρτισμόν. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 8. 42, p. 106, 17. Diels' correction ἀπαντάν is less satisfactory in meaning.

77. Censorinus de die Nat. xvii. 2, quare qui annos triginta saeculum putarunt multum videntur errasse. hoc enim tempus genean vocari Heraclitus auctor est, quia orbis aetatis in eo sit spatio, orbe autem vocat aetatis dum natura ab sementi humana ad sementim revertitur. hoc quidem geneas tempus alii aliter definierunt. Herodicus annos quinque et viginti scribit, Zenon triginta.

genean: this substantially accords with the popular reckoning as recorded by Herod. ii. 142, γενεαὶ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνδρῶν ἐκατὸν ἔτεα ἐστι.

Heraclitus: for the other authorities which attribute this statement to Heraclitus see Zeller pre-Socrates ii. p. 87, n. 4 and frags. 87 and 88 ed. Bywater.

sementi: saeculum is properly used with the meaning "generation" and this supports the derivation from sero, satus (Curtius G. E. 1. p. 474 Eng. Tr.). For examples see the Lexx.

Herodicus: either (1) the Alexandrian grammarian, or (2) the physician of Selymbria: see D. Biog.

Zenon: according to Wachsmuth Jahn proposes to substitute Xenon, but the agreement with Heraclitus rather points to the founder of the Stoa.

78. Stob. Ecl. i. 16. 1, p. 149, 8, ἤνων οὐ Στοιχήκος τὰ χρώματα πρῶτους εἶναι σχηματισμοὺς τῆς ὥλης. The
same words occur also in Plut. plac. i. 15. 5 and in Galen Hist. Phil. c. 10. xix. 258 Kühn.

The above extracts appear to represent all that is known of the Stoic theories about colour: for the Epicurean view cf. Lucr. ii. 795 foll. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 310, rightly observes that the definition, implying that colour is an actual attribute of matter, indicates Zeno's reliance on sense-impressions.

79. Epiphan. adv. Haeres. iii. 2. 9 (iii. 36), Diels p. 592, τὰς δὲ αἰτίας τῶν πραγμάτων πῆ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πῆ δὲ οὖκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τούτεστι, τὰ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

We have already seen that Zeno held καθ' εἰμαρμένην τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, frag. 45. How then are we to reconcile with this doctrine of necessity the fact that free will is here allowed to mankind even in a limited degree? The Stoic answer is most clearly given by the simile with which they supported their position, cf. Hippolyt. adv. Haeres. i. 18, καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντη διεβεβαίωσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτω ὦτι ὀσπερ ὁχήματος ἤδή ἢ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἢδ' μὲν βούληται ἐπεσθαί καὶ ἐλκεταί καὶ ἐπεται ἐκών, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξού- σιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης οἷον τῆς εἰμαρμένης' ἢδ' δὲ μὴ βούληται ἐπεσθαί πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται· τὸ αὐτὸ δὴ ποὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων' καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν. The simile itself very possibly belongs to Cleanthes as it accords exactly with his lines in frag. 91. Chrysippus struggled vigorously with the difficulties in which he was involved in maintaining this theory: see the authorities collected by Zeller p. 177 foll. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie pp. 328—332, who ascribes to Cleanthes the introduction of the Stoic answer to the dilemma, has omitted to notice
the present frag. and does an injustice to Zeno in asserting that the conflict between free will and necessity never presented itself to his mind.

80. Censorinus de die Nat. iv. 10, Zenon Citicus, Stoicae sectae conditor, pricipium humano generi ex novo mundo constitutum putavit, primosque homines ex solo adminiculo divini ignis, id est dei Providentia, genitos.

This doctrine is connected with that of the destructibility of the world: cf. frag. 56, where however there is unfortunately a lacuna at the point where the origin of man is being discussed. ὡψίγονον in that passage must not be supposed to be at variance with this: the argument there is simply to show that the world cannot be without beginning, because facts show that mankind has not existed from eternity. Zeno is, therefore, distinctly opposed to a theory of progression; mankind was produced in the first instance, when the primary fire was in full sway, and was entirely formed out of the divine essence; the inference must be that men have degenerated through the assimilation of coarser substances, and in this connection we may perhaps point to Posidonius’ belief in the popular view of a golden age, when there was a complete supremacy of wise men. Senec. Ep. 90, 5. There is a parallel to this passage in Sext. Math. ix. 28 where the arguments given by various schools for the existence of gods are being recited, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων στωικῶν φασὶ τινες τοὺς πρῶτους καὶ γγυγενεῖς τῶν ἄνθρωπων κατὰ πολὺ τῶν νῦν συνέσει διαφέροντας γεγονέναι, ὡς πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαιοτέρους καὶ ἡρωικάς ἐκείνους, ὡσπερ τι περιττὸν αἰσθητὴριον σχόντας τὴν ὄξυτητα τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβεβληκέναι τῇ θείᾳ φύσει καὶ νοησαί τινας δυνάμεις θεῶν. Cf. Cic. Leg. 1. 24. Tusc. III. 2, nunc parvulos nobis dedit (natura) igniculos quos celeriter
malis moribus opinionibusque depravati sic restinguimus, ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. For the anthropological aspect of this passage see Stein, Psych. p. 115.

81. Varro de Re Rust. II. 1, 3, sive enim aliquod fuit principium generandi animalium, ut putavit Thales Milesius et Zeno Citieus, sive contra principium horum exstitit nullum, ut eredit Pythagoras Samius et Aristoteles Stagirites.

It is obvious that only on the hypothesis of the world in its present form being without beginning is the doctrine of the eternity of the human race or of animals possible. Aristotle, however, expressly says (de Caelo i. 10 279 b 12) that none of his predecessors had held the world to be without beginning in this sense. Unless therefore Aristotle is mistaken, the reference to Pythagoras in the present passage must be erroneous: see the discussion in Zeller pre-Socratics i. pp. 439–442 and especially p. 439 n. 2 and for the similar case of Xenophanes ib. p. 570: see also Newman on Ar. Pol. II. 8 1269 a 5. At any rate Zeno is in agreement with the great majority of those who went before him: the early philosophers held for the most part that animal life was produced by the action of the sun’s rays on the primitive slime, as Anaximander, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Archelaus (Zeller i. c. i. pp. 255, 577, 601, II. p. 392), or on the earth, as Diogenes of Apollonia (ib. i. p. 296). Somewhat similar were the views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras (ib. II. pp. 160, 365).

82. Schol. ad Plat. Alcib. i. p. 121 E δις έπτα έτων] τότε γάρ ὁ τέλειος ἐν ἡμῖν ἀποφαίνεται λόγος, ὡς 'Αριστοτέλης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Ἀλκμαίων ὁ Πυθαγόρειος φαίν. Cf. Stob. Eel. i. 48. 8, p. 317, 21, πάλιν τοῖνυν περὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ πασῶν τῶν κρειττόνων δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς
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οἱ μὲν Στικαῖοι λέγουσι μὴ εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τοῖς λόγον, ύστερον δὲ συναθροῖσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἕτη. Plut. plac. iv. 11, ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ’ ὑν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐβδομάδα. (This points to some slight divergence in the school itself as to the exact period of life at which ὁ λόγος τελειοῦται: secus Stein, Erkenntnistheorie p. 116, but how can συμπληροῦσθαι="begin"?) Diog. vii. 55, φωνὴ...ἀπὸ διανοιας ἐκπεμπομένη, ὡς ὁ Διογένης φησίν. ἦτις ἀπὸ δεκατεσσάρων ἐτῶν τελειοῦται. The mind at birth is a tabula rasa: reason lies in the application of προλήψεις and ἔννοιαι, which are themselves ultimately founded on external impressions, cf. Cleanth. fr. 37 θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν. The present fragment has been generally overlooked.


aiēθητικήν: the MSS. have aiēθησιν but the correction (made by Wellmann p. 475 and Zeller p. 212) is rendered certain by the parallel passage in ps-Plut. vit. hom. c. 127, τὴν ψυχὴν τιν Στωικοὶ ὅριζονται πνεῦμα συμφυές καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν aiēθητικήν ἀναπτομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σῶματι ύγρῶν.

ἀναθυμίασιν: cf. Ar. de Anim. i. 2. 16. 405 a 25, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φησὶν ψυχὴν, εὑπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, εἶ ὡς τάλλα συνιστησιν, i.e. Aristotle identifies the ἀναθυμίασις (“fiery process” Wallace) with πῦρ. Zeno adopts the word as an apt description of the warm breath of which the soul is composed.

νοερὰ. The soul’s rational power is constantly renewed by the fiery process, because it is fed by the emanations from the περιέχον according to Heraclitus or from the moist parts of the body, i.e. the blood, according to Zeno. In this way Heraclitus explained his famous saying αὕτη ψυχή σοφωτάτη (frag. 74 ed. Bywater), while the Stoics from their point of view regarded the excellence of the soul as consisting in a suitable admixture of heat. Stein, Psych. p. 105. Hence, as Diels observes, there is no necessity to read ἔτεραι αἰεί.

ῄκασεν αὐτὰς: the principle of πάντα ὑπάρχει applies no less to the soul than to the world in general: thus Arist. l.c. continues καὶ ἀσωματώτατον τε καὶ ρέον αἰεί: τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινούμενῳ γνωσκέσθαι ἐν κινήσει δ’ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κάκεινος ὑπερτα καὶ οἱ πολλοί. The soul is νοερὰ because it is in flux. For ποταμοῦσι cf. Plat. Crat. 402 A, Ἡράκλειτος...ποταμὸν ῥοῖ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὲς ἐσ τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν ὦν ἀν ἐμβαίησ. R and P § 26.

καὶ...ἀναθυμίαντα. Bywater Heracl. fr. 42 ascribes these words to Zeno and not to Heraclitus: the importance of this will appear presently.
ομοίως: i.e. in the same sense as Heraclitus: the latter however would not have called the soul αἰσθητική, distinguishing as he did between sensation and knowledge: κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώπων ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὁτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχοντων frag. 11 Sch. and Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 12: hence Sextus infers that Heraclitus held τὴν αἰσθησιν ἀπίστον εἶναι (Math. vii. 126).

tυπούσθαι: cf. frag. 7, and for ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων κ.τ.λ. frag. 11.


This passage has been discovered by Stein, Psych. n. 81 to whose remarks the reader is referred.

85. Diog. L. vii. 157, Ζήνων δὲ ο Κιτιεύς...πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν. τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἐμπνέον, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι.

Cf. Alex. Aphr. de an. p. 26, 16 ed. Bruns, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοάς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενον πως ἐκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἄρος. Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 70, ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ἦγεμονικὸν ἣ λεπτομερέστερον τι πνεύματος κ.τ.λ. If any of the authorities seem to assert that Heraclitus defined the soul as πνεῦμα, this is doubtless either due to Stoic influence or is a mere gloss on ἀναθυμίασις: see thereff. in Zeller pre-Socrates II. p. 80 where however the reference to Sext. Math. ix. 363 (leg. 361) is a mistake, as the passage is dealing with τὰ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεία. Not dissimilar is the Epicurean definition of the soul: Diog. L. x. 63, ἡ ψυχὴ σώμα ἐστὶ λεπτομερές παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον' προσεμ-φερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι. Sext. Emp. Math. ix. 71, λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ οὐσίαι (αἱ ψυχαῖ) καὶ οὐχ ἤτοι πυρόδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις εἰς τοὺς ἄνω μᾶλλον τόπους κούφοφοροςιν.
86. Cic. Acad. i. 39, (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret et mentem atque sensum. Fin. iv. 12, eum autem quaereretur res admodum difficilis, num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse ex qua ratio et intelligentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis cuius generis essent quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem. Tusc. i. 19, Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur.

See also Stein, Psychologie p. 101.

87. Galen plac. Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8 (v. 283 Kühn), εἰ δὲ γε ἐποιτο (Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος) Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ζήνωνι τρέφεσθαι μὲν ἐξ αἵματος φήσασι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν δ' αὐτῆς υπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα.

It is doubtful whether the doctrine of the nourishment of the soul by the blood was held by Heraclitus and from him derived by Zeno. The only authority, besides the doubtful passage of Arius Didymus (frag. 83), from which it can be argued that such a view belonged to him is Nemes. Nat. Hom. c. 2 p. 28 (quoted by Zeller, pre-Socratics ii. p. 80) Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν υγρῶν, who however goes on expressly to distinguish the individual soul from the world-soul and states that the former is composed ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτός (ἀναθυμιάσεως). It is best therefore to regard this as a Stoic innovation: just as the stars in the fiery aether are fed by the moist particles rising from the watery zone which they enclose, so is the fiery soul fed by the moist blood: thus man is in himself an organic whole, and the microcosm of the individual is an exact parallel to the macrocosm of the universe. Further references ap. Zeller p. 212 n. 2. With regard to this passage, Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 10) suggests that there is here a confusion between Zeno of Citium and Zeno of Tarsus, but there is no necessity
to adopt this supposition: that Zeno held the soul to be fed from the internal moisture of the body, which must be the blood, is clear from frag. 83 even if we leave out of account the frag. next following.


In both cases the MSS. have σῷματος for αἵματος, but the words are often confused and σῷματος yields no satisfactory sense. The emendation is made by Stein, Psychol. p. 107, and is confirmed by the passages which he cites from Marcus Aurelius (v. 33, vi. 15). στερεοῦ αἵματος is rather an odd expression, but was probably introduced by way of contrast to ψυχή as λεπτομερέστατον πνεῦμα. For ἁμφω Viger suggested ἁμφοῖτο, but the word is sometimes indeclinable.


p. 211, where further illustrations to this and the following frag. will be found in the notes. concretum or consitum corpori spiritum = Chrys. ap. Galen. Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1 (v. 287 Kühn), ἡ ψυχή πνεῦμα ἐστι σύμφωνον ἡμῖν συνεχές παντὶ τῶ σώματι διῆκον (quoted by Zeller). For quo digresso etc. cf. Cic. Tusc. 1. 18, sunt qui diseessum animi a corpore putent esse mortem. Plat. Phaed. 64 c, ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι (ἡγούμεθα τὸν θάνατον εἶναι) ἡ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλαγήν;

90. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 220, Spiritum quippe animam esse Zenon quacrit hactenus: quo recedente a corpore moritur animal, hoc certe anima est. naturali porro spiritu recedente moritur animal: naturalis igitur spiritus anima est.

It is possible that this passage and the extract from Tertullian (fr. 89) are derived from a common original, but, as in their present form the syllogisms are directed to distinct points, it has been thought better to keep them separate.

91. Galen, Hist. Phil. 24, Diels, p. 613, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς (ψυχῆς) οἱ μὲν ἁσώματον ἔφασαν ὡς Πλάτων, οἱ δὲ σώματα κινεῖν ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἔξ αὐτοῦ. πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὕτωι.

σώματα κινεῖν. So MS. A, but B has σώματα συγκινοῦν and the Latin version of Nicolaus has “corpus simul secum movens.” Wachsm. conj. σῶμα σώματα ἀμα κινοῦν. Usener: σῶμα τὰ σώματα κινοῦν. Diels: σῶμα αὐτοῦ κινοῦν sive ἔξ ἑαυτοῦ κινοῦμενον. Coll. Gal. def. Med. 30 κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Στυίκοὺς σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ κινοῦμενον. Whatever may be the right reading, σῶμα certainly seems wanted as well as σώματα to point the contrast with Plato. For the doctrine of the soul re-
garded as the principle of movement, see the summary of the views of previous philosophers given by Arist. de An. i. 2. §§ 2—6, 403 b 27—404 b 7. That the soul was self-moving as being the principle of motion, was a distinctively Platonic dogma. Phaedr. 245 c, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχὴν. Legg. 895 A, ψυχὴν ...τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν, where the argument is made use of to prove the immortality of the soul.

For the Stoics cf. Sext. Math. ix. 102, πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικῶν, and the references collected by Stein, Psych. nn. 217 and 221 to which add M. Aurel. v. 19. The theory of τόνος throws an entirely new light on this, as on many other Stoic doctrines, which were originally adopted on independent grounds.

92. Stob. Ecl. i. 49. 33, p. 367, 18, ἀλλὰ μὲν οἱ γε ἀπὸ Χρυσίππον καὶ Ζήνωνος φιλόσοφοι καὶ πάντες ὅσοι σῶμα τὴν ψυχὴν νοοῦσι τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας συμβεβάζουσι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ὡς οὐσίαν προϋποκειμένην ταῖς δυνάμεσι τιθέασιν, έκ δ’ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων σύνθετον φύσιν εξ ἀνομοίων συνάγοντι.

ποιότητας...οὐσίαν. This distinction we have already met with in frag. 53. It properly belongs to the department of logic but, in consequence of the Stoic materialism, it has also a quasi-physical application: see Zeller, Stoics, pp. 105, 127, Reid on Cie. Ac. i. 24 foll. The different activities of the soul bear the same relation to the soul as a whole, as the qualities of any particular object bear to its substance: hence Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 234, φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς τὸ τε συνέχον τὴν ὀλὴν σύγκρισιν καὶ κατ’ ἕδιαν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν.

προϋποκειμένην: for the significance of this expression, see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 310.

We must distinguish the μέρη ψυχῆς from the δυνάμεις, for they are not identical, as the passage in Stobæus shows. Sext. Emp. Math. v. 237, καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὀρμή καὶ ἡ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις ἐτεροίσχεις εἰσὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. In spite of this eightfold division of local extension (see Zeller, p. 214 n. 2) the Stoics held the unity of the soul as an essence: see especially Stein, Psych. pp. 119, 122, who suggests “soul-functions” as a more suitable expression for the Stoics than “parts of the soul”.

τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν. We have clear evidence here that the term ἡγεμονικὸν is Zenonian. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie mm. 219 and 693, is inconsistent on this point, in the former passage attributing its introduction to Cleanthes and in the latter to Zeno. It is very possible that Cleanthes first spoke of τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, which with him was the sun, in furtherance of his view of man as a microcosm.

94. Tertullian de Anima, c. 14, dividitur autem in partes nunc in duas a Platone, nunc in tres a Zeno.

This passage is at variance with the account given by Nemesius. Wellmann, l. c. p. 476, prefers the authority of Tertullian, thinking that the three divisions in question are the ἡγεμονικῶν, the φωνητικῶν, and the σπερματικῶν, and that the five organs of sense were regarded by Zeno as parts of the body, though the centre of sense resides
in the ἡγεμονικόν. On the other hand Weygoldt, l. c. p. 36, and Heinze in Bursian’s Jahresb. i. p. 191, think Nemesius more trustworthy than Tertullian, and certainly the better opinion is that Zeno taught the eightfold division (see Stein’s full discussion, Psych. pp. 158—160). It is just possible that the triple division mentioned by Tertullian is (1) τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, (2) the five senses, and (3) the voice and the reproductive organism, and that, if we were in possession of the full text of Zeno, the discrepancy would explain itself. If all that we knew of Plato’s psychological divisions had been contained in this passage and a statement that he divided the soul into λόγου ἐχον, θυμοειδές, and ἐπιθυμητικόν, we should have had some difficulty in reconciling the two. Hirzel, ii. p. 154, 155 appears to be unaware of the passage in Nemesius: he accepts the evidence of Tertullian, but explains it as an ethical rather than a physical distinction.

95. Epiphan. adv. Haeres. iii. 2. 9 (iii. 36), Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ὁ Στυκικὸς ἐφ...δείω...ἐχειν τὸ θείων ἐν μονῷ τῷ νῷ μᾶλλον δὲ θεόν ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ νοῦν. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀθάνατος...ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ μετά χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματος * * * καὶ έκάλει τὴν ψυχήν πολυχρόνιον πνεύμα, οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀφθαρτὸν δι’ ἐλοῦ ἐλεγεν αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἐκδαπανάται γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰς τὸ ἀφανές, ὡς φησί. Cf. August. contra Acad. iii. 17, 38, quamobrem cum Zeno sua quadam de mundo et maxime de anima, propter quam vera philosophia vigilat, sententia delectaretur, dicens eam esse mortalem, nec quidquam esse praeter hune sensibilem mundum, nihilque in eo agi nisi corpore; nam et deum ipsum ignem putabat.


πολυχρόνιον: the language of this extract recalls the objection of Cebes in the Phaedo to Socrates’ proof of
the immortality of the soul p. 87 a—88 b, recapitulated by Socrates p. 95 b—e, cf. especially τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἵσχυρὸν τι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή καὶ θεοειδές καὶ ἴνετι πρότερον πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι οὐδὲν καλύειν φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τέ ἐστιν ψυχή, καὶ ἴνεν ποὺ πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἳδει τε καὶ ἐπραττεν πολλὰ ἀττα κ.τ.λ. For the limited future existence which the Stoics allowed to the soul see Zeller, p. 218 foll. and add Schol. ad Lucan. ix. 1, alii (animas) solidas quidem, postquam exierint de corpore, permanere, sed deinde tractu temporis dissipari: haec opinio Stoicorum. There was considerable variation in points of detail among the various members of the soul: see on Cleanth. frag. 41.

tοῦ σώματος: some such words as χρόνον τινὰ διαμένειν have fallen out here.

οὐ...ἀθάνατον: this is not inconsistent with ἀθάνατος above. The soul never perishes entirely, although eventually it passes into a higher power, Diog. vii. 156. ψυχὴν μετὰ θάνατον ἐπιμένειν, φθαρτὴν δὲ εἶναι. Stein Psychol. p. 145.

96. Themist. de An. 68 a Speng. ii. p. 30, 24, ἀλλ' ὀμως Ζήνων μὲν ὑπολείπεται τις ἀπολογία κεκράσθαι ὅλην δὲ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος φάσκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔξοδον αὐτῆς ἀνεν φθορᾶς τοῦ συγκρίματος μὴ ποιοῦντι.

The passage of Aristotle is de An. i. 3 § 6, p. 406 a 30—65, where he says that one of the objections to the view that the soul κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα is that in that case the soul’s movements will correspond to those of the body, so that if the body moves locally, the soul may do the same and change its position with regard to the body by leaving it. εἰ δὲ τοὺτ´ εὐδέχεται, ἔποιεῖ ἀν τὸ ἀνίστασθαι τὰ τεθνεῦτα τῶν ζῴων. We might therefore
infer from this passage that Zeno taught that the soul moved the body (frag. 91).

Themistius says that Zeno is rescued from this dilemma by the doctrine of κράσις δι’ ὄλων, for which see on frag. 52. He seems to refer to the Stoic view of the soul as the bond of union for the body, so that body cannot exist qua body without the presence of soul, cf. Iambl. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 49. 33, p. 368, 6, καθ’ οὐς δὲ μία ξωὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ συνθέτου, συγκεκραμένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ σώματι. Sext. Math. ix. 72, οὐδὲ γὰρ πρότερον τὸ σώμα διακρατητικὸν ἢν αὐτῶν (τῶν ψυχῶν) ἀλλ’ αὐταὶ τῷ σώματι συμμονής ἔσαν αὕταί κ.τ.λ. The best illustration however is Sext. Math. vii. 234, φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τὸ τε συνέχον τῆν ὀλὴν σύγκρισιν καὶ κατ’ ἱδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπωμεν συνεστάναι τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἢ τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χωρίσμον ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἱδίως καλοῦμεν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, the meaning of which passage seems to be that only the ἡγεμονικὸν and not the whole soul is said to depart, inasmuch as the corpse must possess συνεκτικὴ δύναμις in the form of ἔξις, for otherwise it will be altogether non-existent. (See Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 105 foll.) But there is no inconsistency with the present passage, since the change of τὸ συνέχον from ψυχῆ to ἔξις is φθορὰ τοῦ συγκρίματος (for φθορά τοῦ θάνατος see on frag. 95).

97. Lactant. Inst. vii. 7. 20, Esse inferos Zenon Stoicus docuit et sedes piorum ab impiiis esse discretas: et illos quidem quietas et delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere poenas in tenebris locis atque in caeni voraginis horrendis.

Cf. Tertull. de anima c. 54, quos quidem miror quod imprudentes animas circa terram prosternant cum illas

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a sapientibus multo superioribus erudiri adfirmant. ubi erit scholae regio in tanta distantia diversioriorum? qua ratione discipulac ad magistros conventabunt, tanto discrimine invicem absentis? quid autem illis postremae eruditionis usus ac fructus iam iam conflagratione perituris? reliquas animas ad inferos deiciunt. Hirzel thinks that Virgil’s description of the souls of the lost in Aen. vi. is derived from Stoic sources, and therefore ultimately from Zeno, and refers to Ecl. vi. 31, Georg. iv. 220, Aen. vi. 724, for the influence of Stoicism on Virgil. The same writer correctly points out the distinction between the treatment of popular religion in this doctrine of Zeno and that which appears in those passages (to be presently considered) where the attributes of the popular deities are explained away by rationalistic allegory. He compares the spirit of the present passage with the Platonic myths, called by Grote “fanciful illustrations invented to expand and enliven general views,” and suggests that it may have occurred in the πολυτεία, which Zeno, as we are told by Plutarch, directed against the Platonic school (see Hirzel, Untersuchungen ii. pp. 25—31). It is certainly hardly credible that Zeno can have attached any philosophical importance to a theory stated in these terms, and it is better to regard it as a concession to popular belief in a matter which could not be formulated with scientific precision. See also Stein, Psych. p. 149 and 162, who infers that Zeno agreed with Chrysippus rather than with Cleanthes in the controversy appearing in Cleanth. frag. 41. The general view of the school was that the soul after death ascends to the upper aether and is preserved there among the stars to which it is akin: Sext. Math. ix. 73, 74, Cic. Tusc. i. 42, 43.

98. Plut. plac. iv. 21. 4, τὸ δὲ φωναῖον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος
eirímenon, ò kai φωνήν καλούσιν, ἐστὶ πνεῦμα διατείνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι φάρυγγος καὶ γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων.

Cf. on Cleanth. frag. 43.

99. Eustath. in II. Σ 506, p. 1158, 37, ἡεροφώνους κήρυκας “Ομηρος κανταῦθα εἰπὼν τὸν κατὰ Ζήνωνα τῆς φωνῆς ὄρον προὐπέβαλεν εἰπόντα: “φωνή ἐστὶν ἀπὸ πε-πληγμένος.”

Cf. Diog. L. vii. 55, ἐστὶ δὲ φωνή ἀπὸ πεπληγμένος. This frag. is taken from Wachsmuth, Comm. I. p. 12.

Sound is produced by the breath coming in contact with the external air; in the case of an animal the air is said to be struck ὑπὸ ὀρμῆς, while the voice of man is ἐναρθρὸς καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεπομενή, Diog. I. c. See also the passages quoted by Stein, Psychol. n. 248.

Cf. Plato's definition, Tim. p. 67 b., ὄλως μὲν οὖν φωνήν θῶμεν τὴν δὲ ὡτῶν ὑπ’ ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἴματος μέχρι ψυχῆς πληγήν διαδιδομένην. Ar. de An. ii. 8 discusses ψόφος, ἀκοή, and φωνή. Sound is formed ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγείς ὃ ἀπὸ καὶ μὴ διαχυθῇ (§ 3, p. 419 b 21): voice is then defined as ψόφος τὸς ἐμψύχου (§ 9, p. 420 b. 5) and is minutely described.

100. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. ii. 5, ν. p. 241, Κ, ὁ θαυμαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν στωικῶν λόγος ὁ Ζήνωνος... ἔχει γὰρ ὤδε. “φωνὴ διὰ φάρυγγος χωρεῖ. εἰ δὲ ἤν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου χωροῦσα, οὐκ ἂν διὰ φάρυγγος ἔχωρει. ὠθει δὲ λόγος, καὶ φωνὴ ἐκεῖθεν χωρεῖ. λόγος δὲ ἀπὸ διανοίας χωρεῖ, ὡστ’ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια.”

It is tempting to suggest that λόγος and φωνὴ have changed places: the argument would certainly be more transparent if the transposition were made: cf. the following passage in Galen, speaking of Diogenes Babylonius: ὠθεν ἐκπεπομεται ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἡ ἐναρθρος τοιοῦν.
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καὶ ἡ σημαίνουσα ἐναρθρος φωνὴ ἐκεῖθεν· τοῦτο δὲ λόγος.
καὶ λόγος ἄρα ἐκεῖθεν ἐκπέμπτεται ὅθεν καὶ ἡ φωνὴ.
Galen's comment is that Zeno has omitted some of the necessary ἀξιώματα, while Diogenes has too many. He also points out the fallacy underlying the preposition ἀπό, which is ambiguous; either ἐξ or ὑπὸ ought to have been used, in which case the argument could never have stood the test of daylight. The gist however of his argument against Zeno, which is given at some length, is that Zeno has been deceived by the following fallacy: ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἐκπέμπτεται, ἐκεῖ δεδ καὶ τὸν διαλογισμὸν γύγνεσθαι, τοῦτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ μορίῳ. τοῦτο δὲ φήσομεν ἀντικρυς εἶναι ψεῦδος, οὐ γὰρ ἐὰν τι κατὰ προσαίρεσιν ἐκ τινος ἐκπέμπτεται κατ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μόριον δεῖκνυται τὴν διάνοιαν ὑπάρχειν, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑφὸν οὔδε τὸ πτύελον οὔδὲ ἡ κόρυξ οὔδὲ τὸ ἀποπάτημα. Wachsmuth quotes further passages from Galen's argument in which Zeno's name is mentioned, but they add nothing to the words cited above. Chrysippus, and after him Diogenes of Babylon (Cic. N. D. i. 41), laboured to prove that the birth of Athene from the head of Zeus in no way conflicted with their view that the breast was the seat of reason (Zeller, p. 364). See generally Stein, Psychol. p. 137.

tὸ σφετέρῳ χορῷ παντὶ διαδίδοσθαι τὴν ἐκ τοῦ προσ-
pεσόντος ἐξωθὲν ἐγγενομενὴν τῷ μορίῳ κίνησιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵν' αἰσθηταί το ἥνον.

This passage occurs in the course of the discussion as to φωνὴ and διάνοια as a parenthetical argument, and Galen objects that there is no perceptible interval of time between the impression and the sensation. Cf. Plut. plac. iv. 23. 1, impressions are made on the organ of sense but
the seat of feeling is in the ἵγεμονικόν. Philo de mund. Opif. p. 114 Pfeiff. (quoted on Cleanthes, frag. 3). See also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 306.


φέρει, so I. Müller for MSS. φέρει. This obscure passage was formerly punctuated as though Zeno’s words extended from ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντα to φέρεται, but, if the context is read, it is at once plain that I. Müller is right in putting the inverted commas after καταπίνεται. Chrysippus, who is being quoted, is aiming to prove the location of the ἵγεμονικόν in the breast by the usage of ordinary speech: e.g. ἀναβαίνειν τὸν θυμὸν—καταπίνειν τὴν χολήν—σπαράγματα καταπίνεσθαι—καταπιων τὸ ῥηθέν ἀπῆλθεν: then comes this reference to Zeno, and the conclusion οὕτε—φέρεται is the inference drawn by Chrysippus from the facts stated. Still, it is by no means clear what was the force of the objection made to Zeno or of his rejoinder. Müller translates:—Et Zeno reprehendentibus, quod omnia, quae in quaestionem vocarentur, in ore gestaret, ‘at,’ inquit, ‘non omnia a me devorantur,’ apparently making Zeno the subject of φέρει, but the Latin is in other respects hardly less obscure than the Greek. Wachsmuth, who has the old punctuation, interprets πάντα τὰ ζητοῦμενα as “affectus” and suggests φέρεται for φέρει, but what meaning he deduces from the passage I do not understand. In this perplexity, the following explanation is suggested. πάντα τὰ ζητοῦμενα is the
subject of φέρει and the objectors say:—all objects of investigation are ultimately concerned with the mouth. For φέρει see L. and S. οἱ ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι are the Epicureans, who denied the existence of any intermediate σημαίνομενον (λεκτόν) between σημαίνον (φωνή) and τυγχάνον (τὸ έκτὸς ύποκείμενον), cf. Sext. Math. viii. 11 foll. and esp. 13, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον...φαίνονται... περὶ τῇ φωνῇ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος ἀπολείπειν. Diog. L. x. 33, πᾶν οὖν πράγμα ὀνόματι τῷ πρῶτῳ ἐπιτεταγμένῳ ἐναργής ἔστι. But this nominalism went hand in hand with the most absolute credence in every sense-perception. To the Stoic, however, not every φαντασία is ἐναργής, but only that which is καταληπτική. Hence Zeno’s reply:—however this may be, we can’t swallow everything. καταπίνεται is substituted for καταλαμβάνεται, just as στόμα takes the place of φωνή. Some confirmation of this guess may be found in the recurrence of τὸ ξητούμενον, ξητεῖν, etc. in Epicurean texts (Diog. x. 33, 37, 38, Sext. Math. xi. 21). If Müller’s punctuation is adopted, this fragment ought rather to be numbered with the ἀποφθέγματα, but, in a matter of so much uncertainty, I have not ventured to remove it from the physical fragments, among which it is placed by Wachsmuth.

ΩΤΕ Κ.Τ.Λ. It would not be correct to speak of “swallowing” or “imbibing” another’s words, in any other case unless (ἀλλος ἐι μή) the dominant part of the soul were in the breast. For καταπόσεως cf. Ar. Ach. 484 (of Dicaearchus encouraging his θυμὸς to persevere in taking the part of the Lacedaemonians) ἑστηκας; ὅνκ ἐι καταπιών Εὐριπίδην;

103. Cic. de Divin. ii. 119, contrahi autem animum Zeno et quasi labi putat atque concidere et ipsum esse dormire.
Elsewhere sleep is said to be caused by a slackening of the tension in the πνεῦμα. Diog. L. vii. 158, τὸν δὲ ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἐκλυομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνον περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Plut. plac. v. 23. 4, Πλάτων οἱ Στωικοὶ τὸν μὲν ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἄνεσθι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος, οὐ κατ’ ἀναχαλασμὸν, καθάπερ ἔπλη τῆς γῆς, φερομένου δὲ ὁς ἔπλη τὸ ἡγεμονικόν μεσόφρυον. For Plato’s theory of sleep cf. Tim. p. 45 D, E, and for the Stoics, Stein, Psychol. p. 141.


For the Stoic theory of vision see Zeller, p. 221, n. 4. Stein, Psych. n. 241. In Plut. plac. iv. 21, ὤρασις is defined as πνεῦμα διατείνου ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ὀφθαλμῶν. The views of the ancient philosophers before Aristotle will be found concisely stated in Grote’s Plato, iii. 265 n., and for Aristotle see Grote’s Aristotle, p. 465.

105. Varro de L. L. v. 59, sive, ut Zenon Citieus, animalium semen ignis is, qui anima ac mens.

Mueller’s punctuation of the passage has been followed: in Spengel’s edition, Zeno’s statement is made to extend farther: ignis = πνεῦμα in the next fragment. Zeller remarks: “Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2. 17, 1. 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, has been developed thereout by cooling and condensation,” p. 213, n. 1. Stein’s explanation of this paradox (Psych. p. 115—117) is ingenious, but he is driven to assume that φύσις is warmer than ψυχή, which seems question-able.

106. Euseb. P. E. xv. 20. 1, Ar. Did. fr. phys. 39,

See also Zeller, p. 212, 213. Stein, Psych. n. 252, collects the various points of resemblance between the Stoics and the Hippocratican school of medicine.


φύε: is productive (not intrans.). So perhaps in the well known line: Ἑμ. II. vii. 149, ὁς ἀνδρῶν γενεί, ἢ μὲν φύει ἢ δ' ἀπολήγει. Otherwise, as τε is not required
by the sense, we might suggest that ςὲφνεὶ arose from φυτεῖν, cf. Diog. L. vii. 159, τῶν εἰς τὴν γῆν καταβαλλομένων σπερμάτων ἀ παλαιωθέντα οὐκ ἔτι φυτεῖν. Cleanth. fr. 24, ὁστέρ γὰρ ἐνός τινος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύτευν κ.τ.λ. Diels suggests κερασθέν τε φυεὶ and Usener κρύφα ἑπισχύει. 

 eiusmod after ἐδε is perhaps due to dittography.


σπερματικῶν. Diels, p. 418 reads σπέρμα πεπτικῶν.


Sextus proceeds to describe the forced interpretation which Diogenes of Babylon and others put upon Zeno’s words in order to get rid of the transparent sophistry (ib. 133—136). Theon, Progymn. 12, p. 251 (Spengel, Rhet. gr. p. 126, 16) gives proofs of the existence of the gods, among which is: ἐξῆς δὲ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκεῖ, οἴον Πλάτωνι, Ἀριστοτέλει, Ζήνωνι.

109. Lactant. de ira Dei c. 11, Antisthenes...unum esse naturalem Deum dixit, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares. Eadem fere Zeno cum suis Stoicis. Cf. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. p. 84 Gomp., πάντες οὐν οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος, εἰ καὶ ἀπέλειπτον τὸ δαιμόνιον...ἐνα θεον λέγουσιν εἶναι.
At first sight these passages are inconsistent with frag. 108, but in reality there is no such difficulty: cf. Athenag. Suppl. c. 6, p. 73, quoted supra on frag. 45. The Stoics strongly opposed the follies of the popular belief, while at the same time they called attention to the germ of truth which it contained, being no doubt anxious to preserve it as a basis for morality. Zeller well observes, p. 347, "Holding that the name of God belongs in its full and original sense only to the one primary being, they did not hesitate to apply it in a limited and derivative sense to all those objects by means of which the divine power is especially manifested." In testing how far this admission goes, it should be observed that the Stoic in Cic. N. D. II. 45 distinctly denies that the derivative gods are human in shape, cf. Philod. ἐνσεβ. p. 85 G., ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἄλλα ἱέρας καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρας. For Antisthenes cf. Philod. ἐνσεβ. p. 73 G., παρ᾽ 'Αντισθένει ἐν μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι πολλοὺς θεοὺς, κατὰ δὲ φύσιν ἑνα.

110. Cic. N. D. I. 36, Cum vero Hesiodi θεογονίαν interpretatur, tollit omnino usitatas perceptasque cognitones deorum; neque enim Iovem neque Iunonem neque Vestam neque quemquam qui ita appelletur in deorum habet numero sed rebus inanimis atque mutis per quandam significacionem haec docet tributa nomina.

Hesiodi θεογονίαν: Introd. p. 31.

Iovem: see on frag. 111 and cf. Flach, Glossen u. Scholien zur Hesiodischen Theogonie, p. 66.

Iunonem = air: see infra and cf. Cic. N. D. II. 66; she is identified with air as being the wife of Iuppiter (= aether), and air is regarded as feminine, quod nihil est eo mollius. Similarly " Hep = air in Empedocles (R. and P. § 131). ἀηρ is also one of Plato's derivations, who says the order of
the letters has been reversed, γνώις δ' ἄν εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ἡρας ὤνομα, Crat. p. 404 c.


This is perhaps the best place to refer to a supposed fragment of Zeno contained in Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, Hercul. vol. vi. Tab. i. 1, <αυ> δὰ <ὁ> Ζήνων ἔκαστον <τὸν θεὸν ἀπειρα κατέχειν> δὴ τὰ εὖ <τὴρια>... <οὐκ ἄ> ν συνακο<λοῦθει εἰ μή τι> τῶν αἰών<ων> καὶ ἃ<ξι> οὖταὶ δια<φ>θισάμε<νος> ὅς με<τὰ τὰ>ς θεάς. It will be seen that so little of the papyrus is legible here that the sense for which it is quoted by Zeller, p. 165 n. 5, is entirely due to the imagination of the Naples editor. Prof. Scott (Fragm. Hercul. p. 181) rightly characterises this as “gibberish,” and wonders that Zeller should have seriously quoted it: see also Wachsm. Comm. i. p. 9 n. If we are to follow the conjectures of the Naples editor of this work of Philodemus, there are at least three other fragments of Zeno preserved in it. In no place but this, however, does the name of Zeno occur, and, though the doctrines appear to belong to some Stoic, there is no reason whatever for supposing that they originated with Zeno. They will be found at Tab. iv. 7. c. iv. col. i. c. xi. and col. ii. c. xii.


Iovem: it is clear that Zeus was identified with the
aether or pure fiery essence, of which caelum is here an equivalent, as in Pacuvius ap. Cic. N. D. ii. 91, hoc quod memoro nostri caelum Grai perhibent aethera. Cf. Chrysipp. ap. Philod. ἐνδεύσεως p. 79 Gomp., "Ἡφαιστον δὲ πῦρ εἶναι...Δία δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα. Diog. L. vii. 147 God is the creator of the universe, and, as it were, the father of all; his various manifestations are described by different names. Δία μὲν γὰρ φασι δι’ ὄν τὰ πάντα. Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ’ ὅσον τοῦ ζῆν αὐτίος ἐστιν, ἢ διὰ τοῦ ζῆν κεχώρηκεν...... "Ἡραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς αέρα· καὶ "Ἡφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ· καὶ Ποσειδώνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ύγρόν. The extract from Minuc. Felix lends some slight weight to Krische's theory (p. 398) that the whole of Diogenes' description is ultimately derived from Zeno. The same writer thinks that the explanation of the myths of the mutilation of Uranus and the binding of Cronos (Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 64) belongs to Zeno.

ilentem. Diogenes' πῦρ τεχνικὸν is, according to Krische, a blunder: Hephaestus is elsewhere identified with earthly fire (τὴν φλόγα in Plut. de Iside c. 66, for which however see on Cleanth. frag. 23). But see Zeller, p. 359, 1. These explanations were not novelties introduced by the Stoa, except in so far as they were specially adapted to Stoic dogmas. Cf. Sext. Math. ix. 18 (after citing Euhemerus and Prodicus), καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ἄρτον Δημήτραν νομισθῆναι τὸν δὲ οἶνον Διόνυσον τὸ δὲ ύδωρ Ποσειδώνα τὸ δὲ πῦρ "Ἡφαιστον καὶ ἡδὴ τῶν εὐχρηστοῦντων ἑκαστον.

pellatum ἀπὸ τοῦ χέεσθαι, quanquam eandem opinionem ab Homero possumus intelligere quod ait Ὅκεανὸν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν. This frag. is cited by Wachsmuth Comm. i. p. 11, who adds "eadem originatio est apud Achill. Tat., Isag. in Arat. phaen. 3. 125 e. Petav."

The lines of Hesiod, Theog. 116 foll. are often quoted, e.g. by Plato, Symp. 178 B, to prove the antiquity of love, and by Ar. Met. i. 4. 1 as an indication that Hesiod recognised both the efficient and the final cause. Aristotle also refers to the passage in Phys. iv. 1 and de Caelo iii. 1. 298 b. 25, and Krische suggests (p. 395) that the application which is put upon it by him in the latter place prevented Zeno from identifying χάος with his own πρῶτη ἕλη as might have been expected. Cf. also the anecdote related of Epicurus in Sext. Math. x. 18, 19.

ἀπὸ τοῦ χέεσθαι. Krische l. c. remarks that this derivation is probably referred to in Plat. Cratyl. 402 B where Socrates, after saying that Heraclitus likened all things to a flowing river, and that Homer’s line showed that he was of the same opinion, proceeds: οἴμαι δὲ καὶ Ἡσίοδος.

113. Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. i. 498, καὶ Ζήνων δὲ τὸ παρ’ Ἡσίοδῳ χάος ὑδὼρ εἶναι φησιν, οὐ συνικανοῦντος ἰλυν γίνεσθαι, ἢς πηγενμένης ἢ γῆ στερεμνιούται. τρίτων δὲ Ἐρωτα γεγονέναι καθ’ Ἡσίοδον, ἵνα τὸ πῦρ παραστήσῃ πυρωδέστερον γὰρ πάθος Ἐρως.

This passage shows clearly that Zeno must have rejected or been ignorant of ll. 118 and 119 of the Theog. see Krische, p. 396.

χάος. See on frag. 112 and add Cornut. c. 17, p. 85 Osann, ἔστι δὲ χάος μὲν τὸ πρὸ τῆς διακοσμήσεως γενόμενον ύγρόν, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως οὕτως ὄνομασμένον.

ιλών: similar views with regard to the formation of the
earth are attributed to Xenophanes. Hippolyt. i. 14, ταύτα δὲ φησι γενέσθαι ὅτε πάντα ἐπηλώθησαν πάλαι τῶν δὲ τῶν ἐν τῷ πηλῷ ἐξηρανθῆναι κ.τ.λ., and to Anaxagoras
(Zeller, pre-Socratics ii. p. 356). Hence Zeno himself
spoke of earth as ὑποστάθμη πάντων, frag. 114.

πυρωδίστερον: a familiar comparison. Pind. P. iv. 219
Medea ἐν φρασί καιομέναν. Virg. Aen. iv. 68, uritur in-
felix Dido. Georg. iii. 244, in furias ignemque ruunt: amor omnibus idem. Cf. Schol. ad Hes. Theog. 120, ἡδ' ἔρος...ἐνοι δὲ πῦρ· τὸ πυρὸς γὰρ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.

The authorities give two further Stoic explanations of
Hesiod’s Eros; (1) with a reference to λόγος σπερματικὸς.
Cornut. c. 17, p. 86 Osann, ὁ δὲ Ἐρως σὺν αὐτοῖς γεγονέναι ἔρρηθη, ἡ ὀρμή ἐπὶ τὸ γεννᾶν. (2) Fire regarded as
συνεκτικὴ δύναμις: Schol. ad Hes. Theog. 120, τὰ τρία
στοιχεῖα εἰπὼν τὸ δ' λέγει τὸ πῦρ ὅπερ δαιμονίως ἐρωτά
φησι, συναρμόζειν γὰρ καὶ συνάγειν καὶ ἐνοῦν πέφυκεν.
On the passage generally cf. Flach, Glossen u. Scholien,
p. 37, who attributes to Zeno the words in the Schol. on
l. 115, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὑδατος ἐγένοντο τὰ στοιχεῖα, γῆ κατὰ
συνιζησιν, ἀὑρ κατὰ ἀνάδοσιν· τὸ δὲ λεπτομέρες τοῦ
ἀέρος γέγονε πῦρ, τὰ δὲ ὄρη κατὰ ἐξοστρακισμὸν τῆς γῆς,
which appear also in Cornut. c. 17, p. 84 Osann. This is
likely enough, but there is no direct evidence. The same
remark applies to the derivation of Κρόνος from χρόνος
id. p. 44 (cf. Cic. N. D. ii. 64). Flach refers many other
definitions to Zeno: a list of some of them will be found
at p. 48 of his work, but those of his inferences which are
not supported by direct evidence cannot be dealt with
here.

114. Schol. on Hes. Theog. 117, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Στωικὸς
ἐκ τοῦ ύγροῦ τὴν ὑποστάθμην γῆν γεγεννηθᾶται φησιν,
τρίτου δὲ Ἐρωτα γεγονέναι, ὅθεν ὁ ἐπαγόμενον ἀθετεῖται

Wachsmuth connects this with frag. 113. For the general sense cf. frag. 52. The word ὑποστάθμη is Platonic (Phaed. 109 c).


ποιότητα, frag. 53. πάντα τὰ βάρη, frag. 67. βάρη...ἀνωθεν... εἶδος: so Flach, p. 223 after Schoeemann. The old reading was κοφα...ἀνω...μέρος. Osann suggested ἐπτειν for πίπτειν. Cf. Cornut. c. 17, p. 91 Osann, οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν Ἰάπετος μὲν ὄνομάσθη ο λόγος καθ’ ὅν φωνητικὰ τὰ ξών ἐγένετο καὶ ὅλος ὁ ψόφος ἀπετελέσθη, ἱάφετος τις ὄντι ἰὰ γὰρ ἡ φωνή. Κοίνος δὲ καθ’ ὅν ποιά τινα τὰ ὅντα ἔστιν τὸ γὰρ κ πολλαχού οἱ ᾿Ιωνες ἀντὶ τοῦ π χρωνται...

Κρῖος δὲ καθ’ ὅν τὰ μὲν ἄρχει καὶ δυναστεύει τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δ’ ὑποτέτακται καὶ δυναστεύεται ἐντεῦθεν τάχα καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ποιμνίοις κριοῦ προσαγορευομένου. ᾿Τηρεῖον δὲ καθ’ ὅν ὑπεράνω τινα ἐτέρων περιπορευεται. See Flach, Glossen u. Scholien zur Hes. Th. p. 42 foll.

116. Schol. on Hes. Theog. 139, Gaisf. Gr. Poet. Min. ii. 484. Κύκλωπας. Ζήνων δὲ πάλιν φυσικωτέρως τὰς ἐγκυκλίους φορᾶς εἰρήσθαι φησι’ διὸ καὶ τὰ ὄνοματα τούτων ἐξέθετο Βρόντην τε καὶ Στερόπην. ᾿Αργην δὲ ἐπειδὴ φασὶ τὸν ἀργῆτα κεραυνὸν· παῖδας δὲ φησιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ὅυρανοῦ ἐπειδὴ πάντα ταύτα τὰ πάθη περὶ
τον ούρανόν εἰσι...[ἐν χρόνῳ γάρ τινι ἐγένοντο ἑγκυκλιο
περιφοραὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τοῦ ἄνεος].

Flach’s arrangement of the text is quite different: he
inserts the words ἐν χρόνῳ—ἀέρος after εἰρῆσθαί φησιν,
altering φοράς into περιφοράς. See his interpretation,
p. 50.

ἐγκυκλίως φοράς. The band of aether which formed
the external stratum of the world revolved in a circle round
it. Stob. Ecl. 1. 14, 1', p. 142, 13, τὸ αἰθέριον (φῶς) περι-
φερῶς κυνεῖται. In the matter of the revolving aether
Zeno followed Aristotle, whose quinta essentia is described
by Sextus as τὸ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα (Pyrrh. II. 31).
Aristotle himself approves of the Platonic derivation from
ἀεὶ θείῳ and censures Anaxagoras for referring it to αἰθό
(de Caeio I. 2); see also Krische, p. 306 foll.

Βρόντην τε καὶ Στερόπην. Wachsmuth says:—“immo
βρόντην τε καὶ στερόπην,” but surely Hesiod is the
subject to ἔξεζητο as to φησι below. τίθεσθαι ὄνομα is
used regularly of the father: e.g. Isae. II. § 36, τῷ ἐμῷ
παιδίῳ ἐθέμην τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἐκεῖνου.

ἐν χρόνῳ κ.τ.λ. These words cannot belong to Zeno,
unless Flach’s view of the passage is adopted, as they
are inconsistent with the rest of the explanation.

117. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 8, τ<οὐ>ς δὲ ὀρθοὺς
<λόγο>ous καὶ σπουδαίας διαθέσεις Διοσκούρους.

From the position of these words in the fragments of
Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας it appears probable that they
belong to Zeno: see on frag. 40. Gomperz however p. 74
puts a full stop after διαθέσεις.

ὀρθοὺς λόγους: see Introd. p. 8, and for the ethical
importance of the expression Stein, Erkenntnistheorie,
p. 259 foll. Cic. Tusc. iv. 34, ipsa vir tus brevissime recta
ratio dici potest.
diathéseis are opposed to ἔξεις as "permanent forms admitting neither of increase nor diminution," Zeller, p. 103. Thus intellectual goods are divided into (1) virtues = διαθéseis, (2) σπουδαίας ἔξεις such as μαντική, and (3) ἐπαινετὰς ἐνεργείας = οὕτε ἔξεις οὕτε διαθéseis, such as φρονίμενα, Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5, e and f, Diog. vii. 98, Cleanth. frag. 51, cf. Sext. Pyrrh. III. 243, αὐτῇ γὰρ ἡ φρονíμη διάθéseis ἀκατάληπτος ἔστι μήτε ἔξ αὐτῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ αὐτόθεν φαινομένη μήτε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς: κοινὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ ταύτα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν. For the distinction between ἔξεις and διάθéseis in Aristotle see Wallace on de An. II. 5. 417 b. 15.

Δισσοκούροντος: explained physically by Xenophanes as clouds made to shine by their movement (Stob. Ecl. I. 24. 1a p. 204, 18). See also the explanations cited by Sext. Math. IX. 37. 86: the latter passage appears to be Stoic, as recognising the belief in demons.

118. Diog. L. VII. 149, καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν ὑφεστάναι πάσαν φασίν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι· καὶ αὐτήν καὶ τέχνην ἀποφαίνουσι διὰ τινας ἐκβάσεις, ὡς φησὶ Ζήνων.

μαντική. The Stoic definition was as follows: Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5b 12, p. 67, 16, εἶναι δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν φασίν ἐπιστήμην θεωρητικὴν σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπινων βίου συντεινόντων. Substantially the same in Sext. Math. IX. 132.

εἰ καί. Others read ὡς καί, reversing the argument: in fact, the Stoics seem to have appealed to the truth of μαντική as a proof of the existence of God, no less than vice versa. See the references in Zeller, pp. 175, 3; 372, 2 and 3.

tέχνη. They prove that it is an art by the truth of certain results, cf. Cie. de Divin. I. 23, Quid? quae reris, Carneades, cur haec ita fiant aut qua arte perspici possint?
Nescire me fateor, evenire autem te ipsum dico videre. That its professors are sometimes deceived does not invalidate the title of divination as an art (ib. § 24), cf. N. D. II. 12.

**ETHICA.**

119. Diog. L. vii. 84, τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιροῦσιν εἰς τὸν περὶ ὅρμης καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπουν καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περὶ τε τῆς πρώτης αἰζίας καὶ τῶν πρᾶξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν καὶ ὦτῳ δ’ ὑποδιαιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιττου καὶ Ἀρχέδημου καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα κ.τ.λ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς ἄν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον.

There is a full discussion of this passage in Zeller, p. 223, 1: its difficulties, however, do not affect Zeno or Cleanthes.

120. Diog. L. vii. 87, διόπερ πρώτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλος εἰπὲ τὸ ὦμολογομενώς τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὡσπερ ἐστὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν· ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. Lactant. Inst. iii. 7, Zenonis (summum bonum) cum natura congruenter vivere. id. iii. 8, audiamus igitur Zenonem; nam is interdum virtutem somniat. Summum, inquit, est bonum cum natura consentaneae vivere. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 6a, p. 75, 11, τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων ὦτος ἀπεδώκε 'τὸ ὦμολογομενώς ζῆν'. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἑνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως ζῶντων κακοδαιμονιῶν. Plut. Comm. Not. 23, 1, οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτους (scil. Peripatetics) ἱκολούθησαν ὑποτιθεμένοις στοιχεία τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τῆς φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. (Cf. Cíc. Fin. iv. 72, videsne igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis consistere,
re dissidere; cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis discrepare? ib. v. 88.) Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 21. 129, p. 496 P., 179 S., πάλιν δ' αυ Ζήνων μὲν ὁ Στοικὸς τέλος ἧγεταί το κατ' ἀρετήν ζῇν, cf. Cie. Fin. iv. 14, hunc ipsum Zenonis aitn esse finem, declarantem illud, quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere (where see Madv.): ib. iii. 21, summum...bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod όμολογίαν Stoici, nos appellamus convenientiam, etc.

There is a conflict of testimony here between Diog. and Stob. as to whether Cleante added the words τῇ φύσει to Zeno’s definition or found them there already. On the whole the fact that Diogenes quotes from a named book of Zeno’s makes his authority the more trustworthy. So Wellmann, l. c. pp. 446—448, cf. Krische, p. 372, 3. Ueberweg, p. 199, adds that Diog.’s statement is all the more credible, because Speusippus, Polemo, and Heraclitus had enounced similar principles. Zeller, p. 228, 2, does not decide the point. Hirzel, iv. p. 105—112, argues the question at some length and decides in favour of Stobaeus, but his arguments are always biassed by the desire to vindicate the originality of Cleante. See also Introd. p. 14.


This frag. has been taken from Stein, Erkenntnis-theorie, p. 271. Although we cannot with certainty attribute to Zeno a statement, which is only expressed to belong to οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος, yet there is no reason why he should not have taught this. The soul at birth is only open to the impressions of sensation, and its first impulse is towards self-preservation. Cf. Plut. Sto. Rep. 12, 5, p. 1038 C, ἀλλ’ οὐτ’ αἰσθησίς ἐστιν οἷς μηδὲν αἰσθητόν,
οὐτ' οἰκείωσις ὁίς μηδὲν οἰκεῖον· ἡ γὰρ οἰκείωσις αἰσθησὶς ἐοικε τοῦ οἰκείου καὶ ἀντίληψις εἶναι.

122. Porphyry. de Abstin. III. 19, τὴν δὲ οἰκείωσιν ἀρχὴν τίθενται δικαιοσύνης οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος.

Δικαιοσύνη is one of the four cardinal virtues (see infra. frag. 134) and is founded on οἰκείωσις in the same sense as ἀρετή generally. The natural impulse of every animal is towards self-preservation, so that it seeks after those things which are κατὰ φύσιν and shuns those which are παρὰ φύσιν. Diog. L. vii. 85; Cic. Fin. iii. 16; Alex. Aphr. de an. p. 150, 28 ed. Bruns. οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ οὐ πάντες δὲ λέγουσιν πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι τὸ ξύδον αὐτῷ· ἔκαστον γὰρ ξύδων εὐθὺς γενόμενον πρὸς τέ αὐτὸ οἰκεῖονθα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπων· οἱ δὲ χαριέστερον δοκοῦντες λέγειν αὐτῶν καὶ μᾶλλον διαρθροῦν περὶ τοῦ σκέψειν φασιν πρὸς τὴν σύστασιν καὶ τήρησιν ωκειώθας εὐθὺς γενομένους ἡμᾶς τὴν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 13, p. 118, 11 (where the doctrine is attributed to the Peripatetics). For τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, see Madv. de Fin. Exc. iv. and especially p. 8183, “Stoici...ita disputabant, ut, quae postea denuum, orto subito rationis lumine, quod in infante nondum esset accensum, et animadversa constantia convenientiaque naturae, nasceretur voluntas cum natura consentiendi, in qua et virtus et perfectio rationis esset, eam omnino a prima conciliatone dirimerent, bonumque constituenter, quod expeteretur, a primis, quae appetenterunt, genere seiunctum.”

123. Epict. diss. i. 20. 14, καίτοι αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ προηγούμενος λόγος τῶν φιλοσοφῶν λίαν ἐστὶν ὀλίγος. εἰ θέλεις γνῶναι, ἀναγνωθί τὰ Ζήνωνος, καὶ ὄψει· τί γὰρ ἔχει μακρὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τέλος ἐστι τὸ ἐπεσθαί θεοῖς, οὕσια δὲ ἀγαθοῦ χρήσις οία δεῖ φαντασιῶν;
προηγούμενος λόγος, "leading doctrine": not in the technical sense to be noticed on frag. 169.

ἐπεσθαί θεοὶ is only another way of expressing ὀμολογία τῇ φύσει. This passage furnishes an argument in support of the view taken in the Introd. p. 14 as to the character of Zeno’s φύσις.

φαντασιών. Zeno went back to the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge, so that it is not surprising to find that his epistemology is brought into connection with practical morality. That particular class of impressions which is directed towards the performance of some moral action gives rise to corresponding όρμαι in the soul, cf. Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 9, p. 86. 17, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὀρμὴν οὐδὲν ἔτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ' ἡ φαντασίαν ὀρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος αὐτόθεν. Virtue consists in the proper direction of these όρμαι in accordance with the dictates of ὀρθὸς λόγος: hence Diog. L. vii. 86 says of reason:—τεχνίτης γὰρ οὕτως ἐπιγίγνεται τῆς ὀρμῆς, cf. Cleanth. frag. 66. The doctrine depends on the freedom of the assent: supra, frag. 19, cf. Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 9, p. 88, 1, πάσας δὲ τὰς ὀρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν, and see Windelband in Müller’s Handbuch, ν. 295. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 166, 167, points out that the ethical application of φαντασίαι is very often mentioned by the younger Stoics, although not unknown in the earlier period, cf. Diog. vii. 48, ὥστε εἰς ἀκοσμίαν καὶ εἰκαϊότητα τρέπεσθαι τοὺς ἀγμανστους ἑχοντας τὰς φαντασίας.

M. Aurel. II. 5, v. 9, x. 6. eúdaimonía is not identical with télôs, which rather consists in tò tûxēîn tîs eúdaimonías.

125. Diog. vii. 127, αὐτάρκη εἶναι ἄρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, καθά φησί Ζήνων. August. contra Acad. III. 7. 16, clamat Zenou et tota illa porticus tumultuatūr hominem natum ad nihil esse aliud quam honestatem; ipsam suo splendore in se animos dueere, nullo prorsus commodo extrinsecus posito et quasi lenocinante mercede; voluptatemque illam Epicuri solis inter se pecoribus esse communem; in quorum societatem et hominem et sapientem tendere ncfas esse. August. de trin. xiii. 5. 8, diximus ibi quosque posuisse beatam vitam quod eos maxime delectavit...ut virtus Zenonem. Cic. Fin. v. 79, a Zenone hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: “virtus ad bene vivendum seipsa contenta est.” Cf. Acad. i. 7, 35; ii. 134, 135; Paradox. II. This position was borrowed from the Cynics, Introd. p. 19.

126. Cic. Fin. iv. 47, errare Zenonem, qui nulla in re nisi in virtute aut vitio propensionem ne minimi quidem momenti ad summum bonum adipiscendum esse diceret, et, cum ad beatam vitam nullum momentum cetera habe- rent, ad appetitionem tamen rerum esse in iis momenta diceret. ib. iv. 60, Zeno autem quod suam quod proprian speciem habeat cum appetendum sit, id solum bonum appellat, beatam autem vitam eam solam, quae cum virtute degatur.

This point constitutes the main gist of Cicero’s argument against the Stoic virtue in de Fin. iv., viz. that while the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν are an object of desire, they have no weight in the explanation of virtue itself. Madvig points out (1) that Cicero has throughout confused the Stoic prima constitutio, which excludes virtue, with that
of Antiochus which includes it, (2) that throughout the Fourth Book he attributes far more importance to the doctrine of οἰκείωσις than the Stoics themselves did (pp. 820, 821), and (3) that he fails to notice the Stoic distinction between τὸ τυχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν and τὸ πάντα ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ τυχάνειν αὐτῶν (Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 6°, p. 76. 13; Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 26; Cic. Fin. ii. 22). On the subject in general see Zeller, p. 278 foll. For the nature of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν cf. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 3°, p. 47. 12 f.; ib. 7°, p. 80. 9; 7°, p. 82. 12. The position of Zeno will have to be considered with reference to the προηγμένα, where the same inconsistency appears.

aut vitio: these words were bracketed by some of the edd. and are, of course, logically indefensible, but see Madv.

127. Cic. Tusc. ii. 29, Nihil est, inquit (Zeno), malum, nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum est...Numquam quidquam, inquit (scil. doleas necne interest), ad beate quidem vivendum, quod est in una virtute positum, sed est tamen reiciendum. Cur? Asperum est, contra naturam, difficile perpessu, triste, durum. ib. v. 27, si Stoicus Zeno diceret qui, nisi quod turpe esset, nihil malum duceret. Cf. ib. ii. 15.

In Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5°, p. 58, 14, we read ἄνάλογον δὲ τῶν κακῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι κακίας, τὰ δ' οὗ, and the examples given of the latter class are λυπή and φόβος. This occurs in the course of a passage which Wachsmuth attributes to Zeno, but see on frag. 128. Just before this, in what is clearly Zeno's classification of ἀγαθὰ and κακία, we find ἵδουν classed among the ἀδιάφορα, cf. Diog. L. vii. 103, and this agrees with the statement in the present passage that dolor is an ἀπορροημένον. So dolor is classed in Cic. Fin. iii. 51, where Zeno's name appears in the
immediate context, and it is to be observed that the corresponding προηγμένον in that passage is not ἡδονή but "doloris vacuitas." The entire subject of the relation which the emotions bear to the classification of ἀγαθά and κακά is extremely obscure, and the ancient authorities are not only defective but, as we have seen, contradictory. See Introd. p. 46, where this passage should have been referred to. Zeller's account is not clear on this point: at p. 253 he apparently asserts that the emotions are to be classed as κακά.

128. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 5a, p. 57, 18, ταύτ' εἶναι φησιν ὁ Ζήμων ὁσα οὐσίας μετέχει, τῶν δ' ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. ἀγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα· φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, δικαιοσύνην, ἀνδρείαν καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἐστὶν ἀρετή ἢ μετέχου ἀρετῆς· κακὰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀφροσύνην, ἀκολασίαν, ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν, καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἐστὶ κακία ἢ μετέχου κακίας· ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ξωὴν θάνατον, δόξαν ἀδοξίαν, πόνον ἡδονήν, πλοῦτον πενίαν, νόσον ψυχειαν, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὄμοια.

Substantially the same account appears in Diog. L. vii. 101, 102, where Heaton, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus are referred to as authorities.

τῶν δ' ὄντων κ.τ.λ. This classification is attributed by Sext. Math. xi. 3, 4, to the Old Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics in common: he quotes from Xenocrates, πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἢ ἄγαθόν ἐστὶν ἢ κακόν ἐστὶν ἢ οὕτε ἄγαθόν ἐστὶν οὕτε κακόν ἐστὶν. In the same passage he states that the name ἰδιάφορον was applied to the third class by all three schools, but probably this is a mistake, as all the other evidence points to Zeno as having been the first to use the word in this special ethical sense. On the other hand, there is not much likelihood in Hirzel's opinion (II. p. 45 n.) that Aristotle was the first to in-
introduce the term *adiaphoros*, and that Zeno spoke of *meôsa*.

φρόνησιν κ.τ.λ. cf. frag. 134.

τόν ο έστων ἀρετή: cf. Sext. Math. xi. 77, ἄλλον μὲν Ζήνων, δι’ οὗ τήν ἀρετήν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δεδόξακεν. ib. 184, καθ’ καὶ ὄριζομενοι τινες ἐξ αὐτῶν φασιν ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν ἀρετή ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς. The meaning of *metêchon* ἀρετῆς is made clear by Diog. L. vii. 94, 95, where it is explained as including actions in accordance with virtue, and good men: the converse is true of *metêchon kakias*.

ηδονή: cf. Aul. Gell. ix. 5, 5. Zeno censuit voluptatem esse indifferens, id est neutrum neque bonum neque malum, quod ipse Graeco vocabulo *adiaphoros* appellavit. For the attitude of the Stoics towards the Epicurean summum bonum see Wellmann l.c. pp. 449, 450. Heinze, de Stoicorum affectibus p. 37, doubts, without sufficient ground, whether Gellius' statement is accurate, thinking that Zeno would rather have classed *ηδονή* among the *kaká*. It will be observed that, omitting πόνον *ηδονήν*, every pair of *adiaphora* here mentioned contains a *propriômenon* and an *appropriômenon*, and that, except in the case of νόσου υγίειαν (which Wachsm. transposes), the *propriômenon* is mentioned first. We should naturally suppose the same to be the case with *ηδονή* and πόνος; but which then is the *propriômenon*? Wachsmuth evidently thinks *ηδονή*, since he transposes the words, and at first sight Diog. L. vii. 102 is conclusive. But it should be observed that Hecaton is the main authority there cited, and there is reason to believe that this was one of the points on which the view of the School altered as time went on. With Zeno and Cleanthes, at least, it seems better to suppose that πόνος is the *propriômenon*, and *ηδονή* the *appropriômenon*, and that *ηδονή* is contrasted with πόνος rather than with λύπη, because the latter certainly belonged

Wachsmuth would continue to Zeno the passage following this in Stobaeus down to p. 59. 3, but the evidence is against this. The prominence given to ἰσχύς ψυχῆς rather points to an origin subsequent in date to Cleanthes, and λύπη and φόβος are here classed as κακά, which is inconsistent with frag. 127, not to speak of ἡδονή in the present fragment.

129. Senec. Epist. 82, 7, Zenon noster hac collectione utitur: "Nullum malum gloriosum esse; mors autem gloria est; mors ergo non est malum."

In the subdivision of the ἀδιάφορα death belongs to the ἀποπροηγμένα Diog. L. vii. 106; cf. Cic. Fin. iii. 29, ut enim, qui mortem in malis ponit, non potest eam non timere, sic nemo ulla in re potest id, quod malum esse decreverit, non curare idque contemnere.

130. Cic. Acad. i. 36, Cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam diebeat (Zeno), alia naturae esse contraria. His ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda diebat, contraque contraria; neutra autem in mediis relinquuebat, in quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti.

In this and the following §§ of Cicero it is unsafe to attribute entirely to Zeno the summary of Stoic doctrines there set forth, in the absence of other testimony pointing in the same direction. At the same time there is no
reason a priori why Zeno should not have sub-divided ἀδιάφορα into (1) τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, (2) τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, and (3) τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδιάφορα = media, or have identified τὰ κατὰ φύσιν with ληπτὰ or τὰ ἀξίαν ἔχοντα, and τὰ παρὰ φύσιν with ἀληπτὰ or τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. Cf. Stob. Ecl. π. 7, 7\(^{(d)}\), p. 82, 11; 7\(^{(f)}\), p. 84, 3.

131. Stob. Ecl. π. 7, 7\(^{(e)}\), p. 84, 21, τῶν δὲ ἀξίαν ἔχοντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν τὰ δὲ βραχείαν. ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντων ἢ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἢ δὲ βραχείαν. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὴν ἔχοντα ἀξίαν προηγμένα λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν ἀποπροηγμένα, Ζήνωνος 5 ταῦτας τὰς ὅνομασίας θεμένου πρώτου τοῖς πράγμασι προηγμένου δὲ εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον ὑπὲρ ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον. τὸν δὲ ὀμοίον λόγον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀποπροηγμένῳ εἶναι καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ταύτα. οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἄγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον 10 διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἄγαθῶν φύσει οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν προηγμένων εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα ἀλλὰ τῶν μετ’ αὐτῶν τεταγμένων. προηγμένα δὲ λέγεσθαι οὐ τῷ πρὸς ἐνδαμονίαν τινὰ συμ-15 βάλλεσθαι συνεργεῖν τε πρὸς αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τούτων τὴν ἐκλογὴν ποιεῖσθαι παρὰ τὰ ἀποπροηγμένα. Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 1. Some of the πρεσβύτεροι said that Zeno’s προηγμένον was in as bad a way as the sour wine, which its owner could not dispose of as wine or vinegar: so the προηγμένον is neither an ἄγαθον nor an ἀδιάφορον.

phrase, Acad. i. 37 (sed quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris), is of doubtful import: see Reid in loc. In Fin. iii. 51 we have:—quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quamobrem quibusdam anteponentur, where Madvig remarks that none of the authorities give examples of those things which are οὐκ ἡπτα without being προηγμένα.

5. Ζήνωνος: apart from the evidence of Stob. and Plut. it is clear that the προηγμένα must have formed part of Zeno’s system from the fact that Aristo expressly dissented from him on this point (Cic. Acad. ii. 130), cf. Cic. Fin. iii. 51. According to Hirzel p. 418 the word was discarded by the later Stoics, and εὐχρηστα substituted by Posidonius.

8. προηγούμενον λόγον: see on frag. 169.

τὸ ἀποπροηγμένω: so Wachsmuth for τὸ ἀποπροηγμένων MSS. Heeren reads τῶν—ων.

13. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν αὐλῇ: cf. Cic. Fin. iii. 52, ut enim, inquit (Zeno), nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem—id est enim προηγμένον—sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primario loco sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinent, προηγμένα, id est, producta nominentur.

τῶν προηγμένων: so Madv. ad de Fin. i.e. for MSS. τῶν προαγόμενων: he is followed by Wachsmuth. Hirzel ii. p. 823 prefers προηγούμενων.

15. τινά: so MSS. τὶνι Davies. <μοιράν> τινὰ Hense.

16. τέ: Mein. τί MSS.

αὔλῳ τῷ κ.τ.λ. On the subject of the προηγμένα in general consult Zeller, pp. 278—287. This sentence contains the gist of the Stoic position in the matter. Although sickness e.g. does not impede the happiness of the wise man, since he is secure in the possession of virtue, it
is at the same time impossible ceteris paribus not to prefer health to sickness, cf. Stob. Eel. ii. 7. 7, p. 79, 12—17.


Cf. Cie. Paradox. iii. Hor. Sat. i. 3. 120 foll. Both Sextus and Diog. give as the ground for this doctrine an argument from the relation of truth to falsehood. As one true thing cannot be more true or one false thing more false than another in respect of its truth or falsity, so one sin cannot be more sinful than another. ἀμάρτημα is the correlative of κατόρθωμα and is defined as τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγον πραττόμενον, ἢ ἐν ὃ παραλέλειπται τι καθήκων ὑπὸ λογικὸν ζῶου, Stob. Eel. ii. 7. 11a, p. 93, 16. See further Zeller, p. 267.

133. Cie. Mur. § 61, omne delictum scelus esse nefarium, nec minus delinquere eum, qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum, qui patrem suffocaverit.

This is quoted among the sententiae et praecepta Zenonis, but it is extremely unlikely that the illustration used is that of Zeno. Cicero attempts (Paradox. iii. 25) to answer this objection by the remark, doubtless borrowed from some Stoic source, that whereas the wrongful killing of a slave involves a single ἀμάρτημα, many ἀμαρτήματα are committed in the act of parricide.

134. Plut. Sto. Rep. vii. 1, 2, ἀρετᾶς ὁ Ζήνων ἀπο-
Zeno taught that virtue is one and indivisible, but that in different spheres it is manifested in different forms. He resumed the Socratic position (for which see Zeller, Socrat. E. T. p. 140 foll., and especially Xen. Mem. III. 9, Plat. Men. 88 c), that virtue is knowledge, but adopted the terminology of Aristotle by making use of the word φρόνησις instead of ἐπιστήμη, and thus indicated that moral insight is to be distinguished from intellectual research (cf. Ar. Eth. vi. 13). There is therefore high probability in Zeller's suggestion (p. 258 n.) that "perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν.
"At the same time he must have been influenced by the Platonic doctrine of the four cardinal virtues (Rep. p. 441 foll.), but he traced the differences in virtue to the diversity of the objects with which it is concerned, while Plato treated them as arising from the distinct parts of the soul, which produce different mental states.

\[ \text{\textit{aponevntenoi}} = \text{the rendering every man his due (\textit{aponevmptik} η της αξιας έκαιστω Stob. l.c.), cf. the definition attributed to Simonides in Plat. Rep. i. p. 331 E, \textit{ōti το τη \textit{δ}ικαιον \textit{δικαιον} \textit{δικαιον} \textit{δικαιον}. It is more general in meaning than Aristotle's \textit{το \textit{εν \textit{ταις \textit{δ}ιανομαίς \textit{δικαιον} (Eth. N. v. 2. 12).}}]}

\[ \text{\textit{diamet}o} = \text{distinguishing between things with a view to choice: it deals with \textit{τας αιρέσεις και έκκλισεις (Cleanth. frag. 76).}}\]

\[ \text{\textit{upomevnenoi...enephtoeoi.} Hirzel suggests that there is a lacuna in Plut. Sto. Rep. l.e. and that we ought to read there \textit{φρόνησιν ειναι \epsilonν <\textit{upomevnenoi την \epsilonε σοφροσύνην φρόνησιν > a}\textit{retoi (in place of \textit{enephtoeoi). For \textit{upom. cf. Ar. Eth. III. 6, 6, \textit{ο τυ}δρείοσ...συδείσ γαρ \textit{upomevnetikoxteros των \textit{δ}εινων: for the general sense cf. Thuc. ii. 40. 3, \textit{κριτιστοι} \delta' \textit{αν την \textit{ψυχή} ον \textit{δ}ικαίως \textit{κ}ριθείεν \textit{οι τα \tau' \textit{δεινά και \}'δεα σαφέστατα γι\textit{μ}νωσκοντες και διά \\textit{ταύτα μη \textit{ἀποτρε}πομενοι ἐκ των κινδύνων}.}}\]

\[ \text{\textit{σχέσεις}. This word has a technical meaning with the Stoics, being opposed to \textit{κίνησις on the one hand (cf. Cic. Tusc. iv. 30), and to \textit{ε̂ξις (non-essential)(essential) on the other (Stob. Eel. II. 7. 5k, p. 73, 1). The virtues themselves are \textit{διαθέσεις, for which see on frag. 117.}}\]

μένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγου οὐσαν αὐτὴν ὀμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται· καὶ νομίζοντων οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἁλογὸν διαφορὰ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος (ὁ δὲ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν), διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μετάβαλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἐξίν ἡ διάθεσις μεταβολαίς, κακιᾶς τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετῆν, καὶ μηδὲν ἐχεῖν ἁλογὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ λέγεσθαι δὲ ἁλογὸν, ὅταν τὸ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὀρμῆς ἵσχυρὰ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρὸς τὸν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰρόντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ρώμην προσλαβόντα.

τὴν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ. cf. Stob. Ecl. Π. 7. 56, p. 64, 18, ἀρετᾶς δ' εἶναι πλείους φασὶ καὶ ἁχωρίστους ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ὑπόστασιν.

ᴅᴏᴍᴏʟᴏɢΟᴜΜΕΝΟΝ: frag. 120.

ἀμετάπτωτον: cf. the definition of knowledge in frag. 17. Virtue is knowledge as applied to conduct.

καὶ νομίζοντι κ.τ.λ. This is principally aimed at Plato (see e.g. Rep. 436 α), but partly also at Aristotle, although the latter denies that the soul is μεριστὴ in the Platonic sense (de An. i. 5, 24, but cf. Eth. i. 13, 10). With Zeno the local extension of the soul as a πνεῦμα throughout the body does not detract from its unity either on the physical or the moral side: πάθος and ἀρετὴ are alike affections of the ἡγεμονικόν: see on frag. 93. "The battle between virtue and vice did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country." Reid on Acad. i. 38.

dιάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. For the distinction between these two terms see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 132, 306.

ἐξίν ἡ διάθεσις: see on frag. 117. The πάθη are dis-
tistinguished, being neither ἐξεις nor διαθέσεις but κινήσεις, Cie. Tusc. iv. 30.

τῷ πλεονάζοντι. Zeno’s view of the πάθη will be considered in the next following fragments. Cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 10, p. 88, 10, εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς.


Cf. Cie. Off. i. § 136, perturbationes, id est, motus animi nimios rationi non obtemperantes. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7: 2, p. 44, 4, πᾶν πάθος ὀρμή πλεονάζουσα. ib. 7. 10, p. 88, 8, πάθος δ’ εἶναι φασιν ὀρμῆν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῇ τῷ αἴροντι λόγῳ ἢ κίνησιν ψυχῆς <ἀλογον> παρὰ φύσιν. Plut. in fragm. utr. anim. an corp. libid. et aegrit. c. vii. Andron. περὶ παθῶν c. i. The comments in Stob. lec. 10a, p. 89, 3—90, 5, are important. They appear to belong to Chrysippus and show that, while defining the πάθη as κρίσεις, he did not give to that word the restricted interpretation which Galen (see infra, frag. 139) places upon it, and that he recognised the influence of the will in determining the nature of emotion. We may also infer that the words ἀπειθὴς τῷ αἴροντι λόγῳ are a gloss of Chrysippus upon Zeno’s term ἀλογος. This is also clear from Galen, Hipp. et Plat. p. 368 κ, 338 μ, where the reason is given, namely, the desire to enforce the doctrine of the

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unity of the soul (frag. 135). In maintaining that every πάθος is essentially ἄλογον and παρὰ φύσιν, Zeno goes far beyond Plato and Aristotle, although he has much in common with the Platonic point of view. Thus in the Phaedo 83 b, we read ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφέος ψυχὴ οὐτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητῶν καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων καθ' ὅσον δύναται, although elsewhere Plato admits that certain pleasures and pains are allowable (see Zeller’s Plato, p. 444). Similarly Aristotle, while classing certain πάθη as ἄλογα, declares that under certain circumstances wrath and desire are legitimate (Eth. N. ΙΙΙ. 1. 24—26).


Cf. ib. Π. 7. 10, p. 88, 11, διὸ καὶ πᾶσαν πτοῖαν πάθος εἶναι <καὶ> πάλιν <πάν> πάθος πτοῖαν. Wachsmuth refers to Chrysipp. ap. Galen. de Hipp. et Plat. plac. IV. 5, p. 364, 23, Müll. οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἄποδιδοται καὶ ἢ πτοῖα κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ, where the use of the word ἄποδιδοται points to Zeno’s authorship. ἀπὸ τῆς—παρεικάσας seems to be merely the comment of Didymus, although it is possible that Zeno derived πτοῖα from πέτεσθαί, as Wachsmuth thinks.

138. Cic. Acad. Ι. 38, Zeno omnibus his (perturbationibus) quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem...nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat opinionisque iudicio suscipti et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur matrem esse immoderatam quandam intemperantiam.
quasi morbis: see on frag. 144. ἀπαθὴ εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν, Diog. vii. 117.

opinionisque indicio: in view of what follows this is important, and the expression aptly illustrates Galen’s statement that Zeno regarded the πάθη as τὰ ἑπιγνωμονέα κρίσεις.

intemperantiam. The particular virtue which is concerned with regulating the ὀρμαὶ is σωφροσύνη: see on Cleanth. frag. 76, so that excess of impulse or πάθος is said to be produced by its opposite, ἀκολασία (Ἀγνωσία αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, Stob. Eel. II. 7. 5α, p. 60, 2), cf. Tuse. iv. 22, Quemadmodum igitur temperantia sedat appetitiones et efficit, ut eae rectae ratione parcant, conservatque considerata indicia mentis: sic huic inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammant conturbat incitat: itaque et aegritudines et metus et reliquae perturbationes omnes gignuntur ex ea.

139. Galen. Hippocr. et Plat. plac. v. 1, v. 429 K., Ζήνων οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὰς ἑπιγνωμονέας αὐταῖς συστολαῖ καὶ λύσεις ἑπάρσεισ τε καὶ [τὰς] πτῶσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη, ib. iv. 3, v. 377 K. Chrysippus contradicts himself, Zeno, and other Stoics as to this οὐ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ [καὶ] τὰς ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἀλόγους συστολάς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δήξεις ἑπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. Wachsmuth, Comm. i. p. 7, adds ibid. iv. 2, v. p. 367 K., τοιαύτην τινὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν παθῶν (i.e. ὅτι αἱ μειώσεις καὶ αἱ ἑπάρσεις καὶ αἱ συστολαὶ καὶ αἱ διαχύσεις...τῆς ἀλόγου δυνάμεως ἄστι πάθημα ταῖς δόξαις ἑπιγνωμόνεα) Ἑπίκουρος...καὶ Ζήνων ὑπολαμβάνει. Galen distinguishes between three different views of the nature of πάθη, (1) that they have no connection at all with λογισμὸς or κρίσις, which is the view of Plato and
Posidonius, and in which Galen himself concurs. He infers that Cleanthes was of the same opinion (but see on Cleanth. frag. 84); (2) that they are κρίσεις, cf. Diog. L. vii. 111. This is the view of Chrysippus and is in Galen's opinion the worst of the three; (3) between these two extreme views that of Zeno in identifying them with ἐπιγνώμενα κρίσεις occupies a middle position. It would seem however that in this respect Galen has done Chrysippus an injustice: for it is clear from other evidence (see e.g. on frag. 136) that Chrysippus did not confine himself to the view that πάθη are solely an intellectual affection (Zeller, p. 245, 246). At the same it is probably true that he made a distinct advance upon Zeno by identifying πάθη with κρίσεις and connecting them with συγκαταθέσεις: cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 198, 199.

συστολάς. This refers to λύπη, which is defined as συστολὴ ἄλογος (Diog. L. vii. 111, cf. M. Aurel. II. 10) or ἀπειθὴς λόγο (Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 70b, p. 90, 14): in the same way ἐπαρσίς refers to ἡδονή (Diog. L. vii. 114, Stob. l. c., l. 16).

λύσεις. For this word Müller substitutes διαχύσεις, but this is perhaps questionable, cf. Cic. Tusc. iii. 61, ex quo ipsam aegritudinem λύπην Chrysippus [quasi λύσιν id est] solutionem totius hominis appellatam putat.

τάς, delet Müller.

καὶ is expunged by Zeller, p. 246, and Müller, but this corr. is by no means certain: see on frag. 143, and cf. Heinze, Stoicorum de Affectibus doctrina, p. 37.

δήθες. Zeller's correction, accepted by Müller, for δείχεσ, is made almost certain by Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, cf. Tusc. iii. 83, cited on frag. 158.

διαχύσεις. In Diog. L. vii. 114 this word appears as a subdivision of ἡδονή and is defined as ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.
In Suidas, col. 818, however ἠδονή itself is defined as ἀλογος διάχυσις, cf. deliquesceat in Cic. Tusc. iv. 37. It is worthy of observation that all these words (excepting perhaps ταπεινώσεις) refer to λύπη and ἠδονή, and that ἐπιθυμία and φόβος are not so prominent. For ταπεινώσεις, cf. examination humili atque fracta connected with metus in Cic. Tusc. iv. 13, and for πτώσεις demitti (of aegritudo) ib. 14, 37. In the face of the evidence already cited, Wellmann, p. 454, seems to be wrong in supposing λύσεις and πτώσεις to be equivalent to ὄρεξις and ἔκκλησις in Diog. and Stob. II. cc.


140. Themist. de An. 90 b, Spengel, π. 197, 24, καὶ οὖ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τοῦ λόγου διαστροφᾶς εἶναι τιθέμενοι καὶ λόγου κρίσεις ἵμαρτημένας.

In the face of Galen's testimony this statement is of no importance so far as Zeno is concerned and may be discarded.

141. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. plac. π. 3. 5, ν. p. 322 K., οὐ μόνον Χρύσιππος ἀλλὰ καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ζήνων ἐτοίμως αὐτὰ τιθέασιν (τοὺς φόβους καὶ τὰς λύπας καὶ πάνθ' ὁσα τοιάτα πάθη κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν συνιστάσθαι). This passage is taken from Wachsmuth, Comm. 1. p. 7. The emotions are placed in the heart because it is the seat of the ἡγεμονικόν (frag. 100), of which the πάθη are affections (frag. 135), Zeller, p. 213, Stein, Psych. n. 258.

142. Diog. vii. 140, τῶν παθῶν τὰ ἀνωτάτω (καθά φησιν...Ζήνων ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν) εἶναι γένη τέτταρα, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, ἠδονήν.

Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 10, p. 88, 14, πρῶτα δ' εἶναι τῷ γένει
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ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἑπταθύμιαν, φόβον, ὁμηρίν, ἡδονήν, cf. Cic. Off. i. 69, Tusc. iii. 24, iv. 11, Jerome Epist. cxxxiii. illi enim quae Graeci appellant πάθη nos perturbationes possumus dicere, aegritudinem videlicet et gaudium, spem et metum, quorum duo praesentia, duo futura sunt, asserunt extirpari posse de mentibus et nullam fibram radicemque vitiorum in homine omnino residere, meditatione et assidua exercitatione virtutum. Plato had already recognised λύπη, φόβος, ἑπταθύμια and ἡδονή as the four chief πάθη, cf. Phaed. 83 b, cited on frag. 136. From τὰ ἀνωτάτω...γένη it is obvious that Zeno classed certain εἰδη under each of the principal πάθη, but how much of the exposition in Diog. L. vii. 111—116, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 10bκε is derived from him the evidence does not enable us to determine, nor can we tell whether the doctrine of the εὐπάθειαι belongs to him.

143. Cic. Tusc. iii. 74, 75, Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. Additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. Galen de Hipp. et Plat. plac. iv. 7, p. 416, ὁ γόγνον ὅρος οὕτως, φησίν [Posidionius], ὁ τῆς λύπης, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί τῶν παθῶν ὑπὸ τε Ζήνωνος εἰρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦ Χρυσίππου γεγραμμένοι σαφῶς ἐξελέγχουσι τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ. δόξαν γὰρ εἶναι πρόσφατον τοῦ κακῶν αὐτῷ παρείναι φησὶ (φασὶ) τὴν λύπην. ἐν φι καὶ συντομώτερον ἐνίοτε λέγοντες ὡδὲ πῶς προσφέρονται λύπη ἐστὶ δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρονήσια. λύπης is the necessary correction of Cornarius, Bake and I. Müller for the MSS. ἀτης. The unfortunate currency, which Kühn’s ἀσης has obtained, has given rise to much perplexity.

These passages, and especially that of Cicero, have been
strangely neglected by the authorities. A difficulty arises here, because it is generally inferred from frag. 139 that the treatment of the πάθη by Zeno and Chrysippus was radically different, and it is strange that, if Zeno defined λύτη, for example, as ἀλογος συστολή, he should also have defined it as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας. (For the connection of Chrysippus with the latter definition cf. Galen, op. cit. iv. p. 336 K., 336, 9 M., ἐν τοῖς ορισμοῖς τῶν γενικῶν παθῶν τελέως ἀποχωρεῖ τῆς γνώμης αὐτῶν [scil. his own writings] τὴν λύτην ὁριζόμενος δόξαν πρόσφατον κακοῦ παρουσίας τὸν ἐφ' ἄφοβον προσδοκιάν κακοῦ τὴν ἐφ' ἡδονήν δόξαν πρόσφατον ἀγαθοῦ παρουσίας, but at the same time defines ἐπιθυμία as ἂλογος ὀρέξεις.) For, in that case, how could Galen or Posidonius have treated Chrysippus as diverging from Zeno by explaining the πάθη as κρίσεις, especially as Posidonius is the ultimate authority on whom the attribution of the δόξα definition to Zeno rests?

Now the evidence of Galen establishes almost beyond a doubt that the definitions of λύτη as ἂλογος συστολή and of ἡδονή as ἂλογος ἐπαρσίς (Diog. L. vii. 111, 114) were propounded by Zeno. From this it would seem to follow as a natural corollary that he also defined ἐπιθυμία as ἂλογος ὀρέξεις (Diog. vii. 113), and φόβος as ἂλογος ἐκκλισίς (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 10b, p. 90, 11, ἐκκλίσιν ἀπειθή λόγῳ), cf. Andron. περὶ παθῶν, c. l., λύτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἂλογος συστολή, φόβος δὲ ἂλογος ἐκκλισίς, ἐπιθυμία δὲ ἂλογος ὀρέξεις, ἡδονή δὲ ἂλογος ἐπαρσίς; and see Kreuttner, p. 31. On other grounds it seems probable (see on frag. 136) that Chrysippus is responsible for the substitution of ἀπειθής λόγῳ for ἂλογος in Stob. l. c., but we cannot tell who added the words ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι and ἐφ' αἴρετῷ δοκοῦντι υπάρχειν (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. iv. 2, p. 367), which appear also in Diog. 114. It remains therefore to
decide whether the definitions of which δόξα πρόσφατος 
κακοῦ παρουσίας is a type were introduced by Zeno or 
Chrysippus. The latter alternative would be the most 
satisfactory solution and is generally adopted (e.g. by 
Wellmann, p. 454, 455, Zeller, pp. 249, 250, Siebeck, 
Geschichte der Psychologie, ii. 232, 233 and 504), but if 
Posidonius' evidence is to be accepted in the one case, 
why is it to be discarded in the other, especially where it 
tells most strongly against himself? cf. Galen, p. 390 K., 
(Ποσειδώνιος) πειρᾶται μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν τοῖς Πλατωνικοῖς 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Κυτεία Ζήνωνα προσάγειν. We must re-
member that Posidonius was anxious to pick holes in 
Chrysippus, in order to excuse his own heresy. Hence 
he charges Chrysippus not merely with divergence from 
his predecessors but with inconsistency (τὴν αὐτοῦ πρὸς 
αὐτὸν ἑαυτιολογίαν τοῦ Χρυσίππου, Galen, p. 390). It 
would seem therefore that he is less worthy of credence 
as a witness, when he affirms a discrepancy between Zeno 
and Chrysippus than when he testifies to the identity of 
their doctrine. Nor ought we to neglect the fact that 
in Diog. L. vii. 112 φόβος is defined as κακοῦ προσδοκία, 
being thus differentiated from the other πάθη, and that 
this definition is ultimately traceable to Plato (Protag. 
358 D, Lach. 198 B). If however we suppose that Zeno 
made use of a double set of definitions, what was the 
nature of the contribution made by Chrysippus? Only 
two answers seem possible. If Zeno in his oral lectures 
(εἰρημένοι), and subsequently to the publication of the 
work περὶ παθῶν, put forward the δόξα definitions, it 
would devolve on Chrysippus to reconcile as against 
opponents the written and the oral tradition of the 
school. Or again it is quite conceivable that Posidonius 
may have been misled by the desire of Chrysippus to 
represent his own developments as the natural out-growth
of Zeno’s system. In any case the difference was comparatively unimportant: ‘hanc differentiam levissimam esse quis est quin videat, cum uterque id semper docuerit, πάθη esse voluntaria?’ (Heinze, Stoicorum de Affectibus doctrina, p. 10, and see also pp. 23, 24, 36, 37).

144. Lactant. Inst. III. 23, inter vitia et morbos misericordiam ponit (Zeno). id. Epist. ad Pentad. 38, Zeno Stoicorum magister, qui virtutem laudat, misericordiam...tamquam morbum animi diiudicavit.

It is probable that Zeno spoke of the πάθη in general terms as νόσοι and that Chrysippus is responsible for the distinction between νοσήματα and ἄρρωστήματα, as the passage in Cic. Tusc. iv. 23 suggests. Cf. Zeller, p. 251, 252, and Stein, Psych. n. 267. At the same time morbus may here be simply the translation of πάθος, which Cicero rejected (Tusc. III. 7, IV. 10). For ἔλεος, a subdivision of λύπη, cf. Diog. vii. 111, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 10ε, p. 92, 12, Cic. Tusc. iv. 18.


Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 8, p. 85, 13, ὄριζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον· τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὁ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἀπολογισμὸν ἔχει· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δὲ τὸ ἐναυτίως. τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἀλογα τῶν ζωῶν, ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τι κάκειν ἀκολούθως τῇ ἐναυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ <δὲ> τῶν λογικῶν ζωῶν ὄντως ἀπο-
δίδοται τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. Cic. de Fin. III. 58, est autem officium quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit (where see Madv.).

καθήκον is, according to Zeno, any action for the performance of which a sufficient reason can be given and it is entirely distinct from virtuous action, which is described as κατόρθωμα. That Zeno must have treated of κατόρθωμα is a supposition which is rendered necessary by the circumstances of the case, but the evidence to connect him with it is wanting. The doctrine of καθήκον is closely connected with that of προηγμένον (ἀκόλουθος δ’ έστι τῷ περὶ τῶν προηγμένων ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος, Stob. l. c.) inasmuch as in the ordinary course of life we are forced to regulate our conduct with regard to external circumstances, which are strictly speaking ἀδίσφορα. Hence we must explain κατά τινας where κατά means “over against” (diejenige Pflicht, die von aussen an uns herantritt, von der unterschieden werden soll, die in unserem eigensten Wesen, in der Vernunft selber ihren Ursprung hat), as Hirzel has shown by a comparison of Epict. Enchir. 15, μέμνησο ὅτι ός ἐν συμποσίῳ δεῖ σε ἀναστρέφεσθαι. περιφερόμενον γέγονε τι κατά σε; ἐκτείνει τὴν χείρα κοσμίως μετάλαβε παρέρχεται; μὴ κάτεχε. οὔτω ἤκει; μὴ ἐπίβαλλε πόρρῳ τὴν ὀρεξίν· ἄλλα περίμενε, μέχρις ἀν γένηται κατά σε. οὔτω πρὸς τέκνα, οὔτω πρὸς γυναῖκα, οὔτω πρὸς ἁρχάς, οὔτω πρὸς πλοίον, καὶ ἐσθὶ ποτὲ ἄξιος τῶν θεῶν συμπότης. καθήκον, therefore, in Zeno’s system is not a general term of which κατορθώματα and μέσα καθήκοντα are subdivisions, but rather καθήκοντα κατορθώματα are mutually exclusive, so that the distinctions between αἰει καθήκοντα and οὐκ αἰει καθήκοντα, and μέσα καθήκοντα καὶ τέλεια καθήκοντα belong to later Stoics: see Hirzel, Untersuchungen, II. pp. 403—410. εὐλογον does not imply
action in accordance with right reason, i.e. virtue, as Zeller and Ueberweg suppose, for reason in this sense cannot be attributed to φυτα and ἀλογα ξώα, which are nevertheless capable of καθήκοντα according to the authorities. (The use of εὐλογος in this narrower sense is justified by Hirzel, p. 341, from a comparison of Diog. vii. 76. Seneca, de Benef. iv. 33, sequimur qua ratio non qua virtus trahit; Diog. vii. 130, εὐλόγως ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν.) If Hirzel’s explanation is correct, it follows that in Sext. Math. vii. 158, where κατόρθωμα is defined as ὀπερ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν, Arcesilas adopts the Stoic definition of καθήκον as the true basis of κατόρθωμα. Wellmann, p. 461, believes that κατόρθωμα belongs solely to the later Stoics, but surely Zeno must have given some name to virtuous action, and it is most reasonable to assume that this was κατόρθωμα. It is unnecessary to observe that Zeno was not the first to use καθήκον in the sense of “duty”: all that is meant is that he gave the word its special technical sense, cf. κατάληψις. As to the divergence of Stobaeus from Diogenes we should note (1) that τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωή is made the main point in the definition, which is probably a mistake, cf. Cic., (2) the distinction between βίος and ζωή, for which cf. Arist. ap Ammon, in Steph. Thes. βίος ἐστὶ λογικὴ ζωή (quoted by Hirzel).

146. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 1, p. 38, 15, οἱ δὲ κατὰ Ζήνωνα τὸν Στωικὸν τροπικῶς ἦθος ἐστὶ πηγὴ βίου, ἀφ’ ἦς αἱ κατὰ μέρος πράξεις ρέουσι.

The Stoics regarded not so much the act itself as the character of the agent (cf. σπουδαία διάθεσις). For πηγή cf. Plat. Leg. 808 c, who says that a young boy ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μῆπω κατηρτυμένην.
147. Diog. L. vii. 173, κατὰ Ζήνωνα καταληπτοῦν εἶναι τὸ ἡθος ἐξ ἐιδῶν.

Cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 50. 34, οἱ Στωικοὶ τῶν σοφῶν αἰσθῆσει καταληπτοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδῶς τεκμηριωδῶς. Euripides regrets that it is impossible to distinguish men in this manner. Med. 516—520,

ο Ζεῦ, τί δὴ χρυσοῦ μὲν ὃς κίβδηλος ἢ τεκμηρί' ἀνθρώποισιν ὡπασας σαφῆ, ἀνδρῶν δ' ὄτω χρῆ τὸν κακὸν διειδέναι, οὐδεὶς χαρακτήρ' ἐμπέφυκε σώματι;


148. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11, p. 99, 3, ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Στωικοῖς φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου 5 χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἄρεταις, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις· ὅθεν τὸ μὲν ἂεὶ κατορθοῦν ἐν ἀπασίαν οἷς προστίθεται, τὸ δὲ ἀμαρτάνειν. καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαίον ταῖς περὶ τὸν βίον ἐμπειρίαις χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς πραττόμενοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πάντ' εὐ ποιεῖν, καθάπερ φρονίμως καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ 10 κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἄρετας τὸν δὲ φαύλων κατὰ τούναντίον κακῶς. καὶ τὸν μὲν σπουδαίον μέγαν καὶ ἀδρόν καὶ ύψηλον καὶ ἱσχυρόν. μέγαν μὲν ὃτι δύναται ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῶν κατὰ προαιρέσιν ὄντων αὐτῷ καὶ προκειμένων· ἀδρόν δὲ, ὅτι ἑστὶν ηὐξημένοις πώντοθεν· ύψηλὸν δ', ὃτι μετεῖ- 15 ληφθὲ τοῦ ἐπιβάλλοντος ύψους ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ καὶ σοφῷ. καὶ ἱσχυρὸν δ', ὅτι τὴν ἐπιβάλλονσαν ἵσχυν περιπε- ποίηται, ἀήττητος ὁ τι καὶ ἀκαταγώνιστος. παρ' δ' καὶ οὔτε ἀναγκάζεται ὑπὸ τινος οὔτε ἀναγκάζει τινα, οὔτε κωλύει οὔτε κωλύει, οὔτε βιάζεται ὑπὸ τινος οὔτ' αὐτὸς 20 βιάζει τινα, οὔτε δεσπόζει οὔτε δεσπόζεται, οὔτε κακοποιεῖ τινα οὔτ' αὐτὸς κακοποιεῖται, οὔτε κακοῖς περιπέτει <οὔτ'
THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.

It is a matter of doubt how much of this extract can be reasonably regarded as derived from Zeno, but if the whole of it is to be traced to a single source, that source may be Zeno, as there is some evidence for connecting him with the statements appearing at the end of the passage. On the doctrine of the wise man in general see Zeller, p. 268 foll., Cie. Fin. III. 75, 76.


12. μέγαν. Physical excellence can only be predicated of the wise man, even if in the popular sense of the term he does not possess it, for no kind of excellence can be attributed to the φαύλος. Further, inasmuch as the only good is ἀρετῆ or τὸ μετέχων ἀρετῆς, physical advantages only have value when found in conjunction with virtue.

17. ἄστθητος. Cf. frag. 157, the parallelism of which is perhaps a circumstance of some weight in favour of Zeno's authorship here.

19. βιάζεται: for this verb, see Shilleto on Thuc. i. 2. 1.

20. δεσπόζει: cf. Diog. L. vii. 122, ἢ (δουλεία) ἀντι-
Because falsehood consists not merely in stating something contrary to fact but in doing so advisedly in order to deceive others (Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 11m, p. 111, 10; Sext. Math. vii. 44, 45). So, on the other hand the φαύλος may speak ἀληθές τι but is devoid of ἀλήθεια.


άξιωματικός: this appears to mean “high in rank,” see Plut. Mor. 617 d, and cf. the use of ἀξίωμα in Thuc. as applied to Pericles. It can hardly mean “speaking axioms” as when used of Aresa's in Diog. iv. 31.

βασιλικός. Among the sententiae et praecepta Zenonis cited by Cie. Mur. § 61 occurs solos sapientes esse si servitutem serviant reges. It is extremely probable that this paradox was asserted by Zeno from Diog. L. vii. 122, άλλα καὶ βασιλέας (εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς) τῆς βασιλείας οὐσίας ἀρχής ἀνυπευθύνου, ἥτις περὶ μόνους ἀν τοὺς σοφοὺς σταίη, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρήσθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 3. 125, Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 11m, p. 108, 26.


πολιτείᾳ. Introd. p. 29.
πολίτας: the question naturally arises, how is this statement to be connected with the cosmopolitanism which Zeno in the same treatise advocated (see frag. 162, ἵνα...
πέντε αἰθροφόρους ἦγομενα δημότας καὶ πολίτας)? Zeno's ideal state is not a community of the wise alone, but of all mankind. He seems to be arguing here against the ordinary civic distinctions, which are utterly valueless as compared with the broad line drawn between σοφοὶ and φάουλοι. Presumably in the ideal state everyone would be so trained in Stoic precepts as to become thereby 
σπουδαῖος.

φίλους: cf. Diog. L. vii. 124, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11ⁿ, p. 138, 15, where friendship is based upon ὄμόνοια which can only be found among the wise. Cic. Off. i. 56, N. D. i. 121. A full discussion of the subject is given by Zeller, p. 317 foll. This is one of the doctrines borrowed by Zeno from the Cynics, see Introd. p. 19; it had already been taught by Socrates (Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 14 foll.). The view is rejected as inadequate by Plato in the Lysis (p. 214), but no doubt Clement is thinking rather of the Phaedrus and Symposium: he adds his usual comment that Plato's views are borrowed from the Jews.


150. Cic. Mur. § 61, solos sapientes esse, si distortissimi, formosos. This occurs among the "Sententiae et praecepta Zenonis" cited by Cicero in his banter against Cato, so that the evidence is not very trustworthy, a remark which also applies to frags. 152, 153 and 155. The wise man is beautiful because virtue alone is beautiful and attractive: Zeller, p. 270 and n. 4, to whose references add Cic. Fin. iii. 75, recte etiam pulcher ap-
pellabitur: animi enim lineamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis.


152. Cic. Mur. § 61, sapientiam gratia nunquam moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse neque exorari neque placari.

The reasons for this opinion are given by Diog. vii. 123, ἐλεημονάς τε μὴ εἶναι, συγγνώμην τε ἔχειν μηδενί: μὴ γὰρ παριέναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλόντως κολάσεις ἐπεὶ τὸ γε ἐίκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτῇ τῇ ἐπιείκειᾳ οὐδένεια ἐστὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιομένης χρηστότητα μηδὲ οἰεσθαί σκληροτέρας αὐτάς εἶναι. The same at greater length in Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11\(^1\), p. 95, 25—96, 9; see also Zeller, p. 254. It should be remembered that ἔλεος is a subdivision of λύτη (ἐπὶ τῷ δοκοῦντι ἀναξίως κακοπαθεῖν Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 10\(^6\), p. 92, 12) and therefore one of the πάθη: possibly this is all that is meant by Lactant. Inst. III. 23 (frag. 144).

ab eodem Zeno accipisset nihil esse turpium quam opinari.

The Greek authorities for this fall partly under frag. 148, l. 22, ὀὕτε ἐξαπατᾶται ὀὕτε ἐξαπατᾶ ἄλλον, ὀὕτε διαψεύδεται ὀὕτε ἀγνοεῖ ὀὕτε λανθάνει ἐαυτῶν ὀὕτε καθ-όλου ψεύδος ύπολαμβάνει, and the rest may be supplied from Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11, p. 112, 1, μηδὲν δ’ ύπολαμβάνειν ἀσθενῶς ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ βεβαιῶς διὸ καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφὸν... p. 113, 5, οὐδὲ μετανοεῖν δ’ ύπολαμβάνουσι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα...οὐδὲ μεταβάλλεσθαι δὲ κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον οὐδὲ μετατίθεσθαι οὐδὲ σφάλλεσθαι. Diog. vii. 121, ἔτι τε μὴ δοξάσειν τὸν σοφὸν. For Zeno’s definition of δόξα see on frag. 15.

154. Diog. vii. 32, ἐχθροὺς καὶ πολεμίους καὶ δούλους καὶ ἄλλοτριος λέγειν αὐτῶν (Ζήνωνα) ἄλληλων εἶναι πάντας τοὺς μὴ σπουδαίους καὶ γονεῖς τέκνων καὶ ἀδελ-φῶς ἀδελφῶν, οἰκείους οἰκείων.

This is the natural antithesis of frag. 149. Even parents are enemies to their children, if φαύλων, because natural relationship and parental love are absolutely ἀδιάφορα as compared with ἀρετή. On the subject of these paradoxes in general consult Ritter and Preller § 420 with the notes.

155. Cic. Mur. § 61, nos autem, qui sapientes non sumus, fugitivos, exules, hostes, insanos denique esse.

But for the sake of uniformity this might have been omitted, as we can feel very little confidence that we have here the actual words of Zeno. For exules cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11, p. 103, 9, λέγοντι δὲ καὶ φυγάδα πάντα φαύλων εἶναι, καθ’ ὅσον στέρεται νόμον καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιβαλλούσης.

156. Athen. iv. 158 B, Στωικὸν δὲ δόγμα ἔστιν οὕτως

H. P.
TE PANTA EY PONHSEI O SOFOY KAI FAKI V FRONNIMOS ARTHSEI DIY KAI TIMW O FLMISIOS EFH
KAI [ZENONVEION] GE FAKH EFEIN OS MH FRONNIMOS MERMADHKEV
OS OUK ALLWS DUNAMENVES EFHETHNAI FAKH EY MH KATA
THN ZENONVEION UPHYENPISIN OS EFH
EIS DE FAKH EMBAALLE DUNODEKATON KORIANNOU.

OSTI TE KT.L. THIS FOLLOWS FROM THE DOCTRINE THAT ALL
VIRTUE IS WISDOM (FROVNSIS): SINCE FROVNSIS IS REQUIRED
IN THE PREPARATION OF A FAKH, THE WISE MAN CAN ALONE
PREPARE IT PROPERLY. THIS APPLIES EVEN IF THE WISE MAN
HAS NO EXPERIENCE IN THE PARTICULAR PRACTICAL TASK UNDER
CONSIDERATION, BECAUSE HE ALONE POSSESS THE NECESSARY
CAPACITY, CF. FRAG. 148, I. 9. DIOG. L. VII. 125, PANTA TE
EY POIEIN TON SOFOY, OS KAI PANTA FAMEIN TLA AULHIMATA EY
AULIEIN TON 'ISMYNAW, WHICH FURNISHES A CLOSE PARALLEL TO
HOR. SAT. I. 3. 126 FOLL., 'NON NOSTI QUID PATER,' INQUIT,
'CHRYSIPPUS DICEAT:' 'SAPIENS CREPIDAS SIBI NUMQUAM NEE
SOLEAS FECIT, SUTOR TAMEN EST SAPIENS.' QUI? 'UT QUAMVIS
TACET HERMOGENES, CANTOR TAMEN ATQUE OPTIMUS EST MODU-
LATOR ETC.' CF. ALSO STOB. ECL. II. 7. 5b10, P. 66, 14 FOLL.

157. Philo, liber quis virtuti studet, p. 880, AYIOV TO
ZENONVEION EPIFOUNHSAI OTI THATTON AN ASKOV BAPTISAIS
PLHRE PNEUMATOS H BIASAI TON SPONDALON OMNIWON
AKONTA DRAASAI Tl TON ABIOULHTON: ANENDOTOS GAE KAI
AISSHHTOS PSIHI HN ORTHOS LOGOS DQHMAI PAGIOIS EN-
NEVROSESE.

BAPTIASAI...BIASAI. SO MANGEY, FOLLOWED BY WAHS-
SMUTH, FOR THE MSS. BAPTIASAI...BIASAI TO. THE SAME
EDITOR SUGGESTS THE ALTERNATIVE OF INSERTING TIS, WHICH IS
LESS PROBABLE.

BIASAI: FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE WISE MAN'S WILL CF. CIC.
TUSC. IV. 12, EUSMODI APPETITIONEM STOICI BOULHEOWN
appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem. Eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat, and see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 196.


ὁρθὸς λόγος: see Introd. pp. 8, 9.

158. Seneca, de Ira, i. 16, 7, Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis quoque animo etiam quam vulnus sanatum sit cicatrix manet. Sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras affectuum, ipsis quidem carebit.

This is a concession to popular feeling, although at the same time the absolute ἀπάθεια (Diog. L. vii. 117, Cic. Acad. i. 38) of the wise man is maintained. It would be a mistake to infer from this passage that Zeno is responsible for the doctrine of εὐπάθεια. Further references are given by Zeller, p. 291. Cf. Diog. vii. 118, προσπεσείσθαι μέντοι ποτὲ αὐτῷ φαντασίας ἀλλοκότους, διὰ μελαγχολίαν ἢ λήρησιν κ.τ.λ., where however the point is rather different. Remembering that Zeno described the effect of grief as δῆξεις, we may compare Socrates’ description of the result of violent love in Xen. Symp. iv. 28, ὡσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίου τινὸς δεδηγμένος τὸν τε ὁμον πλεῖον ἢ πέντε ἡμέρας ὠδαξον καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὡσπερ κυῆσμα τι ἐδόκουν ἔχειν. Cic. Tusc. iii. 83, hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegeultudo erit sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiuncula quaedam animi relinquetur. The best account of the sensibility of the wise man to pain is given by Heinze, Stoicorum de aff. doctr. pp. 14, 15. The wise man cannot resist the impact of the φαντασία, but will refuse συγκατάθεσις. See further on Cleanth. frag. 94.
159. Seneca, Epist. 83. 8, Ebrio secretum sermonem nemo committit: viro autem bono committit: ergo vir bonus ebrius non erit.

Seneca finds no difficulty in refuting this fallacy, in spite of the defence which he quotes from Posidonius. For the syllogistic form of the argument see Introd. p. 33. Von Arnim, Quellen Studien p. 104, has pointed out the original in Philo de Plantatione Noë p. 350, ει τῷ μεθ’οντι ούκ ἂν τις εὐλόγως λόγον ἀπόρρητον παρακατάθειτο <τῷ δὲ σοφῷ παρακατατίθεται> οὐκ ἄρα μεθεύει ὁ ἀστείος.

ebrius non erit: cf. Diog. L. vii. 118, καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μέν (τὸν σοφόν), οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δὲ. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 11<sup>m</sup> p. 109, 5, οὐχ οἶον δὲ μεθυσθήσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα τὴν γὰρ μέθην ἀμαρτητικὸν περιέχειν, λήρησιν εἶναι <γὰρ> παρὰ τὸν ὄιον, ἐν μηδενὶ δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀμαρτάνειν κ.τ.λ. Similarly Socrates in Xen. Symp. ii. 26. The Peripatetics held, on the contrary, according to Stobaeus, that the wise man μεθυσθήσεσθαι κατὰ συμπεριφοράς, κἂν εἰ μὴ προηγουμένως (Ecl. ii. 7. 24, p. 144, 10).

160. Plut. de prof. in virt. 12, ὁρὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑποίον ἐστιν ἤξιον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνείρων ἐκαστὸν ἑαυτὸν συναισθάνεσθαι προκόπτοντος, εἰ μήτε ἤδομενον αἰσχρὸ τινι ἑαυτὸν μήτε τι προσείμενον ἢ πράττοντα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ ἄδικων ὁρὰ κατὰ τοῦς ὑπόνους ἀλλ' οἶον ἐν βυθῷ γαλήνης ἀκλύστω καταφανεῖ διαλάμπετε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυμένον.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνείρων: it was a popular Greek notion that the vision of the mind’s eye is clearer in sleep. Aesch. Eum. 104. Pind. frag. 108 [96], Fennell.

προκόπτοντος: Wellmann p. 462 argues that Zeno, while
maintaining to the full the possibility of acquiring virtue, did not admit the practical non-existence of wise men or the consequent distinction between οἱ προκόπτουτες and οἱ σπουδαῖοι: these latter views, he thinks, may have originated with Chrysippus. On προκόπτῃ in general see Zeller, p. 293 foll.

προστέμενον, “approving” (cf. Dem. Timoer. § 156). The words αἰσχρῶν δεινῶν ἀδικῶν point to the acquisition of the three leading virtues σωφροσύνη ἀνδρεία and δικαιοσύνη.

ἀλλ’ οίνον κ.τ.λ. The emotions are dispersed by reason in the mind of the προκόπτων, which remains clear and unsullied, like the transparent ocean on a calm day when shingle and sand settle down to the bottom: cf. Cleanth. frag. 66.

φανταστικόν, has no objective reality but is merely διάκενος ἐλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν τῇ τυχῇ ἀπ’ οὐδενός φανταστοῦ γνώμενον (Plut. plac. iv. 12). Observe that it is described as a πάθος. Stein, Erkenntnistheoretic, p. 156, n. 309.

161. Seneca, Epist. 104. 21, quod si convivere etiam Graccis juvat [cum Socrate, cum Zenone versare: alter te docebit mori, si necesse erit: alter, antequam necesse erit.

antequam necesse erit. Suicide (ἐγκατωγὴ) is justifiable under certain circumstances. It is important to remember that life and death belong to the class of the ἀδιάφορα, and suicide therefore has no connection with ἀρετή, but is merely to be regarded as a matter of καθήκον (τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθήκον <παρὰ>μετρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 111 p. 110, 13 and see on frag. 145). This point is emphasised by Zeller p. 338.
162. Plut. Alex. virt. 6, καί μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τῆς Στωικῶν αἰρέσιν καταβαλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἐν τούτῳ συντείνει κεφάλαιον ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν, ἵδιοις ἐκαστοί διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολιτῶς, εἰς δὲ βίοις ἃ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νομῷ κοινῷ συντρεφομένης. τούτῳ Ζήνων μὲν ἐγγαρασκέν ὅσπερ ὀναρ ἡ εἴδωλον εὐνομίας φιλοσόφου καὶ πολιτείας ἀνατσελμένης: id. de Sto. Rep. ii. 1, ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν, ὡς ἐν λόγοις αὐτῶ Ζήνων...γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περί πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἀρχεσθαί καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικαίειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν. Chrysost. Hom. i. in Matth. 4, οὐ γὰρ καθάπερ Πλάτων ὁ τὴν καταγέλαστον ἐκείνην πολιτείαν συνθείς καὶ Ζήνων καὶ εἰ τις ἐτερος πολιτείαν ἐγγαρασκέν ἡ νόμος συνέθηκεν.

πάντας ἀνθρώπους: see on frag. 149. The idea of cosmopolitanism was largely developed by the later Stoics, especially Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. Zeno's disregard of the fundamental distinction between Greeks and barbarians may partly be due to the influence of his birthplace, as Zeller remarks, but at the same time he only carries out Cynic teaching (Diog. L. vi. 72, μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ). As to Socrates, see Zeller's Socrates p. 167 n. 8, R. and P. § 219°.

ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου. As Zeno is generally admitted to have written the πολιτεία when he was still under the influence of the Cynic school, Zeller (Socrates p. 325) treats this passage as being typical of Cynicism, and suggests that Plato, in the Politicus (267 D, οὐκοῦν τῶν νομεντικῶν ἢ μὲν πολλῶν φανεισῶν ἄρτι τεχνῶν μία τις ἢν ἢ πολιτική) καὶ μιᾶς τινὸς ἀγέλης ἐπιμέλεια; κ.τ.λ.) and in his description of the ὧν πόλις in Rep. 372 A. foll. is referring to Antisthenes. The reference is however extremely doubtful (see Ueberweg p. 93), and it is worth noticing
that the comparison of the ruler of a state to a herdsman was a favourite one with Socrates. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 32, εἰπέντι ο Σωκράτης ὃτι θαυμαστόν οἱ δοκοῖ ἐχεῖν, εὕτις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεύσαι καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττουσιν τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὀμολογοῦν ἀκάκοις βουκόλῳ ἐχεῖν ἐτί δὲ θαυμαστότερον εὖ τις προστάτης γενόμενος πόλεως κ.τ.λ., with which cf. Plat. Gorg. 516 A. See also Newman, Politics of Aristotle, vol. I. p. 30.

163. Athen. xiii. 561 c, Ποντιανὸς δὲ Ζήνωνα ἐφή τὸν Κιτίεα ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ἕρωτα θεοῦ εἶναι φιλίας καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἐτί δὲ καὶ ὀμονοίας παρασκευαστικὸν, ἄλλον δ' οὐδενός. διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἐφή "τὸν Ἕρωτα θεοῦ εἶναι, συνεργὸν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν." Plut. vit. Lycurg. 31. Lycurgus' object was not to leave Sparta with a large empire, ἀλλ' ὠσπέρ ἐνός ἀνδρός βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὀλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὀμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτήν, πρὸς τοῦτο συνέταξε καὶ συνήρμοσε, ὅπως ἐλευθεριοι καὶ αὐτάρκεις γενόμενοι καὶ σωφρονοῦντες ἐπὶ πλείστουν χρόνον διατελώσι. ταύτην καὶ Πλάτων ἔλαβε τῆς Πολιτείας ὑπόθεσιν καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων κ.τ.λ.

τὸν Ἕρωτα. Love is in Hesiod to be regarded as an allegorical presentment of fire, frag. 113. In the ideal state Love is taken as a presiding deity, because all discord and party strife are to be banished from it, and the wise men, who are its citizens, are to be united by friendship and concord. Cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11m, p. 108, 15, ἐν μόνοις τε θοῖς σοφοῖς ἀπολείποντοι φιλίαι, ἐπεὶ ἐν μόνοις τούτοις ὀμονοία γίνεται περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, τὴν δ' ὀμονοίαν εἶναι κοινών ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην. Chrysipp. ap. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. col. 12, p. 79, Gomp., καὶ τὴν αὐτήν εἶναι καὶ Ἐνυμοίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ Ὁμόνοιαν καὶ Εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάν. It is probable that
Zeno took the same objection, that of want of unity, to Plato's Republic as is taken by Aristotle Pol. ii. 5, p. 1264 a 24, ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πόλει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτας ὑπεναντίας ἀλλήλαις. Cf. also ib. ii. 4 1262 b 7, Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 16, and contrast Ar. Pol. ii. 2. 1261 b 10. Hirzel, ii. p. 36, finds here a divergence from Antisthenes, comparing Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 485 P., but he apparently forgets Diog. L. vi. 12, which shows that the inconsistency, if it exists, is with Antisthenes himself.


The Cynics also deny the sanctity of temples: Diog. L. vi. 73, μηδέν τε ἄτοπον εἶναι ἐξ ἱεροῦ τι λαβέιν. Zeno's language in some particulars recalls St Paul's address to the Athenians, Acts xvi. 24, ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τῶν κοσμών καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, σύντος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς Κυρίος ὑπάρχων οὐκ ἐν χειροποιητοῖς ναοῖς κατοικεῖ.
In a similar spirit Crates promised to honour Hermes and the Muses on δαπάναις τρυφεραῖς ἄλλ' ἀρεταῖς ὀσίαις (Julian Or. vi. 200 Α, quoted by Zeller, Socrates p. 329 n. 1).

166. Diog. L. vii. 33, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους στίχους μήθ' ἵππα μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οἰκοδομεῖσθαι.
κατὰ...στίχους. Prose writings were cited according to the number of lines, cf. Diog. L. vii. 187, (Chrysippus) ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων συγγράμματι λέγων κατὰ τοὺς ἐξακοσίους στίχους. Dion. Hal. de Thuc. hist. jud. c. 19, προοίμιον τῆς ἱστορίας μέχρι πεντακοσίων ἐκμηκύνει στίχων.


167. Diog. vii. 32, ἐνιοὶ μέντοι...ἐν πολλοῖς κατηγοροῦντες τοῦ Ζήνωνος τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν ἀχρηστον ἀποφαίων ἕγονος ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς πολιτείας.

ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία. The ordinary course of Greek education comprised the three branches of γράμματα, μονυσική, and γυμναστική (Becker’s Charicles E. T. p. 231 foll.). Zeno intended to imply, probably again in opposition to Plato, that, as compared with the acquisition of virtue or true wisdom, the wisdom which education proposes to supply is worthless (cf. Wellmann p. 437, 8). Such at least seems to be the ground on which the Cynics put forward a similar opinion, Diog. L. vi. 11, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν
The Fragments of Zeno.

168. Diog. vii. 33, peri te nomismatos ou'tos grafein (Zeïnôva), nòmysma d' ou't' allagήs ènèkev o'èesbhai deîn katakaskeu'zein ou't' apodîmias ènèkev. 

nòmysma. "Diogenes in the politeia proposed a coinage of bones or stones (astrapagaloi) instead of gold and silver, Athen. iv. 159 E." Zeller, Socrates, p. 325 n.

allagήs ènèkev. This again is pointed at Plato Rep. ii. 371 b, ãgorâ ìth hîmîn kai nòmysma ëxumîbolon ths allagήs èneka gevîsetai èk tou'tou. Aristotle's statement is more exact, explaining that money is a security with a view to future exchange: úper ths melloúsìs allagήs, ei nûn múdeîn deîta, òti ësstaì eîn deîbì, th nòmysma oîon ègnwnthis ësbì hîmîn. Eth. v. 5. 14. Cf. especially Ar. Pol. i. 9. 1257 a 32 foll. and Newman on ib. 1257 b 11.

169. Athen. vi. 233 b, c, Zeïnôn ðe ð ðapò ths
The opinions professed with regard to money bear the same relation to the last frag. as frag. 171 bears to frag. 176. This passage affords another good illustration of the doctrine of the καθήκοντα as applied to those things which are morally indifferent. The σπουδαῖος, who is unaffected either by fear or desire (ἀπαθής), and whose ὀρμαὶ are properly directed by right reason, will know how to discriminate between τὰ κατὰ φύσιν and τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, so as to cling to the former and avoid the latter. Thus πλοῦτος is a προηγμένον (Diog. L. vii. 106), and possesses value as being of advantage for life in accordance with nature (ib. 105), while ἡ ὀρθὴ χρῆσις πλοῦτον which is characteristic of the σπουδαῖος is sharply distinguished from the φιλοπλουτία (Stob. Ecl. ii. 10), p. 91, 18) of the φαῦλος.

αἴρεσιν: suggested by Schweighäuser and adopted by Kaibel for the MSS. ἀρχῆν. After τὴν χρῆσιν δὲ Schweig. thought some words had fallen out such as τὴν μὲν ὀρθὴν εἴα.

λιτῶν. Cf. M. Aurel. i. 3, τὸ λεῖτον κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν.

ἀπερίττων. So Casaubon in place of MSS περιττῶν. Contrast M. Aurel. v. 5 with id. ix. 32.

προηγομένως. This word is difficult. In Sext. Emp., with whom it occurs at least eight times, it always means “principally” or “in the first place,” being often opposed
to ἀκολούθως. cf. προηγούμενος λόγος frag. 123 = leading doctrine. Here however it seems to have the special Stoic sense = in the absence of overriding circumstances ἐκατὸ περίστασιν, cf. Epict. diss. III. 14. 7, Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 24. p. 144, 19, frag. 131. In this connection we may compare Diog.'s division of καθήκοντα into τὰ ἀνευ περιστάσεως, such as ὑμείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (or καλῶς χρῆσθαι πλούτῳ as here), and τὰ κατὰ περίστασιν, such as τὴν κτήσιν διαρρίπτειν (vii. 109). Hirzel, p. 825, denies that προηγούμενως belongs to the elder Stoics, thinking that it was taken over subsequently from the Academics and Peripatetics. He would substitute here ὡς προηγούμενων.

ἀδείη points to the purging of the soul from the influence of the πάθη: δέος is a subdivision of φόβος not very explicitly defined ap. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 10c p. 92, 5.

ἀθαύμαστον. Cf. Hor. Epist. i. 6. 1, 2, nil admirari propres est una Numici solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum; where see Orelli, who properly observes that τὸ θαύμαξεν, which Plato and Aristotle speak of as the starting point of philosophy, is something quite different. Cf. Marc. Aurel. i. 15, Cic. Tusc. III. 30. Hence Arr. Epict. Diss. i. 18, 11, μὴ θαύμαξε τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τὸ μοιχᾶ οὐ χαλεπάνεις. For διάθεσιν see on frag. 117.

170. Seneca de Otio 30, 2, Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit. id. Tranq. An. i. 7, Promptus compositusque sequor Zenonem, Cleanthem, Chrysippum; quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accessit, nemo non misit.

The same doctrine is attributed to Chrysippus in Diog. L. vii. 121, πολιτεύεσθαι φασί τὸν σοφὸν, ἀν μὴ τι κωλύῃ, ὡς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων: cf. Cic. Fin. iii. 68, Schol. on Lucan ii. 380, Stoicorum sapiens erit civilis, hoc est, in administratione rei publicae.
τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι is another instance of καθήκον which is to be undertaken κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11\textsuperscript{m}, p. 111, 5) = προηγουμένως (see on last frag.). We may say then that, while τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι is καθήκον προηγουμένως or ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὸ μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι is καθήκον κατὰ περίστασιν, just as a careful use of wealth is contrasted with the condition of the spendthrift.

171. Diog. vii. 121, καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησίν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, (τὸν σοφόν) καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι.
Cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11\textsuperscript{m}, p. 109, 16, Cic. Fin. iii. 68. The statement refers to the duty of a wise man under existing circumstances, and while living in an ordinary civil community. It has no reference to the ideal state in which wives are to be held in common (frag. 176) : γάμος clearly belongs to the ἀδιάφορα and γαμεῖν is a καθήκον. This seems better that Wellmann’s view p. 439, who strains the meaning of γάμος to bring this passage into conformity with frag. 176, and is strongly supported by the analogous case of the duty of the wise man to enter public life. The latter clearly refers to existing political institutions, cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11\textsuperscript{b}, p. 94, 9, πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς τοιαῦταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαίνονσαι τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας. The same explanation will account for the two passages in Diog. vi. 11 and 72, where similar views are attributed to the Cynics, without supposing (with Zeller, Socrates p. 320) a divergence of opinion between Antisthenes and Diogenes.

172. Diog. l. vii. 129, καὶ ἔρασθησεσθαι δὲ τῶν σοφῶν τῶν νέων τῶν ἐμφαίνοντων διὰ τοῦ εἴδους τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυίαν, ὡς φησί Ζήνων ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.
For the Cynics see Introd. p. 20. This passage is no
doubt inspired by the influence of the Phaedrus and Symposium. Speaking of the ἔρως of Socrates Dr Thompson remarks (Phaedrus App. i. p. 152):—"It was not the beauty of Alcibiades, but his splendid mental endowments, his great capacity for good or for evil, which excited the admiration and the solicitude of Socrates." Cf. Symp. 208 B foll. and for εὐφυίαν ib. 209 B, ψυχὴ καλὴ καὶ γενναία καὶ εὐφυεῖ, cf. frag. 147, καταληπτῶν εἶναι τὸ ἴθος ἐξ εἰδοὺς. We must distinguish between the ἔρως of the σπουδαῖος and the φαύλος. τὸ ἔραν itself belongs to the class of ἀδιάφορα, and implies, therefore, a corresponding καθήκον, the duty, that is, τοῦ καλῶς ἔραν, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5β9, p. 66, 3—10. If then the objection is raised that the σπουδαῖος should avoid ἔρως, if he is to retain his ἀπάθεια, since ἔρως is a subdivision of ἐπιθυμία and a πάθος, the answer is that this is untrue of that particular form of ἔρως which is defined as ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποίιας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον (Stob. l.c. l. 12, ib. 10ο p. 91, 15, 11α p. 115, 1, Diog. L. viii. 113, 120, Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 239), and which is not an ἐπιθυμία. Under ἐπιθυμία are to be classed ἔρωτες σφοδροί only, and in Diog. vii. 113 the distinction between the two classes of ἔρως is clearly indicated. Cic., Fin. iii. 68, speaks of amores sanctos.

173. Athen. xiii. 563 ε, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐξηλωκότες τῶν ἄρχηγῶν ὑμῶν τῆς σοφίας Ζήνωνα τῶν Φοίνικα, ὅς οὐδεπότοτε γυναικὴ ἐχρήσατο παιδικός δὲ ἀεὶ· ὡς Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος ἱστορεῖ ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ βίου αὐτοῦ· θρυλλεῖτε γὰρ ὅτι "δεὶ μὴ τῶν σωμάτων ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔραν."

δεὶ μὴ κ.τ.λ. It is most natural to suppose that these are Zeno’s words from the position of his name in the context. For the sense see on frag. 172.
174. Clem. Alex. Paedag. iii. 11. 74, p. 296 P. 109 S., ὑπογράφειν ὁ Κίτιεὺς ἐσικε Ζήνων εἰκόνα νεανίου καὶ οὕτως αὐτῶν ἀνδριαντουργεῖ· ἐστω, φησί, καθαρὸν τὸ πρόσωπον, ὀφρὺς μὴ καθεμένη, μηδὲ ὄμμα ἀναπεπταμένον, μηδὲ διακεκλασμένον, μὴ ὑπτίος ὁ τράχηλος, μηδὲ ἀνιέμενα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέλη, ἀλλὰ [τὰ] μετέωρα ἐντόνοις ὁμοία· ὁρθὸς νοῦς πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὄξυτης καὶ κατοκωκή τῶν ὀρθῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ σχηματισμῷ καὶ κινήσεις μηδὲν ἔνδιδουσα τοῖς ἀκόλουθοις ἔλπιδος. αἰδὼς μὲν ἐπανθεῖτο καὶ ἀρρενωτία· ἀπέστω δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν μυροπολίων καὶ χρυσοχοείων καὶ ἐριοπολίων ἄλυς καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐργαστηρίων, ἐνθα καὶ ἐταίρικῶς κεκοσμημένοι, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέγους καθεξόμενοι, διημερεύουσιν.

This remarkable fragment was first restored by Cobet in Mnemos. O. S. vi. p. 339, who saw that the writer was necessarily speaking of young men and not of young women, as the word ἀρρενωτία of itself shows. It seems probable, as Wachsmuth suggests, that this frag. comes from the ἐρωτικὴ τέχνη (Introd. p. 30).

νεανίου. So Cobet l.c. for νεανίδα. Dind. with two MSS. reads νεανία.

καθαρὸν. Cf. Plut. de Audiendo 13, p. 45 c, προσώπῳ κατάστασις καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνέμφατος.

ἀναπεπταμένον: barefaced, impudent, cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 22, τὰ δὲ ὄμματα ἔχειν ἀναπεπταμένα, of the woman representing Vice in Prodicus' fable. See Aesch. Suppl. 198, 9 and the comm. μηδὲ διακεκλασμένον is an emendation of Cobet's (Mnemos. xi. 387) for the MSS. μηδὲ ἀνακεκλασμένον, the meaning of which is not clear. With the alteration ἀναπ. est hominis protervi et petulantis, διακ. mollis et impudici.

τὰ is rejected by Wachsm. with great improvement to the sense.

ὁρθὸς νοῦς, so Wachsm. for vulg. ὀρθόνου· πρὸς κ.τ.λ.
Perhaps it would be better to place a comma after νοῦς, and connect πρὸς τὸν λόγον with ὀξύτης. Dind. brackets ὀξύτης.

κίνησις...ἐνδιδούσα Dind. with some MSS.

μυροπωλίων: these shops are mentioned as the lounges frequented by young men. Ar. Eq. 1375, τὰ μειράκια ταυτὶ λέγω, τὰν τῷ μύρῳ. Lys. Or. 24 § 20, ἕκαστος γὰρ ύμῶν εἰδισται προσφοιτάν ὁ μὲν πρὸς μυροπωλεῖον, ὁ δὲ πρὸς κουρεῖον, ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοτομεῖον, ὁ δ’ ὁποῖ τὰν τύχην: id. Or. 23. § 3, Isoc. Or. 7. § 48, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς σκιραφείοις οἱ νεότεροι διέτριβον οὐδ’ ἐν ταῖς αὐλητρίσιν οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις συλλόγοις ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἔμενον ἐν οἷς ἐτάχθησαν. In Homer’s time the smith’s shop was used for this purpose: Od. xviii. 38, Hes. Op. 491: later the barber’s shop is most frequently mentioned: see the comm. on Hor. Sat. i. 7. 3. Other authorities are collected by Becker, Charicles E. T. p. 272.

κεκοσμημένοι...καθεξόμενοι. So Cobet for κεκοσμημέναι...καθεξόμεναι. For the former word cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 11. 4 where Theodota is spoken of as πολυτελῶς κεκοσμημένη, and Lucian, Ver. Hist. ii. 46, γυναίκας πάνυ ἐταιρικῶς κεκοσμημέναι (quoted by Becker, Charicles E. T. p. 249); and for the latter Aeschin. Timarch. § 74 τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκημάτων καθεξομένους (referred to by Wachsm.), and Catull. xxxvii. 8, 14.

175. Diog. L. vii. 22, δεῖν τε ἐλεγε τοὺς νέους πάσης κοσμίωτητι χρῆσθαι καὶ πορεία καὶ σχῆματι καὶ περιβολῆ.

Possibly this is only a reference to the preceding frag. For πορεία see on frag. 31. περιβολῆ = clothing.

176. Diog. L. vii. 131, ἄρέσκει δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ κοινῶς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς ὡστε τὸν ἐνυχώντα τῇ ἐντυχούσῃ χρῆσθαι, καθά φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ
πολιτεία. ib. 33, κοινάς τε τὰς γυναῖκας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

For the Cynics see Introd. p. 20. Observe, however, that Chrysippus concurred in this opinion, which must not therefore be treated as merely Cynical.

177. Diog. L. vii. 33, καὶ ἐσθήτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει (Ζήνων) χρῆσθαι ἀνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκεκρύφθαι.

The same view seems to have been advocated by the Cynics. Hence the point of Menander's lines quoted by Diog. L. vi. 93, συμπεριπατήσεις γὰρ τρίβων 'έχουν' ἐμοί, ὥσπερ Κράτητι τῷ Κυνικῷ ποθ' ἡ γυνή. Socrates in Xen. Symp. ii. 3 says:—ἐσθήτι ἄλλη μὲν γυναικεὶ ἄλλη δὲ ἀνδρὶ καλὴ. With regard to the words μηδὲν μόριον ἀποκ. Zeller, p. 308 n. 2, remarks:—"The latter act is only conditional and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of gymnastics." But the limitation is Plato's (Rep. v. 452 A, 457 A) and we have already seen that Zeno proposed to abolish γυμνάσια: it may well be that Zeno, like the Cynics, disclaimed the theoretical propriety of the ordinary rules of modesty in dress. There is no question here of the καθήκοντα of ordinary life, and Zeno's departure from the Cynical point of view is largely to be found in this direction.

178. Origen e. Celsum, vii. 63, p. 739, ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Κιτιέως Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες... διὰ τὸ κοινωνικὸν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τῷ λογικῷ ξώφ νοθεύειν τὴν ύπὸ τῶν νόμων ἐτέρῳ προκαταληφθείσαν γυναίκα καὶ φθείρειν τὸν ἀλλικον ἀνθρώπου οἴκον.

Since strictly speaking marriage is an ἀδιάφορον, τὸ μοιχεύειν cannot be contrary to virtue, and such an offence would be impossible in the ideal state. Still, with
society constituted as it is, μὴ μοιχεύειν is καθήκον ἀνευ περιστάσεως and therefore κατὰ φύσιν. The wise man will recognise the laws of the state in which he lives in the same spirit in which he takes part in its public affairs (Stob. Ecl. π. 7. 11b 94, 8 foll.). In Sext. Pyrrh. πι. 209 we find τοὺς γε μὴν μοιχοῦν κολάξει παρ’ ἕμιν νόμον, παρὰ δὲ τισιν ἀδιάφορον ἐστὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐτέρων γυναῖξι μίγυνσθαι καὶ φιλοσόφων δὲ τινές φασιν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸ ἀλλοτρία γυναικὶ μίγυνσθαι. The Stoics are probably indicated, and the passage is in no way inconsistent with the present, cf. Theoph. ad Autol. πι. 3 p. 118 D, οὐχὶ καὶ περὶ σεμνότητος πειρόμενοι γράφειν ἀσελγείας καὶ πορνείας καὶ μοιχείας ἐδίδαξαν ἐπιτελείσθαι, ἔτι μὴν καὶ τὰς στυγιτὰς ἀρρητοποιεῖς εἰσηγήσαντο;


ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς. For this book see Introd. p. 30. The true aspect from which to regard this and the four next following fragments is very clearly set forth in a passage of Origen, c. Cels. iv. 45 (quoted by Zeller, p. 310, n. 1). “The Stoics made good and evil depend alone on the intention, and declared external actions, independent of intentions, to be indifferent: εἴπων οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὦτι τῷ ἱδίῳ λόγῳ (the action
taken by itself) θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἄδιάφορον ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ μη θρή ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑποθέσεως χάριν...παρειλήφασι τόν σοφὸν μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς μόνης καταλελειμμένον παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους διεφθαρμένον, καὶ ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθηκόντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελέύστηται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι...τὸ πάν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους.” This also illustrates frag. 178.


It should be observed that Sextus does not state that this extract as well as the last comes from the διαστριβαί, so that we may perhaps refer Plutarch’s words to this passage: Wellmann however, p. 440, thinks that both the
Sextus passages come from the διατριβαί, in which case Plutarch’s statement should form a separate fragment. Cf. Chrysipp. ap. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 246, id. ap. Epiphanius adv. Haeres. iii. 2. 9 (iii. 39), Diels, p. 593, ἔλεγε γὰρ δεῖν μιγνυσθαι ταῖς μητράσι τοὺς παῖδας τοῖς δὲ πατράσι τὰς θυγατέρας. Diog. L. vii. 188, Theophr. ad Autol. iii. 6, 120 d.

181. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. xi. 190, καὶ πάλιν (ὁ Ζήνων) “διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἔρωμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε. πότερον οὐκ ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμηρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλ’ ἐπεθύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ ἐφοβήθης κελεύσαι; μὲ δὲ. ἀλλ’ ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἰτ’ οὐκ ὑπηρέτησέ σοι; οὐ γάρ.”

The line taken here is that the intention is all important, and not the act in itself: hence virtue belongs only to σπουδαία διάθεσις, cf. Cleanth. frag. 95,

όστις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχετ’ αἰσχροῦ πράγματος οὕτος ποιήσει τοῦτ’ ἐὰν καίρον λάβῃ.

Bekker suggests ἀλλ’ ἐπιθυμήσας...εἰτ’ ἐφοβήθης.

182. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. iii. 200, καὶ τί θαυμαστόν, ὅπου γε καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς κυνικῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Κιτίεα Ζήνωνα καὶ Κλεάνθην καὶ Χρύσιτππον ἀδιάφορον τούτο (i.e. ἀρρενομιξίαν) εἶναι φασιν;


184. Theophr. ad Autol. iii. 5, p. 119 c, τί σοι ἔδοξε τὰ Ζήνωνος ἢ τὰ Διογένους καὶ Κλεάνθους, ὅπόσα περιέχονσιν αἱ βιβλίοι αὐτῶν διδάσκονται ἀνθρωποβορίας, πατέρας μὲν ὑπὸ ἵδιων τέκνων ἐφεσθαι καὶ βιβρώσκεσθαι
καὶ, εἰ τις οὐ βούλοιτο ἢ μέρος τι τῆς μυσερᾶς τροφῆς ἀπορρίψειν, αὐτὸν κατεσθίεσθαι τὸν μὴ φαγόντα;

Cf. Diog. L. vii. 121, γεύσεσθαι τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων σαρκῶν κατὰ περίστασιν, ib. 188 (Chrysippus) ἐν δὲ τῷ γ’ περὶ δικαίον κατὰ τοὺς χιλίους στίχους, καὶ τοὺς ἀποθανόντας κατεσθίεις κελεύων. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 207, 247 foll., Math. xi. 192—194, Mayor on Juv. xv. 107. Cannibalism was also recommended by the Cynics, Diog. vi. 73, μὴ ἀνόσιον εἶναι τὸ καὶ ἀνθρωπεῖων κρεῶν ἀψασθαι, ὥς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἑθῶν, with which cf. an amusing summary of the various modes of disposing of the dead prevalent in different countries, ap. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 226—229. It should be observed however that the Stoics only enjoined this practice κατὰ περίστασιν.

185. Epiphan. Haeres. iii. 36, τοὺς δὲ τελευτῶντας ζύον παραβάλλειν χρῆναι ἢ πυρί. καὶ τοὺς παιδικοῖς χρῆσθαι ἀκωλύτως.

Chrysippus, ap. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. iii. 248, Math. xi. 194, recommends that the flesh of deceased relations should be eaten if suitable for food, but, if useless for that purpose, ἢ κατορύζαντες τοῦ μνήμα ἐποίουσιν ἢ κατακαύσαντες τὴν τέφραν ἀφῆσουσιν. The meaning of these obscure words of Epiphanius appears to be similar, and παραβάλλειν is certainly commonly used in this sense (see L. and S.). Others however have explained the words very differently. Thus Stein, Psychol. p. 161, n. 314, finds some allusion in them to the doctrine of metempsychosis. In the same spirit Diogenes ordered his body to be cast forth unburied (Diog. L. vi. 79, Cic. Tusc. i. 104). Chrysippus proved the absolute unimportance of any particular form of burial from a comparison of the varying practice of different nations (Cic. Tusc. i. 108, Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 226—9).
186. Cic. Ep. Fam. ix. 22. 1, Atqui hoc (libertas loquendi) Zenoni placuit...sed ut dico placet Stoicis suo quamque rem nomine appellare.

Cf. Cic. Off. i. 128, nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut ei qui fuerunt Stoici poene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et invident, quod ea quae re turpia non sunt nominibus ac verbis flagitiosa ducamus: and see Zeller, Socrates, p. 326.


The allusion to the Indians is explained by the words the Indian philosophers are said to have used to Alexander: σῶματα μὲν μετάξεις ἐκ τούτου εἰς τότον, ψυχᾶς δὲ ἡμετέρας οὐκ ἀναγκάσεις ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ βουλόμεθα. τῦρ ἀνθρώποις μέγιστον κολαστήριον, τούτου ἡμεῖς καταφρονοῦμεν. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. 7. 50. Similarly Philo, in telling the same story: quod omnis probus sit liber, p. 879, τῦρ μεγίστοις τοῖς ζῶσι σώμασι πόνους καὶ φθορὰν ἐργάζεται, τούτου ὑπεράνω ἡμεῖς γινόμεθα, ζῶντες καἰὸμεθα. The historians attest the custom of burning themselves alive said to have been practised by the Brahmans. Strabo, xv. 1. 65, αὐχείστον δὲ αὐτῶι νομίζεσθαι νόσον σωματικῆς τῶν δ᾽ ὑπονοήσαντα καθ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἐξάγειν ἐαυτὸν διὰ πυρὸς νήσαντα πυράν, ὑπαλειψάμενον δὲ καὶ καθίσαντα ἐπὶ τὴν πυρὰν ὑφάσαι κελεύειν, ἀκίνητον δὲ καίσθαι. Curt. viii. 9. 32, apud hos occupare fatur diem pulerum, et vivos se cremari iubent, quibus aut segnis aetas aut incommoda valitudo est:...inquinari putant ignem nisi qui spirantes recipit. Cic. Tusc. ii. 40, (Mueller) uri se patiuntur Indi. The case of Calanus is particularly recorded, Cic. Tusc. ii. 52 etc.
äν, added by Cobet, Ἐρμῆς λόγιος, i. p. 487.

τάς...ἀποδέξεις. There is no doubt some particular reference in this, the point of which it is difficult now to ascertain. May it refer to Antisthenes? In Diog. L. vi. 2, we read of him: ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἰππικλέους καὶ τοῦ Κύρου, and in the list of his works preserved by the same writer (vi. 15—18) we find three with the title Ἰππικλῆς, two of which bear the alternative title ἡ περὶ ἵσχυος.

188. Galen de cogn. animi morbis, v. 13, οὔτω γοῦν καὶ Ζήνων ἰδίου πάντα πράττειν ἡμᾶς ἀσφαλῶς, ὡς ἀπολογησομένους ὕλιγον ὑστερον παιδαγωγοῖς· ὄνομαζε γὰρ οὔτως ἔκεινος ὁ ἀνήρ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐτοιμοὺς οὕτας τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτιμάν κἂν μηδεὶς αὐτούς παρακαλῇ.

παιδαγωγοῖς: for their duties see Becker, Chariclees, E. T. p. 226.

189. Stob. Flor. 14, 4 = Anton. Meliss. i. 52,

ἐλεγχὲ σαυτὸν, ὡστὶς εἰ, μὴ πρὸς χάριν ἄκου', ἀφαιροῦ δὲ κολάκων παρρησίαν.

ἐλεγχὲ σαυτὸν recalls ἐνοθὶ σεαυτόν, for which see the authorities ap. Mayor on Juv. xi. 27.

πρὸς χάριν ἄκου' = do not listen to flatterers, is the passive form of πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν (Thuc. ii. 65), πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν (Dem. Phil. i. § 38), πρὸς χάριν ἔρεις (Soph. O. T. 1152). The best illustration however is Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11ε, p. 114, 23, the wise man οὔτε προσφέρει τινὶ οὔτε προσίεται τὸν πρὸς χάριν λόγον, Diog. L. vii. 117.

Meineke would also ascribe to Zeno the couplet quoted by Stob. Flor. ii. 12, where the lemma in the MSS. is Ζηνοδότου.
190. Maxim. Floril. c. 6, ed. Mai, δὲ μὲν γεωργὸς ἀφ’ ὧν ἀν πολὺν καὶ καλὸν θέλοι καρπὸν λαβεῖν ωφελιμον ἐαυτὸν ἐκεῖνος παρέχεται καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖται καὶ θεραπεύει: πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀνθρωποὶ τοῖς ωφελίμοις πεφύκασι χαρίζεσθαι καὶ περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους μάλιστα σπουδάζειν καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὔδεν. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνων ἐπιμελούμεθα μᾶλλον ἀπερ ὁφελιμωτερα ἐαυτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ύπηρεσίαν νομίζομεν εἶναι, ὅθεν ὁμοίως ύφ’ ὧν εὐ πάσχειν ἄξιοῦμεν, ωφελίμους αὐτοῖς ἐργοις, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἶναι δεῖ. οὔδε γὰρ ἡ ἐλαια τῷ θεραπεύνοντι αὐτὴν ἐπαγάλλεται, ἀλλ’ ἐκφέρουσα πολλοὺς τε καὶ καλοὺς καρποὺς ἐπεισεν ἐαυτῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον.

This fragment is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 6): see Introd. p. 31.

θέλοι: unless θέλη be read, ἀν belongs to the verb. Cf. Dem. de Cor. § 246, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ’ ἀν ὁ ρήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἰη, πᾶσαι εξέτασιν λάμβανε. But it is often difficult to determine whether the optative is really potential. See Fennell on Pind. Nem. iv. 8, Goodwin § 557, Madvig § 137.

ωφελιμον, cf. Cleanth. frags. 75 and 77.

ἀνθρωποί, “οἱ addendum?” Wachsm.

ἰαυτοῖς: Jelf § 654 b.

191. Athen. XIII. 565 D, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἐκεῖνος Ζήμων, ὥς φησιν Ὁλυμπίων ὁ Καρύστιος, προμαντεύομενος ὑμῶν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς προσποιήτου ἐπιτηδεύσεως, ἐφ’ ὥς οἱ παρακούσαντες αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων καὶ μὴ συνέντες ἔσονται ῥυπαροί καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· καθάπερ οἱ τῆς Ἀριστιππου παρενεχθέντες αἱρέσεως ἅσωτοι καὶ θρασεῖς.

Cic., N. D. III. 77, attributes this remark to Aristo: si verum est quod Aristo Chius dicere solebat, nocere audientibus philosophos iis, qui bene dicta male interpre-
tarentur: posse enim asotos ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis schola exire. It should be observed, however, that Athenaeus specifies Antigonus of Carystus as the source of his information, so that he is at least as much entitled to credit as Cicero.


τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. Conformity to nature, i.e. external environment, is taken as the basis of all those actions, which, although unconnected with virtue, yet constitute the objects of καθήκοντα, Diog. L. vii. 108, ἐνέργημα δὲ αὐτὸ (καθήκον) εἶναι, ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖσι οἰκεῖοι, Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 8a, p. 86, 13; Diog. L. vii. 105.

193. Diog. L. viii. 48, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν πρῶτον (i.e. Pythagoras) ὄνομάσαι κόσμου καὶ τὴν γῆν στρογγυλὴν· ὡς δὲ Θεόφραστος Παρμενίδην· ὡς δὲ Ζήνων Ἡσίόδον.

The lines of Hesiod supposed to be referred to are Theog. 126—128, Γαῖα δὲ τοῦ πρῶτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἵσον ἐαυτῇ οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ’ ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτων ὁφρ’ εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἔδος ἀσφαλές αἰεί, which are a very poor basis for the two assertions. For the limited sense in which κόσμος is used, cf. Diog. vii. 138, καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγονσιν, Krische, p. 396, 397.

194. Diog. L. vi. 91, Ζήνων δ’ αὐθ’ ὁ Κιτιεύς ἐν ταῖς χρείαις καὶ κόσιον αὐτοῦ (Crates) φησί ποτὲ προσράψαι τῷ τρίβων άνεπιτρεπτοῦντα.

ἐν ταῖς χρείαις. Introd. p. 31.

ἀνεπιτρεπτοῦντα i.e. "nec curavisse deformitatem." The word is omitted in L. and S. and also in Steph. Th.


For the object of Zeno's Homeric studies cf. Krische p. 393, 394, who points out that, although Zeno may have incidentally controverted some of the Chorizontes of his time, yet his main object was to fortify Stoic precepts by appealing to Homer's authority. For Antisthenes see Zeller, Socrates p. 330.

Μαργίτου. This work seems to have resisted the dis-integrating process, which from early times was applied to Homer's works, better than any other of the poems ascribed to him, except the Iliad and Odyssey. Aristotle (Poet. iv. 10) does not question Homer's authorship.

196. Plut. comm. Hesiod. ix., Ζήνων ὁ Στωίκος ἐνιόλλατε τοὺς στίχους λέγων

κεῖνος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὐ κάκεινος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
THE FRAGMENTS OF ZENO.


The lines of Hesiod (Op. 291) are often quoted or imitated: cf. Ar. Eth. i. 4, 7, Liv. xxi. 29, 8, Soph. Ant. 720 φήμ' ἐγώνε πρεσβεύειν πολὺ φύναι τὸν ἄνδρα πάντ' ἐπιστήμης πλέων εἰ δ' οὖν...καὶ τῶν λεγόμενων εὐ καλὸν τὸ μανθάνειν.

197. Plut. de aud. poet. p. 33 ε, καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἐπανορθούμενος τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους, ὅστις δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπορευέται κείνου ἃτι δοῦλος κἀν ἐλεύθερος μόλη, μετέγραφεν ὥστι δοῦλος ἄν (ἢ οὐ) ἐλεύθερος μόλη, τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ νῦν συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἂδεῖ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα καὶ ἀταπείνωτον.

The fragm. is no. 711 (Dind.). This was also given to Aristippus or Plato by other authorities: see Diog. L. ii. 82. For ἐλεύθερος cf. frag. 149.

198. Strabo vii. 3. 6, Homer never mentions Arabia εἰ μὴ Ζήνων τῷ φιλοσόφῳ προσεκτέου γράφοντι

Αἰθίοπας δ' ἵκόμην καὶ Σιδονίους "Αραβᾶς τε.
The Fragments of Zeno.

Hom. Od. iv. 83 where the edd. now adopt καὶ Ἐρεμ-βοῦς the reading of Posidonius: Crates of Mallus preferred Ἐρεμοῦς (Krische p. 393).

199. Stob. Floril. 95. 21, Ζήνων ἐφη Κράτητα ἀναγιγώσκειν ἐν σκυτεῖῳ καθήμενον τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους προτρεπτικὸν ὅτι ἐγραψε πρὸς Θεμίσωνα τῶν Κυπρίων βασιλέα λέγων ὅτι οὐδεὶς πλείω ἀγαθὰ υπάρχει πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφῆσαι, πλούτον τε γὰρ πλείστον αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὡστε δαπανᾶν εἰς ταῦτα ἢτι δὲ δόξαν ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶ. ἀναγιγώ- σκοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν σκυτέα ἐφη προσέχειν ἕμα τάπτοντα, καὶ τὸν Κράτητα εἰπεῖν ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ, ὁ Φιλίσκε, γράψειν πρὸς σὲ προτρεπτικὸν πλείω γὰρ ὅρῳ σοι ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφῆσαι ὅτι ἐγραψεν Ἀριστοτέλῆς.

This passage belongs to the work entitled Κράτητος ἀπομνημονεύματα: Introd. p. 31.


The meaning is made clear by Stob. Eel. II. 7. 11κ p. 105, 4, where it is said of the φαύλος:—μηδὲ εἶναι φιλό- λογον, λογοφίλον δὲ μᾶλλον, μέχρι λαλῶς ἐπιτυπολαίον προβαίνοντα, μηκέτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἑργοῖς ἐκβεβαιούμενον τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς λόγον.

201. Stob. Floril. 6. 34, ὁ Ζήνων ἤτιάτο τοὺς πλείσ- τοὺς λέγων, ἔξον ἀπὸ τῶν πόνων τᾶς ἡδονᾶς φέρειν, ἀπὸ τῶν μαγειρείων λαμβάνοντας.

πόνων. This passage should have been quoted in the note on frag. 128.

202. Stob. Floril. 4. 107, Ζήνων δὲ ἐφη γελοιοῦν ἐκάστους μὲν τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς δὲι ξῆν μὴ προσέχειν ὡς οὐκ εἰδότων, τὸν δὲ παρὰ πάντων ἔπαινον θαυμάζειν ὡς
ἐχόμενον κρίσεως. πράγμασιν is clearly corrupt and Wachsmuth reads παραγγείλασιν, but Mr R. D. Hicks suggests τοῖς παρὰ τῶν σοφῶν παραγγέλμασιν which restores the balance of the sentence.

For the sense cf. Cleanth. frag. 100.


3. Plut. de Inimic. Util. 2, Ζήνων δὲ, τῆς ναυκληρίας αὐτῷ συντριβείσης, πυθόμενος εἶπεν, εὗ γε, ὡ τύχη, ποιεῖς εἰς τὸν τρίβωνα συνελαύνουσα ἡμᾶς. Plut. de Tranq. An. 6, Ζήνων τῷ Κιτιεῖ μία ναῦς περὶ ἕνων φορτηγός, πυθόμενος δὲ ταύτην αὐτόφορτον ἀπολωλέναι συγκλυσθεῖσαν, εὗ γε, εἶπεν κ.τ.λ. with καὶ τὴν στοὰν added after τρίβωνα. Substantially the same account in Plut. de Exilio 11, with
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καὶ βίον φιλόσοφον in place of καὶ τὴν στοάν. Suidas col. 1023 s. v. νῦν εὐπλόηκα ὅτε νεανάγηκα. ἐπὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἑλπίδα εὐτυχισάντων. Ζήνων γὰρ ὁ Κιτιεὺς καταλι-

πῶν τοὺς πρὶν διδασκάλους καὶ Κράτητος τὸν φιλοσόφον

φοιτητὴς γενόμενος τούτο εὕρηκε, ναυαγίως περιπετεών καὶ εἰπόν, εὗ γε ποεῖ ἡ τύχη προσελαίνουσα ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία

* * * οὗτῳ τραπήναι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. That the story

was given in various forms appears from the account

in Diog. L. vii. 4, 5. Senec. de Tranq. An. 14, 2, Nuntiato naufragio Zeno noster, quum omnia sua audiret

submersa, “Iubet” inquit “me fortuna expeditius philoso-

phari.”

4. Diog. L. vii. 19, πρὸς δὲ τῶν φάσκοντα ὡς τὰ

πολλὰ αὐτῷ Ἀντισθένης οὐκ ἀρέσκει, χρείαν Σοφοκλέους

προενεγκάμενος, ἡρώτησεν εἰ τινα καὶ καλὰ ἔχειν αὐτῷ

dokei. τοῦ δ᾽ οὐκ εἰδέναι φήσαντος, εἰτ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχύνη,

ἔφη, εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν ἢν εἰρημένον ὑπ᾽ Ἀντισθένους

tοῦτο εἰκλεγόμενος καὶ μνημονεύων, εἰ δὲ τι καλὸν, οὐδὲ

ἐπιβαλλόμενος κατέχειν;

5. Diog. L. vii. 20, λέγοντος δὲ τινὸς αὐτῷ περὶ

Πολέμωνος, ὥς ἄλλα προθέμενοι ἄλλα λέγει σκυθρωπάσας,

ἔφη, πόσον γὰρ ἡγίατο τὰ διδόμενα;

The explanation is thus given by Aldobrand: videbatur

ergo cupiditatis Polemonem accusare, ac si illa ita docere

consuevisset, quomodo a discipulis tractaretur.

6. Plut. de prof. in virt. c. 6, ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ὄρῳ τὸν

Θεόφραστον ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἔχειν μαθητὰς θαυμαζόμενον,

ὁ ἐκεῖνον μὲν χορὸς, ἔφη, μεῖζων, οὕμος δὲ συμφωνότερος.

Plut. de seips. citra inv. laud. c. 17, οὗτῳ γὰρ ὁ Ζήνων

πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Θεοφράστου μαθητῶν, ὁ ἐκεῖνον χορός,

ἔφη, μεῖζων, ὁ ἐμὸς δὲ συμφωνότερος.
7. Diog. L. vii. 24, φησὶ δ᾿ Ἀπόλλωνιος ὁ Τύριος ἐλκοντος αὐτὸν Κράτης τοῦ ἱματίου ἀπὸ Στίλπωνος εἰπεῖν, ὁ Κράτης, λαβῇ φιλοσοφὸν ἐστὶν ἐπιδείξιος ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁτῶν' πείσας οὐν ἐλκε τοῦτον. εἰ δὲ με βιαζῇ, τὸ μὲν σῶμα παρὰ σοι ἐσταί, ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ παρὰ Στίλπωνι.


8. Diog. L. vii. 21, ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς πλείστους, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἀσόφους εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μικρὰ καὶ τυχηρὰ ἀμαθεῖς.

Wilamowitz(Antigonos p. 117) says:—“die Philosophen sind in den meisten Dingen ungeschickt, von den gewöhnlichen begreifen sie nichts: sie wissen nur das eine was Not tut,” but probably we should read εὐμαθεῖς, with Meric Casaubon.


10. Diog. L. vii. 25, καὶ πρὸς τὸν δείξαντα δὲ αὐτῶ διαλεκτικὸν ἐν τῷ θερίζουντι λόγῳ ἐπτὰ διαλεκτικὰς ἰδέας πυθέσθαι πόσας εἰσπράττεται μισθοῦ ἀκούσαντα δὲ ἐκατὸν διακοσίας αὐτῷ δοῦναι.

The fallacy known as θερίζων was concerned with the nature of the possible. “According to Ammon. de Inter. 106 a [§ 3 p. 160 ed. Or.], Lucian, Vit. Auct. 22 the θερίζων was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap:
it is therefore incorrect to say, *perhaps you will reap.*” Zeller, p. 182.


15. Diog. L. vii. 20, τοῖς εὖ λεγομένοις οὐκ ἡφή δεῖν καταλείπεσθαι τόπον, ώσπερ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τεχνίταις εἰς τὸ θεϊσάσθαι· τούναντίον δὲ τῶν ἀκουόντα ὀὕτω πρὸς τοῖς λεγομένοις γίνεσθαι, ὡστε μὴ λαμβάνειν χρόνον εἰς τὴν ἐπισημείωσιν.

τόπον: perhaps we should read χρόνον, ώσπερ τόπον.


For the distinction between φωνὴ and λέξις cf. Diog. L. vii. 56, λέξις δ’ ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἐγγράμματος. The meaning is:—we ought not to commit to memory the words and expressions of a maxim (χρείας as in apoph. 4), but to exercise our mind as to its arrangement, without learning it by heart like a cookery recipe. For ἀναλαμβάνειν cf. Plut. Agesil. 20, 3. Cobet, however, translates otherwise.


So Cobet, followed by Wilamowitz, for MSS. φωνῆς... φωνὴν, cf. Diog. L. vii. 130, ὥρα ἄνθος ἀρετῆς. Zeno, frag. 147, καταληπτῶν εἶναι τὸ ἱθος εξ εἴδους.


19. Plut. de Virt. Mor. 4, καίτοι καὶ Ζήνωνας φασιν εἰς θεάτρον ἀνιόντα κιθαρῳδοῦντος Ἀμοιβέως προς τοὺς μαθητὰς, ἵωμεν, εἴπειν, ὅπως καταμάθωμεν οἶαν ἐντερα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὀστὰ λόγου καὶ ἀριθμοῦ μετασχόντα καὶ ταξέως ἐμμελεῖαν καὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησιν.

Cf. Plut. Arat. c. 17, 2, ἅθοντος Ἀμοιβέως ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, a passage which also fixes Amoebus as a contemporary of Antigonus.


22. Diog. L. vii. 26, ἐλεγέ τε κρείττον εἶναι τοῖς ποσίν ὀλισθεῖν ἡ τῇ γλώττῃ. This is found several times in the collections of ὑνωμαί, and is sometimes attributed to Socrates (cf. Stein, Psych. p. 7, n. 5): the references are given by Wachsmuth in Sauppe's Satura Philologa, p. 29.


Köhler in Rhein. Mus. xxxix. 297 proposes βάθρου for βωμοῦ.

The point of this bon mot appears to have been lost in the tradition: it must originally have stood:—"The man who abuses me I send away like an ambassador without an answer (καθάπερ εἰ πρεσβευτῇν ἀναπόκριτον ἀποστέλλομι)"; so Wilamowitz.


The anecdote in the form related in Diog. Laert. rests on the authority of Antigonus of Carystus, and hence Wilamowitz (Antig. p. 114) concludes that the king who sent the embassy was Ptolemaeus and not Antigonus Gonatas. It was natural that in later times, when the friendly relations subsisting between Antigonus and Zeno were remembered, the country of the ambassadors should
have been transferred from Egypt to Macedonia. Diogenes, however, has misconceived the object of the embassy, which appears in a less corrupted form in Plutarch. The ambassadors were sent to Athens, not to Zeno, and the assembly was not one of philosophers but of Macedonian partisans. These the ambassadors were instructed to sound, but they seem to have missed the mark in Zeno's case.


28. Athen. viii. 345 c, Ζήνων δ' ὁ Κυτίεως ὁ τῆς Στοάς κτίστης, πρὸς τοῦ ψυφόγαγον ὃ συνέζη ἐπὶ πλείονα
The same in Diog. L. vii. 19.

The same story is told of Bion Borysthenites, id. viii. 344 A. Schweighäuser (Ind.) thinks it is rightly attributed to Zeno.

30. Diog. L. vii. 17, δυσώς δ’ ὑπανακειμένων ἐν πότῳ, καὶ τοῦ ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν υφ’ ἐαυτὸν σκιμαλιζούσις τῷ ποδί αὐτός ἐκεῖνον τῷ γόνατι. ἐπιστραφέντος δέ, τι οὖν οἰεὶ τὸν ὑποκάτω σου πάσχειν ὑπὸ σοῦ; see also Suidas, col. 792, s. v. σκιμαλίσω. Vulgo ὑπερανακ. and ὑπὲρ αὐτόν: corrected by Menage.


32. Boissonade, Anecd. Gr. vol. i. p. 450, Ζήθι, ὁ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ μόνον ἵνα φάγῃς καὶ πίης ἀλλ’ ἵνα τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὸ εὗ ζῆν καταχρήσῃ, attributed to Zeno in Cod. Reg. Paris, 1168, seems to be another form of the well-known saying of Socrates, ap. Stob. Floril. 17, 22, ξῶμεν οὐκ ἵνα ἐσθίωμεν ἀλλ’ ἐσθίωμεν ἵνα ξῶμεν. This forms frag. eth. 10 in Wachsmuth's collection (Comm. i. p. 8), who refers to other passages giving the saying to Zeno.
33. Diog. L. vii. 21, καὶ προεφέρετο τὰ τοῦ Καφησίουν· ὁς, ἐπιβαλομένου τινός τῶν μαθητῶν μεγάλα φυσάν, πατάξας εἴπεν, ὡς οὐκ ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ τὸ εὗ κείμενον εἶη, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ εὗ τὸ μέγα.

The saying of Caphesias is recorded also by Athen. xiv. 629, A.

34. Diog. L. vii. 26, τὸ εὗ γίνεσθαι παρὰ μικρόν, οὒ μὴν μικρὸν εἶναι.

35. Plut. de vit. pud. 13, τὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὡς ἀπαντήσας τινὶ νεανίσκῳ τῶν συνηθῶν παρὰ τὸ τείχος ἁσυχῇ βαδίζοντι, καὶ πυθόμενος, ὃτι φεύγει φίλον ἀξιούντα μαρτυρεῖν αὐτῷ τὰ ψευδή· τί λέγεις, φησίν, ἀβέλτερε; σὲ μὲν ἐκείνος ἄγνωμονον καὶ ἀδικῶν οὐ δέδειν οὐδ’ αἰσχύνει· σὺ δ’ ἐκείνου ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων οὐ θαρρεῖς ὑποστήναι;

36. Diog. L. vii. 16, 17, οἶον ἔτι τοῦ καλλωπιζομένου ποτὲ ἐφη. ὁχέτιον γάρ τι ὅκνηρός αὐτοῦ ὑπερβαίνοντος, δικαίως, εἶπεν, ὑφορᾶ τῶν πηλῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ κατοπτρίσασθαι.

37. Diog. L. vii. 19, μειρακίον δὲ περιεργότερον παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐρωτῶντος ζητημάτω· τι, προσήγαγε πρὸς κάτοπτρον, καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἐμβλέψαι. ἔπειτ' ἡρώτησεν εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἀρμόττοντα εἶναι ὅψει τὰ τοιαῦτα ζητημάτα.

38. Diog. L. vii. 21, νεανίσκου δὲ τινὸς θρασύτερον διαλεγομένου, οὐκ ἀν εἴποιμι, ἐφη, μειράκιον, ἄ ἐπέρχεται μοι.


43. Stob. Floril. 15, 12, Ζήνων πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολογομένους ύπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν ἀσωτίας καὶ λέγοντας ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος ἀναλίσκειν ἔλεγεν, ἥ που καὶ τοῖς μαγείροις συγγνώσθησθε, εὰν ἀλμυρὰ λέγωσι πεποιηκέναι τὰ ὄψα, ὅτι πλήθος ἄλοιν αὐτοῖς υπῆρξεν;

44. Diog. L. vii. 17, ἐρωτικῶς δὲ διακείμενος Χρεμωνίδου, παρακαθίζοντων αὐτοῦ τε καὶ Κλεάνθους, ἀνέστη. θαναμάζοντος δὲ τοῦ Κλεάνθους, ἔφη, καὶ τῶν ιατρῶν ἀκούω τῶν ἁγαθῶν κράτιστον εἰναι φάρμακον πρὸς τὰ φλεγμαίνοντα ἰνυχίαν.

For Chremonides cf. Introd. p. 6.

45. Diog. L. vii. 18, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φιλόταῦδα, οὔτε τοὺς διδασκάλους ἔφη φρένας ἔχειν, αἱ διατρίβοντας ἐν παιδαρίοις, οὔτε ἐκείνους.

46. Stob. Floril. 17, 43, Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κίτιενς οὐδὲ νοσῶν ὀφετο δεῖν τροφῆν προσφέρεσθαι τρυφερωτέραν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ θεραπεῦων ιατρὸς ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν φαγεῖν νεωτοῦ περιστερᾶς, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος, "ὡς Μανήν," ἔφη, "μὲ θεράπευε."

Manes was a common slave's name, cf. Ar. Av. 522,
47. Diog. L. vii. 17, ὡς δὲ Κυνικὸς τις οὐ φήσας ἐλαίον ἔχειν ἐν τῇ ληκύθῳ προσήτησεν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐφη δώσειν. ἀπελθόντα μέντοι ἐκέλευε σκέψασθαι ὑπότερος εἰς ἀναι-δέστερος.

48. Athen. ix. 370 c, καὶ οὐ παράδοξον εἶ κατὰ τῆς κράμβης τινὲς ὁμονοι, ὥστε καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιέως ὁ τῆς Στοας κτίστωρ μιμούμενος τὸν κατὰ τὴς κυνὸς ὄρκον Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμονε τὴν κάππαριν, ὡς Ἐμποδός φησιν ἐν Ἀπολυμανονεύμασιν, cf. Diog. L. vii. 32.

"Ἐμποδός: on this very doubtful name see Müller, Frag. Hist. Gr. iv. 403, after whom Kaibel reads Ἐμπεδός.


So Theophrastus ap. Cic. Tusc. iii. 69.


So Arist. Eth. N. ix. 4, 5, ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός, cf. Cic. Lael. § 80 verus amicus...est tamquam alter idem, ib. § 23 and Reid’s note.

52. Diog. L. vii. 23, Διονυσίου δὲ τοῦ Μεταθεμένου εἰπόντος αὐτῷ διὰ τί αὐτὸν μόνον οὐ διορθοῖ; ἐφη, οὐ γὰρ σοι πιστεύω.

53. Senec. de Benef. iv. 39. 1, Quare ergo, inquit, Zeno vester, quum quingentos denarios euidem promisisset et illum parum idoneum comperisset, amicis suadentibus ne crederet, perseveravit credere quia promiserat? Perhaps the same circumstance is alluded to in Themist. Or. xxii. 252 b, πότε ἀφήκας τῷ δεδανεισμένῳ, καθάπερ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς.

54. Diog. L. vii. 23, δοῦλον ἐπὶ κλοπῆ, φασίν, ἐμαστίγου. τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος, εἰμαρτό μοι κλέψας καὶ δαρῆναι, ἐφη.
Senec. however says:—nullum servum fuisse Zenoni satis constat (Cons. Helv. 12. 3). To have no slave was a sign of abject poverty: see the comm. on Catull. xxiii. 1.


56. Diog. L. vii. 28, 29, ἐτελεύτα δὴ οὖτως. ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς ἀπιρο ἀποσταίσαι καὶ τὸν δάκτυλον περιέρρηξε. παίσας δὲ τὴν γην τῇ χειρὶ, φησί τὸ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβης,

ἐρχομαι, τί μ' αὐείς;
καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀποπνίξας ἑαυτῶν. Stob. Floril. vii. 45, Ζήνων, ὡς ἥδη γέρων ὄν πταίσας κατέπεσεν, "ἐρχομαι," εἶπε, "τί με αὐείς;" καὶ εἰσελθὼν ἑαυτὸν ἐξηγαγεν. Lucian Macrob. (lxii.) 19, Ζήνων δε...οῦν φασίν εἰσερχόμενον εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ προσπταίσαντα ἀνα-
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ṇόβης: the author of the play is uncertain. Both Aeschylus and Sophocles wrote plays with this title, but Nauck thinks the words belong to the Niobe of Timothes: cf. Soph. frag. 395 (Dind.). The situation must have been similar to the concluding scene of the Oedipus Coloneus, where Oedipus is summoned by a mysterious voice: O. C. 1626 f.


This recalls Marcus Aurelius, e.g. vi. 15.
THE FRAGMENTS OF CLEANTHES.

1. Diog. L. vii. 41, ὃ δὲ Κλεάνθης ἐξ μέρη φησι' διαλεκτικόν, ῥητορικόν, ἢθικόν, πολιτικόν, φυσικόν, θεολογικόν.

ἐξ μέρη. These are only subdivisions of the triple Zenonian division: thus διαλεκτικόν and ῥητορικόν together occupy the same ground as λογικόν (Diog. L. vii. 41 cited in Zeno frag. 6, where Cleanthes is probably meant). For his rhetorical writings see Introd. p. 50. Hirzel II. p. 170—178 tries to establish two points in connection with this statement, (1) that Cleanthes, unlike the other Stoics, believed in the unity and indivisibility of philosophy itself, but adopted six divisions for the purpose of exposition merely, and, (2) that the sixfold division is taken from Heraclitus, cf. Diog. L. ix. 5, εἰς τρεῖς λόγους εἰς τὸν τερματικόν καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν καὶ τὸν θεολογικόν. But see Stein, Psych. n. 95, Erkenntnistheorie n. 206.

πολιτικόν. Similar is Aristotle's distinction between φρόνησις (practical thought) and πολιτική (Eth. vi. 8), in which chapter φρόνησις appears both as the general term and as a special subdivision dealing with the individual. The same may be said of ἢθικόν here.

θεολογικόν. Aristotle divides Speculative (θεωρητική) Philosophy into φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική (Metaph. v. 1, 10). The last-named branch is identical with πρώτη φιλοσοφία and is the best of the three, because its subject-
matter is the most honourable, (id. x. 7. 9). In the Stoic system it would have been impossible to follow out this distinction in practice, since their materialism was destructive of metaphysics, and it may be doubted whether θεολογικον does not simply refer to the treatment of popular religion appearing in the book περὶ θεῶν. The hymn to Zeus belongs to θεολογικον rather than to φυσικον.

LOGICA.

2. Epict. Diss. i. 17. 11, τὰ λογικὰ ἄλλων ἔστὶ διακριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ καὶ, ὡς ἂν τις εἶποι, μετρητικὰ καὶ στατικὰ. τὶς λέγει ταύτα; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης; See Zeno frag. 4.


Zeno's definition of φαντασία (frag. 7) became a battle ground for his successors: Cleanthes explained τύπωσις as referring to a material impression like that made upon wax by a seal, cf. Philo de mund. opif. p. 114, Pfeiff., φ (scil. νῦ) τὰ φανέντα ἐκτὸς εἰσω κομίζουσαι, διαγγέλλουσι
kai ἐπιδείκνυνται τοὺς τύπους ἑκάστων, ἐνσφραγιζόμεναι τὸ ὁμοιὸν πάθος. κηρῷ γὰρ ἔοικὼς, δέχεται τὰς διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων φαντασίας, αῖς τὰ σώματα καταλαμβάνει. Chrysippus however objected that, on this view, if the soul received at the same time the impression of a triangle and a square, the same body would at the same time have different shapes attached to it, and would become at the same time square and triangular (Sext. l.c., Diog. L. vii. 45—50); and he accordingly interpreted τύπωσις by ἐτεροίωσις and ἀλλοίωσις, cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 61 an imprimi, quasi ceram, animum putamus, et esse memoriam signatarum rerum in mente vestigia? Hirzel ii. pp. 160—168 finds here also the influence of Heraclitus, who, he believes, is pointed at in Plat. Theaet. p. 191 foll., θέσ δὴ μοι λόγον ἐνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγείον κ.τ.λ. He relies however entirely on the disputed frag. κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποις ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὄτα βαρβαροῖς ψυχαῖς ἑχοντων, which Zeller interprets in exactly the opposite sense to that of Schuster and Hirzel. The point cannot therefore be regarded as established: see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 734.

dοσοχήν...εξοχήν = concavity...convexity. Cf. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 92, αἱ γούν γραφαὶ τῇ μὲν ὡφει δοκοῦσιν εἰσοχαὶ καὶ ἐξοχαὶ ἔχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ τῇ ἀφῆ, ib. i. 120. Plat. Rep. 602 D, καὶ ταῦτα καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὑδαί τε θεωμένοις καὶ ἐξῳ, καὶ κοιλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχουτα διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ὤφεως.

δακτυλῶν. For ancient Greek rings see Guhl and Koner, E. T. p. 182, with the illustrations, and for κηροῦ see on Zeno frag. 50. Hirzel l.c. shows that the metaphor was common, even apart from philosophic teaching: cf. Aesch. P. V. 789, δέλτοι φρενῶν, etc.

4. Plut. Plac. iv. 11, οἱ Στωικοὶ φασίν ὅταν γεννηθῇ
The grounds upon which this is referred to Cleanthes have been stated in the Introduction, p. 38, 39. For the further illustration and exposition of the passage the reader is referred to the exhaustive and interesting note of Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 112, n. 230; but it may be as well here to set out two quotations from Philo, which make strongly in favour of the hypothesis that Cleanthes was the originator of the "tabula rasa" theory: cf. Philo, quod Deus sit immut., I. 9, p. 279 Mang., fantasia δ' ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, ἥ γὰρ εἰσήγαγεν ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡσπερ δακτύλιος τἰς ἡ σφραγῖς, ἐναπεμάξατο τὸν οὐκεῖον χαρακτήρα: κηρῷ δὲ ἐοικώς ὁ νοῦς. quis rer. div. haer. c. 37, p. 498 Mang., ἥ γὰρ ψυχῇ τὸ κήρυσσα, ὡς εἰπέ τις τῶν ἀρχαίων.

5. Olympiodorus l.c. on Zeno frag. 12, Κλεάνθης τοῖνυν λέγει ὅτι τέχνη ἐστὶν ἔξω ὅδω πάντα ἄνυσα. Quintil. Inst. Or. II. 17. 41, nam sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas, via, id est, ordine eficiens.

Cf. also Cic. Fin. III. 18, quoted on Zeno frag. 12. Olympiodorus objects that the definition is too wide, and that it would include φύσις which is not a τέχνη (cf. Cic. N.D. II. 81), but Cleanthes might have replied that neither is φύσις an ἔξω. For ἔξω cf. on διάθεσις Zeno frag. 117, and Stob. Ecl. II. 7, 5κ p. 73, 7, ἐν ἔξω δὲ οὐ μόνας εἴναι τᾶς ἄρετας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τᾶς τέχνας τᾶς ἐν τῷ σπουδαῖῳ ἀνδρὶ ἀλλοωθείσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἁρετῆς καὶ γενομένας ἀμεταπτῶτους, οἴονει γὰρ ἁρετὰς γίνεσθαι.

6. Syrian, ad Ar. Metaph. 892 b 14—23, ὡς ἀρα τὰ εἰδη παρὰ τοῖς θείοις τούτοις ἀνδράσιν (i.e. Socrates Plato
Parthenius and the Pythagoreans) ὄντε πρὸς τὴν ῥήσιν τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων συνθέειας παρήγαγε, ὥς Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωικῶν ὑστερον φήθησαν... ὦ μὴν ὁ ἐννοηματά εἰσι παρ’ αὐτοῖς αἱ ἴδεαι, ὡς Κλεάνθης ὑστερον εἰρηκεν.

This difficult fragment has been variously interpreted. Wellmann, p. 480, and Krische, p. 421, think that Cleanthes described the ideas as “subjective Gedanken,” in which case the fragment is a restatement of Zeno’s view: cf. Zeno frag. 23. Stein discusses the passage at length (Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 293—295): reading νοηματα, he supposes that Cleanthes’ words were οὐκ εἰσιν αἱ ἴδεαι νοηματα. Zeller also p. 85 has νοηματα. However ἐννοηματα appears in the Berlin Aristotle edited by Usener, and so Wachsmuth (Comm. II. p. 3) reads. Stein explains as follows:—νοηματα represent abstract rationalised knowledge resulting from our experience by the agency of ὄρθος λόγος. By such νοηματα are we made aware of the existence of the gods (frag. 52), and from these we must distinguish the class conceptions (Gattungsbeziehungen) which have no scientific value. Class conceptions (ἐννοηματα) can never be the criterion of knowledge, since they have no real existence. Cf. Simpl. in Cat. f. 26 c: οὐτινά τὰ κοινά παρ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεται. But, even assuming that the distinction between νόημα and ἐννόημα is well founded, which is by no means clear, and that νοηματα is to be read here, the context in Syrian is conclusive against Stein. The meaning simply is, “nor again are the ideas in Plato etc. to be treated as ἐννοηματα” : in other words, the negative οὐδὲ is no part of Cleanthes’ statement, but belongs to the commentator. This is abundantly clear from the following words:—οὐδ’ ὡς Ἀντωνίνος, μηγὺς τὴν Δογμὰν καὶ Κλεάνθους δόξαν, τῷ νῷ παρυφισταντο κατὰ τᾶς ἐννοητικὰς ἴδεας.

λεκτά: the abstractions contained in thoughts as expressed in speech, as opposed to thoughts on the one hand and the things thought of on the other (μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος). Neither again are they identical with the spoken words, which are corporeal (Sext. Math. viii. 75). Being incorporeal they can have no real existence, and yet the Stoics seem to have hesitated to deny their existence altogether. In the ordinary terminology of the school κατηγορήμα is a subdivision of λεκτῶν, and is described as λεκτῶν ἐλλιπές (Diog. vii. 64). From this passage, then, we must infer that Cleanthes was the first to restrict κατηγορήμα to its narrower sense by the introduction of the new term λεκτῶν. An example of κατηγορήμα given by Sextus is ἄψυθιον πιεῖν (Pyrrh. ii. 230), but a new term was required to denote the abstraction of a complete assertion (e.g. Cato ambulat), for which κατηγορήμα was obviously insufficient. For λεκτῶν generally see Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 219—222.

Ἀρχέδημος: Zeller p. 50. The most important fact recorded about him is that he placed the ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου in the centre of the earth (Zeller p. 147).

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καὶ δυνατῶ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἄκολουθεί· οὐ πᾶν δὲ παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθεὶς ἀναγκαῖον ἔστι· καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην φέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, οἶς ἐτί πολὺ συνηγόρησεν Ἀντίπατρος. οἱ δὲ τῦλλα δύο, ὅτι δυνατόν τ' ἐστὶν ὃ οὐτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθεὶς οὐτ' ἐσται· καὶ πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθεὶς ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν· δυνατὸ δ' ἀδύνατον ἄκολουθεί· τὰ τρία δ' ἐκεῖνα τηρῆσαι ἀμήχανον, διὰ τὸ κοινῷ εἶναι αὐτῶν μᾶχην. 

Cic. de Fato 7. 14, omnia enim vera in praeteritis necessaria sunt, ut Chrysippus placet, dissentienti a magistro Cleanthe, quia sunt immutabilia nec in falsum e vero praeterita possunt convertere.

Three propositions are here mentioned, which are inconsistent with each other in such a way that the acceptance of any two involves the rejection of the third:—

(1) Every past truth is necessary. (2) That which is possible can never become impossible. (3) A thing may be possible which does not exist and never will exist. Diodorus asserted the truth of (1) and (2) and denied (3): thus Simplicius ad Cat. 65. 6—8 describes his followers as αὐτῇ τῇ ἐκβάσει κρίνοντες τὸ δυνατὸν. Cic. Fam. IX. 4 (writing to Varro) περὶ δυνατῶν me scito κατὰ Διόδωρον κρίνειν. Quapropter, si venturus es, scito necesse esse te venire: sin autem non es, τῶν αδυνάτων est te venire. Cleanthes asserted the truth of (2) and (3) and denied (1). Chrysippus asserted the truth of (1) and (3) and denied (2), cf. Alexander ad An. Pr. 1. 15 p. 34 a 10 Χρύσιππος δὲ λέγων μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ δυνατῷ αδύνατον ἔπεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cleanthes maintained therefore that it is and was possible for past events to have happened differently. See further on this controversy Grote's Plato vol. III. p. 495 foll. On p. 499 Hobbes is quoted, who is in agreement with Diodorus. The dilemma itself was originally propounded by Diodorus the Megarian, on whom see Zeller Socrates p. 252. It went by the name of ὁ κυριεύων λόγος =
argument getting the better of others: cf. Themist. Or. ii. 30 b who mentions it together with ὁ κερατίνης as the discovery of Philo or Diodorus. In Lucian Vit. Auct. c. 22 Chrysippus professes his ability to teach it as well as the θερίζων Ἡλέκτρα υπὸ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. Aul. Gell. i. 2. 4, κυριεύοντας ἱσυνχάζοντας καὶ σωφρείτας. Cleanthes wrote a special treatise on the subject (Introd. p. 50).

9. Quintil. Inst. Or. ii. 15. 33—35. huic eius substantiae maxime conveniet finitio, rhetorician esse bene dicendi scientiam, nam et orationis omnes virtutes semel complectitur, et protinus etiam mores oratoris, cum bene dicere non possit nisi bonus. idem valet Chrysippi finis ille ductus a Cleanthe, scientia recte dicendi (scil. rhetorice).

Kiderlin (Jahrb. f. Class. Phil. 131, p. 123) conjectures that the word Cleanthis has fallen out after substantiae, so that, while Cleanthes defined rhetoric as ἔπιστήμη τοῦ εὖ λέγειν, the words τοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγειν would be an alteration of Chrysippus. See however Striller Rhet. Sto. pp. 7, 8. For the usual Stoic definition cf. Diog. L. vii. 42, τὴν τε ῥητορικὴν, ἔπιστήμην οὐσαν τοῦ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξὸδῳ λόγων where rhetoric is contrasted with dialectic, since dialectic was also defined as ἔπιστήμη τοῦ εὖ λέγειν by the Stoics (Alex. Aphr. Top. 3. 6, quoted by Stein, Erkenntnistheorie n. 210). Sext. Emp. Math. ii. 6.

10. Varro de L. L. v. 9, quod si summum gradum non attigero, tamen secundum practeribo, quod non solum ad Aristophanis sed etiam ad Cleanthis lucubravi [secundum explained in § 7 quo grammatica escendit antiqua, quae ostendit quemadmodum quodque poeta finxerit verbum confinxerit declinarit].

16—2
11. Athen. xi. 467 d, Kleánthe s de o filósofoi ev tò perì metalýψeow apò tôn katalýkeasàntwv fêsìn ónomaðhènai tìn te ðerikleion kúlika kai tìn ðeuniaída. ib. 471 b, Kleánthe s ð' ev tò perì metalýψeow syggrámmati fêsì, tà tooùn eýrímatà, kai ðsa tooànta ìti kai tà louptà ìsti, ðiun ðerikleios, deunías, 'Iðikrátís, taúta [gær] pròteron svnistóreis toùs eýróntas, faiýnetai ð' ìti kai vúv 'eî ðè mu' poieí tooùto, metaβebhìkòs ìnì eìh mikróon tooùma. álalá, katháter eýrhtai, ouk ìsti πιστεú- saí tò tûxónti.

Metalýψeow: the meaning of this word seems to be that explained by Quintil. viii. 6. 37, superest ex his, quae aliter significent, metalýψis, id est, transumptio, quae ex alio in aliud velut viam praestat: tropus et varissimus et maxime improprius, Graccis tamen frequentior, qui Centaurum Chirona, et νήσους (? ναύς) θοίς δέξειας dicunt. Nos quis ferat, si Verrem suem aut Lælium doctum nominemus? cf. Arist. Top. vi. 11, p. 149 a 6.

Δeristikleioin: a kind of drinking cup, said to be named after Thericles, a Corinthian potter of some celebrity, and, according to Bentley on Phalaris § 3, a contemporary of Aristophanes. Welcker, however (Rhein. Mus. vi. 404 foll.), maintains that these cups were so called because they were decorated with the figures of animals.

Δeunías and 'Iðikrátís are the names given to particular kinds of slippers, the latter of which was so called after the celebrated Athenian general. Cf. Poll. vii. 89, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν χρησαμένων Ἰθικρατίδες, Δευνίδες, Δαλķιβία, Σμινειρίδα, Μυνάκια ἀπὸ Μυνάκου. Diod. Sic. xv. 44, τὰς τε ὑποδέσεις τὸς στρατιώτας εὐλύτους καὶ κούφας ἐποίησε, τὰς μέχρι τοῦ νῦν Ἰθικρατίδας ἀπ' ἐκείνου καλομενάς. Alcephr. Ep. iii. 57, ἐναγχαὶς Κρονίων ἐνστάντων Ἰθικρατίδας μοι νεουργεῖς ἐπεμψε. Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 450, Müller Handbuch iv. 428.
γάρ is expunged by Meineke, whom Wachsm. follows.

οὐ καὶ τὸν θέον ἀν διὰ τὸν θεόν ἐν νὰ ὑπὸς δεδωκότες.

PHYSICA.

12. Diog. L. vii. 134, δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἄρχας εἶναι τῶν ὀλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχουν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχου εἶναι τὴν ἀποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ αἴδιον οὖντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἔκαστα. τίθησι δὲ τὸ δόγμα τούτο... Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀτόμων. See Zeno frag. 35.


spiritum = πνεῦμα. So far as the evidence serves, Cleanthes was the first to explain the Heraclitean πῦρ as πνεῦμα. While not refusing to admit that Zeno's aether is an emanation from the Godhead (see on frag. 15), he differs from Zeno in identifying God with the sun, as the ruling part of the universe, and the ultimate source of the "Urpneuma." Stein Psych. p. 68. Hirzel's account is inconsistent: at p. 211 he attributes πνεῦμα to Chrysippus and restricts Cleanthes to πῦρ, while at p. 216 he allows that Cleanthes introduced the conception of πνεῦμα.

permeatorem. Gk. διήκειν Zeno frag. 37, probably indicates that Cl. accepted κράσις δι' ὀλων, cf. Alex. Aphrod. de Mixt. 142 a, ἡνώσθαι τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν,
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πνεύματος τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ύφ’ οὗ συνάγεται καὶ συμμένει.


Cleanthes teaches the exact correspondence between the microcosm of the individual and the macrocosm of the world: there is therefore in the world a ruling principle analogous to the soul of man. Sext. Math. ix. 120, ὡστε ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικεῖται πολυμερῆς καθεστώς, εἴη ἂν τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κυριεύον καὶ τὸ προκαταρχόμενον τῶν κινήσεων. οὐδὲν δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἢ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, ἥτις θεὸς ἐέστων. ἔστιν ἄρα θεός.

15. Cic. N. D. i. 37, tum ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexum ardorem, qui aether nominetur, certissimum deum judicat. Lactant. Inst. i. 5, Cleanthes et Anaximenes aethera dicunt esse summum Deum (quoting in support Verg. Georg. ii. 325).

According to Krische, p. 428—430, Cicero has here made a blunder by importing an explanation of his own into the Greek original θεὸν εἶναι τὸν αἰθέρα, and by a confusion of the two senses in which αἰθήρ is used in the Stoic School (1) = πῦρ τεχνικῶν, (2) = the fiery zone surrounding the world. Cleanthes, as will be presently seen, disagreeing with the rest of the school, regarded the
sun and not the belt of aether as the ἕγερμονικόν, or, in popular language, as the abode of God (Cic. Acad. i. 126). Cleanthes therefore only meant to affirm the identity of θεός and the πῦρ τεχνικόν. This may be true, but the reasoning is not conclusive. Apart from the word certissimum, which is not important, there is no reason why Cleanthes should not have attributed divinity to the ultimus omnia cingens aether, just in the same manner as he does to the stars, where Krische feels no difficulty. Similarly Stein, Psychol. n. 99: the aether emanates from the "Urpneuma" and is a divine power, but not God himself.

ultimum i.e. farthest removed from the earth which is in the centre of the universe. Zeno, frag. 67. Cic. N. D. ii. 41. 117. Diog. vii. 37.

16. Philod. περὶ εὐσεβ. c. 9, λόγον ἕγομένων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. Cic. N. D. i. 37, tum nihil ratione censet esse divinium.

This, it should be remembered, is in direct opposition to the teaching of Epicurus, who speaks of the world as φύσει ἀλόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστῶτα (Stob. Ecl. i. 21. 3c p. 183, 10).

17. Cic. N. D. i. 37, Cleanthes...tum ipsum mundum deum dicit esse. Cf. N. D. ii. 34. 45.

See Krische p. 424—426, according to whom we are to interpret mundum here in the first of the three senses specified by Diog. L. vii. 137, 138, ἔστι κόσμος ὁ ἰδίως ποιός τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας. Cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 21. 3, p. 184, 11, λέγεται δ' ἐπέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός, καθ' ὄν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειώτατη. In any case, we have here a distinct statement that Cleanthes was a pantheist, and identified God with matter. The different meanings given to κόσμος in effect amount to this that it
may be regarded either as the sum total of all existence, or as the transitory and derivative part of existence: the distinction, however, as Zeller observes, is only a relative one (see his remarks p. 159). For pantheism as advocated by Cleanthes see Hirzel ii. p. 206. Stein, Psychol. p. 67 and n. 98.

18. Chalcid. in Tim. c. 144, ex quo fieri ut quae secundum fatum sunt etiam ex providentia sint. eodem-que modo quae secundum providentiam ex fato, ut Chrysippus putat. alii vero quae quidem ex providentiae auctoritate, fataliter quoque provenire, nec tamen quae fataliter ex providentia, ut Cleanthes.

Zeno had affirmed the identity of εἰμαρμένη and πρόνοια (frag. 45), but omitted to discuss the difficulties involved in so broad an explanation of fatalistic doctrine. Cleanthes felt the difficulty that κακὸν could not be said to exist κατὰ πρόνοιαν, even if it existed καθ’ εἰμαρμένην. This point will recur in the Hymn to Zeus frag. 46, l. 17, οὕδε τι γίνεται ἐργὸν ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα δαίμον...πλὴν ὁπόσα ἰέδουσι κακοὶ σφετέρησιν ἀνοίασι, where we shall have to discuss the nature of the solution which he offered. In support of the position here taken up by Chrysippus cf. id. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 34, 3, κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλῆσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπέχυων...οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γλύγνωσθαι οὐδὲ τοῦλάχιστον ἄλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ τῶν ἑκείνης λόγον. id. Comm. Not. 34, 5, εἰ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦλάχιστον ἔστι τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν ἄλλως ἄλλ’ ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς Βούλησιν. Chrysippus also defined εἰμαρμένη as λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικομένων. The Sceptic objections on this head are put very clearly in Sext. Pyrrh. III. 9—12.
19. Philo de provid. ii. 74 p. 94 Aucher: (astra erratica) nota sunt non solum ratione verum etiam sensu ita movente providentia, quae, ut dicit Chrysippus et Cleanthes, nihil praetermisit pertinientium ad certiorem utilioremque dispensationem. quod si aliter melius esset dispensari res mundi, co modo sumpsisset compositionem, qua tenus nihil occurreret ad impediendum deum.

I have taken this fragment from Gercke (Chrysippea p. 708).

quae nihil praetermisit...Much of the Stoic exposition in the 2nd book of Cicero's de Natura Deorum is a commentary on this. Thus for astra erratica cf. § 103 foll. and esp. § 104, ergo, ut oculis adsidue videmus, sine ulla mutatione et varietate cetera labuntur...caelestia...quorum contemplatione nullius explieri potest animus naturae constantiam videre cupientis. Generally cf. M. Anton. i. 3, τὰ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ἀνευ φύσεως ἡ συγκλώσεως καὶ ἐπιπλοκῆς τῶν προνοία διοικουμένων' πάντα ἐκείθεν ἰε' πρόσεστι δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ συμφέρον, οὐ μέρος εἰ.

qua tenus...At the same time we find elsewhere a chain argument of Chrysippus in Alex. de fato c. 37 p. 118 οὐ πάντα μὲν ἐστι καθ' εἰμαρμένην, οὐκ ἐστι δὲ ἀκόλυτος καὶ ἀπαραπτόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις κ.τ.λ. But inconsistency was inevitable in this matter, when Chrysippus could account for the existence of evil by saying (Plut. Sto. Rep. 36. 1) κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἄραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ' ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. See Zeller's lucid exposition pp. 176—193.

20. Probus ad Verg. Ecl. 6. 31, p. 10, 33, Omnem igitur hanc rerum naturae formam tenui primum et inani mole dispersam refert in quattuor elementa concretam et ex his omnia esse postea effigiata Stoici tradunt
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φρέατος. This is explained by the anecdote related by Diog. vii. 168, διεβοήθη δὲ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφία, ἢς γε πένης ὅν ἄγιν ὀρμησε μισθοφορεῖν καὶ νῦκτωρ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κήποις ἤντιλε, μεθ' ἠμέραν δ' ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγυμνάζετο. θεν καὶ Φρεάντλης ἐκλήθη. The same idea is kept up by αὐνμᾶ i.e. "hauls up."

καὶ τὴν μὲν γῆν κ.τ.λ. This constant interchange of the various elements is not so strongly brought out in the Stoic system as it was by Heraclitus with his formula πάντα ρεῖ. Cf. Krische p. 387. It is however always implied, cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 10. 16° p. 129, 18, πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἄερα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ' ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης δὲ ἐτε μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς γῆν. πάλιν δ' ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυμένης καὶ διαχειμένης πρῶτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δευτέρα δ' ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἄερα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἑσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. Cie. N. D. ii. 84, et cum quattuor genera sint corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aer, ex aere aether, deinde retrorsum vicissim ex aethere aër, inde aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic naturis his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursus deorsus, ultro citro commeantibus mundi partium coniunctio continetur. For Heraclitus see R. and P. § 29.
eis τῦρ. Some words must be supplied here: Diels inserts ἄνω.

tὸ δὲ τῦρ: the reverse process is concisely stated.

ἡς μέρος μετέχοντας: for the divine origin of the human soul see Stein Psych. p. 96, n. 169.

22. Stob. Eel. i. 20, 1° p. 171, 2, Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίτπῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ τῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν, οἴα πρῶτερον ἦν. See Zeno frag. 54.


Philo is arguing that when everything becomes fire, it must burn itself out and cannot be created anew, but there is no importance in his objection, as he is confounding the πῦρ τεχνικὸν with πῦρ ἀτεχνων. φλόξ and αὐγή therefore alike express what Numenius, speaking of the school in general, calls πῦρ αἰθέρωδες i.e. πῦρ τεχνικὸν (Euseb. P. E. xv. 18. 1). What then is the meaning of the divergence? Stein believes that we have here a piece of evidence showing a substantial disagreement in the views taken by Cleanthes and Chrysippus of the ἐκπύρωσις and that φλόξ is used with reference to the Sun (see on frag. 24), and αὐγή as a representation of the finest aether. For the connection of φλόξ with ἰλιος he quotes Diog. L. vii. 27, Aesch. Pers. 497, Soph. Trach. 693, O. T. 1425 (Stein, Psychologie pp. 70, 71 and the notes). Hirzel's explanation is similar (Π. p. 211), except that he does not see any reference to the sun: according to him, Cleanthes spoke of a permeating πῦρ for which πνεῦμα was substituted by Chrysippus: but see on frag. 13. For φλόγα cf. ἐκφλογισθέντος in frag. 24.
The explanation of the first part of this difficult fragment appears to be as follows:—When everything has been set on fire and the tendency of all things to become absorbed in the πῦρ ἄειξιον has been satisfied, the reaction commences in the centre, and spreads towards the extremities until everything except the outer rim is in a watery mass. Seneca, N. Q. III. 13. 1, nihil relinqui... aliud, igne restineto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem latere. Then the remaining portions of the original fire, concentrated in the sun (Stein p. 71), in spite of resistance from the centre, begin to exert their creative influence, and by their ever-increasing activity, the elements and the world are formed. Phenomenal existence, then, is possible only when the tightening and slackening influences are in equilibrium or nearly so; the exclusive predominance of either destroys the balance of the universe. The centre of the σφαίρος is always readier to admit the loosening of tension, while the bracing in-
vigorating vivifying power, which knits together the frame of the universe as of the individual, is in fullest sway in the parts at the circumference (hence ἄνω αὐξεθαί). This is the theory of tension as applied to the ἐπισ-μησις, and its statement constitutes the most important contribution made by Cleanthes to Stoicism. A difficulty in the above exposition remains to be stated:—Why is there no created world in the period between ἐκπύρωσις and ἔξυγρωσις, as there must then be a time when the two influences are of equal strength? The answer, perhaps, is that during the whole of this period there is an ever-increasing slackening of tension, as the fire of the ἐκπύρωσις is gradually extinguished, and slackening of tension produces not life but death (Plut. plac. v. 24 etc.); the creation of the world only starts when τὸ ἐσχατὸν τοῦ πυρὸς τρέπεται εἰς τοὺςαντίον. There is also a divergent view, namely, that the destruction of the world may be compassed by κατακλυσμὸς as well as by ἐκπύρωσις. This implies that our world can exist during the transition towards ἔξυγρωσις. Cf. Sen. N. Q. iii. 29. 1 and Heraclit. Alleg. Hom. c. 25, p. 53, quoted by Zeller p. 169, 1. Schol. on Lucan viii. 813 ἐκπύρωσις, quam secuturam κατακλυσμοῦ adserunt Stoici, seems to have been overlooked, but is of doubtful import. Stein’s account of the διακόσμησις (Psych. p. 32 foll.) is radically different, but I do not see how it can be reconciled with this passage: (1) the creation of the world is due to a slackening of tension in the original fiery substance, and (2) τὸ ἐσχατὸν τοῦ πυρὸς is what remains of the original “Urpneuma” after the four elements have been formed, whereas according to Cleanthes the creation of the world only begins when this remnant of fire begins to exert its influence. Hirzel discusses the present passage at some length (Untersuchungen ii. p. 124—134). He strongly insists
that τὸ ἑσχατον meansextremum (das Feuer des Umkreises) and not reliquum, and that Philo περὶ ἀφθ. κόσμου 18, (μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ἐπειδὰν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλῃ δη-μοιρυςθαι σύμπαν μὲν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται ποσὴ δὲ τις αὐτὸν μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται) follows Chrysippus and not Cleanthes. It would seem, however, that the distinction is not important, as ἑσχατον must in this case be both extremum and reliquum. Further on he suggests that Cleanthes did not maintain the doctrine of the four elements, but cf. frag. 21. Two possible anticipations of the tension theory have been noticed in Zeno’s fragments, but the passage in frag. 56 is probably spurious, while in frag. 67, even if τεύνεσθαι is sound, Zeno is confessedly dealing with another point, viz. the explanation of how the separate parts of the κόσμος are kept in one solid mass and why they are not scattered into the void. Ogereau p. 10 attributes the introduction of τόνος to Zeno, and depreciates the performances of Cleanthes (p. 19); but he insists throughout too strongly on the unity of the school, without considering its historical development.

τὸ μέσον, cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 21, 3b p. 183, 3, ἀπὸ γῆς δὲ ἄρξασθαι τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ κόσμου, καθάπερ ἀπὸ κέντρου, ἀρχῆ δὲ σφαίρας τὸ κέντρον.


τρεπομένου. MSS. corr. Canter.

τὸν...τὸν. The MSS. have τοῦ...τοῦν. The reading in the text is due to Mein., whom Wachsm. now follows, although he formerly (Comm. ii. p. 11) kept the MSS. reading, removing the colon after ὀλον and inserting commas after καὶ and τοῦν. There is some mistake in Stein’s note on this point, Psychol. n. 41.

ἐκ σπερμάτων. Cf. Zeno frag. 54 = Cleanth. frag. 22, and see Ritter and Preller § 402.
λόγοι was unnecessarily suspected by the older edd. of Stobaeus. The conj. τόνοι is tempting, but Wachsm. quotes Marc. Aurel. IX. 1, ὄρμησεν (ἡ φύσις) ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν συλλαβουσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων κ.t.l. The best parallel is Zeno frag. 106, which puts the text beyond dispute. τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν = certain proportions of the constituent parts of the soul.

γινομένων P. γεινομένων F, whence γεινομένων Mein. Wachsm. Diels: but the present, accepted by Hirzel II. p. 126, seems preferable.

eis is bracketed by Diels and Wachsm.


As the sun is, according to Cleanthes, the ἵγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου, the πῦρ ἰαίζον may be supposed to exist there in its purest form (cf. the authorities cited by Zeller, Stoics p. 204, 3, Krische p. 386), and to this the moon and the other stars will be assimilated at the ἐκπυρώσεις.

ἐξομοιωσειν. MSS. have ἐξομοιώσαι corr. Zeller, p. 165, n. 4.

26. Stob. Ecl. i. 15, 6a p. 146, 19, Κλεάνθης μόνος τῶν Στωικῶν τὸ πῦρ ἀπεφήματο κωνοείδες.

Presumably this refers to the fire of the revolving aether, for the doctrine appears to be borrowed from the Pythagoreans cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 15, 6a p. 146, 14, οἱ ἀπὸ Ηνθαγόρου...μόνον τὸ ἀνώτατον πῦρ κωνοείδες. This is supposed to refer to the Milky Way (Zeller, pre-Socrates, i. p. 466 n. 2), cf. infra frags. 32, 33.

27. Plut. de facie in orbe lunae c. 6, 3, ὀσπερ
'Αρισταρχος ὤμοι δεῖν Κλεάνθης τὸν Σάμιον ἀσεβείας προσκαλεῖσθαι τοῖς Ἴδλοις Ἐλληνας, ὥς κινοῦντα τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἔστιαν, ὡς εἰ <τὰ> φαινόμεναι σώζειν ἀνὴρ ἐπειράτο, μὲνεν τὸν οὐρανὸν ὑποτιθέμενος, ἐξελίπτεσθαι δὲ κατὰ λοξοῦ κύκλου τὴν γῆν, ἁμα καὶ περὶ τὸν αὐτῆς ἄξονα δινουμένην. This comes from the treatise πρὸς 'Αρισταρχον: Introd. p. 51.

'Αρισταρχον: the celebrated mathematician. For the theory here attacked cf. Sext. Math. x. 174, οἱ γε μὴν τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κύνησιν ἀνελόντες τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι δοξάσαντες, ὡς οἱ περὶ 'Αρισταρχον τοὺς μαθηματικοὺς κ.τ.λ. Stob. Ecl. i. 25, 3*k p. 212, 2, 'Αρισταρχος τὸν ἥλιον ἱστησι μετὰ τῶν ἀπλανῶν τὴν δὲ γῆν κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν ἥλιον κύκλου. (This also illustrates κατὰ λοξοῦ κύκλου.) It appears however to be doubtful whether Aristarchus propounded this view otherwise than hypothetically: cf. Plut. quaest. Plat. viii. 1, 2, 3.

ἀσεβείας προσκαλεῖσθαι. For the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας see Attischer Process ed. Lipsius, pp. 366—375, and cf. the case of Anaxagoras (ib. p. 370). Every γραφὴ, as well as an ordinary civil action, commenced with the πρόσκλησις or writ of summons (ib. p. 770 f.).

ἔστιαν: alluding to the central position of the earth. Aesch. Ag. 1056 ἔστιας μεσομφίλου, Virg. Aen. ii. 512 aedibus in mediis nudoque sub aetheris axe ingens arafuit. It is possible that Cleanthes had in his mind the Pythagorean description of the central fire as ἔστια τοῦ παυτῶς: see Dr Thompson on Phaedr. 247 Λ, μένει γὰρ Ἐστία ἐν θεῶν οἴκῳ μόνῃ.

τὰ φαινόμενα σώζειν: "to save appearances:" for which phrase see Prof. Mayor in Journ. Phil. vi. 171.
There is no warrant whatever for Krische's suggestion (p. 435), that Cleanthes probably ("wahrscheinlich") adopted the Heraclitean theory of the daily renewal of the sun: everything points the other way. At the same time, the important position assigned to the sun was probably due to his Heraclitean studies (see Introd. p. 50), for, though Heraclitus himself did not maintain this doctrine, we read of the Heraclitean school in Plat. Cratyl. 413 B, τὸν ἥλιον...διαίοντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὀντα. Cf. Pliny, N. H. p. 12 (cited by Hirzel, p. 138).

29. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 3¹ p. 211, 18, Κλεανθῆς ἄναμμα νοερὸν τὸ ἐκ θαλάττης τῶν ἥλιων. περὶ δὲ τῶν τροπῶν φασὶ κατὰ τὸ διάστημα τῆς ὑποκειμένης τροφῆς ὡκεινὸς ὤστι ** ** ἢς τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐπινέμεται. συγκατάφερεσθαι δὲ τὸν ἥλιον κινούμενον ἐλικα ἐν τῇ σφαιρᾳ, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰσημερινοῦ ἐπὶ τε ἄρκτου καὶ νότου, ἀπερ ἐστὶ πέρατα τῆς ἐλικος. Cic. N. D. iii. 37, Quid enim? non eisdem vobis placet omnem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo modo posse, nisi alitur: ali autem solem, lunam, reliqua astra aquis, alia dulcibus, alia marinis? eamque causam Cleanthes adfert cur se sol referat nec longius progradiatur solstitiali orbi itemque brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo. Macrobr. Sat. i. 23, 2, ideo enim sicut et
Posidonius et Cleanthes affirmant, solis meatus a plaga, quae usta dicitur, non recedit, quia sub ipsa currit Oceanus, qui terram ambit et dividit.

Wachsmuth regards Cic. and Stob. ll. cc. as containing two distinct fragments (Comm. II. fr. phys. 7 and 8), but the passage in Cic. is only a verbal expansion of τερποτών...τροφής. Wachsm. does not cite Macrobr. I. c. This is one of the points which attest Cleanthes' study of Heraclitus, cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 1st p. 239, 5. Hirzel concludes (II. p. 122) from the evidence, that Cleanthes, like Heraclitus, spoke only of the feeding of the sun by exhalations, and not also of that of the moon and stars.

άναμμα κ.τ.λ. cf. Plut. plac. II. 20. 3, τερπι υσιας ήλιου, οί Στωικοί άναμμα νοερόν εκ θαλάττης. Diog. vii. 145, τρέφεσθαι δε τα ἐμπυρα ταῦτα (i.e. the sun and moon) και τα ἄλλα ἁμηρα' τὸν μὲν ήλιον εκ τῆς μεγάλης θαλάττης νοερόν οὐτα ἄναμμα, whereas the moon is fed with fresh water, and is mixed with water. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 5, τὸν ἠλίον εἶναι τὸ ἀθροισθὲν ἔξαμμα νοερὸν εκ τοῦ τῆς θαλάττης ἀναθυμιάματος. Wachsmuth adds Galen, hist. phil. c. lviii. p. 277 K., ὕκεανδ' δὲ καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν παρέχειν τῷ ἠλίῳ τροφήν τὴν αὐτοῦ υγρότητα ἔχουσαν εἰς αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν γεώδη ἀναθυμίασιν.

τροφῶν: a necessary correction by Bake for the mss. τροφῶν.

φαι MSS. Wachsm. suggests φησι.

ιστ.: there is a lacuna after this word. Wachsmuth formerly (Comm. II. p. 10) supplied καὶ γη' coll. Plut. plac. II. 23. 3, but he now writes: "lacuna fuit in Actii exemplo, quod eum Ps. Plutarcho legit Stobaeus; Plut. ἡ γη' add.; Aetius καὶ ἡ μεγάλη θάλασσα vel simile scripsit," quoting the passages cited above.

συγκαταφεσθαι i.e. with the aether, which is itself in motion.
The discovery of the inclination of the earth's orbit to that of the sun is attributed by some to Anaximander, and by others to Pythagoras (Zeller, pre-Socratics i. p. 455, 2).

30. Cic. N. D. ii. 40, atque ea (sidera) quidem tota esse ignea duorum sensuum testinornio confirmari Cleanthes putat, tactus et oculorum. nam solis et candor illustrior est quam ullius ignis, quippe qui immenso mundo tam longe lateque colluceat, et is eis tactus est, non ut tepefaciat solum, sed etiam saepe comburat. quorum neutrum faceret, nisi esset igneus. "ergo," inquit, "cum sol igneus sit Oceanique alatur humoribus, quia nullus ignis sine pastu aliquo possit permanere, necesse est aut ei similis sit igni quem adhibemus ad usum atque ad victum, aut ei, qui corporibus animantium continetur. atqui hic noster ignis, quem usus vitae requirit, confector est et consumptor omnium idemque, quocumque invasit, cuncta disturbat ac dissipat. contra ille corporeus vitalis et salutaris omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet sensu-que adfit." negat ergo esse dubium horum ignium sol utri similis sit, cum is quoque efficiat ut omnia floreant et in suo quaeque genere pubescant. quare cum solis ignis similis eorum ignium sit, qui sunt in corporibus animantium, solen quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quae oriantur in ardore caelesti, qui aether vel caelum nominatur.

testimonio: this passage illustrates two characteristics, which are specially prominent in Cleanthes: (1) his activity in the investigation of the problems of natural science, and (2) his confidence in the results of sense observation. Stein, Psychol. p. 69, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 319.
Oceani: cf. frag. 29.
ei...igni: for the two kinds of fire cf. Zeno frag. 71.
corporeus: see on frag. 42.
aether vel caelum: hence in Zeno frag. 111 Zeus is identified with caelum in place of the usual gloss aether.


πλήκτρον: Krische p. 400 connects this with the Stoic identification of Heracles with the sun. Thus Heracles is τὸ πληκτικὸν καὶ διαίρετικὸν (Plut. de Iside c. 40), and his name is derived from ἀῖρ and κλασις by Porphyrius ap. Euseb. P. E. III. p. 112 c, and Nicomachus ap. Laur. Lyd. de Mens. iv. 46. πλήκτρον is properly “any striking instrument”: hence lightning is described as πλήκτρον διόβολον πυρὸς κεραυνὸν (Eur. Alc. 128): cf. especially Plut. de Pyth. orac. c. 16 ad fin. ὑστερον μέντοι πλήκτρον ἀνέθηκαν τῷ θεῷ χρυσοῦν ἐπιστήσαντες, ὡς ἑοικε, Σκυθῖνῳ λέγοντι περὶ τῆς λύρας, ἥν ἀρμόζεται Ζηνὸς εὐειδῆς 'Απόλλον, πάσαν ἀρχήν καὶ τέλος συλλαβῶν’ ἐχει δὲ λαμπρὸν πλήκτρον ἥλιον φάος (quoted by Hirzel, p. 181). Eur. Suppl. 650, λαμπρὰ μὲν ἀκτίς, ἥλιον κανων σαφῆς. Sandys on Bacch. 308, and Milton’s “With touch ethereal of Heaven’s fiery rod.”

32. Stob. Eel. i. 26. 1 p. 219, 14, Κλεάνθης πυροειδή τὴν σελήνην, πυλοειδῆ δὲ τῷ σχήματι.

πυροειδή: but the fire of the moon is not so pure as that of the sun, being fed with grosser matter. Cf. Diog. L. vii. 144, εἶναι δὲ τῶν μὲν ἥλιον εἰλικρινὲς πῦρ...145, γεωδεστέραν δὲ τὴν σελήνην.
the MSS. have πηλοειδή corrected by Lipsius (Phys. Stoic ii. 13), who also suggests πολυειδή, to πυλοειδή, in which correction he is followed by the editors of Stobaeus. But what is the meaning of this word as applied to shape? In this connection “like felt” (L. and S.) is nonsense. Zeller translates “ball-shaped,” which is improbable because, apart from other considerations, it is almost certain that Cleanthes did not regard the moon as spherical. There remains Hirzel’s suggested rendering:—“shaped like a skull-cap.” The only justification for such an absurdity is to be found in the Heraclitean σκαφοειδής (Stob. Ecl. i. 26. 1° p. 218, 8), for no support can be derived from πιλήματα ἄερος (Anaximander) or νέφος πεπιλημένου (Xenophanes), which simply refer to densely packed clouds. Krisehe, p. 435, boldly reads κωνοειδῆ which gives the required sense, but is not close enough to the MSS. It is suggested therefore that the true reading is ἡλιοειδή, the Π being due to dittography of the following H. There would be no obscurity in this, assuming Cleanthes or his epitomiser to have previously described the sun as κωνοειδῆς (cf. frag. 33). The other Stoics consistently describe the moon as σφαιροειδῆς (Stob. Ecl. i. 26. 1° 1° p. 219, 20, 26).


Cleanthes attributed a conical shape to fire, sun, moon, and stars. There is no direct evidence as to the sun and moon, but it is a fair inference from the authorities that they also were conical. It is probable, moreover, that
Cleanthes was moved by the consideration that Heraclitus described sun, moon and stars as boat-shaped (σκαφοειδή), cf. Stob. Ecl. i. 25. 1e 26. 1e, Diog. L. ix. 9. Krische is apparently right in inferring that the same is true of the world, cf. Plut. plac. ii. 2. 1, οἱ μὲν Στωικοὶ σφαιροειδῆ τὸν κόσμον, ἅλλοι δὲ κωνοειδῆ, οἱ δὲ φοειδῆ.

34. Plut. plac. ii. 16. 1, Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν ἐτὶ δυσμᾶς φέρεσθαι πάντας τοὺς ἀστέρας. Galen, hist. phil. c. 13, xix. 272 K. Ἀ. καὶ Δ. καὶ Κλ. ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν εἰς δυσμᾶς φέρεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας νομίζουσιν. Πάντας in Plut. apparently includes ἀπλανη ἄστρα as well as the πλανώμενα: the former are said συμπεριφέρεσθαι τῷ ὀλῷ οὐρανῷ, τὰ δὲ πλανώμενα κατ’ ἱδίας κινεῖσθαι κινήσεις (Diog. vii. 144). Full information on the ancient theories as to the rising and setting of the stars will be found in Achill. Tat. Isag. cc. 37, 38.


This fragment is taken from Wachsmuth’s collection (fr. phys. 27, Comm. ii. p. 14): cf. frag. 29 and Macrobi. i. 23, 2 there cited. Krische, p. 393, refers this to the influence of Zeno’s studies on Homer. “Hiernach möchte ich glauben, dass Zenon dort auch den Homerischen Ocean aufgesucht und dadurch den Kleanthes und Krates aufgefordert habe, dieselbe Betrachtung zu erneuern.” Cf. Achill. Tat. Isag. c. 29, p. 89:—There are five zones: Arctic, Antarctica, two temperate (εὐκρατοι), μία δὲ διακεκαυμένη, ἢ δὲ τούτων μέσῃ πασῶν ἔστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερινοῦ τροπικοῦ μέχρι τοῦ χειμερινοῦ τροπικοῦ θοσοῦτον γὰρ πλάτος ἔχει.
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όσον καὶ ὁ ἥλιος περιέρχεται. καλεῖται δὲ διακεκαυμένη διὰ τὸ πυρώδης εἶναι, τοῦ ἥλιου δὲ αὐτῆς τὴν πορείαν αἰὲ ποιούμενον. Posidonius, as we learn from ib. 31, p. 90, made six zones, dividing the torrid zone into two.

36. Tertullian de An. c. 5, vult et Cleanthes non solum corporis lineamentis, sed et animae notis similitudinem parentibus in filios respondere, de speculo siliciet morum et ingeniorum et affectuum: corporis autem similitudinem et dissimilitudinem capere: et animam itaque 5 corpus similitudini vel dissimilitudini obnoxiam. item corporalium et incorporalium passiones inter se non communicare. porro et animam compati corpori, cui laeso ictibus, vulneribus, ulceribus condolescit, et corpus animae, cui adfictae eura, angore, amore, coaegrescit, per detrimentum siliciet vigoris, cuius pudorem, et pavorem rubore atque pallore testetur. igitur anima corpus ex corporalium passionum commutatione. Nemesius, Nat. Hom. p. 32, ὁ Κλεάνθης τοιοῦτε πλέκει συλλογισμόν οὗ μόνον φησίν ὁμοίου τοῖς γονεῦσι γυνόμεθα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἄλλα 15 καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἠθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεις, σώματος δὲ τὸ ὁμοίου καὶ τὸ ἀνόμου, οὐχὶ δὲ ἀσωμάτου, σῶμα ἁρὰ ἡ ψυχὴ...ἐτὶ δὲ ὁ Κλεάνθης φησίν οὐδὲν ἀσωμάτων συμπάσχει σώματι, οὐδὲ ἀσωμάτω ἑνώμα, ἄλλα σῶμα σώματι συμπάσχει ἡ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι 20 καὶ τεμνομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσχυνομένης γονῶ ἐνρθρὸν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ωχρόν σῶμα ἁρὰ ἡ ψυχή. Tertullian de An. c. 25, unde oro te similitudine animae quoque parentibus de ingenii respondemus secundum Cleanthis testimonium, si non ex animae semine 25 educimur?

The Nemesius passage is regarded as a distinct fragment from the two places in Tertullian by Wachsmuth (Comm. ii. fr. phys. 20, 21), but, as Hirzel has observed, they
obviously refer to the same original. Stein's observations on this passage should be consulted (Erkenntnistheorie, n. 736). The mind is a tabula rasa at birth, in the sense that it possesses no definite knowledge. But through the seed a capacity for knowledge, and ethical tendencies in particular, are transplanted from father to son: see also Introd. p. 38 f.

5. The ordinary punctuation of this passage puts a full stop at animam, with no stop after capere, but this gives no satisfactory sense. Mr Hicks would strike out the words capere et, remove the stop after animam, and alter obnoxium to obnoxiam. The latter change, which is a decided improvement, I have adopted, and, by putting the stop after capere, the required sense is obtained without further alteration.

15. γονέωσι: cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 79, vult enim (Panaetius)... nasci animos, quod declarret eorum similitudo, qui procreentur, quae etiam in ingeniis, non solum in corporibus apparet. The child receives through the seed the same grade of tension in the soul as his father, and, as the activity of the soul depends on its inherent tension, the mental resemblance between children and parents is explained. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, pp. 130, 131.


diathέσιν: cf. on Zeno, frag. 117.

17. σώματος: agreeably to Stoic tenets, for likeness and unlikeness cannot be predicated of the non-existent, cf. Zeno, frags. 34 and 91.

19. συμπάθεια: the συμπάθεια μερῶν is an indication to the Stoic of the ἐνωσις of a body: this is true of the cosmos no less than of the individual. Sext. Math. IX. 79, who continues (80), ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἡνωμένων συμπάθειά τις ἔστιν,

This is an obscure statement which cannot be understood in the same manner of the various philosophers mentioned. Thus, as regards Pythagoras, it is simply a deduction from the theory of metempsychosis (Zeller, pre-Socratics i. p. 479): while for Plato and Xenocrates we may understand a reference to the previous existence of the soul before its entrance into the body (Zeller, Plato, p. 596). The terminology however is Aristotle's (de Generat. An. ii. 3, p. 736 b 27, λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισίεναι καὶ θείον εἶναι μόνον οὐθέν γὰρ αὐτῷ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικῇ ἐνέργεια), whose doctrine is widely different from Plato's. As regards Cleanthes, the Stoics in general do not distinguish between νοῦς and ψυχή (see on Zeno, frag. 43): the latter is transmitted in the seed, developed in the womb, and brought to maturity by the action of the outer air, so that it is hard to see in what sense ψυχὴ θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεται. Perhaps the meaning is that the reasoning powers (νοῦς) are founded on external impressions, from which Knowledge is derived: cf. Zeno, frag. 82. Stein, however (Psychol. p. 163 foll.), believes that by θύραθεν is indicated the action of the outer air on the embryo at birth, whereby the ψυχὴ is
developed out of a mere φύσις. In this case Cleanthes anticipated the Chrysippean doctrine of περὶψυχῆς. Hirzel (II. p. 156 foll.) uses this passage in support of his improbable view that Cleanthes maintained a tripartite division of the soul: he sees here also the influence of Heraclitus. Cic. N.D. II. 18 might suggest a more general view, that the point referred to is the material nature of the soul as πνεῦμα, but the context in Stobaeus is against this.

38. = Zeno, frag. 83.

There is a curious contradiction in Stein’s Psychologie on this point. At p. 107 and p. 155 he cites and upholds the evidence which distinctly attributes to Zeno the doctrine of the soul being fed by exhalations from the blood. Yet at p. 165 he suggests that this innovation was made by Cleanthes.


41. Diog. L. vii. 157, Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πᾶσας ἐπιδιαμένειν (τὰς ψυχὰς) μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνον.

Cf. R. and P. § 409. Cic. Tusc. i. 77, Stoici diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant, cf. Zeno frag. 95. The teaching of Cleanthes is everywhere more materialistic than that of Chrysippus, who was no doubt anxious to vindicate the purity of the soul essence: see Stein Psychol. n. 279 and pp. 145—147, who compares their divergence as to the nature of τύπωσις and the “Urpneuma” (φλόξ and αὐγή). Ar. Did. ap. Euseb. P. E. xv. 20. 3 follows the account of Chrysippus, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν γεννητὴν τε καὶ φθαρτὴν λέγουσιν οὐκ εὖθυς δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ’ επιμένειν τινὰς χρόνους καθ’ έαυτὴν τὴν μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀναλύ-
σεως τῶν πάντων, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων πρὸς ποσοῦς τινας χρόνους...τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων καὶ ἀλόγων γενέων ψυχὰς συναπόλλυθαι τοῖς σώμασιν.

42. Cie. N. D. p. 24, quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: negat enim ullam esse cibum tam gravem, quin is die et nocte concocatur, cuius etiam in reliquis inest calor is, quas natura respuerit.

This must be regarded as an argument in favour of the warmth of the vital principle: hence Zeno called the soul πνεύμα ἐνθέρμων (frag. 85). The excellence of the human soul consists peculiarly in a suitable mixture (ἐυκρασία) of warmth and cold. Cf. Galen quod animi mores etc. iv. 783 K. (quoted at length by Stein, Psychol. p. 105). Cleanthes no doubt was influenced by Heraclitus: cf. frag. 54, Byw. αὐτή γεγράμφη ψυχή σοφωτάτη, but substituted warmth for dryness. It is highly probable that the words immediately preceding this extract, which are of great importance for the τόνος theory, are ultimately derived from Cleanthes: they are as follows: sic enim res se habet, ut omnia, quae alantur et quae crescent, contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possent neque crescre. Nam omne, quod est calidum et igneum, cietur et agitur motu suo, quod autem alitur et crescit, motu quodam utitur certo et aequivabili, quia quandiu remanet in nobis, tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et exstinguimur. Compare with this the remarks of Stein Psychol. p. 32, and Philo de incorr. mundi, p. 507, Mang. ἀπαυ γόμα ἀναλύομενον εἰς πῦρ διαλύεται τε καὶ χεῖται, σβεννυμένης δὲ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ φλογὸς στελλεται καὶ συνάγεται. This is one of the many points of contact between the Stoics and the medical school of Hippocrates. We are reminded of the τόνος of Cleanthes when we read
that Aristoxenus, the Peripatetic and musician, described the soul as ipsius corporis intentionem quandam (Cic. Tusc. i. 20), but the doctrines were totally dissimilar: see Munro on Lucr. iii. 100.

43. Seneca, Epist. 113, 18, inter Cleanthem et discipulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio: Cleanthes ait, spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum; Chrysippus ipsum principale.

ambulatio: the Stoics were led to this extreme materialism by their insistence on the dogma that nothing exists but the corporeal. Cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 45, 2, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῶα ποιοῦσιν, τὸν περίπατον ζῴουν, τὴν ὀρχησιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσ- αγόρευσιν, τὴν λοιδορίαν.

spiritum: the Greek original of this would be πνεῦμα διατείνουν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠγεμονικοῦ μέχρι ποδῶν (cf. Plut. plac. iv. 21). The deviation of Chrysippus from the teaching of his predecessor was probably caused by a desire to insist more strongly on the essential unity of the soul. Cf. Iambl. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 49. 33, p. 368, 12, πῶς οὖν δια- κρίνονται; κατὰ μὲν τοὺς Στωικοὺς ένιαὶ μὲν διαφορότητι <τῶν> ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων: πνεύματα γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠγεμονικοῦ φασιν οὕτω διατείνειν ἀλλα κατ’ ἀλλα, τὰ μὲν εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὥτα, τὰ δὲ εἰς ἄλλα αἰσθη- τηρίαν. ένιαὶ δὲ ἱδιότητι ποιότητος περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκει- μένων ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ μῆλον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι τῆς γλυκύτητα ἔχει καὶ τῆν εὐώδιαν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἠγεμονικὸν ἐν ταύτῳ φαντασίαν, συγκατάθεσιν, ὀρμῆν, λόγον συνε- εἰληφε. Sext. Math. ix. 102, πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὀλοῦ ἐξαποστέλλομενα δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπὸ τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἠγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται, ὡστε πᾶσαι δύναμιν τὴν περὶ τὸ μέρος οὐσιν καὶ περὶ τὸ ὀλον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἠγεμονικὸ διαδίδοσθαι. The former passage
is, I find, also cited by Stein for the same purpose (Psychol. p. 168). He points out that Cleanthes explained the different soul functions by means of a πνεῦμα διατείνον, and Chrysippus by a πνεῦμα πως ἔχον. The former regarded only the grade, while the latter also distinguished the kind of tension. It is possible that this passage also points to the different treatment of φαντασία by Cleanthes and Chrysippus (cf. frag. 3), Cleanthes insisting more strongly on the immediate contact of the psychical air-current with the sense organ (Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 728). Hirzel's explanation (II. p. 201) is vitiated by his fundamental error as to Cleanthes' view of the ἡγεμονικῶν. See also on Zeno frag. 93. There is a certain affinity between the doctrine here mentioned and that attributed to Strato of Lampsaus by Sext. Emp. Math. vii. 350, οί δὲ αὐτήν (scil. τὴν διάνοιαν) εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινῶν ὄπων τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἡς στάσεως ἥρξε Στράτου ὁ φυσικός. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 46, viae quasi quaedam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares, a sede animi perforatae.

44. Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. 6. 33. 849 P. 304 S., οθέν καὶ ὁ Λίσσωπος οὐ κακῶς ἔφη τοὺς ὑς κεκραγήναι μέγιστον ὅταν ἔλκωνται. συνειδέναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο χρησίμους ἢ πλὴν εἰς τὴν θυσίαν· διὸ καὶ Κλεάνθης φησίν ἀνθ' ἄλον αὐτοὺς ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν, ἵνα μὴ σαπῆ τὰ κρέα. The same saying is attributed to Chrysippus by Cic. N.D. ii. 160, sus vero quid habet praeter escam? cui quidem ne putescerat animam ipsam pro sale datam dicit esse Chrysippus: to which add Porphyry de Abstin. iii. 20, ἡ δὲ ὂς, ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν χαρίτων τὸ ἡδιστον (scil. τοῦ Χρυσίππου), οὐ δ' ἄλλο τι πλὴν θύεσθαι ἐγεγόνει, καὶ τῇ σαρκὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ θεὸς οἶον ἄλας ἐνέμιξεν. Elsewhere the statement is ascribed to no definite author. Cic. Fin.
v. 38, ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. Varro de R. R. ii. 4, 10, suillum pecus donatum ab natura dicunt ad epulandum. itaque iis animam datam esse proinde ac salem quae servaret carnem. Plut. Quaest. Conv. v. 10, 3, διὸ καὶ τῶν Στωικῶν ἐνιοὶ τὴν ὑινὴν σάρκα κρέα γεγοιέναι λέγονσι, τῆς ψυχῆς ὠσπερ ἁλῶν παρεσπαρμένης ὑπὲρ τοῦ διαμένειν. Lastly, we have two passages of similar import in which a suggested derivation of ὃς from θύειν is referred to: Clem. Alex. ii. 20. 105, p. 174 S. p. 484 P., λέγεται γοῦν τινα τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων ἐτυμολογοῦντα τὴν ἢν θύν εἶναι φάναι, ὡς εἰς θύειν καὶ σφαγὴν μοῦν ἐτιτηδειον θεοῦθεαι γὰρ τῶδε τῷ ζῷῳ ψυχῆν πρὸς οὐδὲν ἔτερον ἢ ἕνεκα τοῦ τάς σάρκας σφριγάν. Varro R. R. ii. 4, 9, sus Graece dicitur ὃς, olim θῦς dictus ab illo verbo, quod dicunt θύειν, quod est inmolaire. ab suillo enim [genere] pecore inmolandi initium primum sumptum videtur; euius vestigia quod initiis Cereris porci inmolantur.

Everything in the world is created for and adapted to a special end; the existence of various animals is used as an argument to prove the government of the world by πρόνοια (cf. the context in Cic. N.D. i. c.). In a similar spirit Epict. Diss. ii. 8. 7 says that asses were intended to bear burdens, and that, as for this purpose they must walk, imagination has been given them to enable them to do so.

The passages here collected, as well as Zeno frag. 43, shew conclusively that Stein's theory (Psych. p. 92 f.) that the vital principle of animals is not ψυχῆ, but something midway between φύσις and ψυχῆ, ought not to be accepted. He contends that Marcus Aurelius is the first Stoic who expressly gives ψυχῆ to animals, but cf. Zeno frag. 50, spiritum...fore non naturam, sed animam et quidem rationabilem, which clearly points to the ἄλογος ψυχῆ of

45. Plut. de sollertia animalium xi. 2, 3, ὁ μὲν οὖν Κλεάνθης ἔλεγε, καίπερ οὐ φάσκων μετέχειν λόγου τὰ ζώα, τοιαύτηθεν ὑπομνηματικῶς μὑρμήκαις ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ μυρμηκίων ἐτέραν μὑρμήκας νεκρὸν φέροντας· ἀνιὼντας οὖν ἐκ τῆς μὑρμήκας ἐτέρους οἶνον ἐντυγχάνειν αὐτῶς καὶ πάλιν κατέρχεσθαί· καὶ τούτῳ διε ἦ τρὶς γενέσθαι τέλος δε, τοὺς μὲν κάτωθεν ἄνενεγκεῖν ὦσπερ λύτρα τοῦ νεκροῦ σκώληκα, τοὺς δ’ ἐκεῖνον ἀφαμένους, ἀποδόντας δὲ τοῦ νεκροῦ ὁμοιευθαί. Aelian Nat. An. vi. 50, Κλεάνθης τῶν Ἀσσιῶν καθηνώγακε καὶ ἀκούται εἰςαὶ καὶ ἀποστῆναι τοῖς ζῷοις τοῦ καὶ ἐκείνα λογισμοῦ μὴ διαμαρτάνειν, ἀντιλέγοντας ἰσχυρῶς καὶ κατὰ κράτος, ἱστορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ, φασίν. ἔτυχεν ὁ Κλεάνθης καθήμενος καὶ μέντοι καὶ σχολὴν ἄγων μακροτέραν ἄλλως· οὐκοῦν μὑρμήκες παρὰ τοῖς ποσίν ἦσαν αὐτῷ πολλοὶ· ὁ δὲ ἄρα ὀρᾶ ἐξ ἀτραποῦ τινος ἐτέρας νεκρῶν μὑρμήκας ἄλλους κομίζοντας εἰς οἴκον ἐτέρων, καὶ οἷαντος οὐ συντρόφων καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ χείλει τῆς μὑρμήκας ἐστῶτας αὐτῷ νεκρῷ, καὶ ἀνιὸντας κάτωθεν ἐτέρους καὶ συνύοντας τοῖς ξένοις ὡς ἔπὶ τινι, ἔπτα κατιόντας τοὺς αὐτοὺς, καὶ πλεονάκις τούτῳ· καὶ τελευτῶντας σκόληκα, οἷονεὶ λύτρα, κομίζαι τοὺς δὲ ἐκεῖνον μὲν λαβεῖν, προέσθαι δὲ ὄντερ οὐν ἐπήγγοντο νεκρῶν· καὶ ἐκεῖνος ὑποδέξασθαι ἀσμένων, ὡς οὐν κομιζομένους ἥ ἀδελφόν.

μετέχειν λόγου τὰ ζώα: for animals possess indeed ψυχήν, but not ψυχὴν λόγον ἔχουσαν καὶ διάνοιαν: hence the term ἄλογα ζώα: cf. Sext. Math. xi. 99 foll:—the Stoics say that the courage of certain of the nobler (γενναία) animals proves that τὸ καλὸν is φύσει αἱρετόν, but only
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ή φρονίμη διάθεσις can discern τὸ καλὸν: hence ὁ ἀλεκτρύων καὶ ὁ ταῦρος μὴ μετέχοντα τῆς φρονίμης διαθέσεως οὐκ ἄν βλέποι τὸ καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν. Hermes ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 41. 6, p. 284, 12, πῶς οὖν ὁρῶμεν τίνα τῶν ἀλόγων ἑπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη χρώμενα, ὦν τοὺς μύρμηκας τὰς τροφὰς ἀποθησαυρίζομένους τοῦ χειμῶνος. It was easier, however, for the Stoics than for those who separate the soul of man from that of animals by a sharp dividing line, to make the admission which circumstances forced upon Cleanthes. For the soul of man differs from that of animals in degree only and not in kind; it is the same substance, though varying in its degrees of purity, which permeates inorganic matter as ἐξις, plants as φύσις, and men and animals as ψυχή (Diog. L. vii. 139). Chrysippus believed that dogs possessed the power of inference (Sext. Pyrrh. i. 69). Stein, Psychol. n. 165, is mistaken in quoting Ael. N.A. iv. 45 as an authority bearing on this subject. The passage, when cited in full, is seen to have an entirely different application: "Ομηρος μὲν οὖν φησιν "ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ παιδα καταφθιμένοι λιπέσθαι," ἐοίκε δὲ ἡ φύσις δεικνύσαι, ὡτι καὶ φίλον έαυτῷ τιμωρῶν καταλιπτεῖν, ὁ φίλε "Ομηρε, κέρδος ἐστίν, οἰον τι καὶ περὶ Ζήμωνος καὶ Κλεάνθους νοούμεν εἰ τι (or εἴτε) ἀκούομεν, i.e. it was an advantage to Zeno to leave his friend Cleanthes behind him to uphold his doctrines.


εξ ἀτραποῦ τινος ἑτέρας: alluding to the practice of ants to use one narrow path in passing backwards and forwards between their hole and any other place. Cf. Verg. Aen. iv. 404, praedamque per herbas convectant calle angusto. Georg. i. 379, angustum formica terens iter, where Forbiger refers to Arist. Hist. An. ix. 38, ἀεὶ μίαν ἀτραποῦν πάντες βαδίζονσιν.

46. Cic. N. D. i. 37, idemque (Cleanthes) quasi delirans in iis libris, quos scripta contra voluptatem, tum finging formam quandam et speciem deorum, tum divinitatem omnem tribuit astris, tum nihil ratione censet esse diviniss.

quasi delirans: for the treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς see Introd. p. 53.

formam quandam: either (1) an allusion to the allegorical explanations of the popular deities, whereby they are identified with the powers of nature, or (2) referring to ἀνικήτους ἐν χερσίν in the hymn to Zeus, as Prof. Mayor suggests.

astris: this position is proved at length in N. D. ii. 40—44, cf. Chrysippus ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 21. 5. p. 185, 5, ἐν ὧ (αἰθέρι) τα ἀστρα καθίδρυται...θεία τὴν φύσιν ὄντα καὶ ἐμψυχα καὶ διοικούμενα κατὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν.

47. Plut. Comm. Not. 31, 5, ἀλλὰ Χρύσισσπος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν γῆν τὸν ἄερα τὴν θάλατταν οὐδένα τῶν τοσοῦτων ἀφθαρτον οὐδ' αἵδιον ἀποκλειότασι, πλὴν μόνον τοῦ Διός, εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκοσι τοὺς ἄλλους...ταῦτα δὲ οὐ...τοὺς δόγμασιν ἔπεται, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν καὶ προνοίαις εἰμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι διαρρήκτην λέγουσι τοὺς ἄλλους θεῶς ἀπαντάς εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους υπὸ τυρώς, τηκτοὺς καὶ αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττιτερίνους ὄντας.

Η. Ρ. 18
The Stoics would readily admit this: Cicero makes his Stoic say:—quidquid enim magnam utilitatem generi adferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur (N.D. II. 60).

Διός: Zeus is here identified, as often, with the supreme Stoic God: see Zeller, p. 358.

ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν κ.τ.λ. Chrysippus wrote περὶ θεῶν (Diog. vii. 148), περὶ προνοιας (ib. 139), περὶ εἰμαρμένης (ib. 149), and φυσικά (ib. 39). For Cleanthes περὶ θεῶν see Introd. p. 51.


κύδιστ’ ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατεῖς αἰεί, Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγῆ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν, χαίρε σὲ γὰρ πάντεσσι θέμις θυντοίσι προσανθὰν. ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν, ἥχου μίμημα λαχόντες μοῦνοι, ὅσα ξόει τε καὶ ἐρπεί θυντ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν’ τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰεν ἁεῖσιν. σοι δ’ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος, ἐλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν, πειθεῖται, ἢ κεν ἄγγης, καὶ ἐκὼν ὑπὸ σείο κρατεῖται τοῖον ἑχεις ὑποεργον ἀνικήτως ἐνὶ χερσὶν ἀμφική, πυρόεντ’, ἀειζώντα κεραυνὸν τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγής φύσεως πάντ’ ἐρρίγα <σιν>· ὥ σοι κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὅς διὰ πάντων φοιτά, μιγνύμενος μεγάλοις μικροῖς τε φάεςσι’ [ὡς τόσσος γεγαώς ὑπάτος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός,] οὐδὲ τι γίγνεται ἐργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμον, ὁμίου κατ’ αἰθέριον θείου πόλον ὁμ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
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πλὴν ὁπόσα ἔδειξεν κακοὶ σφετέρησιν ἀνοίας· ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ ὁ περισσῶς <τ'>ἐπίσταται ἄρτια θεῖα, καὶ κοσμεῖν τάκοσμα καὶ οὐ φίλα σοι φίλα ἑστίν, ὥδε γὰρ εἰς ἐν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν, ὥσθ᾽ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον ἀιῶν ἑόντα, ὑπ' ἐφόνοις ἑώσις ὧσοι θυντῶν κακοὶ εἰςιν, δύναμοροι, οὗ τ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες οὔτε ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον, οὔτε κλύσιν, ὦ τε πειθόμενοι σὺν νῦ βλον ἐσθλον ἔχοιεν. 20 αὐτοὶ δ' αὐθ' ὄρμωσιν ἀνοι κακῶν ἀλλος ἐπ' ἀλλο, οἷς μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης σπουδὴν δυσεριστὸν ἔχοντες, οἷς δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι σύδειν κόσμῳ, ἀλλοι δ' εἰς ἀνέσιν καὶ σώματος ἥδεα ἔργα

.................................................ἐπ' ἀλλοτε δ' ἀλλα φέροντε τσευδόντες μάλα πάμπαν ἐναντία τῶνδε γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ Ζεὺ πάνωκε, κελαίνεφες, ἀργυρόπον<μἐν>ῥύου ἀρχιροθήθης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς, ἢν σὺ, πάτερ, σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἀπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι γνώμης, ἢ πίσυνοι σὺ δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾷ, 30 ὅφρ' ἀν τιμηθέντες ἀμείβομεσθά τε τιμῆ, ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκές, ὁς ἐπεδικε ἥντον ἐόντ', ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἀλλο τι μεῖζον, οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινῶν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν.

1. πολυώνυμο: not merely in the popular religion, but more particularly from the Stoic standpoint, cf. Diog. L. vii. 147 δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄλων, καὶ ὡσπερ πατέρα πάντων' κοινῶς τε, καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ δηκον διὰ πάντων, ὁ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσονομαζείται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. See also Krische, p. 401; Stein, Psych. n. 74.


4. ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν. Cf. Act. Apost. xvii. 28, where the words τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν are quoted by St Paul. The divergence in reading points to the fact

18—2
that these words were taken from the Phaenomena of Aratus, l. 5, rather than from the present passage.

ηχον: so MS. F, an unmetrical and senseless reading, not yet satisfactorily corrected. The vulg. ιης is a conjecture of Brunck, and is destitute of authority. Meineke read γενόμεσθα λόγον; Wachsm. (Comm. II. p. 18) suggested νοῦ σοῦ (or ἀ δῆ σοῦ) τμήμα, and now proposes τίμημα for μίμημα; Usener ‘cum appareat ηχου ex glossemate natum esse’ ιδῆς (a word coined from ιδεῖν). None of these are convincing, and all are inferior to Bergk’s ὀλοῦ, which might have been adopted, had it satisfactorily accounted for the MS. reading. Wachsmuth indeed says that it introduces “sententiam a Stoicis alienam,” but he must have failed to remember frag. 24, which shows that it is a favourite thought with Cleanthes to represent the individual as a counterpart of the divine cosmos. It appears to me that an allusion to “speech” is not here appropriate, in spite of Zeller (p. 215). Meineke’s λόγον, if adopted, would mean “reason” (not “speech”), cf. Euseb. P. E. xv. 15, p. 817 d (quoted by Wachsm.) κοινωνίαν δ’ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (σεil. θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων) διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν. If γενόμεσθα is accepted for γένος ἐσμέν, perhaps μόνου or ἐκ σοῦ.

5. ὅσα: for the omission of the antecedent cf. Soph. Ai. 1050, Trach. 350, and for the sense Hom. Il. 17. 447, Od. 18. 131. Hirzel argues (II. 201—210), mainly relying on this passage, that Cleanthes was not a pantheist in the full sense of the term, and that he allowed only a limited extension to the divine πνεύμα: but see Introd. p. 41.

6. ἀείω: ἀείῳ F, whence ἀείῳ Wachsm.; but the present is very awkward after καθυμνήσω, and it is by no means clear that Cleanthes would have preferred ἀείσομαι (see the evidence collected by Veitch s. v.).

7. κόσμος is here used, as Krische, p. 425, has observed,
in the less extended sense mentioned in Diog. vii. 138, καὶ ἀντὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμου εἶναι: hence ἔλισσόμενος = κυκλοφορητικός.


κεραυνόν: for the physical explanation cf. Zeno frag. 74. But to Cleanthes κεραυνός is only another name for πλῆγγυ πυρός, which he identifies with τόνος, cf. Heraclit. frag. 28. Byw. τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰκαίζει κεραυνός.

11. ἔρρίγασιν: so Ursinus and most edd. for ἔργα F "in quo postea spatium 10 litt.," which might suggest ἔργα <δαμάσθη>: but there are similar spaces after vv. 12 and 13, and the text at this point is generally suspicious. Wachsm. formerly marked a lacuna after this line, but now agrees with Hirzel, Π. p. 118, n. 1, in referring ὅ in v. 12 to κεραυνόν.

13. μεγάλων μικροίσι F, which Petersen tries to defend, was corrected by Brunck. The reference is to the sun, moon, and stars. For the general sense cf. Zeno frag. 45. A lacuna was marked after this line by Mein., who is followed by Wachsm. But it is equally possible that v. 14 is a spurious or corrupt addition, for (1) the sense is complete without it, (2) διὰ παντὸς is suspicious after διὰ πάντων in v. 12, (3) it is difficult to imagine any context which would prevent ὡς τόσον γεγαγὼς from being frigid, if not obscure, (4) the excessive sigmatism is pointless.

17—20. πλῆν ὑπόσα κ.τ.λ. The explanations given by the Stoics of this weak point in their system are hopelessly confused and contradictory, as may be seen from an examination of the passages cited in the notes to Zeller, p. 189—193. We have had occasion to refer to
this subject before (frag. 18), and, putting together that
passage and the present, we may perhaps suppose that
Cleanthes accounted for the existence of moral evil some-
what as follows:—evil is not directly due to God, but is a
necessary accompaniment of the process, whereby he
created the world out of himself. At the same time, the
omnipotence of God is vindicated by the consideration that
evil is ultimately swallowed up in good, and that the
apparent irregularity of nature is in reality only a phase
in the working of a higher law. Chrysippus is inconsis-
tent here, as elsewhere (cf. Diog. L. vii. 180), but to
some extent, at least, he agreed with Cleanthes: ωσ των
αίσχρων τό θείου παραίτιον γίνεσθαι ούκ εὐλογον ἐστιν
(Plut. Sto. Rep. 33, 2). We may compare Plato’s words
Rep. Π. 379 c, ούδ’ ἄρα ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθὸς, πάντων ἂν
εἰη αἰτίος, ώσ οί πολλοί λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὁλίγων μὲν τοῖς
αὐθρόσωποι αἰτίος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος: πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω
τάγαθα τῶν κακῶν ἥμιν και τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὔδενα ἄλ-
λον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ’ ἄττα δεὶ ξητείν τὰ αἰτία,
ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν θεῶν. See further Gercke Chrysippea, p. 699.
24. κοινὸν νόμον. Cf. infra frag. 73. No doubt Cle-
anthes remembered Heracl. frag. 91. Byw. ξυνὸν ἐστι πᾶσι
τὸ φρονεῖν.
25. κεν belongs to the verb, Madv. § 137.
26. ἄνευ κακοῦ...ἀλλα F, ἄνοι Wachsm., κακόν...ἀλλο
Sauppe.
28. οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ: this phrase is used by Herod. and
Thuc. as an equivalent for ἀτάκτως. Here it means
“inordinately, recklessly.” Cleanthes was probably in-
fluenced by Homer’s fondness for μᾶς ἀτάρ οὐ κατὰ
κόσμον (II. 2. 214 etc.) and the like. al. οὐδ’ ἐνὶ
κόσμῳ.
30, 31. ἄλλοτεν Usener, φέρονται Meineke, while in 31
Wachsm. suggests πένεσθαι for γενέσθαι. The sense is
unsatisfactory, but as the text is so mutilated conjecture seems hazardous. Mohinke (pp. 34—44) has a long discussion on these lines, which he calls the hardest in the Hymn. As the text stands, l. 31 must mean that the effect of the actions of the φαύλοι is just the opposite to that which they intend.

32. ἀργυκέραυνε. Cf. Ζεῦς ἀργῆς, an expression used by Empedocles to denote fire (R. and P. § 131), Zeno frag. 116, Ἄργην δὲ ἐπειδῆ φασί τὸν ἀργῆτα κεραυνὸν.

33. μὲν: add. Scaliger, but perhaps we should read ἐκρόου. ἀπειροσύνης i.e. ἀγνοια, the condition of the φαύλοι.


49. Philodem. de Mus. col. 28, 1, εἰ μὴ γε τι>αρὰ Κλεάν<θ>εί λέγειν <αὐτὰ> θελήσουσ<ι>ν, ὥς φησιν ἀμείνο<ν>γε εἶναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ <μοῦσ>ικὰ παρα-<δεῖ>γματα, καὶ, τοῦ <λόγο>ου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἕκαν<ν> μὲν ἔξαγ<γ>έλλει<ν>ν δυναμένου τὰ θε<ὶ>α καὶ ἂν <ν>θρο<ν>πη<ν>τα ἐξο<ν>τος δὲ ψιλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν λέξεις οἰκείας, τὰ μέτ<ρ>α καὶ τὰς μέλης καὶ τῶν μυθικοῦς οὕς μᾶλ<ι>στα προσικνείσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν θείων θ<ε>ωρια.

For the general sense, cf. Plat. Rep. x. 607 Α, εἰδέναι ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὑμνόυσθεοὶ καὶ ἐγκάμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσωσεν παραδεκτέων εἰς πόλιν. The underlying thought is that it is impossible to define the nature of God: cf. Hermes, ap. Stob. Ecl. ii. 1. 26, θεον νοήσαι μὲν χαλεπῶν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον. Plat. Tim. 28 c, 29 c, d. The construction is not quite clear. Zeller, in citing this passage (p. 342, 1), puts a full stop after οἰκείας, but this makes τὰ μέτρα κ.τ.λ. very abrupt, and it is better to regard καὶ before τοῦ λόγου as connecting εἶναι and
prosikneisthai, although this leaves âmeivova without an object.

ψιλοῦ: bare prose, i.e. stripped of the advantages of metre. The history of the word is well explained in Jebb’s Appendix to Oed. Col. 866. Cf. Plat. Menex. p. 239 b, c, ποιηταὶ...έν μουσικῇ ύμνήσαντες...εὰν οἷν ἁμεῖς ἐπιχειρῶμεν τὰ αὐτὰ λόγῳ ψιλῶ κοσμεῖν. ψιλὸς λόγος also means “abstract reasoning” (Dr Thompson on Phaedr. 262 c), and a “bare statement” unsupported by evidence, Dem. Androt. § 22, Aphob. 1. § 54.

tῶν...οικεῖας, “expressions suitable to the divine majesty.”

50. Senec. Epist. 108, 10, Nam, ut dicebat Cleanthes, quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem sonum reddit, quam illum tuba, per longi canalis angustias tractum, potentioram novissimo exitu effudit; sic sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit.

tuba. Greek trumpets were long and straight, ending in a bell-shaped aperture (κώδων), cf. Aesch. Eum. 567, διάτορος Τυρσηνική σάλπιγξ βροτείον πνεύματος πληρομένη ύπέρτονον γήρυμα φανέτω, and Soph. Ai. 17, where Odysseus compares the voice of Athene to the sound of a trumpet.


arta necessitas: cf. Pind. N. iv. 33, tà μακρὰ δ’ ἐξενέπειν ἐρύκει με τεθμός.

51. Sext. Math. ix. 88, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης οὕτως συνηρωτά: εἰ φύσις φύσεώς ἔστι κρείττων, εἰδὴ ἂν τις ἀριστη
fragments. 

This argument for the existence of God is stated in different language and a somewhat amplified form by Cic. N. D. II. 33—36: cf. especially § 35.

2. φύσις: the vital principle of plants. Zeno frag. 43.

e...εστι...εἶ ἡ ἂν: in this form of the conditional sentence the inference is stated less bluntly than if the indicative were used: see Madv. § 135 r, 1 a. This is especially frequent with ἐθέλω or βούλομαι in the protasis: cf. Stallb. ad Plat. Symp. 208 c. Eur. Alc. 1079.
A close parallel to the use here is Dem. xxxvi. 44, εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι πίστις ἄφορμή πασῶν ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμὸν, πᾶν ἄν ἀγνοήσειας.


12. καὶ: Bekker proposed to read ἄλλα or καὶ μὴν, but Wachsmuth’s καὶ τοῖς is preferable.

15. περιγένεστο: for the optative in protasis, see Jebb on Soph. Ai. 521, Ant. 666.

16. δυσμαίς: cf. Ar. Poet. c. 21, § 13, 14:57 b 22, ἡ ὁ γῆρας πρὸς βίου καὶ ἐσπέρα πρὸς ἡμέραν· ἐρεὶ τοῖνυν τὴν ἐσπέραν γῆρας ἡμέρας, καὶ τὸ γῆρας ἐσπέραν βίου ἡ, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, δυσμαίς βίου. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1123, βίου δύντος αὐγαίς. The difficulty of attaining ἀρετή, in the Stoic sense, is illustrated by the fact that even Socrates and Antisthenes were only regarded as προκόπτοντες (Diog. vii. 91); and Alexander says that they admit the existence of a good man here and there, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῷον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιότερον τοῦ Φοίνικος (de Fato, c. 28). In Diog. l. c. the fact that φαῦλοι can become ἀγαθοὶ is given as a proof that virtue is teachable. Hirzel has traced the development of the doctrine of the wise man within the Stoa, and shews that by the earlier Stoics (Zeno and his immediate pupils) the ideal was regarded as attainable and as actually realised by themselves (pp. 274—277).

20. ἀπαιτοῦντος. The preposition conveys the idea of demanding as of right: cf. ἀποδούναι as used in the Halonnesus dispute (Aeschin. Ctes. § 83).


52. Cic. N. D. ii. 13—15. Cleanthes quidem noster quattuor de causis dixit in animis hominum informatas deorum esse notiones. primam posuit eam, de qua modo dixi, quae orta esset ex praesensione rerum futurarum:
alteram quam ceperimus ex magnitudine commodorum, quae percipiuntur caelorum, temperatura, fecunditate terrarum, aliarumque commoditatum complurium copia: tertiam quae terreret animos fulminibus, tempestatibus, nimbis, nivibus, grandinibus, vastitate, pestilentia, terrae motibus et saepe fremitibus, lapideisque imbribus et guttis imbrium quasi cruentis, tum labibus aut repentinis terrarum hiatibus, tum praeter naturam hominum pecudunque portentis, tum facibus visis caelestibus, tum stellis iis, quae Graeci cometas nostri cincinnatas vocant...tum sole geminatis...quibus exterriti homines vim quandam esse caelestem et divinam suspicati sunt. quartam caussam esse camque vel maximam aequabilitatem motus, conversionem caeli, solis, lunae, siderumque omnium distinctionem, varietatem, puleritudinem, ordinem, quorum rerum aspectus ipse satis indicaret non esse ea fortuita.

Cic. N. D. iii. 16, nam Cleanthes, ut dicebas, quattuor modis formatas in animis hominum putat deorum esse notiones. unus is modus est...qui est susceptus ex praesensione rerum futurarum. alter ex perturbationibus tempestatum et reliquis motibus. tertius ex commoditate rerum quas perspicimus et copia. quartus ex astrorum ordine caeli et caelique constantia.

1. Cleanthes. Mr Bywater concludes (Journ. Phil. vii. 75 foll.) that Cleanthes was largely indebted to Aristotle's dialogue "periphiλοσοφίας" for his statement of the four reasons given for the origin of a belief in gods, and proves that the first and fourth in the series were derived from that work.

2. informatas. It is to be observed that Cleanthes regards the idea of God's existence as derived entirely from our experience of external objects, and not as an innate conception. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 737.

4. præsensione: this argument depends on the exis-
tence of μαντική, ἢ δὲ όνείρων πρόρρησις etc. (Sext. Math. ix. 132), which are described as πλήθος πραγμάτων πεπιστευμένων ἤδη παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπωις. Krische, p. 419, attributes some further arguments to Cleanthes, which the evidence does not warrant.

7. tertium: there does not appear to be any extant parallel to this in the Greek texts. Although there is no reason to suppose that we have not here a reproduction of the general argument of Cleanthes, at the same time it is probable that Cicero has enlarged the list of portents from Roman sources. The prodigies mentioned are those which constantly meet us in Livy, as requiring expiation by lustrationes, supplicationes, lectisternia etc. Lists of prodigies illustrating those mentioned here by Cicero will be found in Liv. xx.i. 62, xxii. 1, xxiv. 44, xxvi. 23, etc. Tac. H. i. 86, Juv. xiii. 65—70, and above all in the exhaustive account of Lucan, i. 525—583.


14. cometas: for the physical explanation, cf. on Zeno, frag. 75.

16. quartum: for a fuller statement of the fourth argument, cf. Sext. Math. ix. 111—118, ib. ix. 26—27: in the last passage it is simply introduced by the term ἐνοι, but from its position between an argument of Epicurus and one belonging to some “younger Stoics,” Mr Bywater (Journ. Phil. vii. 76) infers that its immediate source was one of the earlier Stoics, possibly Cleanthes.

17. aequabilitatem. “Cicero is probably translating some such phrase as ὀμαλότητα κινήσεως, φορὰν οὐρανοῦ,” Prof. Mayor.

53. Epiph. adv. Haeres iii. 2. 9 (iii. 37), Κλεάνθης τὸ ἄγαθόν καὶ καλὸν λέγει εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς, καὶ ἀνθρώπου
et betrayed the strength, and the wise man more easily  


evok the moly of them, and the god of their  


to the athletes... the canon. An obvious blunder. Krische, p.  


d 431 n. 1, suggests that the writer of the epitome has con-  


founded the statement by Cleanthes of his opponents'  


position with his own teaching.  


ήθοδος. Not much can be made of this mutilated  


statement; possibly it points to the doctrine of the soul  


regarded as the bond of union for the body. Stein, Psych.  


e 209, finds here a trace of the correspondence between  


the macrocosm and the microcosm, and quotes frag. 106  


tous ἀπαιδευτούσι μόνη τῇ μορφῇ τῶν θηρίων διαφέρειν.  


tous  


θεοὺς κ.τ.λ. These obscure words appear to repre-  


sent an explanation of the Eleusinian mysteries from the  


Stoic point of view, in which the sun as the ἡγεμονικόν is  


symbolised by the torchbearer who marches at the head  


of the procession of mystae, and (adopting Diels' cor-  


rections, v. infra) the world itself corresponds to the mys-  


tery play, while those who are inspired with divine truth  


ein de tois kai Ἐλευσίνα μυστηρίωσ ὁ μὲν ἰερο-  


φάντασε εἰς εἰκόνα τοῦ δημουργοῦ ἐνσκευάζεται, δαδουχος  


de eis τὴν ἡλίου. For the subject in general see Prof.  


Mayor on Cic. N. D. i. 119. Mr Bywater however (Journ.  


Phil. vii. 78) believes that we have here a mutilated  


argument, ultimately derived from Aristotle’s dialogue  


περὶ φιλοσοφίας, and explaining the belief in the gods  


as due to a feeling of awe and admiration consequent on  


the contemplation of the heavenly bodies. The allusion  


to the mysteries is brought in by way of comparison: “we  


seem introduced into a temple like that at Eleusis, only  


more august and solemn, because the figures [= the hea-
venly bodies] we see circling around us are not lifeless or made with hands, and the celebrants are not men, but the immortal gods.” This explanation is fortified by a reference to Dio. Chrys. xii. p. 387 b, Plut. de tranq. 20, p. 477 c, d (also quoted by Diels). For μυστικάς σχήματα see Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 130, and for κλήσεις ἱεράς ib. p. 62.

μύστας...τελετάς. Diels, p. 592, who records other suggestions, has μυστήριον...τελεστάς. Perhaps, from a comparison of Chrysipp. ap. Etym. M. 751, 16 id. Plut. Sto. Rep. 9, we ought to restore τοὺς κατόχους τῶν θείων <λόγοις> τελετάς.

54. Philodem. περὶ εὔσεβ. fr. 13. ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Χρύσιππος τὰ τῆς Ἄρφεα (<καὶ Μ>) ουσαίον ἀναφέρομεν, καὶ καὶ τὰ παρὰ ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Εὐρίπδῃ καὶ ποιηταῖς ἀλλοις ἔρα ταῖς δόξαις αὐτῶν.<ν>.

Cicero’s paraphrase, which omits all mention of Cleanthes, is as follows (N. D. i. 41):—in seundo autem vult Orphei, Musaei, Hesiodi Homerique fabellas accommodation ad ea, quae ipse primo libro de dis immortalibus dixerat, ut etiam veterrimi poetae, qui haec ne suspicati quidem sint, Stoici fuisse videcantur. As far as Cleanthes is concerned the direct evidence only applies to Homer: see Introd. p. 51, but cf. frag. 111. This passage is included by Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 16) under the fragments of the book περὶ θεῶν.

55. Plut. de audiendis poëtis c. 11, δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀμέλεις ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν Κλεάνθους παραιτεῖσθαι κατειρωνυμεῖται γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτε προς-ποιουμένους ἔξηγεῖσθαι τὸ
THE FRAGMENTS OF CLEANTHES.

Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων,
καὶ τὸ
Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε,
κελεύων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ύφ’ ἕν, ὡς τὸν ἐκ της γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν Ἀναδωδωναίων οὕτα. Wachsmuth cites Schol. B L Homer II 233 Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε] τινὲς δὲ ἀναδωδωναῖε ύφ’ ἐν παρὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν (?)

This comes from the book περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ according to Krische, p. 433, and Wachsm., Comm. i. p. 17. Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων, II. iii. 276, 320: Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε, II. xvi. 233.

παιδίαν. It is worthy of observation that Plut. distinctly suggests that Cleanthes was not serious in his etymologies: see Introd. p. 43, 44, and cf. Plat. Cratyl. 406 B, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ σπουδαῖως εἰρήμενος ὁ τρόπος τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτως τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ παιδικῶς.

ἀναθυμιώμενον: a reference to the feeding of the celestial bodies by exhalations of coarser material, cf. frag. 29 ὀκεανὸς δ’ ἐστι... ἵς τὴν ἀναθυμιασιν ἐπινέμεται. Cornut. c. 17, p. 84 Osann. ἅρ κατὰ ἀνάδοσιν. It may be observed that the attribution of this doctrine to Thales by Stob. Eel. i, 10, 12, p. 122, 18 cannot be relied upon.

56. Plut. de Is. et Osir. 66, Φερσεφόνην δὲ φησὶ ποιν Κλεανθῆς τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονεύμον ψεῦμα.

Dübner translates: spiritus qui per fruges dum furtur interimitur. Probably this, as well as the seven following fragments, comes from the treatise περὶ θεῶν (Wachsm. Comm. i. p. 15). Cf. Plut. de Is. c. 40, where Demeter and Persephone are explained as τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν καρπῶν διήκον πνεῦμα. Chrysipp. ap. Philod. περὶ εὑσβῆ. col. 12, p. 79 Gomp. καὶ τὴν Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ
πνεύμα. Cic. N. D. ii. 66, ea (Proserpina) enim est quae Φερσεφόνη Graece nominatur, quam frugum semen esse volunt absconditamque quaeri a materi fingunt. Plato’s derivations of the name will be found at Cratyl. 404 c, d. For modern views see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 894.

57. Macrobi. Sat. i. 18, 14, unde Cleanthes ita cognominatum scribit (Dionysum) ἀπὸ τοῦ διανύσατι, quia cotidiano impetu ab oriente ad occasum diem noctemque faciendo caeli conficit cursum.

In the Orphic hymn, quoted just before the present passage, Dionysus is derived from διενήσθαι. He is elsewhere explained by the Stoics (1) as wine, Cic. N. D. ii. 60, cf. Plato’s derivation from δίδωμι and οἶνος, the latter being resolved into οἰεσθαί and νοῦς, (2) as τὸ γόνιμον πνεῦμα καὶ τρόφιμον, Plut. de Is. c. 40. For the identification of Dionysus with the sun see the commentators on Verg. Georg. i. 5, vos, o clarissima mundi lumina, laben-tem caelo quae ducitis annum, Liber et alma Ceres.

58. Macrobi. Sat. i. 17, 8, Cleanthes (Apollinem) ὡς ἀπ’ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιούμενον, quod ab aliis atque aliis locorum declinationibus faciat ortus.

Chrysippus (Macrobi. l. c.) derived the word Ἀπόλλων from ἄ and πολὺς, while Plato explains the various functions of the God by different etymologies of his name (Crat. p. 405 A—E), so that he is at once ἀπλοῦ, ἀεὶ βάλλοντος, ἀπολούντος, and ὁμοπολούντος (ib. p. 406 A).

59. Macrobi. Sat. i. 17. 36, Cleanthes Lycium Apollinem appellatum notat quod, veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem eripit radiis.

Antipater in the same passage derives the name ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζουτος ἡλίου, a guess, which,
so far as the etymology of Λύκειος is concerned, has found some favour in modern times (Müller Dor. ii. 6 § 8). Probably Cleanthes did not recognise a distinction between the two titles Λύκειος and Λύκειος (Soph. El. 7), and the best modern opinion seems to agree with him to this extent: see Leaf on ii. iv. 101. The connection of Apollo with wolves is indicated by the legends in Pausan. ii. 9. 7, ii. 19. 3. In Cornut. c. 32 the name is explained in connection with the pestilences brought by Apollo on flocks, which were therefore entrusted to him as Apollo Lycius.

humorem eripit: cf. frags. 29 and 55.


ἐλικας: for the obliquity of the sun's course cf. frag. 29 and Diog. L. vii. 144 there quoted.

λέσχαι. In Harpocrat. s.v. we get the additional information that these remarks were contained in the treatise περὶ θεῶν.

Cf. Plut. de ei ap. Delphos c. 2: Apollo is called Λεσχηνόριος, ὅταν ἐνεργῶσι καὶ ἀπολαῦσι χρώμενοι τῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. The inference drawn by Wachsmuth seems correct, viz., that Cornutus took from Cleanthes the words found in c. 32, καὶ λεσχηνόριον δ' αὐτῶν ('Ἀπόλλωνα) προσηγόρευσαν διὰ τὸ τὰς ἡμέρας ταῖς λέσχαις καὶ τῷ ὁμιλεῖν ἀλλήλους συνέχεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὰς δὲ νύκτας καθ' ἐαυτοὺς ἀναπαύεσθαι. He remarks that Cornutus appears to have devoted much attention to the study of Cleanthes. Cf. Pers. Sat. v. 63, cultor enim iuvenum purgatas inseris aures fruge Cleanthea.

έξεδραι. These were recesses or alcoves sometimes branching out from an open air court, and fitted with stone seats; they were especially adapted for the conversation of philosophers and rhetoricians. Cf. Cic. Fin. v. 4, ego illa moveor exedra; modo enim fuit Carneadis; quem videre videor (est enim nota imago), a sedeque ipsa, tanta ingeni magnitudine orbata, desiderari illam ipsam puto. "Vitruvius in his description of the palaestra, or gymnasmum, such as were attached to Roman villas of the higher class, recommends that in three of the cloisters surrounding the court there should be exedrae spatiosae in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis delectantur sedentes disputare possint v. 11." Prof. Mayor on Cic. N.D. i. 15. See also Becker, Charicles, p. 303. Guhl and Koner, p. 403.

ὁμολασ: the distinction between λέσχαι and ἔξεδραι seems to be that the former were separate buildings used entirely as lounges, whereas the latter were attached either to a private house or a public gymnasium.
62. Cornut. c. 31 ad fin., τούς δὲ δώδεκα ἀθλοὺς ἐνδέχεται μὲν ἀναγαγεῖν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, ὡς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐποίησεν: οὐ δεῖν δὲ δοκεῖ πανταχοῦ εὑρεσι-λογον πρεσβεύειν.

It seems clear from the account of Cornutus that there were two current modes of allegorical interpretation of the myths which centre round Heracles. By one set of interpreters Heracles was regarded as an ordinary mortal and by others as a god. Cleanthes apparently explained the twelve labours from the latter point of view. An illustration of this line of interpretation may be seen in the explanation given by Cornutus of Heracles as an archer: καὶ τοξότης δὲ ἀν ὁ θεὸς παρεισάγωτο, κατὰ τε τὸ πανταχοῦ διϊκνεύσθαι κ.τ.λ. But in the account of the twelve labours in Heraclitus, All. Hom. c. 33, Heracles is represented simply as a wise man who brought to light the hidden truths of philosophy: Ἡρακλέα δὲ νομιστέον οὐκ ἦπο σωματικῆς δυνάμεως ἀναχθέντα τοσοῦτον ἵσχυσαι τοῖς τότε χρόνοις. ἀλλ’ ἀνὴρ ἐμφρων καὶ σοφίας οὐρανίων μύστης γεγονός, ὥσπερει κατὰ βαθείας ἀχλύος ὑποδε- δυκνύαν ἐφῶτισε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, καθάπερ ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ Στοικῶν οἱ δοκιμώτατοι. Zeller, pp. 368, 369, relying on the concluding words of the passage cited, thinks that the account is derived from Cleanthes, but, if so, there is a discrepancy with Cornutus. Krische (p. 400) on the other hand says:—"irre ich nicht, so führte Kleaunthes, gleichwie später Porphyrius (bei Euseb. P.E. π. 112 c), die zwölf Ar- beiten des Herakles auf die Bahn der Sonne durch die zwölf Zeichen des Zodiakus zurück (Cornut. de Ν. D. p. 91 c)."

εὑρεσιλογον: “expectes τόν,” Lang. Osann interprets this to mean that Cornutus apologises for referring to the authority of Cleanthes by saying that such a trifler ought not to be respected in all cases. This derives a certain amount of support from Plutarch de aud. poet. p. 31 where
Chrysippus is spoken of as εὑρεσιλογῶν ἀπιθάνως. But it seems strange that Cornutus should have alluded to Cleanthes in this manner. Why cannot the word be used in a good sense as in Diog. L. iv. 37? Mr Hicks suggests εὑρεσιλογίαν.

63. Schol. in Hom. II. iii. 64, ap. Bekker, p. 99 b. 23, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἐν Λέσβῳ οὖτω τιμᾶσθαι χρυσῆν Ἀφροδίτην.

Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 15) classes this among the fragments of the work περὶ θεῶν, but there is more likelihood in Krische's view (p. 433) that it belongs to the περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, for there is no reason to separate it from frags. 55 and 65. Perhaps Cleanthes tried to explain the currency of the epithet χρυσეὴ by the existence of a gilded statue of Aphrodite at Lesbos. For the figurative meaning of χρυσός = precious, which is perhaps all that is implied in the epithet, see Jebb on Soph. Ant. 699.

64. Athen. xiii. 572 f., πόρνης δὲ Ἀφροδίτης ἴερὸν ἐστι παρὰ Ἀβυδηνοῖς, ὡς φησὶ Πάμφιλος: κατεχομένης γὰρ τῆς πόλεως δουλεία τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ποτὲ θύσαντας, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Κλεάνθης ἐν τοῖς Μυθικοῖς, καὶ μεθυσθέντας ἐταῖρας πλείονας προσλαβείν ὃν μίαν, κατακομμηθέντας αὐτοὺς ἰδούσαν, ἀνελομένην τὰς κλεῖς καὶ τὸ τεῖχος ὑπερβᾶσαν, ἀπαγγέλει τοῖς Ἀβυδηνοῖς. τοὺς δ’ αὐτίκα μεθ’ ὑπλῶν ἀφικομένους, ἀνελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φύλακας, κρατήσαντας δὲ τῶν τειχῶν καὶ γενομένους ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς ἐλευθερίας χαριστήρια τῇ πόρνῃ ἀποδίδοντας Ἀφροδίτης Πόρνης ναὸν ἱδρύσασθαι.

Πόρνης: cf. Aphrodite Pandemos, and the worship of Aphrodite Ourania at Corinth (Becker's Charicles, p. 246). The object of Cleanthes was doubtless to explain away the discreditable legends attaching themselves to the gods, and thus in the present instance the debased worship at
Abydos is shown to be due to the accident of a historical circumstance, and not to the essential characteristics of the goddess. There is however considerable doubt as to the genuineness of this fragment, see Introd. p. 51.


Wachsmuth also quotes Eustath. in Hom. p. 1389, 55, τοῦ Ἀτλαντα...οἱ μὲν ἀλληγοροῦσιν εἰς τὴν ἀκάματον καὶ ἀκοπίατον πρόνοιαν τὴν πάντων αἰτίαν καὶ ὀλοόφρονα τοῦ τουτοῦτου Ἀτλαντα νοοῦσιν, ώς τὸν ὕπερ ὄλων φρονοῦντα ἡγονυ τῶν ὄλων φροντιστικῶν. διὸ καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης, ὡς φασιν, ἐδάσυνε τὸ ὄ τῆς ἀρχόνσης. Cf. Cornut. de nat. d. c. 26, ὀλοόφρονα δ' αὐτοῦ ("Ἀτλαντα) εἰρήσθαι διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὄλων φροντίζειν καὶ προνοεῖσθαι τῆς πάντων αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν σωτηρίας. See also Flach Glossen u. Scholien zur Hes. Th. p. 76. Cleanthes identified Atlas with πρόνοια, as holding together the framework of the world (cf. Ἐξίς).


This frag. is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. i. p. 18): cf. Zeno, frag. 160, διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικόν καὶ παθητικόν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διακεχυμένον. Stob. Ecl. ii. 10a p. 89, 16, πάντες δ' οἱ εἰν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον. In this connection we may observe that Odysseus was taken by the Stoic school as one of the few typical wise men (Sen. de Const. 2. 1, de Benef. 13. 3). This is the earliest known instance of the word ἀλληγορία.

67. Certamen Homer. et Hesiod., p. 4, 18, ed. Nietzsch (in act. societ. philol. Lips. tom. i. fasc. 1), Ἐλλάνικος μὲν
THE FRAGMENTS OF CLEANTHES.


68. Porphyr. vit. Pythag. 1, 2, Κλεάνθης ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν μυθικῶν Σύρου, ἐκ Τύρου τῆς Συρίας (seil. Mnesarchus, the father of Pythagoras). σιτοδείας δὲ καταλαβούσης τοὺς Σαμίους προσπλεύσαντα τὸν Μυῆσαρχον κατ' ἐμπορίαν μετὰ σίτου τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ἀποδόμενον τιμηθήναι πολιτεία. Πυθαγόρου δ' ἐκ παίδων εἰς πᾶσαν μάθησιν ὄντος εὐφυοῦς, τὸν Μυῆσαρχον ἀπαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν εἰς Τύρον, ἐκεῖ δὲ τοῖς Χαλδαίοις συστάντα μετασχεῖν τούτων ἐπὶ πλεον ποιήσαι, ἐπανελθόντα δ' εἰς τὴν Ἰωνίαν ἐντεύθεν τὸν Πυθαγόραν πρῶτον μὲν Φερεκύδη τῷ Συρίῳ ὁμιλήσαι δεύτερον δ' Ἑρμοδάμαντι τῷ Κρεσφυλίῳ εὖ Σάμῳ ἤδη γηράσκοντε. λέγει δ' ὁ Κλεάνθης ἄλλους εἶναι οἱ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ Τυρηνὸν ἀποφαίνονται τῶν τὴν Λήμνου ἀποικησάντων ἐντεύθεν δὲ κατὰ πράξιν εἰς Σάμου ἔλθοντα καταμείναι καὶ ἀστὸν γενέσθαι. πλέοντος δὲ τοῦ 15 Μυῆσαρχον εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν συμπλεύσαντα τῶν Πυθαγόραν νέον ὄντα κομιδὴ σφόδρα οὐσαν εὐδαιμόνα καὶ τὸν ὑστερὸν εἰς αὐτὴν ἀποπλεύσαι. καταλέγει δ' αυτοῦ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς δῦο Εὐνουστον καὶ Τυρηνὸν πρεσβυτέρους. Wachsmuth also quotes Clem. Alex. Strom. i. p. 129 S. ὡς δὲ Κλεάνθης (MSS. Νεάνθης) Σύριος ἢ Τύριος (fuit Pythagoras). Theodoret, Graec. aff. cur. p. 8, 43, ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης (MSS. Νεάνθης) Τύριον (Πυθαγόραν) ὄνομάζει.

This frag. must stand or fall with frag. 64. The facts
in the life of Pythagoras with which these statements are concerned will be found fully discussed by Zeller, pre-Socratics, i. p. 324 foll. After εὐδαίμονα in l. 16 some such word as αἰσθέσθαι seems wanted.

69. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluviorn nominibus, v. 3, παράκειται δ´ [ αὐτῷ] τὸ Καυκάσιον ὄρος· ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ τὸ πρότερον Βορέου κοίτη δι’ αὐτίαν τοιαύτην. Βορέας δὲ ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Χιώνην ἀρπάσας, τὴν Ἀρκτοῦρον θυγατέρα, κατήνευκεν εἰς τινὰ λόφον Νιφάντην καλοῦμενον, καὶ ἐγέννηκεν ἐκ τῆς προειρημένης υἱὸν "Ὑπακάκα, 5 τὸν διαδεξάμενον Ἦμιόχου τὴν Βασίλειαν. μετανομάσθη δὲ τὸ ὄρος κοίτη Βορέου. προσηγορεύθη δὲ Καύκασος διὰ περίστασιν τοιαύτην. μετὰ τὴν γιγαντομάχιαν Κρόνος ἐκκλίνων τὰς Δῖος ἀπειλᾶς, ἔφυγεν εἰς τὴν ἄκροφειαν Βορέου κοίτης, καὶ εἰς κροκόδειλον μεταμορφώθηκεν < Ἐλαθέν· 10 ὁ δὲ Προμήθεε> ἕνα τῶν ἐγχορίων πομένα, Καύκασον, ἀναταμών, καὶ κατανοῆσας αὐτοῦ τὴν διάθεσιν τῶν σπλάγχνων, εἰπεν οὐ μακράν εἶναι τοὺς πολεμίους. ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς ἐπιφανεῖς τὸν μὲν πατέρα δήσας πλεκτῷ ἔριφ, κατεταράστηκεν τὸ δ´ ὄρος εἰς τιμήν τοῦ πομένος Καύ-15 κασον μετανομάσας, προσέδησεν αὐτῷ τὸν Προμηθέα καὶ ἰνάγκασεν αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ σπλαγχνοφάγου ἀετοῦ βασανίζεσθαι, ὅτι παρηνόμησεν εἰς τὰ σπλάγχνα, ὡς ἰστορεῖ Κλεάνθης ἐν γ´ θεομαχίας.

The treatise de Fluviis was composed perhaps in the reign of Hadrian or Trajan, but all or nearly all the authorities which the author cites are impudent fictions. For further information see the Preface to Hercher's edition of the tract (Lips. 1851) and especially § 3.


10. μεταμορφώθηκε. Wyttenbach saw that some words
had fallen out here, since a reference to Prometheus is required. He supplied therefore the words within brackets and substituted ἀναταμών for ἀναπαύων. For ἀναπαύων ἀναρπάζων (Reinesius) and ἀνασπῶν (Dodwell) have also been suggested.

70. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluv. V. 4, γεννᾶται δ' ἐν αὐτῷ (Caucasus) βοτάνῃ Προμῆθειος καλομένη, ἣν Μηδεία συλλέγουσα καὶ λειτριβοῦσα, πρὸς ἀντιπαθείας τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχρησατο, καθὼς ἰστορεῖ ὁ αὐτὸς (scil. Cleanthes).

Προμῆθειος, cf. Ap. Rhod. iii. 843,

ἡ δὲ τέως γλαφυρὴς ἔξειλετο φωριαμοῖο
φάρμακον, ὁ ρρά τε φασὶ Προμῆθειοιν καλέσσαι,

where a lengthy description of the plant and its virtues is given. Prop. i. 12. 9, num me deus obruit, an quae lecta Prometheus dividit herba iugis.

71. Pseudo-Plut. de Fluv. xvii. 4, γεννᾶται δ' ἐν αὐτῷ (Taygetus) βοτάνῃ καλομένῃ Χαρίσια ἣν <ai> γυναῖκες ἔαρος ἀρχομένου τοῖς τραχύλοις περιάπτοντο καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν συμπαθέστερον ἀγαπῶνται· καθὼς ἰστορεῖ Κλεάνθης ἐν α' περὶ ὀρῶν.

Χαρίσια: Hercher thinks this word is invented from the name of a city in Arcadia.

ETHICA.

In the extract from Clement, Krische, p. 423 n., proposes to insert the words Διογένης δὲ between ξῆν and ἐν τῷ εὐλογιστεῖν on the evidence afforded by Diog. L. vii. 88, Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 6a, p. 76, 9, who both expressly attribute the definition εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ to Diogenes Babylonius. His suggestion is approved by Wachsmuth (Comm. ii. p. 4) and Heinze, Stoic. Eth. p. 11 n. For the question as to whether Cleanthes first introduced the words τῇ φύσει into the definition, see on Zeno, frag. 120.

73. Diog. L. vii. 89, φύσιν δὲ Χρυσιππὸς μὲν ἐξακούει, ἢ ἀκολούθως δὲι ξῆν, τὴν τε κοινῆν καὶ ἰδίως ἀνθρωπίνην. ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινῆν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ἢ ἀκολούθειν δὲι, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους. τὴν τε ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὑμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ αὐτῆν εἶναι αἱρετὴν, οὐ διὰ τινα φόβον ή ἐλπίδα ή τι τῶν ἐξωθεν. ἐν αὐτῇ τε εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀτε οὐσῃ ψυχῇ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὑμολογίαν παντός τοῦ βίου. διαστρέφεσθαι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ξῆνον ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὰς τῶν ἐξωθεν πραγματείων πιθανότητας, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν κατηχησιν τῶν συνόντων, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς δίδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους.

Diogenes leads us to suppose that Cleanthes and Chrysippus dissented as to the interpretation of φύσις, and that Cleanthes refused to allow that human nature is included. This however is scarcely credible (cf. the next frag.), although it is quite possible that Cleanthes laid special stress on κοινή φύσις and κοινὸς νόμος. cf. frag. 48, 1. 24, Cic. Fin. iii. 73, utrum conveniat neene natura hominis cum universa. So Zeller, p. 229, who is followed by Wellmann, p. 448. To attain this conformity an acquaintance with physics is necessary (Cic. l. c., Chrysipp. ap. Plut. Sto. Rep. 9). Hirzel ii. pp. 112—118, thinks that Diogenes’ account is substantially right.
regards Zeno as the upholder of Cynicism in preference to which Cleanthes devoted himself to the study of Heraclitus, cf. Heracl. fr. 7, Sch., διὸ δὲ ἐπεσθαί ὑπὸ Ἑσυχοῦ, τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος Ἑσυχοῦ ἴδιαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν. To the objection that Zeno had already recognised the Heraclitean λόγος as a leading physical principle, Hirzel answers that it does not follow that he also transferred it to the region of ethics, and that Cleanthes must be credited with this innovation. The latter part of the fragment has been included in deference to the judgment of Wachsmuth, but it appears extremely doubtful whether we are justified in tracing the epitomised views back to Cleanthes, because his name appears in the context.

διάθεσιν ὁμολογομένην: for διάθεσιν see on Zeno, frag. 117, and for the general sense cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5th, p. 60, 7, κοινότερον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι φασὶ ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλου τὸν βίον.

ἀπ' οὔσῃ: Zeller (p. 238, 3) corrects οὔσης ψυχῆς πεποιημένης.

ἀφορμᾶς, cf. frag. 82.

74. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 6e, p. 77, 21, εὐδαιμονία δ' ἐστὶν εὔροισ βίον. κέχρηται δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης τῷ ὀρῷ τοῦτῷ ἐν τοῖς ἔαντοι συγγράμμασι καὶ ὁ Χρύσιτππος καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦτων πάντες τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι λέγοντες οὐχ ἔτεραν τοῦ εὐδαιμονίας βίον, καίτοι γε λέγοντες τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν σκοπὸν ἐκκείσθαι τέλος δ' εἶναι τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὅπερ ταῦταν εἶναι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Sext. Emp. Math. xi. 30, εὐδαιμονία δὲ ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην, εὔροια βίον.

σκοπὸν. For the distinction between σκοπὸς and τέλος, cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 3e, p. 47, 8, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπὸς μὲν τὸ προκείμενον εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν, οἷον ἀστίς τοξοταίς· τέλος δ' ἡ
The same occurs in Strom. v. 14, 110, p. 715 P., 257 S., introduced by the words ἐν τινι ποιήματι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ and also in Euseb. P. E. xiii. 13, p. 679.

Clement's mistake in referring these lines to Cleanthes' conception of the deity, when they really refer to the ethical summum bonum, is obvious, and has been pointed out by Krische, p. 420 f. Krische thinks that they may have formed a poetical appendix to the prose work, which is either the περὶ τέλος or the περὶ καλῶν.

Seven of these epithets, viz. δίκαιον, χρήσιμον, καλὸν, δέον, συμφέρον, λυσιτελές, ὀφέλιμον are predicated of
αγαθόν in Diog. L. vii. 98, 99, with the addition of αἰρέτον and εὖχρηστον: cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5\textsuperscript{a}, p. 69, 11, πάντα δὲ τάγαθα ὁφέλιμα εἶναι καὶ εὖχρηστα καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ λυσιτελὴ καὶ σπουδαῖα καὶ πρέποντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἴκεια, ib. 5\textsuperscript{i}, p. 72, 19, ib. 11\textsuperscript{h}, p. 100, 15 foll. Chrysippus proved similar statements by his favourite chain arguments, Plut. Sto. Rep. c. 13, Cic. Fin. iii. 27, Tusc. v. 45.

3. κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ: pointing to the virtue ἐγκράτεια (frag. 76): reliquum est, ut tute tibi imperes, Cic. Tusc. ii. 47.


αὐθέκαστον: in Ar. Eth. iv. 7. 4 the αὐθέκαστος is the mean between the ἀλαζῶν and the εἴρων, and is described as ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ. We may compare then Stob. Ecl. ii. 7, 11\textsuperscript{m}, p. 108, 11, where the wise man is said to be ἀπλοὺς καὶ ἀπλαστὸς while τὸ εἰρωνεὺςθαὶ belongs alone to the φαύλος, ib. p. 111, 11, ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν τὸν σοφὸν.

5. ἄφοβον, ἀλυπον, ἀνώδυνον: because the wise man is ἀπαθῆς.

7. Some word has dropped out here. In Clem. Alex. Strom. v. i. c. the words ἀσφαλὲς φίλον ἐντιμον are omitted and ὀμολογούμενον is placed at the end of l. 6. In Euseb. i. c. we have two complete lines but εὐάρεστον is repeated from l. 6, thus:—ἐντιμον εὐάρεστον ὀμολογούμενον: this is perhaps the original reading, where the error is due to εὐάρεστον having been copied from the previous line in place of the genuine word. The reading in book V. is due to the scribe’s eye wandering from the first εὐάρεστον to the second. Mohnike however thinks (p. 51) that Eusebius had the work of Clement
before him while writing, and that the second εὐάρεστον is mere patchwork to mend the metre.


πληγῇ πυρός. This is the material air-current which forms the ηγεμονικόν of the individual, being an efflux of the divine πνεῦμα. Cleanthes here brings his ethical teaching into close dependence on his physical researches: of the physical aspect of τόνος we have spoken at frag. 24. Zeno's φρόνησις is explained as ἴκανος τόνος ψυχῆς, i.e. as ἵσχυς καὶ κράτος. Possibly Cleanthes was influenced by the Cynic use of τόνος: see the passage quoted by Stein, Psych. p. 30 n. 37. Not that Cleanthes intended to deny the fundamental position of Zeno that virtue is wisdom, for we shall find that he expressly declared it to be teachable (frag. 79): and cf. frag. 89. Still, he expanded and developed his master's teaching in two ways, (1) by showing that the doctrine of virtue rests on a psychological basis, and (2) by clearing up an ambiguity in Zeno's statement with regard to the four cardinal virtues.
Zeno held, or appeared to hold, that φρόνησις is found in a double sense, (1) as the essential groundwork of all virtue, and (2) as the first of its four main divisions. This inconsistency is therefore removed by retaining φρόνησις in the wider, but substituting ἐγκράτεια in the narrower meaning: see Hirzel ii. p. 97 foll. Chrysippus on the other hand restored φρόνησις as the cardinal virtue, but represented by ἐπιστήμη that notion of φρόνησις which was common to Zeno and Cleanthes.

φανείσιν: so Hirzel, p. 97, 2, for ἐπιφάνεσιν, coll. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5b, p. 61, 11, ἐγκράτειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀνυπέρβατον τῶν κατὰ τῶν ὀρθῶν λόγων φανείσιν. We find also definitions of ἐγκράτεια in Diog. L. vii. 93, Sext. Math. ix. 153, which are substantially identical with that cited from Stobaeus: in Stob. it appears as a subdivision of σωφροσύνη, while both in Diog. and Stob. the word ἐμμενετέον is found in connection with καρτερία, a subdivision of ἀνδρεία. No doubt their account is derived from Chrysippus: it is noteworthy, however, that ὀρθὸς λόγος appears in these definitions: see Hirzel, i.e., Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 262. In giving this prominent position to ἐγκράτεια Cleanthes was following in the steps of Socrates (Xen. Mem. i. 5. 4, ἄρα γε οὗ χρῆ πάντα ἀνδρα ἤγιοσάμενον τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἁρετῆς εἶναι κρηπίδα), and the Cynics (Diog. L. vi. 15).

ἄξια: the full definition, probably that of Chrysippus, appears in Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5b, p. 59, 11, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἄξιας ἐκάστῳ, ib. 7f, p. 84, 15.

αιρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις: σωφροσύνη is concerned with the regulation of the ὀμαλ (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5b, p. 60, 13, ib. 5b, p. 63, 16), and is therefore directed to the avoidance of πάθη, among which φόβος is defined as ἐκκλίσις ἀπειθῆς λόγω (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 10b, p. 90, 11).
77. Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 22, 131, p. 499 P., 179 S., διό καὶ Κλεανθῆς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ ἢδονῆς τὸν Σωκράτην φησὶ παρ᾽ ἑκαστὰ διδάσκειν ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς δικαίος τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ καὶ τῷ πρῶτῳ διελόντι τὸ δίκαιον ἀπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος καταράσθαι ὡς ἀσεβὲς τι πρᾶγμα δεδρακότι· ἀσεβὲς γὰρ τῷ ὄντι οἱ τὸ συμφέρον ἀπὸ τοῦ δίκαιον τοῦ κατὰ νόμον χαρίζοντες.

Cf. Cic. Off. iii. 11, itaque accepimus Socratem exsecrari solitum eos qui primum haec natura cohaerentia opinione distraxissent. cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi ut et quidquid honestum esset id utile esse censerent nec utile quie quam quod non honestum. id. Leg. i. 33, recte Socrates exsecrari eum solesbat qui primus utilitatem a iure seimnisset: id enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium.

For Socrates, who identified τὸ ωφέλιμον with τὸ ἀγαθὸν, cf. Zeller, Socrates, p. 150 foll. Cleanthes, as we have seen (frag. 75), asserted that the good was also συμφέρον and ωφέλιμον: for the school in general see Zeller, Stoics, p. 220, 2.

78. Diog. L. vii. 92, πλείονας (εἶναι ἀρετὰς ἐν τέταρται) οἱ περὶ Κλεανθῆς καὶ Χρύσιττου καὶ Ἀντίπατρον.

Zeller, p. 258, thinks that this simply means that Cleanthes enumerated the various subdivisions of the four cardinal virtues. Hirzel, p. 97, 2, prefers to suppose that it is due to the mistake of placing φρόνησις, which is the source of the several virtues, on the same level as the four main divisions of virtue.

79. Diog. L. vii. 91, διδακτήν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν (λέγοι δὲ τὴν ἁρετὴν) καὶ Χρύσιττος ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ περὶ τέλους φησὶ καὶ Κλεανθῆς.

This is, of course, ultimately traceable to Socrates, but
was also enforced by the Cynics: cf. Diog. vi. 10 (Antisthenes) ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετὴν, ib. 105, ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἰππακλεί.


On this point Cleanthes is in agreement with the Cynics (Diog. L. vi. 105), whence Wellmann, p. 462, infers that Zeno’s teaching must have been in agreement with Cleanthes rather than with Chrysippus. See also the authorities cited by Zeller, p. 295, 3, and add Cic. Tusc. ii. 32, amitti non potest virtus.

καταλήψεις: but Zeno held that the wise man οὐ μεθυσθήσεθαι (frag. 159).

καταλήψεις: Cic. Tusc. iii. 11, quod (furor) cum maius esse videatur quam insania, tamen eiusmodi est, ut furor (μελαγχολία) in sapientem cadere possit, non possit insania.

καταλήψεις: although κατάληψεις is shared by the wise man with the fool (see on Zeno, frag. 16), its especial cultivation and possession belongs to the wise man only: cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 184, 185. Cf. also Sext. Math. ii. 6 (quoted on frag. 9). According to Hirzel, p. 68, 3, the meaning is not that Cleanthes denied that the wise man would get drunk and so lose his virtue, but that the strength of his καταλήψεις is so great, that even melancholy and drunkenness fail to shake him. In support of this he quotes Epict. diss. i. 18. 21—23, τίς οὖν ὁ ἀἵττητος; ὃν οὐκ ἔξιστησιν οὐδὲν τῶν ἀποπροαιρέτων. τί οὖν ἂν καῦμα ἦ τούτῳ; τί ἂν οἰνώμενος ἦ; τί ἂν μελαγχολῶν; τί ἐν ὑπνοῖς; οὗτός μοι ἐστίν ὁ ἀνίκητος.

82. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 53, p. 65, 8, πάντας γὰρ ἀνδρῶ-ποιος ἀφορμᾶς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετῆν, καὶ οἶονεὶ τῶν τῶν ἡμιαμβελών λόγου ἔχειν κατὰ Κλεάνθην· ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους.

ἀφορμᾶς. For this sense of the word cf. frag. 73 ἀφορμᾶς ἀδιαστρόφους “uncorrupted impulses.” Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 53, p. 62, 9 ἔχειν γὰρ (τὸν ἀνδρωπον) ἀφορμᾶς παρὰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καθήκοντος εὕρεσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὀρμῶν εὐστάθειαν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὑπο-μονὰς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. As a general rule, however, it is contrasted with ὀρμή as “aversion”) (“impulse towards,” Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 9, p. 87, 5, Sext. Pyrrh. III. 273, ἐγκράτειαν...ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὀρμαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀφορμαῖς, ib. Math. xi. 210. Cleanthes regarded our capacity for virtue as innate, but whether at the same time he denied an innate intellectual capacity is open to question, cf. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, n. 735.

Cf. M. Aurel. ix. 1, ἀφορμᾶς γὰρ προειλήφει παρὰ τῆς φύσεως, ὅν ἀμελήσας οὐχ οἰός τε ἐστι νῦν διακρίνειν τὰ ψευδή ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν.
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tόν: so Zeller, (p. 243, 1), for τό.

ἡμιαμβείων: so Wachsm. for MSS. ημιαμβείαιων. Meineke reads μμιαμβείων. The meaning is that men possess latent capacities which must be brought into play by their own exertions, if they would attain to perfection, cf. Cic. Tusc. III. 2, sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum, quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret.

83. Themist. Or. II. 27 c, εἰ δὲ αὖ φήσεις τις κολακείαν εἶναι τῷ Πυθίῳ παραβάλλειν τὸν βασιλέα, Χρύσιτος μὲν ὑμῖν καὶ Κλεάνθης οὐ συγχωρήσει καὶ ὅλον ἐθνὸς φιλοσοφίας ἢ ὁ ἐκ τῆς ποικίλης χορὸς οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ θεοῦ.

This doctrine depends on the divine origin of the human soul. Hence the Stoics could say that good men were friends of the gods, and Chrysippus declared that the happiness of the wise man was as great as that of Zeus, since they only differ in point of time, which is immaterial for happiness. Cf. Procl. in Tim. Plat. II. 106 f, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἰρήκασιν. Cic. Leg. I. 25, iam vero virtus eadem in homine ac deo est neque alioullo ingenio praeterea.


Λογισμὸς. τί ποτ’ ἐσθ’ ὅτι βουλεῖι, θυμεῖ; τοῦτο μοι φράσου.

Θυμός. ἐχειν λογισμέ, πάν ὁ θυμόμαι ποιεῦν.

Α. ναὶ βασιλικὸν γε’ πλην ὀμως εἰπὼν πάλιν.

Θ. ὅν ἅν ἐπιθυμῶ ταῦθ’ ὅπως γενησεται.

tαυτὶ τὰ ἀμοιβαία Κλεάνθους φησὶν εἶναι Ποσειδώνιος ἐναργῶς ἐκδεικνύμενα τὴν περὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς
γνώμην αὐτοῦ, εἴ γε δὴ πεποίηκε τὸν Λογισμὸν τῷ Θυμῷ διαλεγόμενον ὡς ἐταίρον ἑταίρῳ.

2, 3. ἐγὼ λογισμὸν... βασιλικὸν γε MSS. ἔχειν, λογισμένον, Wytenbach βασιλικὸν ἐστὶ Mullach, βασιλικὸν εὖ γε Scaliger, ναὶ β. γ. Mein. Perhaps we should read ποιεῖν λογισμὸν... ἐγὼ βασιλικὸς.

4. ὁ Meineke, Mullach, ὥς MSS., ὅσ′ Wytenbach.

MohniKe, p. 52, thinks that this fragment comes either from περὶ ὀρμῆς or περὶ λόγου.

Posidonius uses the verses to prove that Cleanthes was in substantial agreement with himself in supposing that the various functions of the ἱγμονικῶν are radically distinct. Zeller, p. 215, 3, says that this is to confound a rhetorical flourish with a philosophical view, and it may be added that Posidonius must have been hard pressed for an argument to rely on this passage at all. Hirzel, however, pp. 147—160, labours to prove that Posidonius is right, but he mainly relies on frag. 37, θύραθεν εἰς κρίνεσθαι τὸν νόου, where see note, and is well refuted by Stein, Psych. pp. 163—167.

85. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. ix. 1, v. p. 653 K., Ποσειδώνιος... δείκνυσιν εὖ τῇ περὶ παθῶν πραγματεία διοικουμένοις ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ τριῶν δυνάμεων, ἐπιθυμητικῆς τε καὶ θυμοειδοῦς καὶ λογιστικῆς· τῆς δ' αὐτῆς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἔλεξεν εἶναι καὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην.

Though there is no direct proof that Cleanthes adhered to the eightfold division of the soul, yet everything points that way, and Hirzel's opinion (p. 138) that he only recognised three divisions is unfounded: see on frag. 84. The present passage of Galen ought perhaps rather to be added as a testimonium to frag. 84 than cited as a distinct fragment, since the whole argument of Posidonius, so far as we know, was founded on the dialogue be-
tween λογισμός and θυμός. For δυνάμεις see Hirzel, Π. p. 486, 1.


This appears to be the only remaining indication of the position of Cleanthes as regards the definition of the πάθη, but it is not without significance. Zeno had probably defined λύπη as ἄλογος συστολή ψυχής (see on Zeno frag. 143), but Cleanthes saw his way to a better explanation from the standpoint of τόνος: the soul of the wise man, informed by right reason, is characterised by ἵσχὺς, ἰκανός τόνος, εὐτονία, but if the emotions overpower the natural reason of a man, there supervenes a resolution of tension, ἄτονία or ἀσθένεια. This view of the emotions was adopted by Chrysippus, cf. Galen, Hipp. et Plat. Ψ. 387 Κ. ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἔξηγεται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐτονίας: see especially the long passage beginning ib. p. 404 Κ. where the view of πάθος as ἄτονία or ἀσθένεια is explained at length by Chrysippus. With regard to λύπη cf. Tusc. ΠΙ. 61, omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt, propter magnitudinem aegritudinis. Ex quo ipsam aegritudinem λύπην Chrysippus quasi solutionem totius hominis appellatam putat. ib. Π. 54, animus intentione sua depellit pressum omnem ponderum, remissione autem sic urgetur, ut se nequeat extollere. No doubt Cleanthes, like Plato, derived λύπη from λύω: Plat. Crat. p. 419 c. See also Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 130.

Hirzel’s contention (p. 152 f.) that Cleanthes placed the ἤγεμονικὸν in the brain, and that hence we are to explain Plut. plac. iv. 21. 5, is controverted by Stein, Psych. p. 170, from this passage, for we have seen that the πάθη are affections of the ἤγεμονικὸν. Hirzel replies (p. 154) that ὀρμαί and πάθη, though dependent on the ἤγεμονικὸν, are yet distinct from it. The improbability of Hirzel’s whole theory lies in the fact that, if it is correct, Cleanthes was in vital opposition to the whole Stoa down to Posidonius on the most important doctrines of psychology. Such an inference ought not to be accepted, unless the evidence conclusively points to it, and no one will affirm that such is the case here.


ἡδονὴ is, according to Cleanthes, not merely an ἄδιαφρον but also παρὰ φύσιν, being entirely devoid of ἄξια, cf. Diog. L. vii. 105, and see on Zeno, frag. 192.

καλλυντρον cannot here mean “a broom,” but must be “an ornament”: see Suidas s.v. All kinds of personal adornment appeared to the Stoics, as to the Cynics, to be contrary to nature: Zeno wore the τρίβων (Diog. L. vii. 26), recommended the same dress for males and females (frag. 177), and forbade young men to be ἐταιρικῶς κεκοσμημένοι (frag. 174).

αὐτὴν is bracketed by Bekker. Hirzel discusses this passage at length (pp. 89—96). He thinks that the first part (μὴτε...βίῳ) contains a climax: ἠδονὴ has no connection with virtue and therefore is not ἀγαθὸν (κατὰ φύσιν); further, it has no ἄξια and is not even προηγμένον. Hence Zeno and Cleanthes did not identify τὰ κατὰ φύσιν with
προηγμένα: for in that case they could not have treated προηγμένα as αἰδιάφορα. Zeller and Wellmann are, therefore, wrong in regarding Cleanthes' attitude towards pleasure as cynical; rather, his position is that pleasure in itself (for this is the force of the second αὐτὴν which should be retained) is αἰδιάφορον in the narrower sense. Cf. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 7", p. 81, 14 οὕτε δὲ προηγμένα οὕτ' ἀποπροηγμένα... ἡδονὴν πᾶσαν καὶ πόνον καὶ εἶ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο. Next, κατὰ φύσιν μη ἐναι is a gloss, and when this is struck out we should supply άξιαν ἐχειν with καθάπερ δὲ κάλλυντρον. In short, Cleanthes treats pleasure as an ἐπιγέννημα (Diog. L. vii. 86): cf. Seneca Ep. 116, 3, voluptatatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora nobis faceret illius accessio. But it does not follow that, because virtue consists in τὸ ὀμολογομένος τῇ φύσει ζῆν, therefore everything, which is κατὰ φύσιν, is ἄρετη or μετέχον ἄρετης. Cf. Stob. Ecl. 7. 7", p. 80, 9 διὸτι κάν, φασὶ, λέγωμεν αἰδιάφορα τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς, πρὸς τὸ εὐσχημόνως ζῆν (ἐν ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνως) αἰδιάφορά φαμεν αὐτὰ ἐναι, οὐ μὰ Δία πρὸς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐχειν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὀρμήν καὶ αἰφορμήν. Rather, we have seen reason to hold that the class of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν is wider, or, at any rate, certainly not narrower than that of τὰ προηγμένα. Indeed, this is apparent from the present passage:—ὅ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν ἐναι ὡς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ άξιαν ἐχειν, i.e. there are some things which may be κατὰ φύσιν and yet devoid of άξια. Again, Sextus obviously treats Cleanthes as more hostile to pleasure than Archedemus, but the view which Hirzel would attribute to Cleanthes is scarcely to be distinguished from that of Archedemus. Certainly, the passage from Seneca ought not to be quoted as an illustration of Cleanthes' meaning: contrast μήτε κατὰ φύσιν
εἰναί with natura—admiscuit. The inelegant repetition of μὴ...εἰναί has an object, namely, to contrast τὸ καλ-λυτρον with τὰς ἐν μασχιλή τρίχας, whereas, on the other hand, if the second αὐτήν is retained, it cannot be interpreted differently to the first αὐτήν, and to press the latter would make nonsense.

89. Stob. Floril. 6. 37, Κλεάνθης ἔλεγεν, εἰ τέλος ἐστὶν ἡδονή, πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώπωις τὴν φρόνησιν δεδοσθαί.

This is no doubt directed against the Epicureans. Diog. L. x. 128, τὴν ἡδονήν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἰναί τοῦ μακαρίως ξήν. Chrysippus also wrote a treatise described as ἀπόδειξις πρὸς τὸ μή εἰναί τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος (Diog. L. vii. 202). τὴν φρόνησιν furnishes a proof that Cleanthes upheld Zeno’s view of virtue as φρόνησις: see on frag. 76.

δεδοσθαί: so Meineke for δίδοσθαί. Cf. Cic. de Senec. § 40, cumque homini sive natura sive quis deus nihil mente praestabilius dedisset, huic divino muneri ac dono nihil tam esse inimicum quam voluptatem.

90. Cic. Fin. ii. 69, pudebit te illius tabulæ quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere soletbat. iubebat cos qui audiebant secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem, pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem : praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrent et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne quid faceret imprudens quod offenderet animos hominum aut quicquam e quo oriretur aliquis dolor. “nos quidem Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus; aliiud negotii nihil habemus.” Cf. Aug. de civit. dei v. 20, solent
philosophi, qui finem boni humani in ipsa virtute consti-
tuunt, ad ingerendum pudorem quibusdam philosophis,
qui virtutes quidem probant, sed eas voluptatis corporalis
fine metiuuntur et illum per se ipsam putant adpetendam,
istas propter ipsam, tabulam quandam verbis pingere, ubi
voluptas in sella regali quasi delicata quaedam regina
considat, eique virtutes famulae subiciantur, observantes
eius nutum ut faciant quod illa imperaverit, quae pruden-
tiae iubeat ut vigilanter inquirat quo modo voluptas
regnet et salva sit; iustitiae iubeat ut praestet beneficia
quaque potest ad comparandas amicitias corporalibus com-
modis necessarias, nulli faciat iniuriam, ne offensis legibus
voluptas vivere secura non possit; fortitudini iubeat, ut
si dolor corpori acciderit qui non compellat in mortem,
teneat dominam suam, id est, voluptatem, fortiter in
animi cogitatione ut per pristinarum deliciarum suarum
recordationem mitiget praesentis doloris aculeos; tem-
perantiae iubeat, ut tantum capiat alimentorum et si qua
delectant ne per immoderationem noxium aliquid valetu-
dinem turbet et voluptas, quam etiam in corporis sanitate
Epicurei maximam ponunt, graviter offendatur. ita vir-
tutes cum tota suae gloria dignitatis tanquam imperiosae
cuidam et inhonestae mulierculae servient voluptati;
nihil hac pictura dicunt esse ignominiosius et deformius
et quod minus ferre bonorum possit aspectus; et verum
dicunt.

Hæres. III. 2. p. 1090 c Κλεάνθης τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ καλὸν
λέγει εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς is a stupid blunder of the epitoma-
tor: cf. Krische, p. 431. Hirzel, p. 96, 1, holds that it is
merely an exaggeration of Cleanthes’ position: see on
frag. 88.

*pulcherrimo vestitu*: this illustrates κάλλυντρον in
frag. 88.
si modo...possent: Madvig points out that these words belong to Cleanthes’ statement, and are not a part of Cicero’s comment.

Virtutes ut ancillulas: on the controversial character of the work περὶ ἡδονῆς see Krische, pp. 430—432. In the Epicurean system virtue has only a conditional value, as furnishing a means to pleasure. Diog. L. x. 138 διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἁρετὰς δεῖν αἰρέσθαι, οὐ δὲ αὐτὰς: ὁσπερ καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ύγίειαν, καθά φησὶ Διογένης.


άγον δὲ μ’, ὁ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύγ’ ἡ πεπρωμένη, ὁποὶ ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, ὡς ἕψομαι γ’ ἀοκνος· ἢν δὲ μὴ θέλω κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἕψομαι.

The first line is quoted by Epict. diss. ii. 23. 42, and two lines by id. ib. iii. 22. 95, iv. 1. 131, and iv. 4. 34. Senec. Epist. 107, 10, et sic adloquamur Iovem euius gubernaculo moles ista dirigitur, quemadmodum Cleanthes noster versibus disertissimis adloquitur; quos mihi in nostrum sermonem mutare permittitur Ciceronis disertissimi viri exemplo. si placuerint boni consules; si dispuicerint, scies me in hoc secutum Ciceronis exemplum.

due, o parens celsique dominator poli,
quocumque placuit; nulla parendi mora est.
adsum impiger. fac nolle, comitabor gemens,
malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.
ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.

See also the commentary of Simplicius on Epict. l. c. p. 329. These celebrated lines constitute the true answer of the Stoa to the objection that the doctrine of πρόνοια is incompatible with the assertion of free-
will. Zeller p. 182. The matter is put very plainly in the passage of Hippolyt. Philosoph. 21, 2, Diels p. 571, quoted at length in the note on Zeno frag. 79. The spirit of Stoicism survives in the words of a modern writer:—

"It has ever been held the highest wisdom for a man not merely to submit to Necessity,—Necessity will make him submit,—but to know and believe well that the stern thing which Necessity had ordered was the wisest, the best, the thing wanted there. To cease his frantic pretension of scanning this great God’s world in his small fraction of a brain; to know that it had verily, though deep beyond his soundings, a just law, that the soul of it was Good;—that his part in it was to conform to the Law of the Whole, and in devout silence follow that; not questioning it, obeying it as unquestionable.” (Carlyle, Hero-Worship, chap. ii.) Marcus Aurelius often dwells on the contrast between τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν and τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. Cf. especially x. 28, καὶ ἅτι μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζωῷ δέδοται, τὸ ἐκονσίως ἐπεσθαίνας γινομένους· τὸ δὲ ἐπεσθαί ψιλόν, πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον. So ib. vi. 41, 42; vii. 54, 55; viii. 7; xii. 32.

92. Seneca Epist. 94, 4, Cleanthes utilem quidem iudicat et hanc partem (philosophiae quae dat cuique personae praecepta, nec in universum componit hominem, sed marito suadet quomodo se gerat adversus uxorem, patri quomodo educat liberos, domino quomodo servos regat), sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophiae et capita cognovit.

The branch of philosophy here referred to is known as the παραπετικὸς or ὑποθετικὸς τόπος. Aristo regarded it as useless, and it is very possible that his “letters to Cleanthes” (πρὸς Κλεάνθην ἐπιστολῶν ὦ Diog. L. vii. 163) dealt with this controversy. Cf. Sext. Math. vii. 12, καὶ Ἀρίστων ὦ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὡς φασί, παρηγεῖτο τὴν τε
93. Cic. Tusc. iii. 76, sunt qui unum officium consolantis putent malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet.

Consolatio (παραμυθητική) is a branch of παραινετική and is concerned with removing the πάθη, cf. Eudorus ap. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 2. p. 44, 15 ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀποτρεπτῶν καλεῖται παραμυθητικός, ὡς καλούμενος ἐστὶ πρὸς ἐνίων παθολογικός. Cf. Sen. Epist. 95, 65. As emotion is founded on false opinion (see on Zeno, frag. 138), the duty of him who offers consolation to another is to explain that what appears to the other to be an evil is not really so.

malum illud: the context in Cicero shows that the reference is particularly to death, for which cf. Zeno, frag. 129. The construction is not to be explained by an ellipse of docere or the like, but rather esse is nominalised so that malum...esse = τὸ κακὸν...εἶναι. This is common in Lucret., see Munro on i. 331, 418 and cf. Verr. v. 170, quid dicam.
in crucem tollere? Cicero even writes: inter optime valere et gravissime aegrotare (Fin. ii. 43). Draeger, § 429.

94. Cic. Tusc. iii. 77, nam Cleanthes quidem sapi-  entem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget. nihil enim esse malum, quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; alienum autem tempus docendi. et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes ipse fateatur.

Cicero's criticism here is twofold: (1) that what is called consolation is really only instruction, which is ineffective to assuage grief, because it is inopportune, and as regards the wise man, who is ἀπαθὴς, is unnecessary; (2) that grief may be caused by baseness, which is an evil. Cf. Tusc. ii. 30.

This cannot be treated as merely containing Cicero's comment on frag. 93, for we have the additional statement sapientem consolatur, which is surely not an inference from Cleanthes' definition. The statement is strange and perhaps not to be entirely explained in the fragmentary state of our knowledge, but it is not inconceivable that Cleanthes held that the wise man ought to be reminded of Stoic principles when attacked by μελαγχολία or when in severe pain, in spite of his βεβαίας καταλήψεις (see on frag. 80 and cf. Stob. Floril. 7. 21 ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφὸν, μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ. Cic. Fin. v. 94, quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non dolere, quum doleret! Zeno, frag. 158): cf. generally Sext. Math. xi. 130—140 and esp. 139 εἴ δ' ἀπλῶς διδάσκει ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν ὁλιγωφέλες ἔστι, πλείονας δ' ἔχει τὰς ὀχλήσεις, σύγκρισιν ἔσται πολῖν αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς πρὸς ἐτέραν αἰρέσιν καὶ φυγῆν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ταραχῆς. ὀπερ ἄτοπον· ο γὰρ
95. Stob. Floril. 6. 19.

οὐτὸς πράγματος ἔπιθυμωδὸν ἀνέχετ' αἰσχροῦ oὐτὸς ποιήσει τοῦτ' ἐὰν καρδῶν λάβῃ.

For the doctrine that virtuous action depends on the intention and not on the deed itself, see Zeller, p. 264 and cf. Zeno frags. 146 and 181.

96. Stob. Floril. 28, 14, Κλεάνθης ἐφ' τὸν ὀμνύοντα ἦτοι εὐροκεῖν ἢ ἐπιροκεῖν καθ' ὅν ὀμνυαί χρόνου. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὀμνύῃ ὡς ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον εὐροκεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ πρόθεσιν ἔχων μὴ ἐπιτελεῖν, ἐπιροκεῖν.

See on frag. 95, and cf. Chrysipp. ap. Stob. Floril. 28, 15.

97. Seneca de Benef. v. 14. 1, Cleanthes vehementius agit: "licet," inquit, "beneficium non sit quod accipit, ipse tamen ingratus est: quia non fuit redditorus, etiam si accepisset. sic latro est, etiam antequam manus inquinet: quia ad occidendum iam armatus est, et habet spoliandi atque interficiendi voluntatem. exercetur et aperitur opere nequitia, non incipit. ipsum quod accepit, beneficiunum non erat, sed vocabatur. sacrilegi dant poenas, quamvis nemo usque ad deos manus porrigat."

This and the two next following fragments probably come from the book περὶ χάριτος. Introd. p. 52. Eudorus the Academic ap. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 2, p. 44, 20 speaks in Stoic terminology of ὁ περὶ τῶν χαρίτων τόποσ as arising ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς πλησίον σχέσιν ὑπάρχειν.

beneficium non sit: because the question is concerning an act of kindness to a bad man, on whom, according to
Stoic principles, it was impossible to confer a favour (Senec. Benef. v. 12. 3), cf. Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11d p. 95, 5, μηδένα δὲ φαύλον μητε ὦφελεῖσθαι μητε ὦφελεῖν, Plut. Comm. Not. 21.


98. Senecæ de Benef. vi. 11. 1, beneficium voluntas nuda non efficit: sed quod beneficium non esset, si optimaæ ac plenissimæae voluntati fortuna deesset, id aeque beneficium non est, nisi fortunam voluntas antecessit; non enim profuisse te mihi oportet, ut ob hoc tibi obliger, sed ex destinato profuisse. Cleanthes exemplo eiusmodi utitur: "ad quaerendum," inquit, "et arcessendum ex Academia Platonem, duos pueros misi; alter totum porticum perscrutatus est, alia quoque loca in quibus illum inveniri posse sperabat, percucurrit, et domum non minus lassus quam irritus rediit: alter apud proximum circulatorem resedit, et, dum vagus atque erro vernaculis congregatur et ludit, transeuntem Platonem, quem non quaesierat, invenit. illum, inquit, laudabimus pueros qui quantum in se erat quod iussus est fecit: hunc feliciter inertem castigabimus."

Another illustration of the value of the virtuous intention apart from the results attained by it. Cf. Cic. Parad. iii. 20 nec enim peccata rerum eventu, sed viitis hominum metienda sunt.

Academia: see the description of this place in Diog. L. iii. 7: there was doubtless a στοά attached to it, whence totum porticum infra.

circulatorem: a quack, mountebank: cf. Apul. Met. 1. c. 4, Athenis proximo ante Poecilen porticum circulatorem
adspexi equestrem spatham praecutam mucrone infesto devourare. Probably a translation of \textit{θαυματοποιός}: with respect to these men see the passages collected by Becker, Charicles. E. T. pp. 185—189, Jebb’s Theophrastus, p. 227, and add Ar. Met. i. 2. 15, Isocr. Or. 15 § 213, where tame lions and trained bears are spoken of.

_99._ Seneca de Benef. vi. 12. 2, multum, ut ait Cleanthes, a beneficio distat negotiatio, cf. ib. ii. 31. 12, a benefit expects no return: non enim sibi aliquid reddi voluit (qui beneficium dat), aut non fuit beneficium sed negotiatio.

\textit{negotiatio}: probably a translation of \textit{χρηματισμός}, for the Stoic wise man is described as the only true man of business: Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 11\textsuperscript{d}, p. 95, 21, \textit{μόνον δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἄνδρα χρηματιστικὸν εἶναι, γυνώσκοντα ἀφ’ ὅν χρηματιστέον καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ μέχρι πότε.}

_100._ Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 3. 17, p. 655 P. 237 S., καὶ ἡ Κλεάνθους δὲ τοῦ Στωικοῦ φιλοσόφου ποιητικὴ ὁδὸν πώς τὰ ὀμοια γράφει

\textit{μὴ πρὸς δόξαν ὅρα, ἐθέλων σοφὸς αἴσῃ γενέσθαι, μηδὲ φοβοῦ πολλῶν ἀκριτον καὶ ἰναιδέα δόξαν. οὐ γὰρ πλήθος ἔχει συνετὴν κρίσιν οὔτε δικαίαν οὔτε καλίν, ὄλγοις δὲ παρ’ ἰνδράσι τούτῳ κεν εὔροις.}

Clement also quotes an anonymous comic fragment to the same effect:—\textit{αἰσχρὸν δὲ κρίνειν τὰ καλὰ τῷ πολλῷ ψόφῳ.} Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 326 says:—“hätte auch er (Kleanthes) den sensus communis, die \textit{kouai ἐννοια} oder \textit{προλήψεις} gebilligt, wie konnte er dann so wegwerfend und verächtlich über das allgemeine Laienurteil aburteilen?” He concludes therefore that Cleanthes threw over altogether the Stoic concession to
rationalism implied in the doctrine of ὀρθὸς λόγος and προλήψεις, but see Introd. pp. 39, 40. Cf. generally Cic. Tusc. iii. 3, 4.

δόξαν: this is changed to βάξιν by Meineke, who is followed by Wachsmuth, and Cludius is reported as suggesting ἄλογον for ἀκριτον. The reason given for the change by Wachsmuth is that δόξαν “male coniungitur cum ἀκριτον,” presumably because δόξα implies κρίσις, but surely the words may mean “undiscriminating opinion” as explained by the next line. The text is confirmed by M. Aurel. iv. 3, τὸ εὐμετάβολον καὶ ἀκριτον τῶν εὐφημεῖν δοκοῦντων. Cf. ib. ii. 17.

οὐ...οὐτε...οὐτε, is justified by Homer, ii. vi. 450, ἀλλὰ οὐ μοι Τρώων τόσσον μέλει ἄλγος ὀπίσσω οὔτ' αὐτῆς ἔκαβης οὔτε Πριάμοιο ἁνακτός, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. Ant. 952.


ἀνελεύθερος πᾶς ὁστις εἰς δόξαν βλέπει

ὡς δὴ παρ’ ἐκείνης τευξόμενος καλοῦ τινος.

In Clem. Alex. Protrept. vi. 72, p. 21 S. 61 P., the same two lines are cited as the conclusion of frag. 75, but they are obviously distinct.

δόξαν: for Zeno’s definition, cf. Zeno, frag. 15. Cleanthes wrote a separate treatise περὶ δόξης, from which we may conjecture that the present and the preceding fragments are derived. Introd. p. 52. The Cynics described εὐγενείας τε καὶ δόξας as προκοσμήματα κακίας (Diog. L. vi. 72). The Stoics regarded them as προηγμένα (Diog. L. vii. 106).

κακῶς ἁκούειν κρείσσου ἢ λέγειν κακῶς.

Κλεάνθους. This is taken from Wachsmuth (Comm. II. p. 8), whose note is as follows:—"Inter ecclesiasticorum scriptorum sententias hic trimeter laudatur ab Antonio Meliss. i. 53 et a Maximo 10, vid. Gregor. Nazianz. carm. p. 157d."

103. Stob. Floril. 42. 2.

κακουργότερον οὐδὲν διαβολῆς ἐστὶ πω·
λάθρα γὰρ ἀπατημέναι τὸν πεπεισμένον
μίσος ἀναπλάττει πρὸς τὸν οὐδὲν αἴτιον.


diaboleia: defined, ap. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11\textsuperscript{v}, p. 115, 21, εἶναι δὲ τὴν διαβολὴν διάστασιν φαινομένων φίλων ὑσυδεὶ λόγῳ, and hence, reasoning on the basis that slander is only connected with apparent and not with true friendship, the Stoics declare that the wise man is ἀδιάβολος both in the active and the passive sense (i.e. μήτε διαβάλλειν μήτε διαβάλλεσθαι), but their utterances are not consistent on this point: see Zeller, p. 253 n. 6, who in citing passages to the contrary effect fails to notice this discrepancy.

104. Stob. Ecl. II. 7. 11\textsuperscript{v}, p. 103, 12, ἰκανῶς δὲ καὶ
Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγου ἰρώτησε τοιοῦτον· πόλις μὲν <εἰ> ἐστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα, εἰς δὲ καταφεύγοντας ἐστὶ δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστείον δὴ πόλις ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν ἢ πόλις οἰκητήριον· ἀστείον ἢρ' ἐστιν ἢ πόλις.

Possibly this belongs to the πολιτικός: Introd. p. 52. Cleanthes has here adopted the syllogistic form
of argument, which occurs so frequently in Zeno's fragments: see Introd. p. 33. The Cynics' line of argument is somewhat similar. Diog. L. vi. 72 οὐ γάρ, φησίν (Diogenes), ἄνευ πόλεως ὑφελός τι εἶναι ἀστείον· ἀστείον δὲ ἡ πόλις· νόμον δὲ ἄνευ, πόλεως οὐδὲν ὑφελός· ἀστείον ἦρα ὁ νόμος. Cicero's definition is as follows, Rep. i. 39, res publica est res populi, populus autem...coetus multitudinis iuris consentiunt et utilitatis communione sociatus. Cf. Ar. Pol. i. 2. 1253 a 37.

α, inserted by Heeren, who is followed by Wachsm. Meineke omits it and changes δὴ before πόλις into δ' ἦ.

105. Seneca Tranq. An. i. 7, promptus compositusque sequor Zenonem, Cleanthem, Chrysippum: quorum tamen nemo ad rem publicam accessit, nemo non misit.

See on Zeno, frag. 170.

106. Stob. Floril. 4, 90, Κλεάνθης ἐφη τοὺς ἀπαι- δεύτους μόνη τῇ μορφῇ τῶν θηρίων διαφέρειν.

The same occurs in Stob. Ecl. ii. 31. 64, p. 212, 22, where Wachsmuth cites other authorities. Stein, Erkenntnistheorie, p. 326, quotes this frag. in support of his theory that Cleanthes refused to admit any inborn intellectual capacity. Zeno declared τὴν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν ἄχρηστον (frag. 167 and note), with which opinion this passage is not necessarily inconsistent, though it probably implies an advance in teaching. See also on frag. 53.


tā koinā kai periβόηta, ó òi paraδοξα kai autoi, met' evkoliās dekhōmenoi tīn atōpιαν.


This may be referred to the ērωτική tēchnē or perī ērōtos, Introd. p. 52. See on Zeno, frags. 172 and 173, and cf. Diog. L. vii. 24 (Zeno apoph. 7) lαβῇ φιλοσόφων ēstīn ēpιdēξιοι ἢ diā tōn ōtων.


110. Stob. Floril. 6, 20.

pōθēn pot' āra gīnetai μοιχῶν γένος; ēk kριθιωντος ἀνδρός ēn āφροδισίοις.


111. Plut. de Aud. Poet. c. 12, p. 33, ἦθεν υοῦ' αἱ paraδιορθώσεις φαῦλος ἐχούσιν, αῖς καὶ Kλεάνθης ἐχρήσατο καὶ Ἀντιστείης· ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ....ὁ δὲ Kλεάνθης περὶ του πλούτου,

φίλοις τε δοῦναι σῶμα τ' εἰς νόσους πεσόν δαπαναῖσι σῶσαι, metaggráφων ωτω'.

pōrναις τε δοῦναι σῶμα τ' εἰς νόσους πεσόν δαπαναίς ēpιτρίψαι.

The lines in question are from Eur. El. 428, 9, where
Τὰ Κλάνθης Ἐπιστήμην καὶ Αἰσθητικήν Ἀποκαλύπτειν. 

The ordinary view of the school regarded πλοῦτος as a προηγμένον, and we have seen that Zeno concurred in this (frag. 128). It would be hazardous to infer from evidence of this kind that Cleanthes dissented from his master's opinion on this point: a similar question arises with regard to δόξα (frag. 101), but that word is ambiguous.


For the title of the book see Introd. p. 53. The above is Cobet's text; omitting ὡστε δεδιότας, Wachsmuth reads χαλκοῦ for χαλκὸν MSS., and also suggests ἐνίοτε for ἐνίοις, but ἐνίοις implies that the payment was not always exacted, while the article shows that, when made, it was made by all. Similarly Soph. O. T. 107 τοὺς αὐτοέντας χειρὶ τιμωρεῖν τινὰς and Ar. Pac. 832.


114. Schol. ad Nic. Ther. 447, p. 36, 12 Keil, κραντηρες λέγονται οἱ ύστερον ἀναβαίνοντες ὁδόντες παρὰ τὸ κραίνειν καὶ ἀποπληροῦν τὴν ἠλικίαν. νεωτέρων γὰρ ἡδὴ ἡμῶν γενομένων φύονται οἱ ὁδόντες οὗτοι. Κλεάνθης δὲ σωφρονιστήρας αὐτοὺς καλεῖ. νῦν ἀπλῶς τοὺς ὁδόντας. σωφρονιστήρες δὲ διὰ τὸ ἁμα τῷ ἀνιέναι αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ σωφρον τοῦ νοῦ λαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς.

For κραντηρες cf. Arist. Hist. An. ii. 4. φύονται δὲ οἱ τελευταίοι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γόμφιοι, οὐς καλοῦσι κραντηρας, περὶ τὰ εἰκοσιν ἐτη καὶ ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξί. It seems fairly safe to infer that Cleanthes the Stoic is meant, and the account given above is probably more correct than that appearing in Etym. M. p. 742, 35 κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν ὄραν περὶ τὸ εἰκοστὸν ἔτος, and Melet. ap. Cramer Anecd. Ox. iii. 82, 26 τοὺς δὲ μυλίτας τῶν ὁδόντων τινὲς σωφρονιστήρας ἐκάλεσαν διὰ τὸ φύεσθαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀρχεσθαι φρονεῖν τοὺς παιδας ὄραν. Thus, while the growth of the reasoning powers is complete in the fourteenth year (Zeno, frag. 82), the attainment of σωφροσύνη may well have been assigned to the conclusion of the third ἐβδομᾶς.

APORHTHEGMATA OF CLEANTHES.


2. Diog. L. vii. 170, καὶ ποτε ἄθροισθεν τὸ κέρμα ἐκόμισεν εἰς μέσον τῶν γυνώριμων, καὶ φησί, Κλεάνθης μὲν καὶ ἄλλον Κλεάνθην δύναιτ' ἂν τρέφειν, εἰ βούλοιτο. οἱ δ' ἐχοντες οθὲν τραφήσονται, παρ' ἑτέρων ἐπιζητοῦσι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, καίτερ ἀνειμένως φιλοσοφοῦντες. οθὲν δὴ καὶ δεύτερος Ἡρακλῆς ὁ Κλεάνθης ἐκαλεῖτο.

3. Diog. L. vii. 171, προκρίνων δὲ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον τοῦ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐλεγεν, εὖ ἢ σφαιρίζουσιν ἐκείνοι αὐτὸς γῆν σκηνράν καὶ ἁκαρπον ἐργάζεσθαι, σκάπτων.

5. Diog. L. vii. 171, καὶ ποτὲ οὐειδίζομενος ὅς δειλός, διὰ τούτο, ἐπεν, ὅληγα ἀμαρτάνω.


7. Diog. L. vii. 171, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ έαυτῷ ἐπέπληττεν· ὅν ἀκούσας Ἀρίστων, τίνι, ἐφη, ἐπεπλήττεις; καὶ ὃς γελάσας, πρεσβύτη, φησί, πολιας μὲν ἔχοντε, νοῦν δὲ μή.

8. Diog. L. vii. 173, Σωσίθεου τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐν θεάτρῳ εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν παρόντα,

οὕς ἢ Κλεάνθους μωρία βοηλατεῖ,

ἐμείνεν ἐπὶ ταύτον σχῆματος. ἐφ’ ὡς ἀγασθέντες οἱ ἀκροαταί, τὸν μὲν ἐκρότησαν, τὸν δὲ Σωσίθεον ἐξέβαλον. μεταγινώσκοντα δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ λοιδορίᾳ προσήκατο, εἰπὼν ἄτοπον εἶναι, τὸν μὲν Δίονυσον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα φλαραμμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ τυχοῦσῃ βλασφημίᾳ δυσχεραίνειν. Cf. Plut. de Adulat. 11.


11. Cic. Tusc. ii. 60, e quibus (philosophis) homo sane levis Heracleotes Dionysius, cum a Zenone fortis esse didicisset, a dolore dedoectus est. nam cum ex renibus laboraret, ipso in eiulatu clamitabat falsa esse illa, quae antea de dolore ipse sensisset. quem cum Cleanthes condiscipulus rogaret quacnam ratio eum de sententia deduxisset, respondit: quia si, cum tantum opera philosophaie dedissem, dolorem tamen ferre non possem, satis esset argumenti malum esse dolorem. plurimos autem annos in philosophia consumpsi nec ferre possum: malum est igitur dolor. tum Cleanthem, cum pede terram percussisset, versum ex Epigonis ferunt dixisse: 

Audisne haec, Amphiaræ, sub terram abdite? Zenonom significabat a quo illum degenerare dolebat.

Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος is mentioned also in Zeno apoph. 52, where see note. For the quotation from the Epigoni, cf. Soph. fr. 194, 195. (Dind.)

3. renibus: but according to Diog. L. vii. 37, 166 and Cic. Fin. v. 94 the disease was opthalmia.

7. si: inserted by Madv. (on Fin. v. 94), who is followed by the later editors.

12. Stob. Floril. 82, 9 = Ecl. ii. 2. 16, Κλεάνθης ἐρωτόμενος διὰ τί παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις οὐ πολλῶν φιλοσοφοσάντων ὁμώς πλείους διέλαμψαν ἣ νῦν, ὅτι, εἰπὲ, τότε μὲν ἔργων ἡσκεῖτο, νῦν δὲ λόγος.

13. Diog. L. vii. 172, μειράκιος ποτὲ διαλεγόμενος ἐπύθετο εἰ αἰσθάνεται τοῦ δ' ἐπιεύσαντος, διὰ τί οὖν, εἰπεν, ἐγὼ οὖκ αἰσθάνομαι ὅτι αἰσθάνει;

The quotation is from Eurip. Orest. 140.

15. Stob. Floril. 33, 8, σιωπῶντος τοῦ Κλεάνθους, ἐπεὶ τις ἕφη, τί σιγᾶς; καὶ μὴν ἢδυ τοῖς φίλοις ὀμιλεῖν. ἢδυ, ἕφη, ἄλλε ὀσφυπτε ἢδιον τοσῳδε μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ τοῖς φίλοις παραχωρητέον.


Diog. L. vii. 172. Δάκωνος τινὸς εἰπόντος, ὔτι ὁ πόνος ἁγαθὸν, διαχυθεὶς φησιν, αἵματος εἰς ἁγαθοῖο, φίλον τέκος.

πόνος is an ἀδιάφορον (Stob. Ecl. ii. 7. 5a p. 58, 3 Diog. L. vii. 102), but it may perhaps be inferred from this passage that Cleanthes classed it among the προηγμένα. See on Zeno frag. 128. Antisthenes regarded it as ἁγαθόν (Diog. L. vi. 2).

18. Stob. Floril. 95, 28, Κλεάνθης, ἐρωτώμενος πῶς ἀν τις εἰπη πλοῦσιος, εἰπεν, εἰ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν εἰπη πένης.


21. Diog. L. vii. 172, φησὶ δὲ ὁ Ἐκάτων ἐν ταῖς χρείαις, εὐμόρφου μειρακίου εἰπόντος εἰ ὁ εἰς τὴν γαστέρα τῦπτων γαστρίζει, καὶ ὁ εἰς τοὺς μηροὺς τὺπτων μηρίζει, ἔφη, σὺ μὲν τοὺς διαμηρισμοὺς ἔχε, μειράκιον. [αἰ δ’ ἀνάλογοι φωναὶ τὰ ἀνάλογα οὗ πάντως σημαίνουσι πράγματα.] Cobet brackets the concluding words.

22. Diog. L. vii. 176, καὶ τελευτᾶ τόνδε τοῦ τρόπου· διάδοχεν αὐτῷ τὸ οὐλον· ἀπαγορευσάντων δὲ τῶν ιατρῶν δύο ἡμέρας ἀπέσχετο τροφῆς. καὶ πως ἐσχῆ καλῶς ὡστε τοὺς ιατροὺς αὐτῷ πάντα τὰ συνήθη συγχωρεῖν. τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἀλλ’ εἰπόντα ἣδη αὐτῷ προσδοιοπορῆσαι καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀποσχόμενον τελευτῆσαι. Lucian, Macrob. 19, Κλεάνθης δὲ ὁ Ζήνωνος μαθητής καὶ διάδοχος ἔννεα καὶ ἐνενήκοντα οὗτος γεγονὼς ἐτῇ φύμα ἐσχῆν ἐπὶ τοῦ χείλους καὶ ἀποκαρτέρων ἐπελθόντων αὐτῷ παρ’ ἐταῖρων τινῶν γραμμάτων προσενεγκάμενος τροφῆς καὶ πράξας περὶ ὃν ἤξιον οἱ φίλοι, ἀποσχόμενος αὐτὸς τροφῆς ἐξέλπε τὸν βίον. Stob. Floril. 7, 54, Κλεάνθης ὑπὸ γλώττης ἐλκοὺς αὐτῷ γενομένου τὴν τροφήν οὐκ ἐδύνατο παραπέμπειν· ὡς δὲ βρῶν ἐσχῆ καὶ ὁ ιατρὸς αὐτῷ τροφῆν προσήγαγεν, σὺ δὲ με, ἔφη, βούλει ἢδη τὸ πλέον τῆς ὀδοῦ κατανύσαντα ἀναστρέφειν, εἰτὰ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔρχεσθαι; καὶ ἐξῆλθεν τοῦ βίου.
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